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WITH this  volume  we  begin  the treatment  of  the political 
theory  of  the  great  period  of  the  Middle  Ages,  our  first 
volume  having  really  the  character  of  an introduction  to 
this.  The  materials  have,  on  closer  examination,  proved 
to be  so  large  and complex  that we  have  been  compelled 
to  devote  a  whole  volume  to the  political  ideas  embodied 
in the two great  systems of  law which  are derived directly 
from  the  ancient  world.  I  have  felt  very  keenly  how 
difficult  and  dangerous  a  thing  it  is  for  a  student  of 
history,  who  has  no  technical  legal  braining,  to  deal  with 
those  great  juristic  documents ; and indeed I should  have 
felt  much  hesitation  in  presenting  the  result  of  this  work 
to  the  public  if  it had  not  been  for  the  great  kindness 
of  a  number  of  scholars  eminent  in  the  civil  and  the 
canon  law. 
I  must  therefore  express  my  most  sincere  thanks,  first 
to  Professor  Fitting  of  Holle,  Professor  Meynial  of  Paris, 
and  Professor  Vinogradoff  of  Oxford,  who  have  very 
kindly  read  the  proofs  of  the  first  part  of  this  volume: 
and  secondly,  to Professor  Andrea  Galante  of  Innsbruck, 
who  has  been  so  kind  as  to  read  the  proofs  of  the 
second part. viii  PBEFACE.  PREFACE.  iX 
Those  eminent  scholars  are  in  no  way  responsible  for 
the  judgments  which  I  have  expressed,  but  I  am  under 
the  greatest  obligation  to  them  for  a  great  many  most 
valuable corrections,  emendations, and suggestions. 
Every  historical  scholar  who  knows  how  great  is  the 
mass  of  unprintcd  material,  especially  in  the  canon  law 
of  the  twelfth  century,  will  feel  that  a  treatment  based 
only  upon  printed  sources  is  necessarily  incomplete.  It 
is  with  great  regret  that  we  have  been  compelled  by 
the  scope  of  our  work  to  limit  ourselves  in  this  way: 
we  venture  to  think  that  the  material  is  sufficient  to 
justify  such  conclusions  as  have  been  drawn.  It  was 
with  still  greater  regret  that  I  found  myself  unable  to 
use  some very important printed material  for the civil law, 
and especially  Placentinus'  treatise on the Code,  and Azo's 
"Lectura" ;  but  no  copies  of  these  works  are  apparently 
to  bc  found  in  England,  and I  have  been  unable  to  go 
to Paris to consult  them. 
It  would  be  a  difficult  matter  to  make  a  complete 
list  even  of  the  more  valuable  modern  works  which 
deal  with  the  various  aspects  of  the  civil  and  canon 
law  in  the  Middle  Ages,  but  the  following  are  among 
the most important :- 
F.  K.  von  Savigny,  '  Geschichte  des  romischen  Rechts  in  Mittel- 
alter.' 
H. Fitting, '  Die Anfange der Rechtschule in Bologna.' 
))  '  Juristische Schr~ften  dos friiheren Mittelalters.' 
,,  Irnerius, ' Summa Codicis ' (Summa Trccensis). 
,,  Irnerius, '  Qu~stiones  de Jurls subtilltatibus.' 
S. Brie, ' Die Lehrc vom Gewohnheitsrecht.' 
M.  Conrat,  ' Geschichte dor  Quellen dcs Romisches Rechts im  Mit- 
telalter.' 
E. Besta, ' L'Opera d'Irnerio.' 
G.  Pescatore, '  Kritische Studien auf  dem Gebiet der Civilistischen 
Litteriirgeschichte  des Mittelalters.' 
J. Flach, '  Histoire du Droit Romaiii au Moyen Age.' 
P. Stintzing, ' Geschichte der Populkren Literatur dos Romischen und 
Kanonischen Rechts.' 
J, F.  von  Schulte,  '  Geschichte  der  Quellen  und  Literatur  des 
Kanonischen  Rechts.' 
F.  Maassen,  'Geschichte  der  Quellen  und  der  Literatur  des 
canonischen Rechts.' 
A. Galante, ' Fontes juris canonici selecti.' 
E. Friedberg, ' Corpus juris canonici.' 
E. Fournier, "  Yves de Chartres et le Droit Canonique,"  in 'Revue 
des Questions Historiques,' vol. Ixiii. 
9s  "Les Collections de Canons attribubs a Yves de Chartres," 
in ' Bibliothi.que de 1'~cole  des Chartes,' vol. lvil. 
Gierke,  ' Das  Deutsche  Genossenschaftsrecht,'  of  which  a  part  is 
translated  by F.  Maitland. 
A. J. CARLYLE, 
OXFORD,  April  1909. CONTEPI'TS  OF  THE  SECOND  VOLURIE, 
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IN  the first volume of  this work  an attempt has  been  made 
to examine some of  the bources  of  Medieval political theory 
-that  is,  first,  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
and  the  political principles assumed or  defined in  the writ- 
ings  of  the  Christian  Fathers  from  the  first  century  to 
the sixth ; and secondly, the political theory of  the societies 
which  were  built  up  upon  the  ruins  of  the  ancient  Em- 
pire  in  the West,  as  it finds  expression in  the  institutions 
and  in the literature of  the ninth  century.  We  have  seen 
reason  to  conclude  that while  the  civilisation  of  the  New 
World  was  in  many  and  most  important respects  different 
from that of  the Empire, and while the political conceptions 
and customs of  the Teutonic States were very different; from 
those of  the ancient world, yet it is  also true to say that as 
soon as these began to assume a literary form, we  find that 
the men  of  the ninth century had inherited much in theory 
from  the  ancient  society,  and  that  they  constantly  had 
recourse  especially  to the writings  of  the Christian Fathers 
for  the  reasoned  framework  of  their  own  convictions  and 
principles.  The  political  writers  of  the  ninth  century  in- 
herited  from  the  ancient  world  thcir  theory  of  human 
equality,  of  the  necessary  and  divine  nature  of  organised 
authority in the State, and their principle of  Justice as the 
end and the test of  legitimate authority.  It would seem that 
we  are  justified  in  saying  that  the  political  theory  of  the 
early  Middle  Ages  represents  a  fusion of  the pol~iical  prin- 
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ciples of  the ancient world  with the traditions and customs 
of  the barbarian societ'ies. 
When we now come to consider  the political theory of  the 
Middle Ages proper-that  is, of  the centuries from the tenth 
to the thirteenth,-it  will  be  necessary  to take  account  of 
elements  which  are little represented  in the ninth  century, 
especially of  the direct influence of  the ancient jurisprudence, 
through the closer and more general study of  the ancient law, 
of  the highly  important  developments  of  the theory  of  law 
and society in the Canonists, and of  the necessary modification 
of  the theory of  society by the conditions  and needs  of  the 
slowly  developing civilisation of  Mediaeval  Europe.  Finally, 
we  shall  come  to the time  when  the theorz of  the Middle 
Ages  begins  to be  influenced  by  the  writings  of  the great 
political thinkers of  Greece, and especially by Aristotle.  But 
this does not come till the middle of  the thirteenth century ; 
till that time there is very little of  this to be traced in the 
literature of  the Middle Ages. 
The elements which go to build  up the political theory of 
this time are very complex, and it is not easy to be certain as 
to the best mode of  approaching them : it has, on the whole, 
appeared to us  best to begin  by studying &he  subject in the 
technical legal literature, not because this is thc most fertile of 
ideas or the most living in its relation to the time, but be- 
cause it represents better than the more popular or the more 
speculative literature the reasoned and considered  judgments 
of  the  men  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  also  because  in  the 
Roman and Canon Law of  these centuries we have embodied 
much  of  the inheritance of  the ancient world.  It is well  to 
consider these older elements first ; but it is even more neces- 
sary that we  should in the Middle  Ages,  as,  indeed,  at all 
other  times,  distinguish  between  the  often  hasty  and  ill- 
considered  phrases  of  controversy  and  the  reasoned  and 
deliberate record of  more dispassionate reflection.  Evcn now 
it  is  probably  true  to  say  that  much  confusion  has  been 
brought  into the treatment  of  mcdiaeval  ideas  and civilisa- 
tion by the fact that many writers  have not been  at pains 
to  distinguish  between  individual  speculation  and  contro- 
versy  and  the normal  judgment  of  the  ordinary  intelligent 
men. 
16  is,  of  course,  true that often the most extravagant W 
phrase  covers the profoundest and most fruit,ful 
thought,  that the  eccentric  and  the insurgent  often  repre- 
sent the future,  while  the normal man only  represents  the 
present,  and we  shall endeavour to recognise  and to set out 
the value of  even the most paradoxical and eccentric phrases 
and movements, of which the Middle Ages were indeed fertile. 
~ut  if  only  to find  the due place  and to interpret  the full 
significance of  the ideals of  these thinkers, it is well to begin 
with the most sober and matter-of-fact aspects of  our subject. 
In this volume, then, we propose to deal with the Roman 
and  the Canon  Law  of  the Middle  Ages  to the middle  of 
the  thirteenth  century,  leaving  the  new  legal  systems  of 
national  or  feudal law  to be  dealt  with  in  closer  relation 
to the actual political  history  of  these  centuries.  We  deal,  , 
that  is,  with  the  study  of  the  Roman  Law  down  to  the 
middle  of  the thirteenth  century,  taking the compilation  of 
the great gloss by Accursius  in the middle of  the thirteenth 
century  as  the limit  of  our  present  inquiries ; and in the 
same way we  deal with the Canon Law down to and includ- 
ing the publication of  the Decretals of  Pope Gregory JX. PART I. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  ROMAN  LAWYERS  OF 
THE  MIDDLE  AGES  TO  ACCURSIUS, 
CHAPTER I. 
THE THEORY  OF LAW.  BQUITAS AND  JUSTICE. 
WE have  seen that there is but little trace of  any influence 
of  the Roman jurisprudence  on the political  theories  of  the 
ninth century.  This does not mean that the Roman Law was 
exercising no influence in Western Europe during this period. 
A  considerable part  of  the  population  of  the  Carlovingian 
Empire lived under the rule of  Roman Law in some form or 
another ; the people of  Southern France were governed mainly 
by adaptations of  this, and in Italy itself, the native popula- 
tion,  as  distinguished  from  the Lombard  and  Frank,  lived 
under Roman Law.  During this period, as well as later, the 
Roman  Law  was  actually  regulating  the  life  of  a  great 
number  of  persons, and the influence  of  this  system of  law 
upon the laws and customs of  the barbarian races is among 
the most important  of  historical subjects.  We  cannot, how- 
ever, now consider this in general ; we have to inquire how far 
the Roman jurisprudence  affects the theory of  politics in the 
Middle Ages-that  is, how far, when men began to reflect on 
the nature and principles of  political institutions,  they were 
influenced by  the theory  as embodied in this jurisprudence. 
Men  may long be governed by a system of  law, or by a par- 
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are the principles  of  political  or  social relations  represented 
by  their  legal  system.  Some  time  or  other  they  ask  the 
question, and then political theory begins. 
It  was  once  thought  that there  was  no  such  thing  as a 
systematic  study  of  the  Roman  Law  until  the  eleventh 
century, and the beginning of  the great law school at Bologna. 
It was  once thought that Irnerius was the first to study the 
Roman Law  systematically, and that the foundation  of  the 
great school of  Bologna was also the beginning of  the scientific 
study of  the Roman Law in the Middle Ages.  It seems clear 
now that these notions were erroneous, and that the more or 
less systematic study of  Roman Law had, never  died  out in 
Western  Europe.  There  is  some  reason  to think  that the 
Law  School  of  Rome  had  always  continued  to exist,  and 
that Irnerius  himself  was  a  pupil  of  this school.  There are 
traces  of  a  school  at Ravenna,  and it, is very  possible  that 
there  may  have  been  yet  other  schools  of  Roman  Law in 
Southern France.  A  certain  amount  of  literature has  been 
preserved, or rather, we should say, the fragments of  a litera- 
ture which belongs  to a period antecedent to, or at any rate 
to represent  traditions  independent  of,  the great  school  of 
Bologna.  Such  is  the  work  known  as  ' Petri Excsptiones 
Legum Romanorum,'  a little handbook of  Roman Law ; such 
also  are a  number  of  treatises  and fragments  collected  by 
Professor  Fitting  in  his  ' Juristische  Schriften  des  friiheren 
Mittelalters. '  It is, indeed,  very largely to Professor Fitting 
that we  owe  our knowledge  of  this  obscure  but  interesting 
subject.  Whatever  may be  the exact  facts about  this,  we 
shall see that there are important materials for our purpose 
not only in the writings  of  the great school of  Bologna,  but 
in writings which may be earlier than, and are at least inde- 
pendent of, the tradition of  Bologna. 
The  political  theory  of  the mediaeval civilians  is  directly 
founded upon that of the law books of Justinian, and no doubt 
they often do little more than restate the positions laid down 
by the great jurisconsults  of  the second  and third centuries 
or  the  editors  of  the  sixth;  but  the  world  had  greatly 
changed,  and the mediaeval  civilians,  even  when  they were 
most  anxious  $0 restate ancient law, were yet influenced  by 
these changes and sometimes aware of  them.  They did much 
more than merely repeat the phrases of  the ancient law, they 
endeavoured  to  explain  what  was  difficult,  to  co-ordinate 
what seemed  to be  divergent or  contradictory,  and to show 
how  these  ancient principles  or  rules  could  be brought into 
relation with the existing conditions of  society. 
We must refer to our first volume for a discussion of  what 
Beem  to be the most important aspects of  the political theory 
of the Roman Law.  But briefly  we may say that the most 
important  aspects of  this  are to be found in  its treatment 
of  the nature of  law,  in its theory  of  equality and slavery, 
and  in  its  conception  of  the  source  or  origin  of  political 
authority.  We  shall  see  that  the  political  theory  of  the 
mediaeval civilians touches other subjects of  importance, and 
especially the relations  of  Church  and State, of  Canon  Law 
and Civil Law ; but we must begin our consideration of  their 
political theory by considering their treatment of  the former 
subjects.  Of  these, the first, and perhaps the most important, 
is the theory of law.  Like the ancient lawyers, the mediaeval 
civilians think of  law in the largest sense as the expression of 
the principle of  justice ; the positive law of  any one state is 
only the application, by the authority of  some society, of  this 
principle  to the  actual  conditions  and  circumstances  of  a 
particular  place  and time.  We  must,  therefore,  begin  by 
considering  their  theory  of  justice  and  cepuitas,  and  the 
relation  of  these to jus. 
Jus, according to all these writers,  is derived from justice 
and  mpuitas,  while  some  of  them  distinguish  between 
cequitas  and  justice.  These  terms,  and  their  relations  to 
each  other,  are  defined  by  the  author  of  an  anonymous 
fragment which  Professor Fitting  has  thought  to be  earlier 
that the school  of  Bologna :  he  defines  ~quitas  as "  rerum 
convenientis quae in paribus causis paria jura desiderat,"  and 
adds  that  God  is  cequitas  itself;  when  this  temper  is 
fixed  in  a  man's  soul  and  will,  it is  called  justitia,  while 
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customary,  is  called  jus.l  In this  passage  we  have  four 
important  points :  the  definition of  cequitas,  the relation  of 
this to God,  the relation  of  justice  to mquitas,  and the rela- 
tion of  jus to justice. 
The  definition of  cequitas would  seem  to be one generally 
adopted by the mediaeval civilians.  It is probably related to 
a phrase of  Cicero's : "  Valeat aeq~utas  quae  paribus in causis 
paria jura  desiderat,"  and we  find it again in the introduc- 
tion  to a  Summa of  the  institute^,^  in  the  Summa  Codicis 
known as the "  Summa Trecensis," which Fitting attributes 
to the  great  Irnerius  himself,  the founder  of  the  school of 
Bologna,* in  the  work  of  Placentinus,  the  founder  of  the 
School of  Montpellier, in his work  on  the  institute^,^  and in 
the work of  Azo on the  institute^.^ 
We  next  consider  the  theory  of  the  relation  of  justice 
to  cequitas.  In the passage  of  the Prague  fragment  which 
we  have just  quoted, justice is defined as mquitas translated 
into will, justice is a quality of  will  or purpose.  This is the 
normal  theory  of  these  civilians.  It  is  no  doubt  derived 
directly  from Ulpian's  definition  of  justice  as "  constans  et 
perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi."  We may cite 
'  Fragmentum  Pragense,'  Ir  2 : 
"  Bqu~tas est  rerum  convenlent~a 
quae  In  panbus rausls  parla Jura des~ 
derat.  Item Deus, qul secundum hoc 
quod  des~derat  aoqultas dlcltur  mh~l 
ahud  est  aqu~tas  quam  Deus  S1 
tahs aqu~tas  in voluntate homm~s  est 
perpetuo,  justlc~a dlcltur,  quae  talls 
voluntas  redacta  In  prsxept~onem, 
s15e scrlpta  slve  consuetudlnar~a, JUS 
dlc~tur  " 
2  C~cero,  '  Top~ca,'  23 
a  '  Summa  cujusdam  Inst~tut~on 
um,'  3. 
4  Irner~us, '  Summa  Codlc~s,' Intro- 
ductlon, 3  It  would be lmposslble here 
to enter Into the extremely lnterestlng 
d~scuss~on  as to the authorship of  the 
works  attr~buted  to  Irner~us  There 
is no  serlous doubt  as to the authen- 
tlc~ty  of  a  certaln  numher  of  glosses, 
and Professor Fittmg has argued wlt11 
gleat lcarnlng and force for the Irner- 
]an  authorsh~p  of the "  Quaest~ones  de 
juns subtihtatlbus," and of  the "  Sum- 
ma  Codlcls"  known  as  the  Summa 
Trecensls.  We  must  refer  the roader 
to Professor F~ttlng's  ~ntroductlons  to 
these  works.  For  careful  cr~t~clsms 
of  Professor  F~ttlng's  arguments,  the 
rcader can turn to Professor E  Besta, 
'  L'Opera  d'Irnerio,'  and to Prof. Pes- 
catore,  '  Krltluche  Studlen  auf  dem 
Ceblete  der  C~v~list~schen  Lltteral- 
geschichte des Mlttelalters ' 
Plarentmus,  '  Summa  Instltu- 
t~onum,'  I.  1 :  "  Bqu~tas  est  rerum 
conven~entla qu;e  paribus  In  causls 
pana  jura  desiderat,  et  omnla  bene 
coreqmparata, dlcltur  quoque aoqu~tas, 
quasl  ~quahtas,  et vort~t  In  rebus  1t1 
ost In  dlctls et fact18 homlnum " 
Azo, ' Summa Instltutlonum,' l. 1. 7. 
'  Dlgest, I.  1. 10. 
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as illustrative of this a gloss of  Irnerius on the Digest, a phrase 
of  the  Summa  Codicis  attributed to him,  and  a  phrase  of 
placentinus'  work  on the Institutes.'  Justice is regarded  as 
a  quality  of  will,  the will  to  secure and maintain  mquilas. 
The definition of  &quitas is no doubt partial  and one-sided ; 
@quitas may  be taken,  perhaps  more  normally,  as the prin- 
ciple which distinguishes between a general law and its appli- 
cation to particular  circumstances.  We  do not here  deal at 
all with the general theory of  the subject, but only with what 
seems to be the tendency  of  these civilians to relate the con- 
ception of  cequitas to the abstract principle of  justice in these 
formal definitions. 
But it must now  be observed that these conceptions have 
their first truth, their original being, in God Himself.  "  God is 
cequitas," the author of  the Prague fragment says, and justice 
is primarily a quality of  God's  will.  This is very clearly put 
in  a  little  treatise  on  justice,  whose  date is  uncertain,  but 
which  is  regarded  by  Fitting as being either  antecedent  to 
or independent of  the school of  Bologna.  It is the Divine will 
which we  properly  call justice, it is  that will  which  gives to 
every man his jus,  for it is the good  and beneficent  Creator 
who grants to men to seek, to hold, and to use what they need, 
and it is He who commands men to give such things to each 
other, and forbid8 men to hinder their fellows from enjoying 
them.2  We find  the same  conception in  another passage of 
1 Irnenus,  'Glosses  on  Dlgestum 
vetus ' (ed  E  Besta)  Gloss on Dlg , 
I.  1  "  D~ffert  autcm eqmtas a juqtitla 
equltas enlm In  ipsls rebus  perc~p~tur, 
que cum descendlt ex voluntate, forma 
accepta, fit  justit~a  " Irnerms, 'Summa 
Codlcls,'  I.  3  (11  3)  "  Equltas enlm 
est  rerum  conveu~entia, quac  cuncta 
coaqmparat (et in par~bus  causls parla 
Jura deslderat).  Quao  et  ~ust~t~a  eit 
lta demurn, SI ex voluntate redacta s~t  , 
qulcqu~d enlm  aequum,  ~ta  demum 
lusturn, SI  est voluntare " 
Placent~nus, '  Summa  Instltut~on 
Um,'  I  1  "Vel  SIC, ut  ego  puto, 
v'JrO  et  proprle  omnls  ~ustltla  est 
voluntas,  et omnls  voluntas  tails,  est 
~ust,~tla." 
2  '  De Justlt~a,'  1 . '' Dlvlnam volun- 
tatem vocamus justlt~am,  qua v~del~cet 
culque  persone  trlbultur  ]us  suum. 
Meum  jus  lntell~go  quad mlh~  exped~t, 
Plus  enlm  creator  justus  atque  he 
nlgnus  juvta  cond~tlonem  meam, 
quibus  rebus  me  v~det  indlgere,  eas 
mlhi  qurercndaa  habondas  utendasque 
perm~ttlt  , nam  et te jubet  ]nstls  ex 
Gausis  m~hl  re9  elusmodl  przstare , 
prolbet  etlam  ne  quld  lncommod~ 
mlh~,  quomlnus  els  utar,  lnfll 
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the Prague fragment, and in  an abbreviation  or epitome of 
the Institutes which is of  uncertain date.l 
In  order to appreciate these definitions and principles  more 
completely,  we  turn to the full and formal treatment of  the 
subject in two of  the great civilians of  Bologna, in Placentinus 
and  Azo.  We  have  already  quoted  some  sentences  from 
Placentinus' "  Summa " on the Institutes, which deal with the 
nature of  mquitas and justice ; these are only parts of  an ex- 
tended discussion  of  the subject.  He first defines the nature 
of  mquitas, and then says that justice resides in the minds of 
just men, we ought to call a judgment  mquum, while the man 
or the judge  should be called just.  He 'then quotes a defini- 
tion of  justice from Plato and another from Cicero, but it is the 
definition of  Justinian, that is, of  Ulpian in the Digest (i. 1. 10) 
and Institutes (i. 1. l),  on which he dwells, and from which he 
derives the principle that it is the will which makes an action 
good  or evil ; he  adds  that justice  is not only  a  good  will, 
but a  good will or temper which is constant and enduring.2 
1 '  Fragrnentum  Pragense,'  111.  9  . 
"  Est autem justltla voluntas ]us suum 
culque tnbuere.  QUB quldem  In  Deo 
plena est et pertecta, In nob~s  vero per 
partlc~patlonem  just~tla  esse d~cltur." 
'  Abbrevlatlo  Inst~tutlonum,'  I., 
"  Justltla: Deus  auctor est " 
P Placentinus,  ' Summa Institut~on- 
um,'  I  1  "  Bqultas est rerum  con- 
venlent~a,  quce  par~bus  In  causls par~a 
Jura deslderat,  et omma bene  corequl- 
parata,  dlcltur  quoque cequltas,  quasi 
cequalltas  et  vertlt  In  rebus,  ~d  est 
In  diet19 et fact~s  hommum  Justlt~a 
autem  qulesclt  In  mentlbus justorum 
lnde est quod SI  propne vollmus loqul, 
dlclmus zquum jud~t~um,  non justum, 
et homlnem  justum  non xquum, abu- 
tentes  tamcn hls  appellat~onlbus  dlcl 
mus judlcem  cequum, judltlum  justum 
. .  Restat  ut  exponamus  qu~d  s~t 
justltla  Justlt~a  est  secundum  Pla- 
tonem virtus quzt  plurimum  potest m 
h~s,  qu~  mlnlmum  possunt,  nempe  m 
personls  m~serabil~bus  evidentius clar- 
escit  justltla.  Vel  ut  Tulllus  alt, 
Justltla  est  habltus  amml,  cornmuni 
ut~lltate  conservata,  suam  culque 
tr~buens  dlgnltatem,  ld  est  ~d  quo 
dlgnus est, coronam, sl bene meruerlt ; 
pmnam  61  peccavent.  Justmlanus 
autem SIC definlt  Just~tla  est perpetua 
et constans voluntas, etc ,  ~d  est volun- 
tarlum  bonum,  hab~tus  mentls  volun- 
tate  n~tens,  ut s~t  definltlo  data  per 
causam  et effectum.  Voluntas,  ~d est 
voluntar~um  bonum,  nlh~l  enlm  potest 
dlcl bonurn nisl lntercedente voluntate. 
Tolle  voluntatem  omnls  actus  est  In- 
d~fferens, qulppe  affectlo  tua  votum 
lmpon~t  open  tuo.  Et allbt,  crlmen 
non  contrah~tur  nls~  lntorcedat  volun- 
tas nocendl, et allbl, voluntas et p~o- 
posltum  dlstmguunt  maleficium,  ergo 
et factum bonum  Vel  ut aln d~c~mt, 
Just~t~a  est voluntas,  constans  et per- 
petua   cl  est  justltla  est  vlrtus  Vel 
slcut  ego  put0  vere  et proprle  omnls 
just~tla  est voluntaa, et omnls  X oluntas 
talls,  ost justltla  Et qu7a  posset esse 
voluntas  ~nconstans, ad  dlfferentlam 
addltur  constans,  ~d eat  ~nvanab~hs, 
The statement of  Azo is extremely interesting, for he  draws 
out  at length the conception of  justice  as being primarily a 
quality of  God, and secondarily of man.l 
Justice  is then a  quality of  will, it is the will to carry out 
that which is in accordance with mquitas,  and this is found 
first of  all in God, and secondly in man.  Neither God's  will 
nor man's  determines the nature of  justice, but justice  is the 
conformity of  the will  of  God  and man with  that which  is 
cpquum,  the conformity  of  the will  of  God  with  that which 
is His own nature, for in the phrase of  the Prague fragment, 
God is mpuit~s.~ 
The conception of  justice  in these writers is profound  and 
significant.  We shall presently deal with  the interpretation 
of  their conception into the practical theory and criticism of 
law, and we  shall then see how significant these conceptions 
really  are.  We may find a fitting conclusion for their treat- 
ment  of  justice  in  a  passage  from  the  ' Quaestiones '  of 
Irnerius, a passage which describes the vision of  the ineffable 
dignity of  Justice surrounded by her daughters, Ratio, Pietas, 
Gratia,  Vindicatio,  Observantia,  and  Veritas,  and  holding 
Bquitas in her embrace, while she deals with the "  causes "  of 
qua hommem faclt constantem, et qula 
posset  voluntas  esse  constans et tenl- 
poranea  addltur  perpetua  id  est  m- 
dohclens, vel ad omnla negotla patens. 
Et qu~a  posset ease  voluntas constan9 
et perpetun,  esset tamen de trlbuenda 
Injuna,  addltur  trlbuens  lus  suum 
culque  Dlc~tur  autem tnbuens prop 
ter  aptltud~nem  et non  In  actu.  Nec 
enirn  semper  tr~bult  sed  ad  tnbu- 
endum  semper  est  apta.  Ergo  et 
ornnls  justltla  est  voluntas  tahs  et 
omnls voluntas talls convertabiliter est 
Iustltla  . ."  Cf  Accurslus,  Gloss on 
Inst~t.  I. 1, ' Just~tia  " and "  Not~tla." 
Azo, '  Summa Inst~tutlonum,'  I. 1 
"Est  autem just~tla  constans et per 
Petua voluntas jus  suum culque tr~hu- 
ends,  ut ff. eodem  1  justltla  Quo 
definltlo potest intell~gi  duobus mod15, 
un0  prout est In creatore altero prout 
est In creatura , et sl mtell~gatur  prout 
In  creatore,  ~d  est  In  Deo,  omnla 
verba propne poslta sunt, et plana sunt 
omrila  quasl dlceret, justlt~a  est Del 
d~sposltio,  qua m omnibus rebus recto 
conslstlt  et juste  dlspon~t  . Ipse retrl- 
bult  u1iicmque  secundum  opera  sua, 
lpse  non  vanabll~s,  lpse  non  est tem- 
poral~~  In  d~sposlt~on~bus  vel  volunta- 
t~bus  su~s  ;  lmmo  ejus  voluntas  eat 
constans et perpetua . lpse  emm  nec 
habu~t  prlnclplum, nec habet vel habe- 
b~t  finem.  Altero  mod0  lntelllg~tur 
prout est m creatura, ~d est In homlne 
justo  IIomo enlm justus habet volun- 
tatem  trlbuendl  umcu~que  jus  suum . 
et ~ta  voluntas dlcltur justltla et dlcltur 
voluntas tnbuere jus  suum, non quan- 
tum ad actum sed quantum ad affect]- 
onem " 
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God and men, and, rendering to every man his due, preserves 
unharmed the society of  men.' 
1  Irnerius. '  Quastiones de Juris sub- 
tilitatibus,' Exordium, 2 : "  Sunt enim 
preclusa  vitreo  pariete,  cui  litteris 
aureis  inscriptus  est  totus  librorum 
legalium  textus.  Quas cum  avide 
legerem  attentusque  contuorer,  quasi 
per  speculom  mihi  visa  est  ineffabili 
dignitatis  habitu  Justitia,  cujus  in 
vertice  recumbebat  oculis sidereis ar- 
denti  luminis  acie  Ratio,  dispositis 
hinc  indc  sex  quasi  circa  matrem 
Justitiam filiabus :  Religione, Pietate, 
Gratia, Vindicatione, Observantia, Veri- 
tate.  Sub ipsius  autetn  amplexu  re- 
sedit Bquitas vultu benignitatis pleno 
. . . Justitia  vero  una  cum  prole 
generosa  solis  his  qua  illic  aderant 
invigilare contenta erat : causas enim 
et Dei et hominum crebris advertebat 
suspiriis easque lanz prorsus  equabili 
per  manus  Equitatis  trutinabat  ut 
salvo  singulis  suo  merito  servetur 
incorrupta  societas  hominum  cnnc- 
torumqye  perseveret  illibata  com- 
munitas." 
CHAPTER 
THE  THEORY  OF JUS. 
WE have considered  the nature of  justice  as it is thought of 
by the civilians ; we must now turn to the theory of  jus-that 
is, the whole system of  law.  The author of  the Prague frag- 
ment defines jus as being justice  embodied in a command or 
law, whether  written or customary,l and in another passage, 
of  which  we  have  quoted  a few  words,  he  describes jus  as 
having its origin in justitia,  and flowing from it as a stream 
flows from its source ; justice  is tlhe will  or purpose  to give 
every man his  due, a  will  which  is perfect  and complete in 
God; justice is this will unexpressed, jus is the expression  of 
this will.  But justice  a,lso differs from jus, for the former is 
constant, unchanging, while the latter is variable : this is due 
to the varying nature of  t,he circumstances  to which  it has 
to be  ada~ted.~  This  conception  of  the relation  of  jzts  and 
justitia  represents,  we  think, the normal  judgment  of  these 
civilians.  Placentinus repeats  the statement that jus is de- 
rived from justitia, and adds that justitia is so called because 
See p.  8, note  1. 
'  Fragmentum  Pragense,'  iii.  9 : 
"  Cumque de jure Romano tractarc in- 
tendet, inde sumpta occasione do jurc 
gonerali quredam pramittit, tam Itom- 
an0 juri  convenientia quarn  alii.  Sot 
quia in justitia jus initia habet, et ex ca 
quasi rivulus ex fonte manat idco earn 
anteponit.  Est autem justicia voluntas 
jus suum cuique tribuens.  Qua quidem 
in Deo  plena  est et perfects,  in nobis 
"er0  per  participationem  justicia  esae 
dicitur.  Hoc  autem  totum  commune 
habet  cum  jure,  nisi  quod  justicia 
latenh est voluntas, jus manifesta : vel 
scripto vel rebus vel fnctis.  Set differt 
justicia  a  jure,  quia  justi~ia  est  con- 
stans,  jus  autem  variabile.  Set  in 
eadem,  insuper  in  eodem  legidatore 
qui  idem  videtur  justum  facere ; set 
potius  facit  hoc  subjectarum  rerum 
varietas ipsa, sicut splendor solis ocuIos 
quidem  molles  et  lippos  et  egrotoa 
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all jura  have their foundation in it.'  The  same conception 
is again  stated by Azo,  who  adds that whatever jzcstitia  de- 
sires, that jus p~rsues.~ 
These are significant phrases,  but it may be  thought that 
after  all  they  are  only  phrases  which  had  Little  practical 
significance.  That is not  the case ; but rather it is  certain 
that the medizeval civilians were clear in their judgment  that 
laws  which  are  unjust  must  be  modified  and brought  into 
accordance with  justice. 
It  is, indeed, maintained by some that before the develop- 
ment  of  the great  school  of  Bologna, the attitude  of  those 
who  taught or practised  the Roman  Law was  one  of  much 
greater  freedom  than  later.  It  is  certainly  interesting  to 
notice the very emphatic phrases of  some of  the early writers 
of  the school  of  Bologna,  or  of  those  who  stood  outside  it. 
One of  the most  remarkable of  these is  contained in ' Petrl 
Exceptiones Legis Romani.'  In the prologue to his  work he 
uses a very emphatic phrase, expressing his determination to 
repudiate anything in the laws he was hendhng which might 
be useless or contrary to equity.3  In another passage he lays 
down the principle that in special cases, affecting in a high 
degree the public or  private  convenience, or for the purpose 
of  putting an end to quarrels,  a judge  should be  allowed in 
some measure to depart from the law.4 
l  Placentlnus,  '  Summa  Inst~tut~. 
onum,'  I.  1 '  "  Competenter  enlm 
dominus Justlnianus de justltia  et lure 
prsmitt~t,  de justltla,  ut pote  ex  qua 
omnia Jura emanant, tanquam ex fonte 
rlvul~ . . . Est autem  dlcta  justit~a 
quia In ea stant omnla jura " 
P Azo,  '  Summa  Inst~t  ,'  1  1  "  A 
]ust~t~a  enim velut a mater~a,  et quasl 
fonte  quodam  omnla  jura  cmansnt , 
quod emm just~tia  vult, ~dem  ]us pro 
slequitur  .  Et dic~tnr  justitla,  quin 
In  ea  stant  omnia  jura  Jus  ergo 
derlvatur a justltla " 
8  '  Petri Exceptlones Legum Roman 
orum,'  Prologue  "  Utrlusque  jurls 
natural13 scilicet  et clv111s ratione pcr 
specta, judic~orum  et controvcr~~olum 
exitus  planls  et apert~s  cap~tulls  eno- 
damus  S1  qu~d  lnutlle,  ruptum, 
aqu~tat~ve  contrarlum  In  leglbus  re- 
pentur, noetris pedlbus subcalcnmus " 
'  Petri Exceptlones,'  IV  3  "  Cum 
autem secundum legem profel tur judlcl. 
um, omnino leg19 sentent~a  est servanda, 
~ns~  allq~ia  causa apparuer~t,  per quam 
ncccsse  sit,  allquld  temperament1 im 
mlxerl  sententlir  Causn  autom  llla 
ilebet  rsse  cvldens  et honrstn,  pertl- 
nens  ad maxlma  commoda  et incorn- 
moda pubhca  X el prlvata  Sicut onim 
mnxlma  util~tatcs  eonservandre  sunt 
atque retlnenda,  SIC  et maxlma  mala 
et  detrimenta  vitanda  atque  repel- 
lcnda  . . . 
"  S1  pravallda  ratione  monente  vel 
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~t is  significant that the author  of  the ' Summa Codiois,' 
to Irnerius by Fitting, takes up the same position, 
and  clearly  lays it  down  that laws  whlch  are  contrary  to 
equity are not to be enforced by the judge.l  A similar view 
is  expressed in  an extremely interesting  discussion by  Bul- 
garus,  one  of  the four doctors,  the immediate  successors of 
Irnerius in the sch~ol  of  Bologna.  He  is  commenting on  a 
phrase  of  Paulus,  "  In omnibus  quidem,  maxime  tamen  in 
jure, zequitas spectanda est."  He urges that this means that 
we  must  always  consider  ca'refully whether  any  particular 
law (jus statutum) is equitable, if  not it must be  abolished. 
The judge  must prefer equity to strict law-e.g.,  strict law 
enacts that all agreements must be kept, but equity declares 
that  certain  agreements,  such  as  those  made  under  false 
pretences, or through fear or violence, or by minors or women, 
are not to be kept ; the judge  must decide such cases on the 
ground  of  equity.2  It is  clear  that the civilians  who  have 
cogente,  legum  sententia  allquando 
mmus  vel  majus  in  judiclo  profertur, 
cum sanct~  canones, qul majorls vlgorls 
aunt  et  auctoritat~s, ~dem  srepisslme 
patiantur,  nemlni  mlrum  vlderl  de 
bet  . . . 
"Hoc  iptur et in srecular~bus  leg1 
bus  atque  negctils  ab eorum  tracta 
tor~bus, cum  re8  expostulat,  obser- 
vandum  putamus,  et  non  solum 
propter  suprad~ctas  causas,  sed  etlam 
ut graves in~mlcltla  \ elocius finiantur 
Quls  enlm  eam  reprehendet  senten- 
t~am,  qua  prreter~ta mala  sopluntur, 
surgentla  prrefocantur  pax  firmlor 
solldatur.  Hoc  autem  legum  slve 
lu&clorum  temperamc~ltum non  Im 
prudenter  qu~bushbet  l~omlnlbus  judl- 
clbus  est  commlttendum,  sod  jurls 
auoto~~tatlbus,  qu~  non faclliter gratla 
"el  Pecunla corrumpuntur, rel~gios~s  ct 
tlmentrbus Deum 'l 
'  Imenus,  'Sum  Cod ,'  I  14  G 
'I COndlta?  leges  intelligenda  sunt 
benlgnlus ut mens  earum  servetur  et 
*b  equltate  discrepent  leglt~ma 
enlm Pracepta  tunc  demum  a  judlco 
admlttuntur,  cum  ad  equitatls  ra- 
tionem  accominodantur  Item  in 
leglbuq  intelhgendls  ne  qua fraus ad- 
hibeatur, vitandum est  . . . 
" 7  Omnls  enim  interpretatio  ita 
faclenda  est. ne ab equ~tate  discrepet, 
et ut omms absurd~tas  evltetur, et ne 
qua  fraus  admlttatur "-Cf.  on  thls 
passage Fitting's Introd, p  Ixxi,  &c 
Cf.  also Irnerius, ' Qoest~onea  de Juris 
Snbtilitat~bus,'  Exord.  6  "  Parietem 
vero  supra memoratam frequentabant 
honorablles  vlri,  non  quidem  paucl, 
sedulo  dantes  operam,  ut 61  que  ex 
llttens 1111s  ab equ~tatis  examlne  dis 
sonarent, llaberentur pro cancellatis " 
2 Bulgarus,  '  Comment  on  Digest,' 
L  17. 90. "  In  omnibus quidem, max 
ime tamen In  jure,  zqu~tas  spectanda 
est  (Paulus )  Kquitas  m  singuhs 
causis et nogotns spectanda est, maxime 
tamen In jure, hoc PQ~,  inqulrendum an 
decem  pro  derem  redd~,  vel  allquld 
s~mile,  slt requum  Mavime  vero  In- 
quircndum est, an quolibet  JUS  statu- 
tum  slt  aquum  Verb1  gratla,  lcx 
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been  cited  looked  upon  cequitas  as  a  test which  should  be 
applied to actual laws, that if  these were not conformable to 
mquitas they ought to be  amended,  and it seems  cle,ar that 
somr of  these civilians thought that even the judge in deciding 
cases must correct the application of  actual laws by reference 
to the principle of  ceguitas. 
Here we come, however, to an ambiguity in the meaning of 
cequitas,  of  which  we  must  take account.  So  far we  have 
considered  the  term  defined  as  some  essentially  fair  and 
reasonable  adjustment  of  things,  a  principle  which  finds 
expression in the just  will to ghe every man his  due.  We 
have  now  to observe  that  the  term  cequitas  is  also  used, 
by some at least of  these civilians, in a much more technical 
sense.  All the civilians  agree with such a statement as that 
of  Bulgarus, but they di£€er  greatly as to the sense in which 
mquitas is to be understood. 
The 'Brachylogus' draws attention to the apparently contra- 
dictory statements of  the Code on the relations of  the magis- 
trate to mquitas.  In one place  it is laid down that ceguitas 
and justice  are to be  held  superior  to strict  law,  while  in 
another,  all  cases  involving  such  a  divergence  of  law  and 
@quitas are said to be reserved  for the Emperor's  decisi0n.l 
The author, who provides no solution of  the question which 
he has raised,  evidently feels that the relation of  the magis- 
trate to mquitas was not easy to determine. 
non  habent,  tolluntur  lex  Falcldle, 
quae,  qula contlnet  aequltatem,  confir- 
matur.  Vel  dlclt, m  omn~bus  profes- 
s~on~bus  et artlbus,  maxlme  In  ]uns 
professlone.  Nam  In  grammatlcls  et 
d~alectlcls  spectatur et  dljudlcatur, qu~d 
aequlus  et  mcllus  s~t  utruln  quod 
Plato  an  quod  Ar~stotclcs senser~t 
Max~me  autem In jurls  profosslone, ut 
&XI, spectatur  acqu~tas,  ut judex  earn 
strlcto  jurl  prafcrat  Nam  cum  ]us 
strloturn  slt,  pacta  servarl  aqultas 
autem sua dlstlnct~one  d~oat  quaedam 
pacta servanda non esse,  ut qua? dolo, 
qu;c metu, qua vl, quave cum mlnore, 
vel quz cum femlna, et quae cum fiho 
fam facta sunt ; judex decernere debet 
secundum  ~qu~tatem,  ~d est,  potlus 
non  essa  servanda  quam  secundum 
juns ngorem atque angustlas " 
1 '  Brachylcgus,'~~  17 4  ' S~nvero 
zqultas jun  scnpto contrarla v~deatur, 
secuudum lpsam  jud~candum  est , alt 
enlm  (constltutlo)  ' Placu~t  In  omnl 
bus rebus prreclpuam esse just~tlre  wqu~ 
tatlsque  rluam  strlct~  lurls  rationem ' 
(Cod , 111  1  8)  HUIL  vero  atlx ersan 
vldetur lex pos~ta  In  prlmo l~bi-o  LO~I- 
as, t~tulo  de  leglbus  et constltut~on~ 
bus  'Inter  ]IIY  ct  iequ~tatem  mter- 
pos~tam  ~nterpretat~onem  nob16  solus 
lloet  et oportet  Insplcere ' " (Cod ,  I. 
14. l).-Cf.  Roger, Surnma Cod., I.  1. 
A gloss of  Imerius,  published  by Pescatore,  seems  clearly 
to teach that in the case of a conflict between jzcs  and mquitas 
the prince alone can 1ntervene.l 
One  school  of  civilians  seems  to have  held  to the view, 
possibly the older view, that the judge  must decide cases in 
with  the  abstract  principle  of  mquitas,  even 
the written law ; but another school maintained that 
the  cepuitas  which  the  judge  was  to  obey  was  of  quite 
another kind.  In the collection  of  disputed questions  com- 
piled  by  Hugolinus,  we  have  a  passage  which  makes  the 
nature  of  the  discussion  clear.  The  question  raised  on 
Cod.,  iii.  1. 8 was  the following-Whether  unwritten equity 
was to be preferred to strict law ?  Some said that the passage 
meant by "  justice "  that which was established by law (lege), 
and not that which a judge might consider to be justice ; and 
they  quoted  Nov.,  18. 8 to show that the strict  law must 
be  preferred  to such  personal  judgments.  Others  said that 
justice,  whether  written  or  unwritten,  was  to be  preferred 
to strict law  (jus), and they referred  to Dig.,  i.  3.  32  and 
33 in  support  of  this  p~sition.~  Savigny has  drawn  atten- 
tion  to  an  observation  of  Odofredus  which  seems  to im- 
ply  that  Martin,  another  of  the  four  doctors,  had  often 
appealed  to an unwritten  equity,  even  against  the written 
'  Irnellus,  Gloss  on  Cod,  I  14  1 
(~n  G. Pescatore,  '  Krltlsche  Stud~en 
buf  dem  Cableto  der  Clvll~stlschen 
Lltterargeichlchte  des  fif~ttelalters,' 
P.  91)  "  Y  cum equltas et jus In h~s 
dem rebus versentur,  d~fferunt  tamen 
Equ~tat~s  enlm  ploprlum  est  ~d quocl 
IUatum  est  s~mpllclter  proponere 
Juns  autem  lclem  proponere  volendo 
Sc'llcet  allquantum  auctontate  wb- 
nectl.  Quod  propter  hommum  lapsus 
multum ab ea dlrtare tontlng~t,  partlm 
mmus  quam  equ~tas  d~ctaver~t  con- 
tlnend~,  partlm  plus  quam  oporteat 
Proponendo  Multls quoque a111s modls 
eqmtas et ]us Inter se d~fferunt,  cujus 
dlssenfius mterpretat~o,  ut lex fiat, soils 
Prlnclp~bus  destmatur " 
* Hugollnus,  '  Dlssens~ones  Domm 
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orum,'  91.  Pradlcto  tltulo  (Cod, 
111.  1  S,  Placu~t)  "  An  squ~tas 
non  bcr~pta  jurl  st~lcto  przferatur ? " 
Olssentlunt In cod  tit  (Cod ,  111  1  8). 
D~cunt  enlm  quldnm  quod  1b1  lo- 
qu~tur  de  just~tla que  est  a  lege 
const~tuta,  et  non  de  ca  quz  quzs 
cxcogltat  ex  lngenlo  suo ,  nam  1111 
ot~am  str~cturn  ]us  prscferetur,  ut In 
Auth  de  Trlente  et sem15se  9  Stu- 
dlum  (Nov , 18.  8)  A111  contra,  et 
dlcunt ~dem  In  omnl  justltla,  sc~hcet 
nt str~cto  jur~  prreferatur, slve scnpta 
sit, slve non,  quum etlam,  SI  non  31t 
scr~pta bene  debet  servan,  ut  D 
(I.  1,  32,  1,  and  33),  et ut  nota\~ 
supra  de  Leg~bus  et Const~tut~on~bus 
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law.'  Azo, in  his  treatise on  the Institutes, shows  that he 
understood by the cepuitas which was to override the written 
law a written  quita as-not some principle which  a man may 
chance to find in his  hearL2  In another place Azo  puts the 
same view  with great clearness : it is certain, he  says,  that 
aquitas is to be preferred- to strict law-that  is,  an cepuitas 
devised by law, not by any one's private judgmenL3 
When, therefore, we consider  the account by Hugolinus of 
the dispute in the law-schools about the meaning of  aquitas, 
and then compare the position of  Azo with that of  the ' Summa 
Trecensis,'  and the author of  the ' Exceptiones,'  we  become 
clear  that there  was  a  real uncertainty  about  the meaning 
of  cepuitas  and its relation  to strict law;  and we  shall  be 
inclined  to agree  with  Fitting that there is some reason  to 
think that the early Bolognese and the pre-Bolognese civilians 
may  have  held  a  more  free  position  with  regard  to  the 
written law than the later members of  the school of  Bologna. 
For  our  purpose-at  least  for  the  present-it  is  sufficient 
to observe  that  the  controversy  brings  out  the great  im- 
portance of  the theory  of  justice,  or  quitas, as the source 
and the test of  law;  and it  is  clear  that even  those  who 
might  not  agree  with  the  principle  that  the judge  should 
decide  according  to  his  own  opinion  as  to -what  might 
be  just,  yet  held  firmly  that  an  unjust  law  must  be 
abrogated.  Imerius,  in  the  ' Quzestiones,'  speaks  of  the 
many  honourable  men  who  diligently  see  to  it  that  if 
anything  in  the  law  is  found  contrary  to  cequitas,  it  is 
'  Sav~gny,  ' Geschlchte  des  Roml- 
schen Rechts, etc ,' ch. XXVIII.,  noto 92 . 
"  Odofredus In Dig. Vetus, L  4,  5 6, de 
h~s  qu~  not  (3. 2) . '  Dlx~t  Martmus, 
de  sua  ficta  ~equltate et  hursal~, 
propter  quas  passus  est  multas  vere- 
cund~as,  &C.' " 
Aso, ' Summa Inst~tut..'  IV.  17.  2 . 
"  Item  ~n pronunclando  potlus  debet 
servare zqultatem, qnam jus scrlptam. 
Quod  est  lntell~gendum  do  aqu~tato 
scr~pta,  non de ea quam quls ex corde 
suo ~nvemat  : ut et major1 relerent~a 
vel  timore servcntur  omnla  zqu~tatis, 
seu just~tle  prrecepta.  Przsent~a  evan- 
gel~orum  debet  osse  apud  judlcem  a 
pnnclplo judlcll  usque ad finem ut no. 
In  sum.  C.  de  jud.  5  przsentlam." 
Cf. Accurs~us,  Gloss on Cod., 111.  1.  8, 
"  In ommbus rebus." 
S Aeo,  '  Brocardlcn,'  Rubrlc  lxxvl : 
"  Bqu~tas prefertur  rlgorl  jurls." 
Certum  est,  aequ~tatem strlcto  jurl 
esse  plaferendam,  ut  C.  de  jud.  1. 
placult  (Cod.,  111  1.  8).  Xqultatern 
dlco,  lege, non cujusquam lngenlo ex- 
cog~tatam, ut  C.  de  leg.  et  ~enat. 
cons, 1.  1  (Cod., I.  14.  1). 
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cancelled; l  and  in  another  treatise  he  says  that  the 
authority  of  the  law  is  only  gladly  accepted  when  it is 
equitable. 
jus  is,  then,  according  to  the  civilians,  derived  from 
justitia--is  the manifestation  of  justitia ;  but  the  question 
then  arises  whether  this  manifestation  is  complete  and 
adequate.  Justice  is  the  will  to render  to every  man  his 
due.  Is this good  will  perfectly and constantly represented 
in  the actual body  of  law  or jus?  Some  of  the  civilians, 
at  least,  clearly  recognise  that  the  representation  is  not 
complete -  that  the  embodiment  of  the  good  will  is  not 
perfectly adequate to the good  will itself. 
But before we deal with this, another question arises, that 
is, whether justice in man is a perfect reproduction of  justice 
in  God, of  the final justice.  Some at least of  the writers on 
the Civil Law are very clear that this is not the case.  There 
is a very interesting passage in that anonymous treatise, '  De 
Justitia,'  to which  we  have  already referred,  bearing  upon 
this.  The author makes a very clear distinction between the 
divine  and the  human  justice,  although  he  holds  that the 
latter is also by the divine testimony declared to be  divine. 
He  urges  that  there  is  a  great  difference  between  such  a 
divine  law  as  that of  the  Gospels  which  bids  a  man  turn 
the  left  cheek  to  the  smiter,  and  the  human  law  which 
permits  men  to  oppose  violence  to  violence.  The  author 
looks upon human justice  as incomplete and inadequate, but 
he  argues  that it is  a  preparation for the divine  or perfect 
justice,  and he  regards the relation  between  the law  of  the 
Old  Testament  and that of  the New  as illustrating the con- 
ception  of  an imperfect  law,  and an incomplete conception 
of justice, preparing the way for the perfecL3 
'  Irnerlus,  '  Quzstlones  de  Jurls 
Bubtllltat~bus,' Exord.  6 :  "  Parletcm 
VerO  supra memoratam  frequentahant 
honorab~les vln,  non  qu~dem  pauc~, 
8edulo dantes  operam,  ut  81  que  ex 
'ltterls  1111s  ab equ~tat~s  examlne  dls- 
80na~ent,  haherentur pro concellat~s." 
P  Irnerlus, '  De aqultate,' I. . "  Jurls 
eten~m  legumque  auctor~tas  tunc  de- 
mum  gratanter  acceptatur,  quando 
equltatls ratlone commendatur." 
'  De  Just~tla,' 8.  "  Eat  autem 
justltla  al~a  superna,  al~a  humana. 
Supernam dlco que et pnma et ultlma 
jure  d~c~tur,  que  nunc evangel~ca  dlc~ 
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There does not seem to have been much discussion  of  this 
point among the civilians,  but the distinction seems to have 
been familiar to them.  Roger clearly refers to it in discuss- 
ing the nature  of  justice  and jus,  when  he  speaks  of  that 
aspect  of  justice  which  allows  a  man to return  a  blow,  as  - 
being unjust  when  considered  by itself,  but just  when  com- 
pared with injustice ;  and Azo does the same when he speaks 
nunc  inflmt,  et hic  incoatur,  I~I  per 
ficltur  Humans.  est  quam  leg~bus 
comprehensam v~demus,  quam et lpsam 
dlvlnarn  esse  divlno  dldlc~mus  test1 
momo.  Et Illam  qu~dem  llle  per  se 
vel  per  suos  servos manlfeste  sanxlt, 
istam  vero  nonnullorum  hommum 
occult?  nature  lnstlnctu  sanc~endam 
lnseruit  Videntur  autem  m  ment~s 
slb~  lnvlcem  adversan ,  ut ecce  per 
mitt~t  leg~t~ma  VI oposlta vlm repellere, 
jubet evangellum percuciencl maxillam 
prebere et alteram  Set 81  hec  ple ut 
oportet,  advertamus,  lntelhgetur  non 
eas  contrar~etate  sese  opugnare,  -et 
alteram  alter1 qu~busdam  gradlbus  ct 
preparatlone  congrua  lnlnlstram  esse 
A  summa  etenim  ln~quitate qua  te 
ultro  ledere  cup10  ut  ad  summam 
venlatur  concordlam  et  pacienclam, 
gradus  est  nemlnl  nocere,  etsi  laces- 
sxtus  sls in]una  Set  SI  lllato  rnlnorl 
malo  tu majus  inferre  vel~s,  nondum 
ad  ~d  quod  equum  est  a~cend~sti 
Perm~tt~t  ergo just~tlz  rat10 par  pall 
refcrrl  non  tam  lncltando  ad  rpsum 
exlgere quam pro~ben~lo,  ne vel manus 
pro  nu110  ~nferatur,  vel  majus  pro 
mmon  referatnr  . .  Quarc  et pro- 
~blt~one  qnal~bet  arcemur  et  perm19 
slone quodam  quasi  lim~te  dlstermin 
amur s~cut  et In  eo quod perm~tt~mur 
oculum pro oculo vel al~qutd  elusmod~ 
potere,  detlnemur  amma  (a)  d~cta 
ln~qu~tate Ab  hoc  gradu  facile 
ascend~tur  ad ~llud  evangell~  (dlmltte 
et)  '  Dim~ttlte  et  d~m~ttetur  vobis ' 
Est  In  eodem  et  przparat~o  atque 
mater~a  superloris justlt~a:  , cum enlm 
ex  ha6  ]uatltla 111s nobis  fit  numende 
vlndlcte, nlmlrunl habemus quod juxtn 
evangeltum d~m~ttendo  mer~tum  nobls 
comparemus  SIC et In  alns  contem 
plan  l~cet  Qu~t  autem  mlrum,  SI 
ist~us  precepta  sunt  ab 1111~s  d~versa, 
cum etlam ~lltt  ~psa  allud antlqu~,  aliud 
novl testament1 dlsc~pulis  s~t  dlctum 7 
Quod  totum  fit  nulla  varlantls incon 
stantia  set  dlspensantls  prov~dent~a 
Nowt  enim  Deus  homlnem  proprlo 
dellcto mortal~tat~s  ~stlus  condlclonem 
subiturum  esse,  przparav~t itaque 
suam  justlt~am  mutab111 vite  congru- 
entem,  ut  lpsa  perpetua  transltorns 
quoque  rebus  motlerarl  dlgnaretur, 
quam  lux  permanens  res  transeunteq 
su~s  perfunderet  radns, cum verlsslme 
d~catur  in  seculum  secul~  persevera 
tura  Unde  et in  omn~bus  qu~  par- 
tlcipes  ejus fiunt  non  mod0  robur  In 
perlculls laboribus  contempnendls,  set 
In  proprns  mor~bus  coh~bend~s  habet 
temperantlam  Humanam  ergo 1ust1- 
tiam  In  jure  clvlli leg~busque  lnterlm 
spectab~mus  " 
l  Roger,  '  Summa  Cod~cis,' I  1 
"  Sed  cum  prlnclpes  et  a111  do  JII~R 
tractantev clrca equltatem et just~t~am 
Intendant  const~tnere,  hoc  faclunt v01 
roferendo se  ad Illam  prlmam  partem 
lustltle In qua justlt~a,  ratlone natural1 
dictante, primum debu~t  officlum suum 
cxercere,  ut Deum  revererl,  parentcs 
llberls aler~  , aut referunt  se ad Illam 
secundum  partem  que  cum  s~t  In  so 
vlsa ~njustlt~a,  tamen ex compsrat~one 
alterlus ~nj~tstlt~e  visa  est  justltla,  ut 
percussum  repercutere,  qula  hoc  est 
In  officlo justltle  ne  al~um  vloles  nlsi 
lacess~tus  injurla " 
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of the second form of  equity which forbids you to injure your 
unless  you  have been  injured,  and says that this 
is rneqmtable when compared with the highest equity, which 
oonsists m turning the other cheek to the smiter.' 
When we  turn back, then, to consider  the relation  of jus 
to justice  we  shall  not  find it  surprising that these  jurists 
hold  that no  system  of  law devised,  however  carefully,  by 
man, can be a completely adequate manifestation of  the prin- 
ciples of  the Divine justice.  This conception is very  clearly 
illustrated in two passages  of  works which do not apparently 
come  from the  School  of  Bologna.  The  first  is  from  that 
Abridgment  of  the  lnstitutes  to  which  we  have  before 
referred.  Justice  is  said  here  to  have  many  qualities  in 
common with jus,  but also they differ, for God is the author 
of  justicc,  while  He  has  made  man  the  author  of  jus. 
~ustlce  has  also  a  wider  scope  than jug,  and  the  author 
refers to an imaginary case, whether the property of  Lazarus, 
which  had upon his  death passed to his  sisters,  should have 
been restored to him.  Jus  could say nothing on such a case, 
but  justice  would  find  the  answer.  And  thus,  he  says, 
justice  will  always  find  a  solution  for  new  cases  for  which 
jus could not make provision. 
A  similar  conception  is  expressed  by  the  author  of  the 
Prague  fragment  in  the  pasbage  already  quoted,  when  he 
says  that in  justice  jus  has  its beginning,  and that justice 
Azo,  Summa Codic~u,'  Introd ,  20 
"Super  11s ornnrbus tractant prlnclpes 
referendo se  ad  prlmam  zqttitatem, 
quz  est  de  summa  Trln~tate  et  fide 
cathollca,  slve ad sccundsm, qua: est 
de  non  vlolando  proximo,  nlsl  curn 
fuer~s  lacess~tu.;  zrijurla , quz qmdem 
eBt  lnlqua respectu 1111us summa: zqul 
tatlq, quac  est. ut sl quls te per~usseilt 
unam  maxlllam,  przebe  el  et  a1 
teram " 
L  I  Abbrev~at~o  Inst~tut~onum,'  1 
"Justltla  et  JUS  quod  ~dem  vldetur 
In  hoc  quod  convenlunt  qula 
utrumque  przclplt,  proh~bet. per 
mlttlt  et  pun~t  sed  d~fferunt qma 
luetlclre  Deus  auctor  est,  jur~s  vero 
Deus  homlnem  feat auctorem , Item 
justic~a ad  plura  patet  quam  ]us. 
Verb1  gratla,  ut  m  vulgar1  lnslstam 
oxemplo,  resuscltat1  post  tr~duum 
Lazar~  devoluta  erat,  sive  ex  testa- 
mento  slve  ab  Intestato,  ad  sorores 
suas ejus heredltas . una  ratlone  v~d- 
ctur  ei  rest~tuenda heredltas,  qula 
restltuta  erat  et  vlta,  quod  maps 
erat,  altera  ratione  non  v~detur  el 
rest~tuenda, qula  ad  sorores  trans- 
latum  erat  domln~um.  Hic  de  lure 
non  lnvenles  quld  s~t  statuendum, 
justlc~a  tamen  qu~d  d~ctet  ~nvemet,  et 
SIC  slngults  dlebus  formantur  nova 
negotia, In  qu~bus  locum habet luatlcla 
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is the will to give every man his due : this is  complete and 
perfect in God, in us it is called justice "  per participationem " ; 
justice  differs from jus,  for  justice  is  constant, jus  is  vari- 
able, though this variability  lies in the nature of  the things 
with which it is concerned, rather than in itse1f.l 
We  have  thus  indicated  some  of  the  most  important 
elements  in  the  theory  of  the  relation  of  jus  to justitia, 
but the conception of  jus can only be adequately considered 
in  relation  to  the  more  or  less  formal  definitions and  dis- 
cussions  of  it which  we  find  in  the  treatises  of  the  great 
jurists.  We may take these in their chronological order, and 
I  begin with an interesting discussion by Irnerius of  that phrase 
of  Paulus on which we  have already commented in our first 
volume : "  Jus pluribus modis dicitur : uno modo, cum id quod 
semper aequum ac bonum est jus  hcitur, ut est jus  naturale, 
Altero modo,  quod omnibus aut pluribus in quaque civitate 
utilis est, ut est jus civile "  (Dig., i. 1.11). Irnerius compares 
with this the phrase of  Ulpian : "  Jus est ars boni et zequi " 
(Dig., i. 1. l),  and asks  how  these  two  conceptions can  be 
reconciled with each other.  He replies by pointing out that 
the  phrase  of  Ulpian  assumes  that  jus  represents  the 
authority  of  him  who  ordains it, but  also  the principles of 
cepuitas;  but the word jus is also sometimes used to describe 
a  form  of  authority  which  does  not  necessarily  represent 
cepuitas, as, for instance,  an unjust  judgment  of  the Praetor. 
Irnerius  explains that this  is  called jus  because  the Praetor 
ought to give a just  judgment.  The distinction between the 
"  natural " and the " civil "  jus is related to this double sense 
of  jus,  and also  to the fact  that the "  civil " jus  often  has 
reference  only  to some  particular  place  or  time,  while  the 
"natural " holds  always  and  e~erywhere.~  This  is  only  a 
See p.  13, note 2  quod est  const~tuentis  praecept~o  qua: 
V01  1  p  60.  vertitur  In  equitate.  Est autem equi- 
a  Irnerius,  '  Quaest~ones de  Juris  tas ejus quod recte fit curn sua causa 
subtil~tatibus,'  1.  2. "  Dlffinltlo quem  coequat~o  et  congruent~a. Set  causa 
commemorastl  praecipentls  auctorlta  ejusmod~ alia  natural~s, alia  civ~hs 
tem  simul  curn  cqultate  slgnlficat  Dod~  tibl X. mutua.  reddl mlctll a te 
Ars  enlm  precept10  est,  'bonum  et  decem  rongrult  causae  precedenti,  id 
requum ' hoc  est  quocl  equltas  Hoc  est d?t~om  X  quae  causa natural~s  est. 
est  ergo  dicere  ' ars  boni  et  equi,'  Item  rem  bona  fide  a  non  domlno 
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brief summary of  the discussion : how far Irnerius' interpreta- 
tion  really  corresponds  with  the  meaning  of  Paulus  and 
apian may be doubted, but the passage serves to show very 
clearly how strongly the medizeval civilians insisted upon the 
conception of law as representing the principle of justice, and 
empiam  trienn~o  contlnuo  po~sedl  61- 
domino  eam rem michl rtppllcarl 
convenlt  CaUsa  pOSsess1on1s  et sllentll, 
(et) hiec est  causa  civ~lis. Quare et 
equltas  Jla  naturalls,  aha  clvllls, 
,tramque  autem  sub equltatls  nomen 
non  amb~gitur. Secundum h00 
nomen slmpliciter et in genere ac~lpltur 
equltas in ea difftnltione, curn d1~0  ]Us 
constltutam equltatem vel artem boni 
et eqm.  Et  ita, sive diffin~tlo  (nem)  sive 
secundum  eam  nomeu  proferas,  non 
allud  intell~go  nisi  auctoritatem  curn 
eqwtate, sive naturali sive civill causa 
mtente.  Unus  ergo  s~gnlhcat~onls 
modus in talibus accip~tur. Set etlam 
fit  lntordum,  ut  sola  deprehendatur 
auctor~tas,  curn  prorsus  des~t  equ~tas 
veluti curn pretor inlque decermt . set 
tamen et hoc solet jus appeliari  Licet 
erum  non  s~t  aequum,  ab  eo  tamen 
statutum est quem oportet aequltatem 
statuere.  Ergo  et  hoc  dicltur   us 
respectu  sequ~tatls non  qula  insit, 
aet  qua pro  officio statuentls  lnesse 
debut,  nec  dlc~  potest  al~a(m)  esse 
nornmls  ejusdem  s~gnlficant~am  set 
magls eandem set lmproprie acceptam. 
Set cum translato xocabulo ejus quod 
fit slgnlficamus locum In  quo fit, tunc 
alla slgnlficatio recte  dicitur.  Et hoc 
ex  lpsls  l~bn  verbis  apparet,  istam 
sclllcet allam esse, in superionbus em- 
dem  (esse) s~gn~ficationem.  Unde non 
lmmerlto te movet illud quo mod0 s~t 
acclPlendum, quod d~c~tur  naturale et 
C1vlle  dlverso mod0 jus  dlci, quld ergo 
michl  hac  in  re  videatur,  accipe. 
Equldem  oplnor  luris  consulti  ita 
divldentls  Intentionem  hanc  fulsse , 
mversltatm que sub boc nomen cadunt 
'perB  dstlnguere  Et llla  qu~dem 
dversltas est preoipue quam  propomt 
m fine,  qua jus  dlc~tur,  ut supra drxi. 
locus  slve  necesbltudo  eodem  emm 
nomine  res  plane  alla  demonstratur. 
Set  et 11la  prlor  sigmficatio, quamvis 
sit una, non est tamen slne vanetate. 
Cum  cnim  ad demonstrandam  consti- 
tutam equ~tatem  accomodata s~t,  Inter. 
dum  demonstrat ~d constitutum  quod 
oporteret qmdom esse, set tamen  non 
eat aequum, hlnc ergo gradatlm venltur 
ad id quod habet quidem equitatem, set 
eam que certo loco vel tempore claud- 
itur,  ideoque  non  exequatur  naturali 
curn llla et ublque et semper optineat. 
Tal~s  ergo videtur istius responsl sen- 
sus  jurls  nomen  in  leg~bus  assidue 
pos~tum  allas propriam alias translatam 
habet s~gnificant~nm  Propria est qua 
demonstratur  constitut~o  pertlnens  ad 
equitatem.  Hec  autem  constitutio 
allas ~qwtatem  habet, allas non habet 
ets~  habere  debet  Rursus cum eqw- 
tatem  habet,  aut  est  ea  que  omni 
congrmt et lo~o  et tempor], aut ea qua 
non usque quaque est oqu~tas,  set certo 
dumtaxat  loco  vel  tempore.  Et ita 
fit (ut) sub una s~gn~ficatione  ad equi- 
tatem sclhcet pertlnente multi sunt in- 
spic~endl  ipslus equltatis modi.  Prlmus 
quidem ubi  deprebend~tur  eqwtas lm- 
mutabilis,  sequens, ub~  mutab~lls,  ter- 
t~us  ub~  magls ~rn~tat~o  est  aquitatis. 
Has  autem  sub  una  s~gn~ficat~one 
d~vers~tates  sequ~tur  alia  prorsus  s~g- 
nificat~o,  quam  supra dixi tranqlatam. 
Cum ergo non  sign~fication~s  set magls 
lnspiclende  equ~tatis  dlvers~  d~cantur 
hoc In loco  mod^, non est quare move- 
arm, quoniam nulla rel~n~u~tur  contra- 
dlct~o  tam  naturale  quam  clvlle  una, 
s~gn~ficat~one  ]us dlcl, utroque responso 
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as deriving its character from this fact.  This is still further 
illustrated by another passage in the same treatise.l 
From  1rner:us  we  turn  to ~licentinus  and  consider  his 
definitions  of  jus,  Zex,  and  jurisp~udentia.  All  jura  flow 
from justitia,  as the stream from the source.  But jus may 
be  usid in  many  senses.  It may be  called  an art, and it 
has  then  to  do  with  the good  and equitable;  but it may 
also be  used for the place where jura  are declared,  or for a 
relationship of  blood,  or it may be equivalent to potestas, as 
when  a  man is  said to be  sui juris.  It  may also  be  used 
for the form of  an action,  or for  the rigour  of  the law,  or 
"  cequivoce " for broth  (pul?nentum).  But jus is in the first 
place  the  art of  that which  is  good  and equitable.  There 
are three precepts  of  jus-to  live honourably,  not to injure 
another,  and to give every  man his  due.  Lex is  a  general 
command to do all  honourable things,  and a  prohibition  to 
do the opposite.  Jus is  that which  the law declares,  while 
Zex  is  the  declaration  of  jus.  Jurisprudentia  is  the know- 
ledge  of  what  is  just,  what  is  unjust,  what is  unlawful  in 
divlne  and human  and legal  matters.  Justice  is  a  virtue, 
jurisprudence  a scien~e.~ 
1 Imerlus, '  Quaest~ones,'  11  1  "  A  t~t~a  contlnetur,  et ~psa  tnbuere  hoc 
Jus  suum  culque  tr~buere  pars  est 
In  dlffinlt~one  justltlae  Pars  autem 
hujusrnod~ prlor  est  toto  Eadem 
ratlone  et jus  pnus  est  justlt~a  Set 
cum  dlcltur  ]us  artem  esse  bon~  et 
zqu~  et acclpltur bonum et aquum p10 
just~tla, ~ldetur  lpsa  quasl  matel~a 
prlor  lure 
I  Id  quod  modo  jus  appellan~us, 
prlusquam const~tueretur,  aequum fut, 
et hoc  quod dlco, In  jure  gcntlum vel 
clv111 clarum  est  Nam  ca  qu'c  con- 
ven~entla  fuere,  consensu colnprobata  .  sunt,  nec  posse(n)t  comp~oban, nlsi 
prlus  essent  quae  In  del~berat~onem 
caderent  . .  General~ter  ergo slve jus- 
t~t~am  slve  bonum  et  lequum  voces 
prlu>  hoc  lntelhgendum  est  Illucl 
mox  constltutum  ]urls reclp~t  nomen 
Ante  quam  autem  const~tuatur,  hcet 
hoc nomlne careat,  In  ~psa  tamen jus- 
lndeslnenter  gestlre vtdetur.  Unde  et 
'  perpetua voluntas 'lure vocatur . cum 
enlm lntordum  re lpsa  non  tr~buat,  a 
propos~to  tnmen non des~stlt,  atque hac 
ratlone  voluntatls  sclllcet ab equltate 
rl~scern~tur  " 
?  l'lacent~nus,  '  Summa  Instltu- 
t~onum,'  I.  1  " Que  de  lustlt~a  et 
lure  tractantur  merlto  leges  appel 
lantur  Haec  enlm  Inter  cate~a  quse 
legantur,  nobls  ad  legendum  propon- 
untur,  et  velutl  excellent~ora, per 
autonumas~am  leges  nuncupantur. 
Competenter  enim  dornlnus  Justln- 
 anus  de  lust~t~a  et  jure,  praem~tt~t, 
de  lust~t~a,  ut  pote  ex  qua  omnla 
]ura emanant, tanquam ex fonte r~vul~ 
Et de lure,  quod est unlversale et do 
s~ngul~s  quae  sunt ]ura est praed~cablle 
vel  de  jure,  ~d est jurls  scientla,  slve 
de  arte lsta  V~deamus  ~taque  quot 
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The treatment of  the subject by  Azo  is very  similar : it 
would indeed appear probable that it is based upon Irnerius 
and  Placentinus.  He  also  describes  jura  as  flowing  from 
jrutitia,  as the stream flows from its source.  Jus is  derived 
from justitia;  but also jus may be used  in various senses. 
~t is interesting especially to observe that he gives the same 
explanation  as Irnerius of  the sense in which the Praetor  is 
,aid  to declare jus,  even when  his  sentence is unjust.  Azo 
with  a  discussion  of  the relation  of  jus publicurn 
and jus privalzcm,  and with  the statement of  the tripartite 
nature  of  jus  privatum  as  consisting  of  Natural  Law,  the 
Law of  Nations, and Civil Law.l 
mod~s  d~catur  ]us,  quid  ]us, 
.q2nt przcepta  JUII~, guld  lex,  quid 
ratio,  qu~d  lequltaa, et quld  slt Jurls- 
prudent~a,  qu~d  just~t~a,  et undo  dlc- 
atur  JUS  dlc~tur  ars 1sta  SIOU~  ]am 
dictum  est  Jus  dlcltur  de  bono  et 
aquo  Jus  dlcitur locus In  quo Jura 
redduntur  Jus quoque  vocatur  San 
gu~ms  necessltudo  Jus quoque dlcltur 
potestas  ut  cum  dlc~tur,  hlc  est  SUI 
lurls.  Jus  quoque  dlcltur  lnstru 
mentum vel forma petend1 ut actlo est 
]us, Item ]us dlcltur jurls rlgor  Sod et 
pulmentum ]us lequlvoce nuncupatur. 
Jus est  ars  bon~  et zqui, ergo per 
consequentlam  mall  et Inlqul,  potest 
enlm  lntelllg~ ut  hac  definlt~o slt 
hujus  artls,  potest  et  ~ICI  ut  slt 
defin~t~o  praecept~ quod  ost  do  bono 
et zquo  Sequ~tur,  JUrlS p~recepta  sunt 
tna,  ]uns  lnquam  ~d est  lurls  artls, 
vel  jurls  omnls  quocl  praec~p~t,  ncc 
enlm  ]us  omne  prjcclp~t, sod  on1110 
guod  praeclplt  vel  precep~t  honesto 
vlvcre,  v01  alterum  non  laedere,  v01 
Suum  culque  tr~buere  Sad  not 
andum quod hoc  ult~mum  arctlus hrc 
acclpltur  quam  m  definlt~one ]us- 
tltla  Slquldem I~I  complect~tur  hrec 
tna,  h10  autem  lllud  solum,  quod 
extra duo prlma  praecepta rellnqultur 
Lex  eat  generalls  sanct~o, cuncta 
lubens  honesta,  ~rohlbens contrarla 
Ergo  lU8  leg18  est  slgluficatum,  lex, 
I 
ut  orat~o  quae  leg~tur,  jurls  est  s~g- 
n~ficatura,  slcque  ]us  et  lex  ~ta  se 
hitbent  ut  argumentum  ct  argumen 
tat10  Ration~s  nomen latlus quam lsta, 
patet  Nam  et argumentum est rat10 
hcet  non  s~t  jus,  dlcltur quoque  rat10 
qu~a  s~t  zqu~tas 
Jurlsprudentla  est  sczre  quld  s~t 
justum,  quid  lnjustum,  qu~d  ~lhc~tum 
In  dlvlnls humanlsque,  slve forens~bus 
negotns,  dlffert  ergo  multum  lurls- 
prudentia  a  lust~t~a  51qu1dem ]ur~s- 
prudent~a prle~lplt  slve  d~gnosclt, 
just~t~a  tr~bu~t  Item  justltia  est 
quoddam  summum  bonum,  jurmpru- 
dent]& medlum,  Item  just~t~a  vlrtus 
est, junsprudent~a  sclentla " 
1 Azo,  '  Summa  Inst~tut~onum,'  1. 
1 : "  A just~t~a  enlm velut a matena, 
et  quasl  fonte  quodam  omnla  Jura 
emanant.  quod  enim  just~tla \ult, 
idcm  ]us  prosequ~tur  .  .  .  Et 
dl~~tur  just~tla, qu~a  In  ea  stant 
omnla  jura  Jus  ergo  derlvatur  a 
juqt~t~a,  et habet varlas s~gn~ficat~ones. 
Pon~tur enlm  quandoque  pro  lpsa 
arte,  vel  pro  eo,  quod  scrlptum 
habemus  de  jure,  et dlc~tur  ars bon~ 
et aequl,  culus mento  quls  nos  sacer- 
dotes appellat  justlt~am  namquo col 
inus,  sacra  lura  m~nlstramus (unde 
et leges d~cuntur  sacrat~sslmz,  1  leges 
sacrat~ss~mae  Cod  de leg)  (Cod ,  1  14 
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Our  examination  of  these  discussions  will  have  made  it 
plain  that  the  mediaeval  civilians  maintain  the  doctrine 
that  law  (i.e., jus)  is  the  embodiment  of  the  principle  of 
justice,  that  they  are  clear  that  all  systems  of  law  rep- 
resent  the attempt of  man  to apply  the principle of  justice 
to  the  circumstances  of  human  life.  Justice  is  the source 
of  law : from it law proceeds,  by it law is to be  tested, in 
accordance with it law is to be made or to be changed.  In 
the first volume of  this work we  have endeavoured to point 
out  that  these  are  the  principles  laid  down  by  the  great 
jurists  of  the  second  and  third  centuries ;  while  they  are 
restated,  and  to  some  extent  developed,  by  the  compiler 
of  the Justinian  Institutes  in  the  sixth  century.  We  have 
now  endeavoured  to show  that the  mediaeval  civilians not 
author  justitiae  est  Deus;  et secun- 
dum  hoc,  jus  et lex  idem significant. 
Licet  autem  largissime  dicatur  lex, 
omne quod legitur ; tamen specinliter 
significat sanctionem justam, jubentem 
honesta,  prohibentem  contraria. . . . 
Jus  etiam  quandoque  ponitur  pro 
jure  naturali  tantum,  quandoque  pro 
jure  civili  tantum,  quandoque  pro 
jure  praetorio tantum,  quandoque  pro 
eo  tentum,  quod  competit  ex  sen- 
tentia.  Pretor  enim  jus  dicitur 
reddere  etiam  cum  inique  decernit, 
relatione facta non  ad id  quod prstor 
fecit,  sed  ad  illud  quod  prstorem 
facere convenit.  Nam si non habetur 
respectus  ad  id  quod  debuit  fieri, 
non  aequum  jus,  sed  iniquum  dicitur 
reddidisse.  . . . Quandoque  ponitur 
pro  juris  rigore, ut cum dicitur,  inter 
jus  et equitatem, etc.,  ut C. de legibus 
et constitut. 1.  prima.  (Cod., i.  14. 1.)  . . . Disert  ergo  multum  jurispru- 
dcntia  a  justitia.  Siquidem jurispru- 
dentia dinoscit,  justitia  autem  tribuit 
ouique jus  suum.  Item justitia  virtus 
est, jurisprudentia  scientia.  Item jus- 
titia  est  quoddam  summum  bonum, 
jurisprudentia  medium.  . . . Hujus 
studii dun: sunt positiones : publicum 
et privatum. . . . Est autem jus  pub- 
licum,  quod  ad  statum  rei  Romanre 
pertinet.  Et consistit in sacris, srtcer- 
dotibus  et  magistratibus.  . . . Jus 
autem  privatum  est,  quod  ad  sing- 
ularem  pertinet.  utilitatem :  subaudi 
principaliter,  secundario  tamen  et ad 
rempublicam  pertinet.  Unde  et  dic- 
itur :  expedit  reipublicae,  ne  quis  re 
sua  male  utatur,  ut  infra,  de  his 
qui  sui  vel  alieni  juris  sunt  5  ult. 
Sic  quod  reipublicre  principaliter  in- 
t,erest, secundario put~  quod respiciet 
utilitatem singulorum.  Est autem jus 
maxime privatum, tripartite collectum. 
Est enim ex generalibus praceptis, aut 
gentium  aut  civilibus.  Maxime  ideo 
dixi quia et jus publicum jure gentium 
est stabilitum.  Nam  erga Deum,  vel 
ecclesiam vel sacerdotem religio est de 
jure  gentium ut ff.  eo. 1.  j.  5  ult. et 1. 
ii.  quod et publicum 8.  appellavi.  Ex 
hoc  patet  etiam  quod  publicum  et 
privatum  non  sunt  species  juris,  sed 
assignentur  res  vel  persona?,  super 
quibus posita sunt jura." 
,dy  these principles, but develop and expand them. 
these  writers  law  is  not  the  expression  simply  of  the 
,ill  of  the sovereign-if  we  may use a phrase which belongs 
to B,  later time,-but  rather all systems of  law represent  the 
to  apply  the fundamental principles  of  justice  to 
the actual conditions of  human life. THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
WE have considered  the nature of  Bquitas and Justice, and 
their relations to jus-that  is,  the system of  law.  We have 
now  to approach  the question of  law in another fashion,  to 
consider the nature and significance of  a classification  of  law 
which  the mediaval  civilians  inherited  from  some  parts  of 
the  Digest  and from  the  Institutes  of  Justinian.  Private 
law had been  described by Ulpian  and by the compilers  of 
the Institutes as tripartite,  as consisting of  "  Natural Law," 
the "  Law of  Nations,"  and the "  Civil Law."  We have now 
to consider  the  treatment  of  law  under  the  terms  of  this 
tripartite description. 
We  must begin  by observing  that all  rnedisval  civilians, 
whether of  the school of  Bologna or not, accept the tripartite 
division : it is needless  to cite passages  to establish this,  as 
it is  stated or implied  by every  writer  who  deals  with  this 
aspect of law.  We quote two phrases to illustrate the matter, 
one  from  an anonymous work  which  is  thought  by Fitting 
to belong  to the eleventh  century,-to  be  antecedent,  that 
is,  to the school  of  Bologna,-the  other  from  Placentinus.1 
As  far  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  civilian  down  to the 
time  of  Accursius  who  rejects  or  throws  doubt  upon  the 
propriety  of  the classification.  We must consider  what they 
understand  it to mean,  and  what  is  its  significance.  We 
1 '  Libellus de verbis  Legalibus,'  1 :  i.  2 : "Duplex  est juris  utilitas,  terns 
"  Tria autem sunt principalia jura : jus  est  euctorites,  natura,  gens,  civltas,  .  naturale, jus civile, jus gentium."  sicque jus aliud naturale, aliud gentile, 
Placentlnus,  'Summa Inatltutionum,'  aliud c~v~le." 
hegin  by  considering  the  meaning  of  Natural  Law,  its 
Y -a 
definition  and relations. 
There  is  some  ~tICertainty  as  to what  exactly  the great 
jurists  of  the second  and third centuries understood by the 
phrase.  Ulpian, in one  well-known  phrase,  defines  Natural 
J,W  as  something  very like an animal instinct, rather than 
a  rational  apprehension  and judgment.l  But,  as  we  have 
to  point  out,  an  examination  of  all  the  im- 
portant  references  to the  subject  leads  us  to think that it 
is doubtful whether even Ulpian intended this as a complete  --  ~ 
treatment of the subject-in  other passages he seems to come 
nearer to the conception of  Cicero : and the references 
of  the  other  writers  of  the  Digest  and Institutes,  and  of 
St Isidore of  Seville, seem to show that the jurists  in general 
never  accepted the theory of  Ulpian.  We have endeavoured 
to point out that the legal theory probably held the Natural 
Law to be the body of  principles apprehended by the human 
reason  as  governing  life  and conduct,  principles  which  are 
recognised  as  always  just  and  good.2  This,  as  we  have 
pointed  out, is the sense in which the phrase was understood 
not  only  by  Cicero,  before  the   lawyer^,^  but  also  by  the 
Christian  Fathem4  But we  must  refer  our  readers  to our 
first  volume  for  the  complete  exposition  of  our  judgment 
upon  this subject. 
In what  sense is  the phrase  understood  by the mediaval 
civilians  whom  we  are considering?  In the first  place,  we 
must  observe that t,hey repeat from the Digest  and the In- 
fititutes Ulpian's  description  of  Natural Law, and sometimes 
they  seem  to agree  with  it.  We  may take as  an example 
Placentinus'  commentary on Ulpian's  definition.  Nature, he 
Concludes, is here equivalent to God, who has caused all things 
to be  brought  forth.  The  law  of  nature  is  in  one  aspect 
Permissive, as regards, for instance, the begetting of  offspring ; 
in another, obligatory, with respect to the bringing up of that 
which is begotten : this law is related to all  animal^.^ 
l  Dig., i.  1.  1. 
Vol. i. chap. 3. 
vol. i. pp. 3 6. 
"01.  i. chap. 9. 
6  Placentinus, '  Summa Inst.,'  i.  2 : 
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But  this  passage  if  taken  alone  would  give  us  a  false 
impression  of  the  standpoint  of  these  civilians.  We  get  a 
good  deal  nearer  their  position  in  \he  discussion  of  the 
meaning  of  the  jus  naturale  by  Azo  in  his  work  on  the 
Institutes.  Jus naturale, he says, can be described in several 
fashions ; it may be described as the instinct of  nature, and 
then it  has  reference  to  all  living  creatures,  or it  may  be 
described as  the jus  commune  created  by man,  and in that 
sense it corresponds with  the jus  gentium,  or  yet  again,  it 
may  be  described as that which  is  contained in  the Mosaic 
Law  and  the  Gospel,  or  as  that  which  is  cepuissimum,  or 
again, it may be used for that law which protects agreements, 
and in this sense it is equivalent to the Civil Law.l 
Azo  enlarges  the  scope  of  the  possible  sense  of  ha 
lucturale,  while in the last sentence he suggests an important 
distinction  between the first meaning he  has mentioned and 
the other forms-namely,  that in the first sense it describes 
a physical or sensuous instinct ; in the others it has to deal 
with the reason.  It is important to observe this significant 
distinction  between  Natural  Lam,  as  something  related  to 
instinct, as in Ulpian's definition, and Natural Law as related 
to Reason, as in the other forms of  law mentioned bv Azo. 
. . . Natura  ~d est  Deus,  quia  faclt 
omnla  nascl  Unde  Ovld~us, '  hanc 
Deus et mellor lltem  natura  dlremlt ' 
Est autem  ]us natura per  exemplum, 
prolem  procreare,  quod  est  permls- 
sionls,  procreatam  educare,  quod  est 
necessltatls, compet~tque  hoc  ]us corn 
muniter  et  anlmalibus  brutls,  ]us 
naturale  ~ntelllgo, non  lpsum  educa- 
tlonls  actum,  sed  anlml prsecedentem 
affoctum,  quo  an~mal movetur  ad 
educandum." 
1 Azo,  '  Summa  Inst ,'  1.  2 : ''  Jus 
autem naturale plurlbus modls dlcltur. 
Prlmus est ut d~catur  a natura animatl 
motus  quodam  lnstlnctu  natura,  pro- 
vemens, quo singula animalla ad allquld 
faclendum  ~nducuntur.  Jus naturale 
est quod natura, id est, lpse Deus docult 
omnla  anlmalla.  . . . Dlcltur  emm 
quandoque ]us naturale, ]us commune 
"  -  --- 
hom~num  mdustna  statutum ;  et ~ta 
]us  gentium  potest  dlcl  ]us  naturale 
ut J  do re  dl. slngulorum.  (Inst ,  11. 
1.  11)  Item  dlcltur   us  naturale, 
quad In  lege Mosalca  vel  In  Evangel~o 
continotur  ut legltur  In  Decret.  con 
I.  dlstinc  I.  (Gratlan, Dec.  Dlst ,  1 ) 
Item  dicltur   us  natursle  BE~UISSI- 
mum,  ut  cum  diclt~~r  lapsos  mlnores 
secunclum  aequltatem  restltui,  ut  ff. 
du  mln  1.  1  IU  prlnc.  (Dlg , ~v.  4. 
1 )  Est  etlam  ]us  naturale  quod 
tuetur pacta ut ff  de pac. 1.  I  In pnn. 
(Dlg, 11.  14  1) et  m  llac  slgnlfica- 
tlone  ]us  naturale  potest  dlcl  olvlle. 
Prlma autem definlt~o  data est secun- 
dum  motum  sensualltatls,  allse  autem 
asslgnata  sunt  secundum  modum 
ratlonls "  Cf.  Accursius,  Gloss  on 
Inst., 1.  2,  "  Jus Naturale." 
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we should observe in lhis passage a phrase which is of  great 
importance, the  words  which  identify the jus  naturale with 
the  Law  of  Moses  and  of  the  Gospel.  We  shall  have  to 
this  in  connection  with  the  Canon  Law.  In the 
meantime  we  may  notice  that  the  phrase  is  not  isolated. 
bzo in another work refers to the jus natumle deca10gi.l 
The  formal  definitions  of  the   US  naturale  leave  us  in 
doubt  whether  the  civilians had  arrived  at any  clear  view 
to the sense in which the phrase should be used ; we  may 
conclude that the ambiguity in the definitions of 
the ' Corpus  Juris ' hampered  them  so  much  as to make it 
difficult for them to come  to  any  definite conclusion.  The 
Canon Law presents in this respect a noticeable contrast with 
the Civil Law.  The civilians cannot make up their minds to 
choose between the various senses in which the phrase might 
be used, while the canonists, as we  shall see, decided clearly 
and  definitely in favour of  a particular  usage.  But on the 
whole it seems true to say that while the civilians hesitated 
to  commit  themselves  in  definition  to  any  one  sense  of  - - 
the phrase, they do very constantly mean by the jus naturale 
that  body  of  moral  principles  which  is  always  and  every- 
where recognised by men's reason as bindlng-that  is, they do 
constantly use it in the sense in which it is sometimes used 
in the ' Corpus Juris Civilis,' and regularly in the Canon Law. 
With  all  their  hesitation  about  definitions the  civilians as- 
sert  very  emphatically  that the jus  naturale  is  immutable, 
and not  to be  overridden  by  any  other  system  of  law.  It 
is  a  graver  fault  to be in  error  as  to the Natural  than  as 
to the Civil Law ;  2  no one can be allowed to plead ignorance 
of  it.3  Natural Law is not on the same level as other laws, 
but is in some sense supreme, not normally to be overridden 
l  Azo, '  Summa Cod ,' I  18  11.  mlssum est lgnorare  us naturale, slcut 
Ilnenus, '  De Zqu~tate,'  3  "  Item  dicltur de hberto qul vocav~t  patronum 
PIUS est  culpe  naturale  ]us  lgnorarc  In  JIIS,  non  vcn~a  edlctl  petlta  Nam 
quam clvlle "  etsi  pretendat  lgnorantlam  naturalis 
Roger,  ' Summe  Cod clb,'  I  14  jnr~s,  non subvenltur el quln lncidat In 
"  Itcm  lgnorantla  J~lrlS  alla  naturallq,  edlctum ut C.  de In  ]us vocando, 1.  11." 
~lla  clvllls.  Ignorantla juris  natural18  (Cod ,  11.  2. 2.) 
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by  other  laws,  not  to be  abrogated  except  in  certain  rare 
cases.l  The  principle is  well  brought  out  by  a  passage  in 
Hugolinus' collection of  questions disputed among the jurists, 
in which  he  puts together  the views  of'different  lawyers on 
the question  how  far the emperor's  rescripts,  obtained  con- 
trary to the existing law, were  to be  accepted in the courts. 
We shall have to return to the discussion of  this subject when 
we  deal with  the theory  of  the authority  of  the ruler.  In 
the meanwhile it is enough to observe that, while some jurist 
is represented  as maintaining  that imperial rescripts,  unless 
they  have  been  obtained  by  falsehood,  override  the  Civil 
Law,  he  is  also  represented  to have  said  that if  these  re- 
scripts are contrary to the Natural or the Divine Law, they 
are to be repudiated.  The same principle is here said to have 
been  held  by  Alberic~s.~  Placentinus  lays  down  a  similar 
view  in  his  work  on  the  Institutes, in  discussing the legis- 
lative power  of  the emper~r.~  Azo  also held that a rescript 
of  the emperor  which is  contrary  to Natural Law is  void.4 
It is  clear  from  such  passages  as  these  that the mediaeval 
civilians have carried on from the Institutes the conception 
that  Natural  Law  represents  the  immutable  principles  by 
which the world is governed, principles apprehended by men 
but  not  controlled  by  them.  The  civilians  have  learned 
l Bulgarus,  L Commentary on D~gest,' 
L  17.  8.  "Sangu~n~s,  id  est  cog 
nat~on~s  jnrrt,  quod  naturalla,  n~illo 
lure  clvlll,  ut  emanclpationo,  adop- 
tlone,  tollr  possunt.  Naturalem  enlm 
rat~onem  rut10 clv111s corrumpere  non 
potest .  .  .  Sunt tamen qutedam cl\ il~a 
jura,  ut  maxlma  et  med~a  capitls 
dlmlnut~o  qute  etlam  jura  cogn~tion~s 
tollunt " 
2  Hugollnus,  '  Dlssens~ones  Domln- 
orum,'  5 :  "  S1  vero  rescripta  non 
sint  ehclta,  id  est  per  subrcption- 
em  obtenta  vel  impetrata,  etlams1 
slnt  jun  ~1~111  vs1  gentlum  contra 
na,  peremtonam  except~onem  lndul- 
gent~a,  omnlno  rata  erunt,  nec  ideo 
refutanda.  Juri c~vil~  ldeo &xi,  qma, 
61  juri  natural~  vel  divlno  contrarllx- 
erint, refutantor omnino. . . .  Domm- 
us  Alhcncns  allter  dlstlngu~t: utrum 
ex certa sclentlu Imperator rescriptum 
dod~t,  an per Ignorantlam vel  ohreptl- 
onem, ut, SI ex certa scientla, valeant, 
nisi sunt juri natural~  contraria." 
S  Placentmus,  '  Summa  Institutl- 
onum,' 1.  2 : "  Placu~t  lnquam princlpi 
ut  jus  const~tuat  ~ta  ut  non  contra 
domlnum statuat vel naturam." 
Azo,  'Sum.  Cod ,'  I.  22.  2 : "  S1 
tamen  sit  (rescnptum)  contra  ]us 
humanum : aut ost In  laes~one  alter1113 
aut non.  S1  eqt In lrcs~one  alterlus : bl 
quidem lrcdatur in eo, quod el compet~t 
de  lure  naturaI1,  nullum  est :  qu~a 
lura naturalia dlcuntur immutabil~a  ut 
Inrt~tnt  de juro  net. penult."  (Inst., 
1.  2.  11.) 
from the ' Corpus Juris ' the same conception as that held by 
the canonists. 
I+,  must, however, be noticed carefully that these phrases do 
not by themselves furnish us with a complete or adequate ex- 
position of the theory of Natural Law held by these civilians. 
For  while  in  these  sayings  we  have  the  statement  of  the 
supreme and immutable character of  Natural Law, in other 
places  we  find  the jurists  recognising very  clearly  that  as 
a  matter  of  fact  there  was  much  in the actual law and in 
institutions  which  was  contrary  to  Natural  Law. 
\ve  have  just  cited  a  passage from  Bulgarus,  in  which  he 
asserts that naturalis ratio-i.e.,  in this case, jura naturalia- 
cannot be annulled by Civil Law, but we  should now observe 
that  the jura  cognationis,  which  belong  to  the jzsra  natu- 
ralia, are as a matter of  fact abrogated by capitis dirninuti0.l 
This is  expressed in  more general terms in a treatise  which 
may very probably  be earlier than Bulgarus, in an appendix 
to ' Petri Exceptiones Legum Romanorum.' 
The truth is that the medizeval jurists,  while they say that 
Natural Law is immutable, also maintain that certain rules or 
institutions  of  the Civil Law,  which they recognise as legiti- 
mate,  are in  some  sense  contrary  to Natural  Law.  It will 
be  well  therefore  to consider  their  theories  of  certain insti- 
tutions,  and  when  we  have done this, to ask  how  far these 
represent a coherent system of  thought. 
See p. 32.  penm~t  : veluti  jus  cognationis  natu- 
'  Petr~  Except~onum  Leg.  Rom.,'  rale  est,  per~m~tur  tamen  maxlma 
App. I.  2 : " '  Naturalls jura civil~s  rat10  cap~tls  d~mlnut~one  :  sot  l~oc  facit 
Perlmere non potest ' . per se tantum ;  malefitlum cum jure." 
set allquendo nl~o  sustcntata presldio 
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We  find  that is the contrast  between  the natural  and the 
conventional order  of  society,  illustrated  by  the institut'ion 
of  slavery,  just  as  it is  in  the ancient  lawyers  and in the 
Christian  Fathers.  We  must  presently  consider  how  far 
the  same  thing  is  true in  the  case  of  these  civilians  with 
regard  to  the institution  of  private  property.  But  before 
doing this,  it will  be  convenient  to consider a little further 
the principles  of  the civilians  with  regard  to the  position 
of  the slave.  As  far as we  can judge,  these do not in any 
important  point  depart  from  the  principles  of  the ancient 
law,  but  perhaps  they  carry  a  little farther  that  tendency 
to modify  the condition  of  slavery  which  we  find  in  the 
' Corpus Juris '-at  any rate, they restate some of  the plarases 
which exhibit this tendency. 
The  author  of  the ' Brachylogus,'  Bulgarus,  and Azo,  all 
restate  the  principle  of  the jus  &vile-that  the  slave  has 
no  persona.l  But Bulgarus  points  out that, under  the jus 
.natzcrale,  the slave is Jnder " obligations,"  and  others  may 
be  under  " obligations " to him,  and these  obligations  can 
be  enforced  under  the  Przetorian  law.  The  slave  cannot 
indeed  sue  or  be  sued  in  civil  cases,  but  he  can  both  sue 
and be sued in criminal matters ; he can proceed even against 
his  master  in  such  cases,  and  can  appear  against  him  to 
maintain  his  own  liberty  and in some other   matter^.^ 
1 '  Brachylogus,' i. 9. 2 : "  Servienim 
jure  civili  nullam  personam  habent ; 
ideo  nuptias,  qum  juris  civilis  sunt, 
non  contrahunt." 
Bulgarus,  '  Comm.  on  Dig.,'  L.  17. 
107 : "  Servus in civili causa nec agere 
potest nec conveniri." 
Azo,  'Sum.  Cod.,'  iv.  36 :  "  Quia 
quantum  ad  jus  illud  (civile) servus 
pro mortuo habetur." 
2  Bulgarus, '  Comm. on Dig.,' L.  17. 
22 : "  ' In  pcrsonam servilem nulla cadit 
obligatio.'  Jure quidem naturali, quo 
liber  est, naturaliter  obligatur.  Civili 
vero, quo neque civis est, neque civil- 
iter  obligatur.  Dominum  autem  de 
peculio jure prietorio, ex suo contractu 
obligat, sicut ex delictis privatis noxal- 
iter, ex publicis  autem  delictis natur- 
aliter  et  civiliter  obnoxius  constitu- 
itur."  L.  17.  32:  " '  Quod  attinet 
ad  jus  civile,'  etc.  Servi  pro  nullis 
habentur,  quia  nec  civilia  munera 
gerunt,, nec alios obligant  sibi, nec  so 
aliis.  Jure  vero  naturali,  quo  omnes 
homines  aequales  sunt  et obligant,  et 
obligantur.  Undo  et alios dominis et 
dominos aliis jure  prztorio  obligant." 
L.  17. 107 : " '  Cum  servo nullo actio 
est.'  In  criminali  et  accusari  et 
accusare  potcst,  quandoque  etiam 
dominum.  Sod  et  pro  libertate  ad- 
versus  dominum  consistere  potest: 
sicut et in servitutem vindicari.  Idem 
de possessione  momentanea  et sepul- 
chro violato agit, et cum eo agitur." 
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When we turn to the subject of  the limitation of  the rights 
of  masters  over their slaves, we  find that in the main these 
jurists  restate  the position  of  the  older  law.  Placentinus, 
for instance,  sums up its most  important  provisions in  one 
passage founded on Inst., i. 8.  The master could once ill-treat 
or kill his  slave at his  pleasure, now  he  may not do  any of 
these things without definite cause, and even if he has cause, 
if  he  Bills  his  slave,  he  will  be  punished  as though  he had 
killed  another  man's  slave  or  a  freeman,  and he  may  not 
ill-treat  him  beyond  reasonable  measure.  If  he  does  this, 
the  slave  is  to  be  compulsorily  so1d.l  Roger  puts  one 
point  very  clearly  when,  in  commenting  on  a  rescript 
of  Constantine  (Cod., ix.  14), he  expIains  that the master 
has  the right  to punish  his  slave,  but  if  in  doing  so  he 
wilfully  kills  him,  he  will  be  liable  to  a  charge  of  homi- 
~ide.~  Azo,  commenting  on  Inst., i. 8, repeats  the view  of 
Placentinus  and  the   institute^,^  and  does  the  same  when 
commenting on  Cod.,  ix.  14, but  with  some  modifications, 
and,  as  he  says,  differing  from  Placentinus  on  one  point. 
The master,  he  says,  who  kills  his  slave without  cause and 
wilfully, is liable to the same charge as though he had killed 
a freeman ; but if, he says, the master punish him reasonably, 
then  he  is not liable  to any punishment,  and he  adds  that 
l Placentinus,  'Sum.  Inst.,'  i.  7 : 
"  Et quidem  potestas  dominica  juris 
pntium est, et olim in servos domini 
latissime  competebat,  poterant  enim 
impune  eos  occidere,  multo  fortius 
intollerabiliter verberare,  atqui coerci- 
tionem  accepit.  Non  enim  licet 
domino  sine  causa  justa  in  servum 
8uUm  srovire,  nec  etiam  causa  inter- 
cedente  supra  modum.  . . . Ergo  si 
9uis  ocoiderit  servum  proprium  iha 
Punietur  per  legem  Corneliam, ac  si 
Occiderit servum alienum, hominem ve 
liberurn,  sed  Aquilia  non  tcnebitur, 
domino  et non  contra  dominum 
ex ordine competit.  Sed et si dominus 
servum non  occiderit,  sed  alias  male 
tractaverit, cum venundare hoc in casu 
bonis conditionibus  jubebitur,  ut  nec 
amplius  ad  dominum  revertatur,  nec 
ab  emptore  pcssime  tractetur.  Et 
interest  dominorum,  servis  juste 
depecantibus auxilium  non  denegari, 
duplici  ratione,  ut  vel  modicum  ac- 
cipiant  pretium,  et ne  eis  justa  de. 
precontibus,  rensura  simili  negetur 
auxilium." 
Roger,  '  Summa  Cod.,'  ix.  12 : 
"  Post  vim  illicitam  tractat  de  licita 
que  adllibetur  ad  emendationem  ser- 
vorum  sive proquinquorum  si  corrop- 
tionis  causa  virgis  aut  loris  scrvum 
dominus  afllixerit  aut in vincula  con- 
jecerit.  Servo mortuo nullum  crimen 
in  his  seu  metum  patietur ;  sod  si 
volantate ictus fustis aut lapidis enm 
occiderit, homicidii erit obnoxius." 
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Placentinus  had  stated a contrary opinion.  This is not the 
case  in  Placentinus'  treatise  on  the  Institutes  just  quoted, 
but it  may  be  so  in  the  treatise  on  the  Code,  or  in  some 
gloss;  it  would  be  interesting  if  indeed  Placentinus  had 
expressed this view, but it seems irnprobab1e.l  It is import- 
ant  to  notice  that  Placentinus  says  that  a  master  killing 
his  slave without  cause  will  be  punished  as though  he  had 
killed  a freeman,  and that Azo  says the same.  This  seems 
to be stronger than either Inst., i. 8, or Cod., ix. 14. 
The mediaeval jurists  again follow the Code  in recognising 
the Churches as places  of  sanctuary.  Roger is  clear that s 
slave taking  refuge in a  church must be  surrendered to his 
master, but only when the latter takes an oath that he will 
not punish  him,2 while Azo  holds  that those who  have fled 
from their masters to the church, in order to escape excessive  - 
cruelty, are to be sold, and not restored to him.3 
With regard  to the question  of  the ordination  of  a slave, 
Azo  reproduces  the  provisions  of  Novel  123.  17.  Slaves 
ordained  with  their  master's  consent  are  free;  if  ordained 
Azo, '  Sum  Cod ,' ~x.  14  "  Sclen- 
dum  est  autem  quod  domlnus  ohm 
impune poterat oco~dere  servum suum 
bed  hodle dlstlngultu, an occ~dat  justa 
causa  ut tunc non teneatur, ut ff  de 
verborum  obligation~b 1  qui  servum, 
et de  legatis  primo  1  quld  ergo  8  SI 
hams (Dlg  xlv  1  96 and xxx  1 53, 3) 
an slne causa.  et tunc aut voluntate 
sue aut casu aut culpa  In prlmo casu 
tenetur, tanquam SI l~berum  occld~sset 
In secundo nu110  mod0 ut lnfra eodem 
1.  unlca  (Cod  IX.  14)  Ubl  autem 
verberlbus  et fame  lpsum  affliglt  SI 
~d fieret  modelate,  impuultum  er~t 
licet  Placentlnus  dlxer~t  contrariunl. 
51  autem  ~mmode~ate  fiat.  confugere 
potest  servus ad statuas vel  pr~s~des, 
ut compellatur  dommus  vendere  ser- 
vum  bonls  cond~tionlbus, ld  est  ne 
levertatur  IU  domm  potcstatem,  ut 
Inrt~tut de 11s qul su~  vel allen~  jurle 
sunt 5 ult " (Inst  I  S) 
Roge~,  ' Sum.  Cod ,'  I.  10 
"  Chrlbtlanl qudam sunt servl, qudam 
hber~. Servi nu110  modo  debe~lt  sus- 
clpi,  msi  propter  domin~  durit~am  vel 
lntollerabilcm  lnjurlam  confugerlnt. 
Hac  causa  cessante non  sunt  SU~CI~I 
 end^.  Set  sl  lnoplnate  In  ecclesla 
Invent1 fuerlnt,  mox  ab  yconomls et 
alns  clerlcls  dominls  sunt  reddendl, 
sacrament0  tamen  prest~to  quod 
nullain  patiantur  lnjur~arn  a  domlnls 
propter hanc offensam  S1 vero etlam 
llac  caucione  prastita  noluer~nt ad 
domlnum  redre,  manu  mox  lnjccta 
revocentur,  et si  cont~gerlt  confhg~  111 
ipsa  concertatlone,  dominus  nullam 
penarn pac~etur  " 
Azo,  '  Sum  Cod ,'  I.  12 :  The 
slave  who  fl~es  to  a  church  1s  to  be 
delwered up to h~s  master  "  Et hoc, 
81  servus  confuger~t ad  ecclosianl 
propter  dellctum  suum  alloquln,  si 
propter  szv~tlam  domin~,  compellltur 
domlnus  vendere  lpsum  bon~s con- 
cllt~onlbus, ld  est,  ne  amplius  reler- 
tatur in potestate domlm " 
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without the knowledge of the master he can within one year 
that the man  is  his  slave,  and reclaim  him.'  With 
,gard  to  the  reception  of  slaves  into  monasteries,  Azo 
the  provisions of  Nov.  5,  2.  If  any  unknown 
,an  enter  a  monastery,  he  is  not  to receive the habit for 
three years, and if  within that time his master  appears and 
proves  that he  is  his  slave,  or  adscriptius,  or  colonus,  and 
that  he  has  fled to  the monastery  to escape  his  work,  or 
because he  had  committed  some theft or other crime, he is 
to be  restored  to his  master,  on  an oath  that he  will  not 
punish  him.  But if  after three  years  he  has  received  the 
habit,  no  claim is to be entertained.2 
It remains  to notice  some  statements by  these  jurists  on 
the  position  of  the  ascriptitius,  and  the  distinction  they 
draw  between  his  position  and that of  the slave.  Irnerius, 
commenting on Florentinus'  definition of  slavery in Digest, 
i. 5. 4, says that the ascriptitius is not subject to the dornin- 
ion  of  another man,  but is  the slave of  the estate  (glebe).3 
Placentinus  is  more  explicit,  and  says  that  in  his  judg- 
ment  the  mcriptitius  is  liber,  although  he  is  servus  glebe.4 
And  Azo  is  even  more  dogmatic,  and  maintains  that  the 
asoriptitius  is  really  free  (liber), although  he  is  bound  by 
1 Azo, '  Sum. Cod ,' I  3  I4 : "  Serv~ 
autem  sl  fiant  clerlcl  sclentlbus  et 
non  contrad~cent~bus  dominls,  liber1 
fiunt:  SI  autem  lgnorant~bus, llcet 
domno  lntra  annum  fortunam  ser- 
wlem  probare,  et  suum  servurn 
reclpere "  Cf. Nov  123  17. 
P Azo,  '  Sum  Cod ,'  I  3.  16. 
"Nunc  autem  de  monachls  . . . 81 
autem  incogn~tus  s~t,  per  tres  annos 
habitum  el  non  przstet,  sed  expen- 
mentum  et  probat~onem v~tz   psiu us 
acclplat  SI  quldem  lntra  trlennlum 
vcnerlt  allquls  dlcens  sum  servum 
mum esse, vel  adscrlptitlum, vel  col- 
Onurn, et ~deo  ad monasterium venisse, 
Ut  cultulam  agrorum  effugeret,  vel 
PrcPter  furta,  et  aha  dellcta  monas- 
tenum  ~ntrasse,  eaque  fuerlnt  appro- 
domino suo reddatul  cum rebus, 
quae In monaster~um  duxisse probetm: 
ut tamen prlus  quldem ]us lurandum 
acclp~at a  domlno  suo,  quod  ~hil 
patlatur.  S1  autem  lntra  trlennlum 
nemo  ex  przdlct~s  personls  lnqmet- 
averlt eum, et transact0 trlennlo osten- 
dent  se  probatum  Egumeno  ~d eat 
Abbat~,  det  el  schema  et  nullus  el 
postea  pro fortuna  s~t  molestus donec 
tamen In monaster~o  deget " 
J  Irner~us, '  Glosses  on  the  Dlgest 
Vetus ' (ed E  Besta), I.  5  4,  8  3  "  V. 
Manu  cap~antur  . Y  ascrlptltia enlm 
cond~c~o  non  est  ea  qua  quis  alleno 
subjio~tur  dominio,  sed  glebe  servus 
intelllgtur, non princlpal~ter  persorle " 
4  Placentlnus,  '  Sum.  Inst ,'  1.  3. 
"  Ascript~tius  quoque meo ludiclo hber 
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certain  kinds  of  serz~itium,~  and he  repeats  the provisi~n  of 
t,he Novels  that  he  can  be  ordained  without  his  master's 
consent,  but  must  in  that  case  continue  to  fulfil his  agri- 
1 Azo,  'Sum.  Inst.,'  i.  3 : "  Est 
orgo  notanda  summa  d~visio  person- 
arum,  quod  omnes homines aut liberi 
sunt aut servi, id est, omnis homo aut 
eet  liber  aut  servus,  ut  ita  pluralis 
oratio rosolvatur  in  singularem, ut ff. 
do  condic.  vet.  1.  fdsa demonstratio 
3  ult.  (Dig.,  xxxv.  1.  33,  4),  ut ita 
v~tetur  oppovitio de duobus assignatis, 
quorum  unus  est  liber,  alter  sorvus. 
Nec  est oppouitio  de  ascripticio,  quia 
vere liber ost, licet quodam servitio sit 
astrictus,  ut  C.  de  episcopis et cl.  1. 
jubemus  (Cod.,  i.  3.  36)  et  Aut. 
ascripticios (Nov., 123. 17)."  The text 
quoted  is  that  of  Maitland  in  his 
' Eracton  and Azo.'  Tho text of  the 
Basle edition of  Azo reads : "  Quia fere 
liber est.  lmmo videtur quod vere sit 
servus, cum inter adscriptitios et servos 
nulla  sit differentia, ut C.  de  agri. et 
censi. 1.  no diutius 5  si quis " (Cod., xi. 
48.  31,  5  1).  Cf. for discussion of  text 
of  Azo, Maitland's '  Bracton and Azo,' 
p.  xxxiv.  Cf.  Aocursius,  'Gloss  on 
Dig.,' i. 5.  3, "  Summa" : "Sed quid de 
ascriptitiis  ?  Respon.  liberi sont . . . 
vel melius quo ad dominos servi sunt : 
quo ad extraneos liberi." 
2  Azo, '  Sum. Cod.,' i. 3.  14 : "Nam 
ascriptitii  contra  voluntetem  domin- 
orum etiam in possessionibus, in quibus 
sint adsoripti, fieri possunt clerici : ita 
tamen ut clerici facti impositam  agri- 
cu1ture;m adimpleant."  Cf. Nov.  123. 
17. 
CHAPTER  V. 
THE THEORY  OF PROPERTY. 
IT has  been  pointed  out in the first volume, that while the 
legal  and  patristic  theories  of  Natural  Law  and  natural 
equality are related to the same philosophical principles, there 
is a difference between them as to the nature of  property and 
its relation  to the  Natural  Law.  It  is  not  indeed  certain 
whether  all the jurists  held  the same opinions,  we  have  no 
information as to the opinion of  Ulpian, and one passage of 
Hermogenianus suggests that he may have held that property 
belonged  to  the  jus  gewtium,  and not  to  the jus  fiaturale, 
but  it is  clear  that many  of  t8he great jurists  conceived  of 
property as a nat,ural instituti0n.l  The Fathers, on the other 
hand,  clearly  held  that property  was  not  an institution of 
nature, that it belonged to the state of  convention as opposed 
to  the  state of  nature12  and it is  fairly clear that they had 
learned  this  doctrine  from  the  pl~ilosophers like  Sene~a.~ 
This  doctrine  assumed  a  legal form  in  the  Etymologies  of 
Isidore of  Seville ;  his  phrase is  perhaps  ambiguous, as 
we  have  pointed  out,* but  it was  in  the  Middle  Ages  un- 
doubtedly taken  to  mean  that under  the Natural  Law  all 
Property  was  held  in  common.  It is  highly  probable  that 
this phrase of  St Isidore is derived from some juristic  source, 
for it is most probable that his legal chapters are based upon 
law-book which we  have losL5 
when  we  now  turn  to  t,he  theory  of  property  in  the 
l  Cf. vol. i., chap. 4.  4  Cf. vol. i., pp. 142,  144. 
Cf. vol.  i., chap. 12.  5  Cf.  Volgt,  'Die  Lehre  vom  jns 
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medieval  civilians,  it  is  extremely  interesting  to find  that 
they  waver  between  these  two  traditions.  Some  of  them 
simply repeat the general legal  doct,rine that property is an 
institution  of  natural  law;  others  dogmatically  assert  the 
patristic theory ; while others again seem to hesitate between 
the two views. 
We begin with some references to the subject in those works 
i 
which are either earlier than the school of  Bologna, or at  least 
independent of  it.  Conrat and Fitting have published a gloss 
on the  Institutes  which  they  consider  to be  entirely  inde- 
pendent  of  Bologna ;  a  passage  in  this  speaks  of  things 
which  are acquired by the civil law or by the natural 1aw.l 
Fitting  has  published  a  little  work  which  he  considers  to 
belong to the eleventh century, and to be of  North Frankish 
origin,  consisting of  definitions  of  legal terms.  This explains 
possessio  in  the  terms  of  Digest,  xli.  2.  1, and  then  adds 
that it is either natural or civil.2  Another treatise, the ' De 
Nature  Actionum,'  speaks  of  the  accio  in rern  to which  a 
man has  the right,  who  has  dominiurn  by  civil  or  natural 
law;  and it is  interesting  to notice  that the  author  has 
misquoted  the  passage  in  the  Digest  which  he  is  citing- 
unless  indeed  his  text  was  different,  for  Paulus,  in  this 
passage  in the Digest,  speaks of  those  who  have  dominium 
by  the law  of  nations  or  by  civil  law.  Fitting  has  sug- 
gested that Placentinus  is  correcting  this  treatise,  when  in 
his  work  De Varietate Actionum ' he states that dominiurn 
does not belong to the jus naturale; he  shall recur to this 
presently.  The ' Brachylogus ' enumerates  six  methods  by 
which  men  acquire  dorninia  under  Natural  Law;  clearly 
l  ' Cologne Gloss on the Institutes ' : 
"Cum  superius  sit  locutus  de rcbus 
que  jure  civili  vel  naturali  aclcluir- 
untur."  Fitting has shown that there 
is vcry strong evidence that the author 
of  this  is  Gualcausus  of  Pavia.  See 
his  '  Die  Institutionem  Glossen  des 
Gualcausus.' 
'  Libellns do Verbis Legalibus,' 54 : 
"  Possessio  dicitur  quasi positio  sedir, 
quia  naturaliter tenetur  ab eo  qui  ci 
insistit.  Possessio  naturalis  sive  civ- 
ilis  detentio est." 
'  De  Iqatura  Actionum,'  63 : 
"  Accionum  in  rem  alie  utiles,  alie 
directe.  Directe,  que  domino  com- 
petunt, ut in Dig. :  'In rem  accio  ei 
competit  qui  jure  civili  vel  naturali 
dominium habet.' "  Cf. Dig. vi.  1. 23. 
H. Fitting, '  Juristischo  Schriften, 
&C.,' p. 58, note 5. 
S  Placentinus, ' De Var. Act.,'  i. 4. 3. 
m  TBE;ORY  OF PROPERTY. 
the  of  the treatise had no doubt that the institution 
of private property belonged to it.l 
When we turn to the great jurists connected with Bologna,  ,  find  that they  are  divided-some  definitely  taking  one 
A,,  while  others hold  the opposite  one,  while  some  speak  "LU,.,  . - 
in terms which are a little difficult to interpret. 
Imerius, in a gloss on the Digest, lays down the principle 
that  there  is  no  private  property  by  nature ;  while  in 
another gloss he  says  that private property is one  of  those 
institutions which  illustrate  the meaning of  the saying that 
by  the civil law something may be  added to or taken from 
the  ius  commune,  and  that  in  the  case  of  property  this 
-  " 
had  been  done  by iniq~itas.~  These  statements  seem  very 
clear  and unequivocal.  Private property is  a  conventional, 
not a natural,  institution ; and Irnerius seems to mean that 
it  is  the result  of  some  vicious  disposition,  as  Seneca  and 
the  Fathers  had  held.  We  should  indeed  be  inclined  to 
suspect  the  influence  of  the  patristic  tradition.  In the 
'Summa  Codjcis,'  which  Professor  Fitting  ascribes  to 
Imerius, we  find, however,  a different view.  In one passage 
the  author  speaks  of  the  beginnings  of  naturalis  juris 
domidun~,  and gives  an account  of  the  origin  of  property 
by "  occupation," "  accession," "  translation,"  as in Institutes, 
ii. 1, or Digest,  xli. 1  ;  and a  little farther on he  says that 
there  is  a  natural  as  well  as  a  civil  posse~sion.~  In a 
l '  Brachylogus,'  ii.  2 :  "  Speciali  ipse :  ista  litera  dicit,  jus  civile  est, 
autem jure  dominia rerum  quoeruntur  quod  neque  a  jure  naturali  vel  gen- 
jure  naturali  aut  jure  civili.  Jure  tium in totum recedit,  nec  per omnia 
naturali quaeruntur dominia rerum sex  ei  servit :  cum  ergo  a  jure  aliquid 
modis : occupatione, inventiono, speci-  additur  vel  detrahitur  juri  communi, 
ficatione, contributione, accessione, tra-  illud  jus  civile  efficitur.  Dicit  glosa 
ditione."  intorlinearis :  additur  vel  detrahitur 
Imerius, '  Glosses on the Dig. Vet.'  juri  communi,  tum nova  materia,  ut 
(ad. Besta), i.  1. 5 : "  v. distinct&.  Y.  tutela :  turn  forma ut servitus : tum 
natura onim nichil privatum."  acquitas,  ut  matrimo~um,  tum  ini- 
Imerius,  '  Glosses  on  Dig.  Vet.'  quitas ut dominium, et sic interlinearis 
(in  Savigny,  '  Geschichte  des  R6m.  glosa denotat quatuor." 
Rechts,  &C.,'  vol.  iv.  p.  387,  &C.)  4  Irnerius, '  Summa Cod.,' vii. 23. l : 
Dig.* i.  1.  6.  Odofredus  in  his  L. :  "  Nnnc  possessionis  ratio  cdisserenda 
"  Unde dominus yr. lucerna juris super  est.  Et quia  neque  usucapio  neque 
lege  scripsit  glosam  intorlinearem  longa przscriptio sine possessione con- 
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collection  of  the  "  Distinctiones " of  the  oldest  glossators, 
it is  said that possession  may  be understood in two ways- 
either as civil, which is a matter of  law ; or as natural, which 
is a matter corpo~is  vel facti.  Natural possession is described 
in  terms suggested by the definition of  Paulus (Digest, XI. 1. 
2, 1)  as " quasi pedum positio seu assessio "--that is, in terms 
of  physical occ~pation.~ 
The jurists of  the latter part of  the twelfth century present 
very  conflicting opinions.  We  have a report  of  the opinion 
of  Joannes  Bassianus, in  which  he  is represented  as having 
held that those things which are still common property have 
continued under the primeval natural law, by which all things 
were  c~mmon.~  Placentinus,  in  his  treatise  ' De  Varietate 
Actionum,'  says  explicitly  that  by  the  jus  naturale  all 
things are common, and there is no private property ;  and 
in  his  Summa  on  the  Institutes  he  says  that property  in 
things  is  acquired by  the jus  civile or the jus  gentium,  but 
not  by  the jus  naturale,  by  which  all  things  are  c~mmon.~ 
sessione apponit, cum et naturalis juris  pori incumbit vel assidet, quod interpre- 
dominium  ab apprehensione  origiuem  tatione civilis juris latius porrigitur." 
traxit. . . . 10. Alias autem possessio  a  Joannes Bassianus (cited in edition 
a  te incipit,  alias ab alio  priore  pos-  of '  Corpus Juris,' Antwerp, 1575, which 
sessore in  to  transfertur, cum  et pos-  contains the gloss  of  Accursius), Inst., 
sessio  tribus  modis  tibi  acquiratur :  ii. 1. 6 : " ' Publicus ' ; Cujus respectu 
aut enim  occupat,ione, aut accessione,  vera  sit opinio Joan, nam  communia 
aut  translatione.  Per  occupationem  sunt  relicta  sub  suo  jure  naturali 
vacuam  seu  que  a  nemine  detinetur  primzevo, quo omnia erant communia." 
acquiris possessionem : quo casu  a  te  I owe  this  passage  to Note  137 in 
incipit  et  omnino,  sive  nullins  fuit  F.  Maitland's  translation of  a part of 
sive alienam vacantem occupas.  Cum  Gierke's  '  Das  Deutnche  Genossen- 
enim  quod  nullius  est  natura  posses-  schaftsrecht.' 
eionem occupas, etiam (et)  ex ca causa  a  Placentinus,  '  De  Variotate  Aot- 
tibi dominium acquiritnr : cumenim jus-  ionum,'  i.  47 :  "  Competit  autem  in 
tam causam possidendi habos, pro suo  rem  actio ei  qui dominium adquisivit 
possides, ut in fcris bestiis (et) lapillis  jure  civili,  vel  gentium,  non  jure 
in litore  inventis.  . . . 20.  In summa  naturali:  nempe  eo jure  omnia  sunt 
est naturalis possessio, est et civilis."  communia, nulla privata." 
1 '  Antiquissimorum Glossatorum Dis.  4  Placeutinus,  '  Summa  Instituti- 
tinctionea,' lxxv. : "  Pos~essionum  du-  or~um,'  ii.  1 :  HUCIIS~U~  de  rerum 
plex  est  ratio :  aut  enim  civilis  est  divisione, nunc  autem  de  acquirendo 
qua:  juris  dicitur,  aut  naturalis  quse  ipsarum  rerum  dominio  disscramus. 
corporis vel facti nuncupat'ur.  Et. qui-  Adquiruntur  omnia  rerum  dominia 
dem possessio nnturalis cut quasi pedum  non  jure  naturali,  quo  omnia  sunt 
positio seu assosxio, ut cum corpus cor-  communia, sed jure  civili et gentium." 
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the  other  hand,  in  the '  Surnma Codicis ' attributed  to 
Roger we  find that the  author definitely holds  that a  man 
may  have  property  in  some  yartic~~lar  thing  by  the jus 
fiaturale, while  another  may  have  property  in  the  same 
thing  by  the jus  gentium  or  the  jus  OCvile,  and  he  takes 
the  well-known example of  t,he picture  from Digest,  xli.  1, 
ssd  Instit., ii. 1  :  the owner  of  the  material  on  which  the 
picture is  painted may  claim by the jus  naturale, while  the 
painter may  claim by the jus  gentiurn or the jus  civile, and 
each has  his  appropriate method  of  procedure :  the former 
has the actio utilis, the latter the actio direota.l 
The  treatment  of  this  subject  by  Azo  is  somewhat 
difficult, and  it  is  specially  complicated  by  the  fact  that 
while,  as  we  have  seen,  he  distinguishes  between  the jus 
gentium  and  the  jus  naturale,  he  also,  as  we  have 
pointed out, holds that the phrase jus  naturale may be used 
in  several  senses :  it may  be  defined  as  something  quite 
distinct  from  the  jus  gentiurn,  but  it  may  also  in  one 
sense  be  identified  with  it,  and,  in  another  sense  still,  it 
may  be  identified  with  the  Mosaic  Law  and  the  G~spel.~ 
In  one  passage  of  this  ' Summa  Institutionum '  he  says 
dogmatically that it  is  not by the jus  naturale, but by  the 
jus  gentium  or &vile, that we  obtain property:  this  is  the 
more  noticeable owing  to the fact  that the passage  of  the 
Institutes  on  which  he  is  com~enting  says  expressly that 
men  become  the owners of  some  things  by  the jus naturale 
quod  sicut  dixirnzcs  appellatur jus  genti~m.~  Azo  evidently 
Roger,  '  Summa  Codicis,'  iii.  21 :  '  See p. 30. 
"  Directa (acrio) ei competit qui dom-  Azo,  '  Summe  Instit.,'  ii.  1.  20 : 
inus est jurc  gentium,  vel jure  civili :  "  Supereat  ut  videamus  de  adquisi- 
jure  gentium  ut  iuventione,  occupa-  tiono  dominii  rerum.  Adquiruntur 
tione, &C.-jure  civili ut usucapione,  autem  dominia  rerum  non  jure 
Si  autem  domiuus  sit  jure  naturali,  naturali,  aed  gentiurn  vel  civili. 
tam@n cum  alius  sit  dominus  jure  Civili  multis  modis,  ut  usucapione. 
gentiurn  vel  civili,  habet  utilem,  ut  . . . Commodius  est  autem  a  vetus- 
dicitur  de  eo  qui  pinxit  tabulam :  tiore  incipere, id est a  naturali,  quod 
nam domilms tabul~  remanet dominus  dicitur gentium, quod c-  ipso genere 
jure naturali, is qui pinxit est dominus  humano  rerum  uatura  prodidit  . . . 
jure  gentium.  Domino  jure  nnturali  Jure  igitur  gontium  dominia  ad- 
datur  utilis,  dominio  jure  gentium  quiruntur nobie multis modis." 
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means that in the strictest sense we  do not obtain property 
by  the  natural  law,  but  only  in  that sense  in  which  the 
natural law may  be  identified  with  the law of  nations.  It 
is in this sense no doubt that a little farther on in the same 
passage  Azo  follows  the Institutes in  speaking  of  property 
by traditio as belonging  to the jus  natura1e.l  His  theory is 
again set out in a passage of  his ' Summa Codicis,' when  he 
defines the nature of  possession, and says that it is naturalis, 
but not under that jus naturale which belongs to all animals, 
for the irrational anima.1~  cannot have the desire for posses- 
si~n.~  On the other hand, in his ' Summa Institutionum ' he 
quotes the sentence of  Hermogenianus  in Dig., i. 1. 5, which 
speaks  of  dominia  distincta  as  having  been  introduced  by 
the jus  gentium,  but  adds  that he  does  not  mean  to say 
that dominia  were  first  brought  into  existence  by  the jus 
gentium,  for  according  to  the  Old  Testament  some  things 
are  mine,  some  things  thine,  and  theft  was  pr~hibited.~ 
In another  place  he  says  that  theft  is  forbidden  by,  the 
jus  natura1el4 and  again  that it  is  prohibited  by  the jus 
naturale  decalogi15 and  yet  once  more,  defining  the  nature 
l Azo,  '  Summa  Instit.,'  ii.  1.  55 : 
"  Acquiritur  etiam nobis dominium de 
jure naturali per traditionem." 
Azo, '  Summa Codicis,' vii.  32.  1 : 
"  Est  autem  possessio,  corporalis  rei 
detentio, corporis et animi,  item juris 
adminiculo  concurrentc.  . . . Item 
ideo dicitur possessio,  detentio : quia 
naturaliter  tenetur  ab eo,  qui  insistit 
ei.  Est  enim  appellata  possessio  (ut 
ait Labeo) pedum  quasi positio, ut ff. 
eodem.  1.  i.  in  principio  (Dig.,  xli. 
2.  1). . . . 4.  Haec talis possessio qnam 
quis  corpore suo,  vel  oculis,  et animi 
affectu adipiscitur,  naturalis est ut ff. 
eodem  1.  i.  in  principio  (Dig.,  xli. 
2.  1) id  est  do  jure  naturali,  quod 
gentium appellatur.  Non  dico de jure 
naturali omnium animalium, ut Instit. 
de  rerum  divisio,  $  per  traditior~em 
(Instit.,  ii.  1.  40).  Nam  irrationalia 
animalia  affectum possidendi  habere 
non  possunt." 
a  Azo,  '  Summa  Instit.,'  i.  2.  6 : 
"  Item ex hoc jnre gentium introducta 
sunt  bella  . . .  dominia  distincta, 
scilicet,  directa  ab utilibus  et e  con- 
verso.  Non  dico,  quod  dominia  sint 
inventa de jure gentium de novo : quia 
et  veteri  Testamento  aliquid  erat 
meum,  aliquid  tuum:  unde  et pro- 
hibcbatur  fieri  furtum,  et  przecipie- 
batur ne retineat mercedem mercenarii 
sui." 
'  Azo,  '  Summa  Instit.,'  iv.  1 : 
"  Licet  enim  furtum  naturali  jure 
prohibitum  sit." 
G  Azo,  '  Summa  Cod.,'  i.  18.  11 : 
"Item  et si  putat  sibi licere impune 
occiclere,  vel  furtum  committcre,  vel 
rapinam,  vel  adulterium ;  quze  etiam 
jure  naturali  decalogi  prohibita  sunt. 
Nam  nihilominus  tenebitur  furti  ex 
illo speciali delicto, quod jure  naturali 
prohibitum est." 
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of  theft, he  says that it is contrary to the jus  maturale, for 
the  Divine  authority  warns  us  not  to do  to  others  what 
we  should  not  wish  them  to  do  to us,  and the Decalogue 
forbids us to stea1.l  The  statement that theft  is  forbidden 
by  the  jus  naturale  is  no  doubt  taken  from  Paulus  in 
Dig.,  xlvii.  2.  1, repeated  in Inst., iv. 1. 1, but  Azo  here 
identifies  the  jzcs  naturale  with  the  Decalogue,  and  we 
must understand  him  under  the terms  of  this  identification. 
bother passage  is interesting,  as illustrating the conception 
that one form at least  of  property  has been  created for the 
public  convenience,  but  is  contrary  to naturalis  mpuitas : 
what exactly Azo meant by this phrase it, is difficult to say. 
If we attempt to sum up his position, we should incline to 
say that it is governed by the tradition  of  the Fathers, and 
possibly  of  the canon lawyers, to this extent, that he recog- 
nises that in some sense private property is not an institution 
of  Natural Law ; but we  must bear in mind that Azo  held 
that  the  phrase "  jus  naturale "  could  be  used  in  many 
senses.  He holds  that private property  does  not belong  to 
the  jus  naturale,  if  you  understand  this  in  the  sense  of 
Ulpian's  definition-that  is, as describing the instincts which 
men  have in  common  with  the other animals ; but it does 
belong  to the jus  naturale  as identified  with the Decalogue, 
and Azo  seems to mean  that in this  sense it  may be prior 
to the jus genti~m.~ 
'  Azo,  '  Summa  Cod.,'  vi.  2.  1 : 
"  Est  autem  furtum  fraudulosa  con- 
trectatio  rei  alienn, mobilis corporalis, 
quae  fit invito domino, animo lucrandi, 
scilicet gratia rei  vel  possessionis,  vel 
Usus,  quod  etiam  jure  naturali  pro- 
hibitum  est,  ut  ff.  eod.  1.  i.  $  ult. 
(Dig., xlvii.  2.  1) et Instit. do  oblig. 
qute  ex  delicto  nas.  5  primo  (Inst., 
iv.  1.  1).  Nam  et  divina  tcstatur 
authoritas,  quod  tibi  non  vis,  alteri 
ne  feceris.  Itern  hoc  eat  unum  do 
Preceptis deralogi.  Furtum ne  facias. 
. . 7. Quod jure  naturali prohibitum 
est, ponitur in definitione ad majorem 
COm~r~bationem  ipsius." 
'  Azo,  '  Summa  Cod.,'  vii.  26.  l : 
"  Est  autem  inducta  usucapio  bono 
public0 id est, utilitate publica, contra 
zcquitatem  naturalem,  sicut  et  ser- 
vitutes." 
8  It is possible that the ambiguities 
in the position of  these civilian8 are in 
part  due  to the  difficulties as  to the 
relation of  '' dominium directum " and 
"  dominium utile."  Cf.  upon the sub- 
ject  a  very  interesting  and  careful 
study by  Professor Meynial :  "  Notes 
sur  la  formation  de  la  th6orie  du 
Domaine Divis6 du xii"  an xivo sidcle 
dans  les  Romanisteu,"  in  '  M6langes 
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It is  clear  that the civilians of  the twelfth  century  were 
divided  upon  the  subject  of  the  "  natural "  character  of 
private property,  some being  governed by  the formal tradi- 
tion  of  the  corpus juris,  others  being  much  influenced by 
the philosophical and patristic conceptions.  It is interesting 
to observe that Hugolinus, who does not furnish us  with any 
direct  statement upon  the subject, does  suggest an explana- 
tion  of  the  origin  of  some  methods  of  acquiring  private 
property, in terms which remind us of  the Stoic and Patristic 
doctrine.  He  lays  down  the  general  principle  that  it  is 
contrary to natural equity that any man should be enriched 
at his neighbour's expense, and, he continues, it mould seem to 
be contrary to this principle that a prescription of  three years 
is enough to transfer property from one man to another.  He 
argues that there is here no real inconsistency, for while the 
general principle is indeed in accordance with natural equity, 
the rule of  prescription  has been introduced by civil equity, 
lest the ownerskip of  things  should be ~ncertain.~  The con- 
trast  between  the  natural  and  the  civil  equity  certainly 
suggests the Stoic and Patristic distinction between the con- 
ditions  appropriate  to the  state of  innocence  and  the  state 
of  vice.  Accursius  says  that  some  maintain  that  private 
property  belongs  to  the  jus  naturale,  for  the  divine  law 
says, thou shalt not steal,  and that when it is  said that by 
the jus  naturale  all  things  are  common,  we  should under- 
stand  this  to  mean  that  all  things  are  to be  shared  with 
others.  He  replies  that  when  God  gave  Moses  the  com- 
mand  against  stealing,  the  jus  gentium  was  already  in 
existen~e.~ 
1 Hugolinus, ' Summa '  of  the Digest, 
Preface : "  Naturaliter  equidem  aqu- 
urn est, nemirlem cum alterius jactura 
locupletari :  cui  contrarium  vidstur, 
quad  przscriptiono brevis  etiam  tem- 
poris,  scilicet  usucapionis,  id  cst  tri- 
ennio, res  aliena fit tua.  Sed non est 
cont~a  : prilnum enim dictum est sec- 
undum naturalem equitatem, secundum 
autem  ex  civili zquitete introductum 
est,  ne  dominia  rerum  essent  in  in- 
certo." 
Accursius,  Gloss on Dig.,'  i.  1. 6, 
"  Dominia distincta " : "  Ilnmo et so- 
cundum  jus  na.  sunt distincta : quia 
secundum  jus  divinum  aliquid  orat 
propdum, dicitur enim ; '  Furtwn non 
facies.'  . . . Et  si  dicatur :  amnia 
sunt  communia  jure  natu.  expone  i. 
communicanda.  Sod  respon.  etiam 
tune qnando haec  przcepta divina  da- 
bantur Moysi a deo, erat jus gentium." 
16  seems,  then,  to  be  clear  that  the  inedizval  civilians 
account for the existence of  institutions  which  are  contrary 
$0 the Natural Law by the tacit or expressed assumption of 
diBerence between the primaeval or natural state of  human 
life and the actual conditions.  They do not, indeed, draw out 
these conceptiolis in the same explicit way as the Canonists, 
with  whom  we  shall presently  deal ; they do not reproduce 
in explicit terms the theories of  the Stoics and the Christian 
Fathers ; but it would seem  to be evident that they assume 
that the Natura.1 Law was  appropriate to a natural or primi- 
tive condition which, in some sense at least, is  also a,ii ideal 
condition,  while  the actual  customs and  laws  of  men  have 
to  be  accommodated  to  other  and  less  perfect  conditions. 
The Natural Law represents the supreme moral principles of 
human Life, it represents thus an immutable ideal, but in the 
world  as it is, men being what  they are, it is impossible in 
all respects at once to conform to this.  The actual institution 
and  laws  of  human  society  are  not  in  themselves  always 
ideally perfect, but are justifiable in so far as they may tend 
to clieck and correct men's vices. 
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CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  THEORY OF  THE  JUS CIVZLE  AND  CUSTOM. 
WE can now  resume our consideration  of  the theory of  law, 
its nature and origin.  In the first chapter of  this volume we 
have  made  the attempt to draw  out the theory  of  law in 
relation to the principles of  Equity and Justice, and we have' 
seen that the civilians of  the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
regard  all actual law as the application  to particular times 
and  circumstances  of  principles  which  are  not  created  by 
human  will  or  power,  but to which  rather the will  of  men 
must submit.  In considering  the theory of  natural law,  we 
have seen that, in spite of  the fact that the civilians are not 
always  clear  or  consistent  in  their  conception  of  this,  it 
is yet true to say that they do constantly  tend to think of 
the natural law as representing  the immutable principles  of 
right by which  the world  is governed,  and to which  human 
law must conform.  That is, the theory of  the civilians with 
regard  to natural  law  represents  in  other  terms  the  same 
general principles  as these which are embodied in their theory 
of  the relations of  law to justice  and ~yuitas. 
We can therefore now turn to the theory of  the Civil Law, 
the positive law of  any one State, to the theory of  its origin 
and the source  of  its authority.  This  will  compel  us  to in- 
quire first into the relations of  law and custom, and secondly 
into  the nature  of  political  authority-that  is,  to examine 
the theory of  the relation of  the people and the ruler. 
Before  doing  this,  however,  we  must  stop for a  moment 
to deal with  the meaning  and use  of  the term lex  in  these 
civilians.  They  sometimes  use  the  word  in  the  technical 
sense of  the definition of Gaius-that  is, as the decree of  the 
Roman  populus ;  l  sometimes  they  use  it  to describe  the 
written  law,  as  distinguished  from  the  unwritten  mos  or 
consuetud~  ;  sometimes they use it in the most general sense 
for  any  law  written  or  unwritten.  In one  of  the  works 
which  is independent  of  the school  of  Bologna,  we  have  a 
which  treats  lex  as  a  branch  of  jus,  and distin- 
guishes it  from  mos,  but  neglects  the  distinction  between 
the  lea  of  the  Roman  populus  and  the  constitutio  of  the 
Roman Emper~r.~  Placentinus, in a passage which we have 
already  quoted,  described lex  as the expression  of  jus ;  S  in 
another  passage  he  says  that  we  may  understand  lex  in 
the broadest  sense as meaning  anything that men read ; in 
a narrower sense in the terms of  the definition of  Papinian ; 
while in the strictest sense lex is the decree  of  the pop~lus.~ 
Azo  has  set out the various  senses  in which  the word  lex 
may  be  used  in  an important  passage.  Lem,  he  says,  is 
sometimes used in a  stricter,  sometimes in a  broader  sense. 
Strictly,  it  denotes  the  statutum  of  the  Roman  populus, 
made  with  the  proper  formalities ;  in  a  larger  sense  the 
word  denotes  any  rationabile  statutum-this  is  what  is 
meant by the saying that lex  is a sacred  command, ordering 
what  is  konestum  and  forbidding  what  is  the  opposite  of 
this ; in the larger sense the constitution  of  the prince and 
the edictum are parts of  le~.~ 
Gaius, Inst. i. 2-7. 
'  '  Llbellus de Verbis Legalibus,' i. : 
"  Jus generale nomen ost, inde d~ctum 
quia  justum ;  lex  autem  juris  est 
species et a legondo vocata quia scripta. 
Jus  vero  omne  legibus  constat  et 
moribus.  Lex  est  principum  consti- 
tutio pro utilitate communi conscripts ; 
m05  autem est antiqua  consuetudo de 
moribus tracta, sive lex non  scripta." 
Cf. Isidore, Etymologies, v. 2 and 3. 
a  Placentinus, '  Summa Inst.,'  i.  1 : 
'"&a  de  justitia  et  jure  tractantur 
merit0  leges  appellantur  . . .  ergo 
legis eat significatum, lex, ut oratio 
quae legitur, jus est significatura, sicque 
jus et lex ita se habent ut argumentu~n 
et argumentatio." 
qlacentinns, '  Summa Inst.,'  i.  2 : 
"  General~ter lex  dicitur  quiclquid 
legitur,  mlnus  late  quicquid  de  jus- 
titia  sancitur,  secundum  hanc  eignifi- 
cationem  in  ff.  definitur,  lex  ost 
commune prreceptum, etc. (Dig., i. 3. l), 
in  arctissima  signlficatione lex  popdi 
censura appellatur, qnro hic definitur." 
5  Azo, '  Summa Codicis,' i. 14 : "  Lex 
autem  ponitur  quandoque  stricte, 
quancloque  large.  Stricte  est  cum 
ponitur  pro  statuto  populi  Romani : POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  ROMAN  LAWYERS.  [PART  I. 
We  can  now  turn  to  the  origin  of  Civil  Law.  The 
medizval jurists,  both  of  the  civil  and of  the  canon  law, 
recognise  very  clearly  that custom  always  has,  or  at least 
that it  formerly  had, the force  of  law.  Azo  uses  a  phrase 
which  puts the principle in its broadest  terms.  Custom, he 
says,  creates,  abrogates,  and interprets  1aw.l  Not  all  the 
civilians would  have agreed to this statement without quali- 
fication, but they would all have agreed to it with regard to 
the past.  All the civilians  with whom  we  are dealing, from 
the earliest to the latest, whether of  the school of  Bologna or 
outside of  it, held that, under certain conditions, custom either 
always did possess, or had once possessed, the force of law. 
The  author  of  ' Petri  Exceptiones '  says  that  what  is 
approved  by  long  usage  has  no  less  authority  than  the 
written  law.2  The  Prague  fragment  quotes  the  saying  of 
Ulpian  (Digest, i.  3.  33), that long  custom  is  wont  to be 
recognised as jus  and Z~X.~  The author of  the ' Brachylogus ' 
speaks  of  that body  of  law  which  use  approves ; while  he 
adds,  citing the Code,  that this  law is  not  of  such  weight 
as that it can overcome reason or law (i.e.,  written law).4  A 
gloss  on  the '  Brachylogus '  develops  the matter  somewhat 
further,  and says  that,  according  to Cicero,  that is  to be 
reckoned  as  the  law  of  custom  which  the  will  of  all  has 
et hoc  est  quod dlcltnr, lex  est quod  partes sunt, ut lex lalgo modo ~ntolll- 
populus Romanu.:  senator10 maglstratu  gatur." 
mterrogante,  velutl  consul0  const~tu  Aao, ' Summa Codlcls,' vln  63  6  : 
ebat (Inst ,  1  2  4) . . .  ot quantum ad  "Et clu~dcm  v~detur  quod consuotudo 
sontentlam 11cot alla slnt \orbs, cadem  slt condltrlx legls,  abrogatrlx et ~nior- 
est llla definltlo,  qua dlcltur, '  Lex est  pretatr~x  " 
commune prreceptum, vlrorum pruden-  '  Pctll Exccptlones Log  Rom ,' IV. 
tlum consultum, dchctorum, qurr, spontc  3 . "  Ea enlm, ut in Dlgcstls loqmtur, 
vel  lgnorantla  fiunt  vel  contrabuntu~  long  temporls  usu  approbata,  non 
coercltlo, communls reipubllc~  sponslo,'  habet  mlnorem  auctontatem,  quam 
ut ff.  de leg], et senatus c  1  1  (Dlg ,  lex scripta " 
I.  3.  1).  Qnandoque ponltur large pro  Fragmentum Pragenso,' 11. 
omnl ratlonablh statuto . undo et dlcl  '  '  Urachyloyus,'  I.  2  12 . "  Ex non 
tur,  lex  est  sanctlo  sancta,  jubens  scnpto  ]us  venlt  quod  116us  cornpro. 
honesta,  prolubens  contrana.  Et ~ta  bav~t,  nam consuotudmls ususqun long. 
est regula   ust to rum  at injustorurn, ut  a?vl non levls est auctontas, \erurn rlon 
dcltur  In  translatlone  Grieca,  ut  ff  acleo  sul  valitura  momento,  ut  aut 
e.  1.  2  (Dlg , 1.  3.  2).  Constltut~o  rstlonem vlncat aut legem."  Cf. Cod., 
ero  prlnclpls,  et  ed~ctum, leg16  v+  52.(53) 
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without any formal promulgation ; and that while 
st  Augustine  rightly says that truth is greater  than custom, 
yet  when  truth  and  custom  agree  nothing  has  greater 
authority.1  Irnerius,  in  a  gloss,  speaks  of  the  threefoId 
nature  of  jus-that  which  is  established  by  law  (Zex),  by 
c~~stom,  and by  the  necessity  of  nat~re.~  And  in  another 
gloss,  while  asserting that nowadays  when  the people  have 
transferred their authority to the emperor their disuse  does 
not  abrogate  law,  he  still  maintains  that in  former  times, 
when  the  people  had  the  power  of  making  laws,  these 
were abrogated by the tacit consent of  alL3  In  his ' Summa 
Codicis ' he deals with the matter very fully, and brings out 
very clearly the important point that it is not only the custom 
of  the Roman people, but that of  any city which has the force 
of  law-subject,  of  course, to the written law of  the Empire ; 
and he urges  that as the principles  of  the written  law are 
to be  drawn  out to meet  similar  cases  which  may not be 
directly  provided  for,  the same is to be  done with  the un- 
written  law  of  custom.  Only  in  regard  to  unwritten  as 
well  as the written laws  we  must  consider  the principles  of 
justice  and  equity  on  which  alone  they  can  be  founded. 
Custom  is  the best  interpreter  of  laws,  for by  custom  also 
laws themselves  are abrogated.4 
' Gloss  on  Brachylogun,'  I.  6  2 : 
"  Consuetudlnls  Secundum  Tulllum 
consuetud~nls   us esse putatur ]cl, quod 
voluntate ornmum, slne lege,  %olunta.t 
comprobaverlt.  Item  consuetudlnls 
jus  est  quod  nut  levlter  a  nnturn 
tracturn  almt et majus feat usus,  ut 
rellglonem  vel  sl  qmd  eorum  qure 
ante  dlxlmus,  a  natura  profectum 
majus  factum proptor  consuetud~nem 
vldemus,  aut quod In morem vetustas 
vulgl approhat~one  perduxlt  August- 
14~9,  frustra ~nqu~t,  qul  ratlone  vln- 
cuntur, consuetudlnem nobls obnciunt, 
quasl  consuetudo  major  slt  vor~tate 
Hoc  plane  verum  eet ,  qula  rat10  et 
verltas  consuetudrnl  prreponenda  est 
sed  cum  consurtudmis  verltas  suffra 
gatur, nlhll oportct firrnlus retmen." 
"menus,  '  Gloss on  Dig ,' I  3.  40 
(m  Savigny, '  Gcsch~cht:,  des Romlschen 
Rechts,' vol.  IV  cliap  vxvll  note 49) . 
"  Qnod  constltu~tur turn  lege,  turn 
morlbus,  tum  et  natura  necessltas 
~ncluxcr~t,  trlplex JUS esse constat." 
S Irnerlus,  'Gloss  on  D~gcst,'  1.  3. 
32 (~n  Savigny, '  Geschlchte des R6m- 
lschen Rochts,' v01  IV.  chap xxvn. note 
49).  "  Loqultur  hac  lex  sccundum 
sue,  tempora,  qulbus populu.:  habebat 
potestatem  condendi l~ges,  ldeo taclto 
oonsensu  omnlum  per  consuetudmem 
abrogabantur.  Sed quia hodle potesta~ 
translata  est  in  lmperatorom,  nlhll 
facerct dssuetudo popnll " 
Srnerlus, '  Summa CO~ICIS,'  v111  48 
1 : "  Nunc  de lure  non  scrlpto cdis- 
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Another  exposition  of  the  matter is  given  by  Azo  in  a 
passage  in  his  work  on  the  Code,  from  which  we  have 
already  quoted  some words.  He begins  by  inquiring  what 
is  coniuetudo,  and  answers  by  saying  that it  is  jus  non 
scripturn, a body of  unwritten, law made by the lollg custom 
of  the people.  How  then, he  inquires,  are we  to recognise 
it? and he  gives  these  tests-the  first,  that it is  received 
without contradiction ; the second,  that no complaint about 
it mill be received in the law courts ; the third, that the law 
courts have, after discussion and consideration,  decided  that 
this is the custom.  Finally, he  asks,  what is the authority 
of  custom ?  and answers that by custom laws are established, 
abrogated, and interpreted.] 
It is  clear,  then,  that  these  civilians  all  recognised  that 
custom  once  had  the force  of  law,  but the passages  which 
sc~lptum  auctorltate  popuh  Roman1 
nltltur,  Imo  ejus  CUI  a  populo  hoc 
permlssum  est,  ~ta  jus  non  scnptum 
rebus  lpsls  et  factls  eodem  judlcio 
declaratur  nlhll  enlm  Interest,  pop- 
ulus  suffraglo  voluntatem  suam  de- 
clarat,  an  ipsls  negotns  cotldie  ex 
usu  et  consuetudlne  hoc  ostendat 
Dluturnl  mmm  mores  consensu  uten- 
tlum  comprobati  pro  lege  ser 
vantur  Set  In  hoc  cllfferunt,  quod 
]US scrlptum  ~ISI  c~v~tatls  Roman] 
non  admittltur, ]us  autem  consuetud 
lnarlum  non  solum  urbls  Romze  sed 
etlam  cujusv~s  oppid~  reclpiendum est, 
dum  tamen  juri  scr~pto  non  obvlet 
Et  quemadmodum  Jura  scrlpta  ad 
slm1lla  producenda  sunt,  ~ta  et  jura 
consuctudinana ad exemplum trahenda 
~unt,  et  tam  ]us  commune  quam 
speclale ex  consuetudlne  constltm  po 
test,  dum  tamen  lllud  dlhgonter  In 
tuetur,  ne  mall  mores  ~mllentur, 
]tern  ne  lllud  quod  errore  et  non 
ratlone  inductum  est,  reclplatur.  Et 
slmlllter  non  ratlone(m) aut  lcge(m) 
v~ncere  sclendum est  Et slcut In  lure 
scrlpto equltas et justltla  prem~ttenda 
est,  ~ta  In  lure  non  scrlpto  semper 
causa  sou  equltas qua, consuetudmem 
~nducat  lnsplclenda  est  Consuetudo 
etlam  opt~ma  legum mterpres  est, noc 
non  per  consuetudmem  quoque  leges 
lpse abrogantur " 
l  Azo,  '  Summa Codlcls,' v111  53  l : 
"  V~deamus  ergo quld  s~t  consuetudo, 
et unde  d~catur  Et quldem  consue- 
tudo  est  ]us  non  scnptum,  moribus 
pop1111  dluturnls Inducturn, ut Instltut. 
de  JUI  nat  5 constat  (Inst., 1  2  3) 
. . . 6  Ex qu~bus  d~gnoscltur  esse 
lnducta ?  Et quldam  ex  tr~bus  pra- 
mpue  Prlmum  est,  qma  SIC  est 
obtentum slne contradlct~one  Secun- 
dem  qula  llbelll  quznmomarum  de 
re  tall  non  reclplehant~ir  Tcrtlum, 
bl  cum  contrad~ceretur  non  ease  con- 
suctudmem,  reprobata  contrad~ctlone 
judlcatum  cst  esse  consuotudlncm 
6  Quanta  est  consuetud~nls  auc- 
torltas 7  Et  quldem  videtur  quod 
consuetudo  s~t  conditrlx  legls,  abro- 
gatnx, et ~nterpretatrlx,  ut ff  do  leg. 
et  senatus  consulter,  1  do  qmbus, 
ultlmo,  et 1  nam lmperator (Dig ,  I 
3  31  et  38) et Inst  de  ~ur.  natura. 
8 ex non scrlpto (Inst,  I  1  12) " 
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we  have  quoted  will  have indicated  that there  was  among 
them  a  difference  of  opinion  on  the  question,  whether 
custom  still  and  always  had  this  force.  We  shall  best 
consider  this  question  by  proceeding  to  examine  the 
theories  of  the  civilians  with  respect  to  the  source  of 
political  auth0rity.l 
1 For a very admirable and deta~led  fessor  Slegfr~ed  Bne, ' Dle  Lehre vom 
dls~ussion  of the theones of  the clvil-  Gewohnheitsreoht,'  Erster  Thell,  pp. 
tans  wlth  regard  to custom,  cf.  Pro-  96-127. CRAP. VII.]  THE  SOURCE  OF POLITICAL  AUTHORITY.  57 
CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  SOURCE  OF POLITICAL  AUTHORITY. 
IN  order  to  consider  the theory  of  the  civilians  as  to the 
source  of  the authority of  law,  and the place  of  custom in 
making  law,  we  are  compelled  to extend  the  scope  of  our 
inquiry, and to ask what  they thought  as to the source  or 
original  fountain  of  political  authority.  We  have  to  ask, 
first, with whom it was  that originally there lay the power 
of  making  laws,-who  were  the original  sources  of  political 
authority ; and next, who was the actual lawgiver, the actual 
holder of  political authority. 
The great  jurists  of  the Digest  recognised  one,  and only 
one,  source  of  political  authority  in  the  empire,  that  is, 
the Roman  people,  and the emperors  themselves,  a.s late as 
Justinian, acknowledged  this as the true the0ry.l  We want 
now  to  inquire  what  was  the  position  taken  up  by  the 
mediaeval  civilians  down  to  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth 
century  with  respect  to  this  theory,  and  the  conclusions 
which  they  derive  from  it  with  regard  to  the  nature  of 
political  authority.  Tlzese  jurists  restate  the theory  of  the 
corpus  juris,  but they  do  not  merely  restate  it,  they  also 
discuss  with  some  care  the  bearing  of  the  theory  on  the 
polit,ical conditions  of  their own  tin~e. 
We may find a convenient st>&rting-point  for our discussion 
by noticing a  definition  of  the univerxitas  and its functions 
which  we  find  in  the little  treatise,  ' De  Bquitate,'  which 
Prof.  Fitting  has  edited,  and  has  ascribed  to Irnerius.  It 
l Cf.  Digest,  i.  3.  32.  Galus, Inst.,  and  2.  Dig.,  i.  4.  1.  Cod.,  i.  14.  4. 
i.  1.  7.  Dig..  i.  2.  2.  Dig.,  i.  B.  1  Cod., i.  17. 7. 
is  the function  of  the  z+ersitas,  that is,  of  the pop&us, 
says  the author  of  this  treatise,  to care for  the individual 
men who  compose it, as for those who  are its members,  and 
hence it comes that it makes law, and interprets and expounds 
the  law  when  made,  since  it  is  by  the  law  that men  are 
taught what they should  do and what they should not d0.l 
We may compare with this a gloss of  Irnerius on Papinisn's 
definition  of  lex,  in  which  Irnerius  treats  the  populus  as 
being identical with the respublioa, and says that the popzclus 
commands in virtue of  the authority of  the ~~niversitas,  and 
undertakes obligations in the name of  its individual rnember~.~ 
We  may  again  compare  with  this  an interesting  phrase  in 
that  treatise  on  the  fiftieth  book  of  the  Digest  which 
Savigny identified  as the work  of  Bulgarus.  The  author is 
commenting on a sa,ying of  Paulus, in which it  is laid down 
that  individuals  are  not  allowed  to  perform  those  actions 
which belong to the public duty of  the magistrate,  lest this 
should prove the cause of  disorder,  and he  explains  this by 
saying  that judicial  authority has  been  established  lest  in- 
dividuals  should  make  laws  for  themselves ;  this  power  is 
reserved  to the universitas,  that is,  the populus,  or  to him 
who  represents  (obtinet vicem)  the u~iversitas,  as the magis- 
trate does.3  It is interesting  to observe that we  have  here 
not only a statement of  the supreme authority of  the populus, 
but  also  of  the  doctrine  that  all  magisterial  authority  is 
representative.  These  passages  present  a  clear  expositioni 
1 Irnerius, ' De &quitate,'  2 : "  Uni- 
versitas,  id  est  populus,  hoc  habet 
officium,  singulis  scilicet  hominibus 
quasi  membris  providcre.  Hinc  de- 
scendit hoc ut lcgem condat, conditam 
interpretetur et aperiet,  quoniam leg0 
prefinitur quod unusquisque  sequi  vel 
quid deboat cleclinaro." 
Irnerius,  '  Glosses  on  Digestum 
Vetus ' (ed. E.  Bcsta),  Dig.,  i.  3.  1 : 
L' '  Lex est ' v. reipublica. Y.  S. populi, 
quod unum et idem rst re ipsa, Eecun- 
dnm diversas  inspectiones hec  nomina 
lecipit : populus universitnt~s  jure pre- 
cipit,  idcm  singulon~m  nomine  pro- 
mittit et spondet." 
Bulgarus, ' Commentary on Digest,' 
L.  177, 176 : "  'Non est singulis con- 
cedendum,  quod  per  magistratum 
publice  possit  fieri,  ne  occasio  sit 
mnjoris  tumultus  faciendi.'  Vigor 
judicinrins  ideo  est  in  medio  con- 
stitutus  ne  singuli  jus  sibi  dicent. 
Non  enim  competit  sinylis,  quod 
permissum eat tantum universitati, vel 
ei  qui  obtinet  vicem  universitatis,  id 
est  populi,  qualis  est  magistratus : 
alioquin  contingeret  occesio  majoris 
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of  the  principle  that the  legislative  authority  of  society is 
founded  upon  the  natural  relation  between  a  society  and 
its members,  and that if  this  authority is  intrusted to any 
particular  person  it  is  in  virtue  of  some  representative 
character in him. 
These  general  conceptions find  a  concrete  exemplification 
in  the  position  of  the  Roman  people,  and  of  the  Roman 
-  - 
emperor upon whom  the R,oman people have conferred their 
authority.  In the ' Summa Codicis,' which Professor Fitting 
has  edited and attributed to Irnerius,  we  find a phrase  an- 
alogous in its general c~ncept~ion  to that which we  have just 
quoted from the ' De Bquitate,' with  regard to the relation 
of  the  ulziversitas  or  populus  to  its  members,  but  the 
phrase also transfers this principle to the case of  the Roman 
State.  The authority to make laws belongs, the author says, 
to the Roman people, and to the prince to whom the people 
have given  this  authority,  for  it is  the duty of  the people 
or  the prince  to care for  the individuals,  as  those  who  are 
members  and children  of  the State.l  The  Roman  emperor 
exercises the legislative authority in virtue of  the fact  that. 
the Roman people has given him authority ; his action is that 
of  a  representative,  or, as  Placentinus, in  a  passage setting 
out the source of  legislative authority, calls him, a vicar.2 
We need not multiply citations to prove that the mediaeval 
oivilians, with  whom  we  are dealing, have all accepted from 
the  corpus  juris  the  principle  that  the  authority  of  the 
Roman  emperor  is  derived  from  the grant  of  the  Roman 
people.  They  not  only  repeat  the phrases  of  the Digest  or 
l  Irncrius,  Summa Codicis,' i. 14. 3 : 
"  In condendis legibus spectandum est, 
a quo et quomodo condi debeant.  Is 
quidcm  auctoritatem  lcgis  condenda: 
habet qui potestatem precipiendi halmt. 
Ergo populus Ronianus,  ille immo cui 
a  populo hoc permissum est : principes 
enim  hanc  facultatcm  habent.  Nam 
populo  seu  principi  hoc  officium  im- 
minct ut singulis hominibus provideant 
ut Bliis propriis seu membris." 
Placcntinus,  '  Summa  Instituti- 
onurn,'  i.  2 :  "  QuaJri  potest  quare 
lex  sicut  catera  juris  partes,  non 
pluralitor,  sed  singulariter  designatur, 
forte ideo quia populus ab initio com- 
muncm  potestatem  habuit,  et postea 
ab  eodem in  plurcs  tran.;fusa  est,  in 
principcs,  consules, pratores,  impera- 
tores.  Principis placitum est imperidis 
sanctio,  qua per  exccllentiam vocatur 
constitutio, quod enim principi placuit 
legis habet vigorem, id est vicem, nam 
cum Imperator propric sit vicarius ejus 
ccrisura licet  non  sit lex,  legis  habet 
vigorem." 
Code, but it is clear that they accept these as the foundation 
of  their theory of  political authority. 
It is interesting to observe that Azo  at least has explicitly 
applied this theory of  the derivation of  all authority from the 
people to the case of the Senate, while the jurists of  the Digest 
can  only  be  said  to imply  such  a  view.  Both  Gaius  and 
Pomponius  certainly  seem  to  suggest  that  the  legislative 
authority of  the Senate rested upon the t,acit if  not expressed 
authority and consent of  the whole people, but they do not 
directly say this.l  Azo  uses some authority which drew out 
the derivation of  the authority of  the Senate from the people 
in explicit  terms,  and relates  how,  when the people  became 
very numerous, it was  difficult to summon them for the pur- 
pose  of  making laws, and so the people  elected one hundred 
senators, that they might take counsel on behalf  of  the people 
(vice popzcli), and ordered that whatever they  should decree 
should have the force of  law.2 
We must now go a step further, and consider the theory of 
these jurists  as  to certain  questions  that arise  out of  these 
principles.  The ancient lawyers, while stating that the people 
had  conferred all their  authority  upon  the emperor,  do  not 
expressly  say  whether,  in  doing  this,  they  had  renounced 
altogether their own authority, or whether they could possibly 
still exercise this either by  direct legislation or by the force 
of  custom.  It is true that Justinian at least in one passage 
of  the Code speaks of  the emperor as being actually the sole 
legislator13  and that Constantine in the Code says that custom 
cannot prevail against law14  but how far thcse phrases repre- 
sent the general judgment  of  the ancient jurists  is uncertain. 
See vol. i. pp. 66-68. 
Azo,  '  Summa  Codicis,'  i.  16 : 
"Dictum  est  supra  de  legibus,  qu;e 
populo  ejusque  interventu  fiebant: 
sed  quia  aucto populo  in  immcnsum, 
difficile ccepit esse convenire ad legem 
condendam, ideo elegit populus centum 
senatores, ut ipsi vice populi consuler- 
entur : et quiquid statuerent, lcx esset, 
Ut  Inst. do  jur.  scripto  8  senatus-con- 
sultum" (Inst., i.  2. 5). 
Cod.,  i.  14.  12:  "  Vcl  quis leym 
anigmata solvcrc  et  omnibus  aperire 
idoneus esse  videbitur nisi  is,  cui soli 
legis  latorem  esse  concessum  est. 
Explosis  itaquc  hujusmodi  ridiculosis 
ambiguitatibus  tam  conditor  quam 
interpres  legum  solus imperator just0 
existimabitur." 
4  Cod., viii. 52.  (53.) 2 :  "  Consuet- 
udinis  ususque  longavi  non  vilis 
auctoritas ost, vernm  non  usque adeo 
sui valitura momento, ut cut rationem 
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This is just the point on which our mediaeval civilians differed 
or were doubtful:  there were those who maintained that the 
people  had  in  such  a  sense  tra,nsferred  their  authority  to 
the emperor, that they could  not resume it, and that even 
the custom of  the people had lost its authority in making and 
unmaking  law,  while  others  were  inclined  to hold  that the 
people retained something of  their old power,  or at  least the 
right  of  resuming it.  On  the one  side we  find,  along  with 
others whose  names  we  cannot recover,  Irnerius,  in a  gloss, 
Placentinus,  and  Roger,  and  on  the  ot,her  side  Bulgztrus, 
Joannes Bassianus, Azo, and Hugolinus, and their view again 
seems  to have been  supported  by  others  whose  names  are 
unknown. 
In one  of  the  glosses  of  Irnerius  on  the  Digest,  which 
Savigny  published,  we  have  a  comment  on  the  saying  of 
Julianus that custom  has  the force  of  law,  makes  and un- 
makes law (Dig., i. 3. 32).  Irnerins urges that this was once 
true, but that the statement belonged  to the time when the 
people  had tlhe power  of  making laws,  but nowadays,  when 
this power  has been  transferred to the emperor,  the custom 
of  the  people  can  no  longer  abrogate  1aw.l  Placentinus 
is  even  more  einphatic  in  his  assertion  of  the  view  that 
the  people  have  wholly  parted  with  their  authority.  He 
describes  " our  law "  as  written  and  unwritten,  but  the 
latter,  he  says,  cannot  abrogate the former, for the people 
have  transferred  their authority to the prince  and have re- 
served none to themselves, and he explains away the phrase 
of  .Julianns  by  saying that this  only  means  that unwritten 
laws  are  abrogated  by  other  unwritten  laws-that  is,  one 
custom  by  an~ther.~  The  judgment  of  Roger,  in  his  com- 
mentary  on  the  Code,  is  eqna,lly  clear.  He  says  indeed 
1 Irnerius, 'Gloss.  on Dig.,'  i.  3.  32  faceret desuetudo populi." 
(in  Savigny, ' Geschichte dos Romischen  Placcntinus,  '  Summa  Institut,i- 
Rechts,'  vol.  iv.,  chap.  xxvii.,  note  onum,'  i.  2 :  "  Jus  autem  nostrum, 
49) :  "  Loquitur  haec  lex  secundum  aliud  scriptum,  aliud  non  scriptum : 
suit  tempora,  quibus populus  habebat  non  scriptum  dicitur,  quod  moribus 
potcstatem condendi leges, ideo tacito  continetur,  moribus  inquam  Roman6 
consensu  omnium  per  eonsuetudinem  introductis  et longavis,  id  est  mem- 
abrogabantur.  Sed quia hodie potestas  oriam  excedentibus :  sed  jus  tamen 
translata  est  in  imperatorem,  nihil  istud  jura  scripta  non  ahrogat  ut C. 
CHAP. ~11.1  Tm  SOURCE  OF  POLlTICAL  AUTHORITY.  61 
plainly  that the legislative authority of  the people  preceded 
that  of  the emperor,  and that it  was  from  them that the 
emperor had received his authority ; but this only brings out 
rnore clearly the fact that he maintains that "  now " only the 
emperor  and  the  man  to  whom  the  emperor  has  granted 
can make  1aws.l 
We might have supposed from the confident tone of  these 
statements  that  this  was  the  only  view  generally  current 
among  the civilians  in the twelfth  and thirteenth centuries. 
When,  however,  we  examine  the  literature  more  carefully 
we  discover  that some of  them hold  another tradition.  The 
collection  of  "  Dissensiones "  of  the  great  lawyers  con- 
tained  in the ' Codex  Chisianus ' includes  a  very  elaborate 
discussion  of  the relations  of  Custom  and Law,  and of  the 
effect  upon  the  authority  of  Custom  of  the  terms  under 
vhich  the  people  created  the  emperor.  Some  writers  are 
mentioned  as maintaining  that no custom  can  override  the 
written law, and this for the special reason that the prince is 
now the sole legislator, while some are mentioned as maintain- 
ing that only  a  universal  custom which  is approved  by the 
prince  can  override  written  law.  But on  the  other  hand 
there  are  cited  the  views  of  some  who  maintained  that 
either  generally,  or  in  certain  cases,  custom  still  prevailed 
against  law.  Some  are  cited  as maintaining  that customs 
which  are  contrary  to law  are  to be  observed  when  they 
are  of  such  a  nature  that they  could  be  confirmed  by  an 
de long. consuet. (Cod., viii. 5%.  (53.) 2). 
Nam  populus  in  principem  transfer- 
endo  communom  potestatem,  nullam 
sibi reservavit,  ergo  potestatem  leges 
scriptas  condencli,  interpretandi,  et 
abrogandi.  Nec  obstat  quod in ff. de 
jure  (Dig., i. 3.  32) clicitur, leges mori- 
bus  abrogari,  sic  enim  intelligo  lcges 
non  scriptas  contrariis  lcgibus  non 
acriptis, id est moribus, tolli. . . . Lex 
est  quod popnlus  universus  constitue- 
bat, ac si diceret : hodie non consiituit 
nec destituit." 
l  Roger,  '  Summa  Codicis,'  i.  12 : 
"  Ideo primum posuit de legibus quam 
constitutionibus, quia primum  conclite 
fuerunt  leges  a  populo  quam  ab im- 
peratore, cum dictum sit quod populus 
trnnstulit  ei  et  in  eum  potcstatem 
omnem : sic ergo inspexit ad originem 
potius  qualn  ad  dignitatem.  . . . In 
condendis  legibns  inspicitur  qua  de 
causa  sint  condende,  qua  in  re  sint 
condende,  et  qualiter  sint  condende, 
in  qua  vi  et potestate  sint  condendo. 
Causa:  veluti  si  novum  negotium 
emergut,  quod  non  sit legc  decisum ; 
quam olim populus habuit potestatem 
vel eui populus concedebat, nune solus 
imperator vel cui imperator concedit." 62  POLITICAL THEORY  OF  ROMAN  LAWYERS.  [PART  I. 
agreement  or  contract,  for  custom  is  nothing  but  a  tacit 
contract,  but not otherwise.  Others  again are said  to hold 
that a written law which has been ratified by custom cannot 
be abrogated by custom, but if  the written law has not been 
ratified, then custom can in some cases render the law void. 
Others again held that a good custom can abrogate law, but 
not a  bad one.  More important,  however,  is the opinion  of 
those who  maintained that, while the custom of  the people, 
which  has  grown  up  through  their  ignorance  of  the  law, 
cannot ovelride the law,  that custom which the people have 
deliberately  adopted in contradiction to the law does amend 
it ;  and again,  the view  that while  a  merely  local  custom 
cannot override the law, the universal custom of  the people 
of  the whole empire does this.l  It is clear that the civilians 
l Dlssenslones Dommorum, '  Codlcls 
Chlslan~ Collectlo,'  46 .  "  Dlfferunt 
Quldam  d~cunt  quod  nulla  consuet- 
udo  jurl  contrana,  slve  slt  goneralls 
slve s~t  spec~alls,  ahrogat  vel  derogat 
leg1  scr~ptz,  arg  Dig  (xlvll.  12  3 
5) et hoc  dlcunt  maxlme  ea  ratlone, 
qula sol~us  pl~nc~p~s  est hodle condore 
legem  ~ntell~gendam  ~ta  et  sollus 
est  ejus.  hodle  legem  intelhgelo 
Dlcunt legem  vero  scrlptam 1ur1 con 
tlallam consuetudmem abrogare et SIC, 
ub~  ~nvemtur,  consuetudlneln  tollero , 
nam  est  lex  scrlpta  et  ejnsmodl  lcx 
non scrlptam tolllt  Sed quod d~c~tur 
' aut  legem  tolllt  aut  ratlonem'  ut 
Cod  (v~n  52. (53 ) 2, respondent  con 
suetudo non tolht legern scrlptam cum 
lotlone, ut Cod  (v1 2  22  5  fin  ) velut~ 
quum res vlro commodata  est et eam 
uxor surrlpu~t,  non teneatur uxor furtl 
actlone, sclllcet ne  allqua causa scd~tl- 
onls orlatur  Plac  A111  autem d~cunt, 
consuetudmem jur~  contrar~am  demum 
servarl debere, quae  pacto expresso po 
test  confirmar].  nlhll  enlm  allud  est 
consuetudo  quam  tac~tum  pactum  ut 
Dlg.  (I  3  35)  Dlcunt crgo,  In  llo~ 
casu consuetud~nem  non vlncere legem, 
In quo pactum expressurn non admlttl 
tu  , velutl  ut partus non  matrls sed 
pat~ls  sequatur condlt~onem  , nec con- 
sueludo ut pote tacltum pactum observ 
atur AI  (Albencus).  Item argument 
um  pro lloc  est In  Cod  (IV.  32  213)  et 
Cod  (v  20)  Sed  ~espondent  quod 
evpresslm  hoc  cavetur  m  lege  A111 
autem dlstlnguunt, an consuetudo juri 
contrar~a  s~t  general~s,  vel  speclalls 
nt, SI slt generalls, quae ab omnl populo 
lmperu  observatur  ~ndlstmcte,  et per 
oam  scupta lex  abrogatur,  et dlcunt, 
senatum posse hodle condere legem et 
abrogare  S1  vero consuetudo speclahs 
s~t,  puta  al~cujus  munlc~pll  vel  rlv~ 
tat~s, dlstlnguunt,  SI  s~t  cornmum 
consensu  utentlum  comprobata,  quod 
potest  adparere, sl tahs conquetudo slt 
allquando  contrad~cto  judlc~o confir- 
matn ,  allas vero non vlnc~t  sed vmc~tur. 
Nec obstat, quod In  Dig  (xlvn  2.  3,  5) 
dlcltur  qma  scrlpta  prlnc~palla post 
contrar~am munlclpll  legem  latam 
fulsse  ~ntell~gltur.  Item  sontentlam 
~llam,  quae  prlma facle vldetur mulcere 
aures audlentlum, sc~l~cet,  nec consuct 
udo jurz  contrar~a  PO  casu admlttatur, 
In  quo Pacturn expressurn contra leges 
valet,  rllsunt  omnlno  reprobandam. 
Quum en.m  consuetudo  omnes  teneat 
etlam  lnfames  et  furlosos,  et  omnes 
omnlno  et  qul  paclscl  non  possunt, 
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who are referred to, unfortunately only occasionally by name, 
were greatly divided ; that while  there were  some who  held 
that  the  Roman  people  had  conipletely  transferred  their 
authority to the emperor, there were  others who maintained 
that the Roman  people  had  always  reserved  to themselves 
the authority which they had exercised through their custom. 
In the works  of  Azo,  and specially  of  Hugolinus,  we  find 
these positions  drawn out more completely,  and the conclu- 
sions which might be founded on them more explicitly stated. 
Azo discusses the question of  the force of  custom in comment- 
ing on that rescript of  Constantine which we have just  cited. 
What,  he  asks,  is  the authority of  custom?  It  makes,  it 
abrogates, and it interprets law, and he cites Dig., i. 3.  32, 33 
and Inst., i. 2. 9.  There are however, he adds, certain persons 
who maintain that the true principle nowadays is represented 
by the phrase in Constantine's  rescript,  and that all power 
has  now  been  transferred  by  the people  to the prince ;  or 
again such persons maintain that the principle of  Dig., i. 3. 32, 
constat, lpsam non  esae  tacltum pact- 
um, nam s~  esset, obllgaret eos, ut Dlg. 
(XIX  2  14) et Dlg.  (xlvl.  8 )  et Dig 
(xxxln  6  8, 2) Arg  contra, D1.g  (xxlv 
3.  2)  Ib  (Joannes  Basslanus)  -4111 
dlount,  generalem  dumtaxat  consuet 
udmnem,  et eam  solam quam  prlnceps 
patltur, vlncere legem  Iudlces, quuro 
ludlcant,  necesse  habent  parere  leg~s 
auctoil, ~d est,  prlnclpl  magls,  quarn 
auctor~  speclalls cor~suetud~nls  et pop 
ulo  cujns~lue  clvltatls  vel  munlclpll 
A111  d~cunt  vero,  SI  lex sc11pta sit ad 
probata  consuetudme,  tunc non  posse 
vlnc~  consuetudme , sln autem nondum 
erat adprobata consuetud~ne  arg  pact1 
quod  consensu  solo  contrah~tur,  con- 
trarlo d~ssensu  dlssolv~tur,  s~  qtatum s~t 
In finlbus pact1 .  sl ultra esset processum 
non solo consensu dlssolv~tur  ,  81 statum 
sit In  finlbus, resclnditur.  SIC  de lege, 
qunm slt consuetudlne adprobata, quasl 
dupllcl  auxlllo  rnunlta  A111  dlcunt 
consuetudinem  bonam  vlrlcc~e  legem, 
malam  consuetud~nem non  vmcere 
legem.  A111  antem  dlcunt,  quod  31 
populus  sclens  utatur  contra  legem, 
toll~tur  leu ,  SI  vero  ignorans,  non 
tollltur,  quls  magls  errare  credltur. 
Sed secundum hoc  mellorls condltlon~r 
sunt  ddlnquentes,  quam  lnnocentes 
Sod quare generalls observatur ub~que, 
speclalls  saltcm  In  eo  loco,  ubl  non 
est lnducta, non est observanda  Re- 
spondent,  qula  gencralls  prmceps  est 
auctor,  unde  parere  necese  est. 
Spec~alls autcm  consuetudm~s auc- 
torcm  esse  populos  cu~jusque  clvltatts 
YOU  mumcIp11,  CUI  parere  ncmo  de 
juro  adstr~ng~t~u,  et  hoc  prohat  Al. 
(Albcr~cus) Sed  quzrltur SI  hommes 
dlvcrsarum provlncxarum qu~  d~versas 
habent  consuetudlnes,  sub  uno  eo- 
demque  judlce  htlgant,  utram  earum 
judex,  qu~  judlcandum  susceplt, 3equl 
debeat ?  Respondeo eam, qua potlor 
et utll~or  vldetur , debet enlm judlcare 
se~undum  quod mollus el vlsum fuerlt. 
Secundum  Aldrl  (Aldr~cum)  "  Cf. 
Accurs~uq,  Gloss on Cod, v111  52  (53 ), 
"  Aut legem,"  and Gloss on Dlg ,  1.  3. 
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only  applied  to the case of  customary laws,  which  could  be 
overriden by custom, or to the authority of  a general custom 
which had the sanction of  the prince.  We must, he adds, be 
careful  to  consider  whether  a  law  which  is  opposed  to  a 
custom, followed or preceded it ; in the former case, the law 
will  override the austom, in the latter the custom will  over- 
ride the 1aw.l  The discussion is very much on the same lines 
as that of  the ' Codex Chisianus,' but it is fairly clear that Azo 
himself  looks upon the custom of  the Roman people  as still 
possessing  the  force  of  law.  His  meaning  in  this  passage 
finds its best comment in another passage of  his work on the 
Code, in which he discusses the nature of  law, and the persons 
by whom law can be made.  He mentions first the emperor, 
who  is  to make  law  with  the  advice  of  the proceres  saeri 
palatii, and of  the Senate ; then the Przetorian Prefect, and 
those  persons  to whom  the  emperor  gives  this  811thority; 
finally, he adds, perhaps even to-day the Roman people  can 
make law,  for though its authority has  been  transferred  or 
conceded  to the emperor, this does not mean that the people 
has wholly  abdicated it : once before,  t,he people  transferred 
their authority, but afterwards they resumed it.2 
1 Azo,  '  Snmma Codicis,'  viii.  63. 6,  jus loci, quae legem non abrogat, etiam 
Rub.,  Quae  sit  longa  consuetudo :  si ex ccrta scientia sit indllcta : licet in 
"  Quanta est consuetudinis auctoritas P  eo  loco  servetm,  ut  ff.  com.  prse.  1. 
Et quidem  videtur  quod  consuetudo  venditor  si  constat  (Dig.,  viii.  4. 
sit conditrix legis, abrogatrix, et inter-  13,  1).  Sod  contra  videtur  ut ff.  de 
pretutrix, ut ff. de leg. ot senatus cons.  sepul.  viol.  1.  iii.,  5  divus (Dig., xlvii. 
1.  de  quibus,  S  ultirno,  et 1.  num  im-  12.  3,  6).  Sed  distingue,  utrum  lex 
perator  (Dig., i.  3.  32 et 38) et Inst.,  .qeq~~atur  consuetudini,  cui  ipsa  est 
do jur.  net.  5  ex non scripto (Inst., i.  contraria, an pracedat.  Si lex  sequa- 
2.  9).  Sed  quidam  dicu~it  quod  illae  tur, quia posterior ent, dcrogat consue- 
leges antiquae sunt, hodie contra, ut j.  tudini,  qux praccssit :  alioquin  legi 
eo. I. consuetudinis (Cod., viii. 52. (53.)  consuetudo derogat : nisi  lex  consue- 
2).  His  enim  legibus  translata  erat  tudinem  prohiberet  admitti,  ut  in 
omnis potestas  in principem.  Vel  ibi  usuris  habemus.  Si vero  per orrorem 
loquitur  de CO,  quod  civitas sibi  con-  inducta esset : nec in eo loco legi dero- 
stituit per  consuetudinem,  namclue  ea  garet : licet  quidam contradicant,  qui 
vel lege scripta vel contraria consuetu-  aliter, quam nos,  casum illius legis,  ff. 
dine  tollitur : leu  autem scripta,  tan-  de legi, et sonatus l. quod non ratione 
tum lege scripta.  Vel  ibi loquitur dc  (Dig., i. 3.  39) ponunt;  sicut ibi nota- 
generuli  consuetudine,  id  est  quanl  vimus." 
princeps patitur, quz cx certa scientia  Azo,  '  Bumma  Codicis,'  i.  14.  8, 
inducta videtur : hoc dc 8peciali alicu-  Rub., I)e leg. et  const. princ. "  A populo 
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This is a passage of  much importance : it goes indeed much 
further than the theories  about the enduring importance  of 
the  custom  of  the  Roman  people  which  we  have  so  far 
considered ;  it carries  much  further the conception  that all 
political  authority ultimately  rests  with  the  people.  It is 
certainly of  great importance to find an eminent civilian like 
Azo maintaining that the Roman people  had not irrevocably 
surrendered its authority, and might perhaps resume it again, 
as it had done before. 
Azo's position would be interesting, even if  he stood alone, 
but his  conception  of  political authority has a much greater 
interest when we  observe that Hugolinus, a pupil, along wit,h 
Azo,  of  Joannes  Bassianus,  holds  the  same  principles,  but 
expresses  them with more confidence and emphasis.  In his 
' Distinctiones ' he  discusses the relation  of  law  and custom 
in terms which  are in large measure similar  to those of  the 
passage we have quoted from the ' Codex Chisianus ' ; but he 
also  expresses  with  great  clearness  his  own  judgment  on 
certain  questions  arising  out of  this.  Placentinus,  he  says, 
had maintained  that custom could not abrogate written law, 
and had interpreted the passage from Julianus in Dig., i. 3. 
32,  as referring only to those ancient  days when  the people 
had full power  to make laws,  and held  that after they  had 
transferred their authority to the emperor, they had ceased to 
possess  this.  Hugolinus  himself  bluntly  and  emphatically 
contradicts this, and maintains that the Roman people never 
transferred  their  authority to the emperor  in  such  a  sense 
that  they  ceased  to  possess  it,  while  the  position  of  the 
emperor,  he  maintains,  is  that of  s  procztratvr  ad hoe.  He 
adds  the  very  important  information  that  Bulga,rns  and 
Joannes Bassianus had taught that a  universal custon~  abro- 
gates law, and that even the local custom of  a pa,rticular city 
autem  Romano forte  et hodie  potest 
condi  lex,  ut ex  przdicta  definitione 
legis patet, licet dicatur potestas tmns- 
hta  in principem, ut j.  de vet ju.  enuc. 
1.  1.  8  hoc  etiam  (Cod.,  i.  17.  7). 
Dicitur enim translata, id est concessa, 
quod populus omnino a se abdica- 
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verit eam, sic et ponitur ff, do offi. ejus 
cui manda. est jurisdict.  1. j.  S qu iman- 
datam (Dig.,  i.  21.  1,  j  1).  Nam  et 
olim transtulerat, sed tumen postea re- 
vocavit, ut dicitur, ff. de ori. juris :  1.  2, § 
exactis, et  5 quid ad magistratus, et  5 et 
cum placuissot (Dig., i. 2.  2.  3,  14, 24)." 
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does  so  within  that city,  if  the  custom  has  been  adopted 
knowingly  or  deliberate1y.l 
We have, then, in Azo and Hugolinus, drawn out in explicit 
phrases  the  principle  which  underlies  the  theory  of  the 
enduring force of  custom in making law,-the  principle, that 
is, that the Roman people continued, at  least in some sense, to 
be  what they had always been,  the source of  all legislative 
authority, of  all political power.  It is, indeed, impossible,  on 
the evidence before  us,  to determine whether this judgment 
was  more  or  less  widely  held  than that which  maintained 
that  the  Roman  people  had  completely  transferred  their 
authority to the emperor,  and that even their customs had 
ceased  to have  authority.  We  have  cited  passages  which 
show that this was maintained by Irnerius, Placentinus, and 
Roger ; but against these must be set the names of  Bulgarus 
and Joannes Bassianus for the continuing legislative authority 
of  custom,  and of  Azo  and Hugolinus  as  holding  that the 
Roman people had never parted with their authority in such  , 
a sense that they could not resume it. 
It would seem, then, to be clear that as late as the middle 
of  the thirteenth century  the civil  or  Roman lawyers  were 
unanimous  in  holding  that  the  popult~s was  the  ultimate 
source of  all political authority, that they recognised no other 
original  source  of  political  authority  than  the  will  of  the 
whole community.  In the first volume of  the work we have 
endeavoured  to  show  that  this  was  the  principle  of  the 
ancient  Roman  jurisprudence ;  the  medigval  civilians  not 
only inherited these phrases, but understood and even devel- 
1 Hugolinus,  '  Distinctiones,'  Dist. 
148.  34 :  "  Secundum  Plarentinum 
per  consuetudinem  numquam  legi 
script=  derogatur  et  quod  dicitur 
Dig.  (i.  3.  32),  intelligendum  est 
secundum vetcra  jura,  quum  populus 
habebat  plenam  potestatem  condendi 
jura:  sed  postquam  transtulit  omne 
jus  in  imperatorem,  non  potuit. 
Sed  certe  non  transtulit  sic,  ut  non 
remaneret  apud  eum,  sed  constituit 
eum quasi procuratorern  ad hoc. . . . 
Secundum  B.  (Bulgarum)  et  Jo. 
(Joannem) distingue an consuetudo sit 
genernlis,  et tunc  abrogat  legem,  an 
partic~~laris,  et tunc si  est inducta ex 
certa scientia, derognt logi, in ea civi- 
tate, in qua est inductn, sod alibi non, 
et sic loquitur C.  (viii. 52. (63.) 2), licet 
secundum P. (Placentinum)  principium 
loquatur  in  ea  ronsuetudine  quae  est 
secundum legem,  finis  in  ea  qu3e  est 
contra ; sed hoc litera non patitur." 
aped the principles of  the ancient law, for, as we  have seen, 
they  not  only  held  that  the  universitas  or  populus  is  the 
source of  law,  but some of  them at least recognise that this 
is  the natural result  of  the relation  between  a  society  and 
its members.  We have just  seen that some of  these civilians 
also maintained that the Roman people  still continued to be 
the actual source of  all political authority, that their custom 
still both made and unmade law, and that as they had once 
delegated  their authority to the emperor,  so  they  might,  if 
occasion arose, resume that authority. 
There remain some interesting and important questions as 
to the theory  of  the civilians  with  respect  to the mode  in 
which the emperor was to exercise the authority intrusted to 
him  by the people,  and as to t,he extent of  this  authority. 
And  first,  we  inquire into their theory as to the method  of 
legislation  by  the  emperor.  Here  again  we  find  a  sharp 
division of  opinion, some maintaining  that the simple letter 
or rescript of  the emperor  has the force of  law,  others that 
the emperor had to go through certain forms, and to obtain 
the  assent  of  certain  persons  before  he  could  promulgate 
a new law.  This division of  opinion arises  directly out of  a 
difference as to the interpretation and the permanent author- 
itly of  certain passages in the Code. 
The ' Libellus  de Verbis  Legalibus ' defines a "  Pragmatic 
Sanction " as a new  constitution devised by the Senate, and 
bearing upon some new  and difficult  question submitted by 
the emper0r.l  This  definition  only  refers  to  one  particular 
form of imperial legislation ; but it is suggestive to find that, 
in the view of  the medizeval civilians, the Pragmatic Sanction 
required  the advice  or  authority of  the Senate.  When  we 
turn to Irnerius we  find him laying down a general principle 
l '  Libellus de Verbis Legalibus,'  21 :  statuit et sanxit, nec indulgotar super 
"Pragmatics sanctio est  novi  negotii  pivatis negotiis  singl~larum,  sod  uni- 
"Ova  constitutio a senatorib~~s  inventa  vcrsitatum, ut j. eod. 1, ult. 5  ultim0 " 
questione difficili  super hujusmodi  ab  (Cod., i.  23.  7,  2).-There  is no refer- 
imperatore  sihi  proposita."  cf.  Azo,  ence in this passago of the Code to the 
I<  &umma Codicis,'  i.  23.  7 :  "  Prag-  counsel of  the "  proceres." 
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of  great  scope  and importance.  In a  passage,  of  which  we 
have  already  quoted  a  part,l he  discusses  the  question  by 
whom  and by what process  laws  are to be  made,  and says ' 
that laws are made by the Roman people,  or by that person 
to whom the Roman people have given their authority ; while 
the manner in which  laws  are to be made is defined by the 
constitution of  Theodosius and Valentinian-that  is, they are 
to be  first  considered  by  the  chief  men  of  the  court,  and 
especially by the Senate, and after that they are to be pro- 
mulgated.  This, Irnerius adds, is the true method of  legisla- 
tion, for law is an ordinance of  the people, promulgated with 
the advice of the wise men of  the comm~nity.~ 
It is very important to notice  that this principle is main- 
tained  by  Irnerius,  and  that  several  civilians  follow  him. 
Roger is  very  clear  and emphatic in asserting this view, and 
says that, in making laws, the emperor is to follow the forms 
prescribed by the constitution of  Theodosius and Vale~~tinian.~ 
Azo has discussed the matter very fully, and is equally clear. 
He first  defines the nature of  the constitution of  this prince, 
distinguishing  between  this and the edictum,  and then asks 
by whom  these imperial laws  are to be  made.  He answers 
that they are to be made by the emperor, with the council of 
the notables of  the sacred "  palatium,"  and in the assembly of 
the senators.  A law is to be considered  twice, and finally, if 
all agree, it  is to be read in the sacred "  palatium "  or consistory, 
that it may be confirmed and promulgated by the prin~e.~ 
1 See p. 68,  note 1. 
Irnerlus, '  Summa Codlcls,' I.  14. 3 . 
"  In  condendis leglbus spectandum est, 
a quo et quomodo condl debeant.  . 
Quomodo condenda? slnt, hoc deslgnat 
constltutlo  Theodosn  et  Valcntlniani 
mlrsa  ad  senatum  (Cod,  I.  14.  S). 
Alitor  enlm  hod10  leges  conficl  non 
dcbent  nlsl  secundum  tenorcm  cjus 
conit~tutlonls  Jubet enlm  leges  non 
al~ter  promulgandas  esse,  nlsi  causa 
necessarla  hoc  exposcat  et  antiquis 
sanct~on~bus  non  lnserta.  Et  hoc 
fac~endum  cst,  causa  In  audltorio  a 
procc~lhus  d~scu,sa, maxlme  a  sena- 
tollbus, et  cum eorum cons1110 ord~nata. 
Et lioc  recte,  qula lex  est constitut~o 
popuh  cum  vlrorum  prudentium  con- 
sulto promulgata."  Cf. Dlg ,  I  3  1. 
8  RO~CI,  '  Summa  Codicls,'  I  12. 
"  In concloricl~i  lcg~bus  lnsplcltur  qua 
dc causa slnt condende, qua In re slnt 
condende, et quallter slnt condendc, In 
qua v1  et potestate slnt condendc  . . . 
Qual~te~  slcut  constltut~o  Theodosl~ 
et  Valentlnlani  expr~m~t  slbl  enim 
lmpon~t  formam const~tuencl~  " 
Am,  '  Summa  Cod~cls,'  I  14.  2 : 
"  Constitut~o  vero pnnclpls, et  edlctum, 
legis  partes  sunt,  ut lex  largo  modo 
We  must,  however,  notice  that the view  of  Bulgarus  is 
different.  In a gloss on Cod., i. 14. 3, he says that there 
were some who wished to conclude from this constitution that 
the Lombard law was no law at all, inasmuch as it was not 
issued  with  this  procedure :  Bulgarus  himself  emphatically 
this  conclusion,  and  maintains  that  Theodosius 
could not impose a law on the emperors who succeeded him, 
but could only give them his  advice ; the formalities, there- 
fore, prescribed by the constitution of  Theodosius and Valen- 
tinian need not be observed.' 
Clearly there was a division of opinion among the civilians, 
but it is extremely interesting and important to observe that 
some  of  the  most  important  among  them  should  have  so 
dogmatically  held  the  view  that  the  legislative  authority 
of  the emperor could only be exercised  with the counsel and 
consent  of  the  Senate.  It  would  seem  probable  that the 
civilians may have been  influenced  by the general  constitu- 
tional  principle  of  the new  Teutonic  States,  but it  is  also 
interesting  to  observe  the  continued  or  revived  influence 
in the West of  these clauses of  the fourteenth title of  the first 
book  of  the Code.  There does not appear, as far as we can 
find,  to  be  any  very  careful  discussion  of  the  significance 
and importance  of  these rescripts of  Theodosius  and Valen- 
~ntelllgatur  ; et lta iargo pos~tum  esse 
In  ruhr~ca  dlcl  potest.  Dlffert  etlam 
constltut~o pr~nclp~s  ab  edlcto  prln- 
Clpis  qula constltut~o  prlnolpls potest 
esse  general~s  et spec~alls,  ut  ff.  de 
const.  prlnclp  1.  1  5  ha?c sunt, et 5 
plane  (Dig , I.  4.  1).  Edlctum  vero 
Prlnclpls eat ]us generale  statutum, ut 
l.  CO  1.  111  (Cod, I  14.  3)  Ncc  In- 
competenter  npecles  post  genus  sup 
Ponltnr,  ut  dlxlmus,  E.  de  hared  et 
ma  A  rluo dcbent cond~  l  et quldem 
ab Imperatore cum cons1110 procorum 
palatn,  et  ccetu  honestlir~mo 
senatorurn, qui erant contum numero ; 
et dlountur  patres  conscrlpt~  , Patres, 
Vel =tat@,  vel s~rn~litudme  cura?, ut alt 
Sallust~us,  et  conscnpt~,  qula Imperator 
eor~lll  nomlna habebat scrlpta In d~ade- 
mate capitis sui.  Delegatur autem lex 
pnmo allcu~  d~ctanda,  et dictata recen- 
setur,  eat  tterum  lnterrogatur  an 
s~t  aquum ~ta  censerl:  et sl tandem 
consent~ant  omnes, recltabltur In sacro 
palat10  vel  cons~storlo,  ut confirmetur 
per  pnnclpem,  et per  populos  ]ussu 
prlnclpls d~vulgetur." 
Bulgarus,  '  Gloss  on  Cod ,'  I.  14. 
3  (In Savlgny,  '  Goscli~chte  dos Rom- 
15chen Recllts,'  bol  ~v , chap  XXVIII , 
note  51)  "  Qu~dam  sunt, qui ex hac 
lrgc Inferre  volunt, legem  Langobard 
orum  non  esse  legem,  quonlam  hac 
forms, facta non est  qulbus non con- 
sent~~,  non  enlm  Theodosius  potult 
facere  legem  secuturls Imperator~bus, 
potlus consllium est quad lsta lex dlclt. 
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tinian.  It would  seem as though they were intended in some 
measure to revive the legislative functions of  the Senate.  It 
seems to be clear that Justinian did not regard them as in any 
\ 
way binding upon him,l and it would seem that the attempt 
to revive  the functions of  the Senate  had  little immediate 
effect ; but  it  is  possible  that  these  rescripts  may  have 
exercised  a  greater  influence  in  the  West  than  we  are  at 
present aware of.  It is worth while to observe that the " Dis- 
sensiones Dominorum,"  contained  in the ' Codex  Chisianus,' 
indicate  that  certain  civilians  maintained  that  the  Senate 
still possessed the power  of  making  and abrogating law.2 
Some  of  the  civilians then  maintained  dogmatically  that 
the emperor or prince had no  arbitrary authority in legisla- 
tion; it  is  important  to observe that some  at least  of  the 
civilians maintained  that his  authority was  always in  some 
measure limited by the law.  Azo  discusses the question how 
far the emperor  could  issue  rescripts  or privilegia  contrary  , 
t80 the  law,  and  says  that  such  priailegia  are  invalid 
if  they  do  serious  injury  to any  one,  unless  the  emperor 
inserted  a  .non  obstante  clause :  he  adds  that it  must  not 
be assumed that the prince intended to act against the law, 
unless  he  definitely said so, inasmuch  as at the beginning of 
his  reign  he  swore to observe the laws.3  We may  perhaps 
here  again  trace  the  influence  of  contemporary  and  tradi- 
tional Teutonic custom  on  the civilians. 
There  is  an interesting  discussion of  the  question  of  the 
limit,ation  of  the  emperor's  authority  in  the  ' Questiones 
Juridica ' of  Pillius, a civilian of  the latter part of  the twelfth 
century.  The particular point discussed is the question whether 
a sentence given by the emperor in an appeal case would be 
valid  if  both parties to the case had not been  summoned to 
1  Cf. Cod., i.  14. 12, 4 and 5. 
2  ' Dis~ensiones  Dominorum,'  '  Cod. 
Chis. Coll.,'  46 :  "Et dicunt senatum 
posse  hodie  condere  legem  et  abro- 
gare."  Cf.  for  the  whole  passage, 
p.  62, note  1. 
S  Azo,  '  Brocardica,'  Rub,  xxxi. : 
"  Idem  dicendum est  si  simile  sit his 
qua dicuntur posso impetrari, non aliter 
tenet ; nisi vel non  ledat alium valde 
. . . nisi  in  rescripto  supponat  prin- 
ceps, non  obstnnto lege illa  qua: dicit 
ita . . . non  enim  przsumitur  quod 
voluerit, et si sciat contraria, et maxime, 
quim in principio sua: creationis jurat de 
consuetudine, se observaturum leges." 
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appear.  Pillius first gives the reasons for holding that such 
a  judgment  would  be  valid,  and  enumerates  some  of  the 
most noteworthy examples of the authority of  the prince : he 
can emancipate a slave, he can make the freedman ingenuus, 
he can legitimatise a bestlard, he can ennoble a man of  humble 
station, he can make a rich man poor ; the emperor can make 
law, can amend it, can abolish it, can interpret it ; if he can do 
all these things, who  can really doubt that he can give judg- 
ment  without  summoning both  parties  to  a  case.  Further, 
every secular power is inferior to him,-who  then can discuss 
his judgment ?  certainly not his inferiors ; and, even if  you 
could  find  an equal to the emperor,  he  could not  annul his 
sentence, or even take cognisance of  it.  On the other hand, 
it is contended, Pillius says, that the judgment  of  the prince 
under such circumstances is invalid, for there are many things 
that he cannot do ; for instance, he cannot annul a sale, or a 
testament,  or  a  donation, he  cannot  confer  a monopoly, he 
cannot enact anything contrary to jzts  and 10%.  If  he cannot 
do any of  these things, much less can he act in a manner so 
contrary to legal order as to give judgment  without hearing 
both sides.  Pillius concludes by giving his own opinion, which 
is  very  cautious ;  he  holds that no  judge  can  set aside the 
sentence of  the prince,  but  that  the prince  himself  should 
correct it.l  Pillius has  carefully balanced  the arguments for 
1 Pillius,  ' Quastiones  Aurea:,'  Q. 
43 : "  Summarium-an  sententia  ap- 
pellationis per Imperatorem lata, parte 
non citata, valeat 3 " 
"  Cum  qurestio vertitur inter Jacob- 
um  et N.,  victus  Jacobus ad Impcra- 
torem  appellavit.  Tandem  volens 
suam  prosequi  appollationem,  adivit 
Imperatorem ; Imperator vcro non re- 
quisita  altcra  parte,  priorem  cassavit 
sentcntiam,  et  pro  Jacobo  juclicav~t. 
Quceritur  utrum  nunc  talis  sententia 
valeat,  que non  requjsita  partc  ad- 
versa,  lata  est,  proponitur  actio  vel 
exceptio judicati. 
Quad valeat sententia. 
Quad  actio  in  factum  judicati,  vel 
exceptio  locum  habeat  ex  principali 
sententia,  manifesta  ratione  potest 
probari :  Imprimis  propter  ipsius 
principis privilegia, quae  varia sunt et 
immobilia, sed pauca  numerari  suffici- 
ant.  Ecce enim de servo potest facere 
liberum  . . . de  libortino  ingenuum, 
. . . de  bastard0  legitimum  . . . de 
divite  paupcrem,  .  .  .  de  humili 
nobilem  . . . de  famoso  infamem. 
. . . In summa,  legem  potest  facere, 
corrigere,  tollere,  interpretari  .  . . 
igitur  hrec  et omnia  et  alia  infinita 
Imperator cum possit, qnis dicit omni 
altera parte irrequisita, quad non possit 
dare  sententiam 7  Ad  hzc,  omnis 
potestas secularis est eo inferior, quis 
ergo de ejus judicio disputabit 3  Nnm- 
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these  texts  will  serve  as  illustrations  of  the  diversity 
of  opinion  among the civilians upon  this subject.  We find 
the matter further illustrated  in the colle,ction of  the "  Dis- 
sensiones " of  the early jurists.  In the collection  made  by 
Hugolinus,  some  jurist  is  reported  to  have  said  that  the 
emperor could  transfer one  man's  property  to an0ther.l  In 
the similar  collection  made  by Roger,  he  states that some 
maintained  that the prince  could  alienate a  man's  property 
whether he knew that it was  the man's  and not his  own,  or 
was  ignorant  of  this,  and  that this  was  founded  on  Cod., 
vii. 37. 3, but adds that Jacobus, one of  the four doctors, the 
immediate successors of  Irnerius in Bologna, maintained that 
this  law  was  only  applicable  to  cases  where  the  emperor 
was ignorant that the property was another man's.2  Another 
collection  cites  Martinus,  also  one  of  the  four  doctors,  as 
agreeing  with  Ja~obus.~  Azo  discusses  the  question  in his 
' Brocardica,' and agrees with Martinus and Jacobus, but also 
holds  that  the  emperor  can  make  grants  of  that property  , 
which  is  in pert his,  and even  of  that in  which  he  has  no 
share, if  this is  for the benefit  of  the State and the public 
utility demands it.4 
l Hugolinus,  '  Dissensiones  Domin- 
orum,' 6 : "  Si quidem imperatori licet 
perpetuam  exceptionem  indulgere,  ut 
D.  (ii.  2.  3.  3), licet  quoque  servum 
liberum  constituere,  ut  D.  (i.  14.  3), 
potest  etiam  rei  alienae  dominium 
tranaferre, ut C.  (vii. 37. 3)." 
Roger, '  Dissensiones Dominorum,' 
50 : "  Disseusus est inter eos in aliena- 
tione  facts a  principe.  Nam  quidem 
dicunt, sive imperator scivit, rem  esse 
alienam,  sive  ignoravit,  illud  obtinern 
quod  dicit  C.  (vii.  37.  3).  Jncobus 
dicit, illam logem loqui : quum ignor- 
avorit." 
a  ' Dissensiones Dominorum,' '  Vetns 
Collectio,'  71 : "  Nam  quidam  dicunt, 
eive  imperator  scivit,  sive  ignoravit, 
rem esse alienam, illud obtinere,  quod 
dicit  C.  (vii.  37.  3),  Martinus  et 
Jacobus illam legem loqui dicunt, quum 
ignoraverit." 
Azo, 'Brocardica,'Rub.xciii.:  "'Im- 
perator potest omnia donare '-Hoc  si 
donat rem  alienam ut suam,  ut C.  de 
quad.  praesc.  1.  2  and  1.  bene  (Cod., 
vii. 37. 2 and 3).  Alioquin non potest, 
nisi  ratione  partis,  ut  Cod.  de  vend. 
rer. fise. cum pri. ca.  I.  i. (Cod., X. 4), 
si enim etsi non habeat partem, alienar 
posset,  pro  nihilo  dicerit  ibi,  ratione 
partis.  Imo  alienare,  donare  potest, 
et  si  nullam  pnrtem  ibi  habeat:  si 
hoc  tamen reip.  expediat. Arg.  C.  de 
sacros. Eccles. Auth (Cod., i.  2.  Auth- 
entic after 14), sed et permutare.  Sicut 
rem ad alicujus instantiam, Cod. do loc. 
prae.  ci.  1.  ult.  (Cod., xi.  71.  (70.) 6). 
Intelligas,  ai  hoc  publica  utilitas  ex- 
poscit." 
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1f we  attempt to sum up our impression of  the theory  of 
authority  which  was  held  by  these  civilians,  we 
are led  to the conclusion that the conception of  the revived 
study  of  the  Roman  law  as  unfavourable  to  the  progress 
of  political  liberty,  while it  may  cont,ain some  elements  of 
t,ruth, requires  at least  very  considerable  clualification-at 
least, so far as its influence in the twelfth  and ea8rly  thirteenth 
centuries  is  concerned.  We  have  seen  that these  civilians 
are  unanimous  in  recognising  that  the  people  is  the  only 
ultimate  source  of  political  authority  and  of  law.  This 
was not indeed a conception strange to the Middle Ages, for 
the  normal  conception  of  the  new  Teutonic  States  was 
that law  and political  authority proceeded  from  the nation 
as a whole ; but while the conception was not strange, it was 
probably a thing of  much importance that the representatives 
of  the legal traditions of  the ancient civilisation should have 
held  the same  principle  as  those  who  represented  the new 
order.  It is  quite  true that a  section  of  the civilians  held 
that  the  people  had  wholly  parted  with  their  original 
authority,  and that some of  them attributed to the emperor 
bhe  possession  of  an  almost  unlimited  authority ;  and  so 
far  it  is  true  to  say  that  the  influence  of  the  revised 
Roman  law  was  unfavourable  to  the  progress  of  political 
freedom.  But against this must be  set the fact that some 
of  the  most  important  of  these  jurists  held  very  different 
principles-that  some  of  them  maintained  that  the  legis- 
lative  authority  of  the  people  had  never  been  transferred 
to the emperor in such  a  sense  that they had  wholly  and 
for ever  parted  with  it, but  that rather  the  people  might 
at any time resume the authority which they had bestowed ; 
while  some  of  them also  maintained  that the amperor  pos- 
sessed no unrestricted authority-that  his legislative functions 
could only  be  exe,rcised with  the advice  of  the Senate, and 
that he  possessed  no  unlimited power  over  the property  of 
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alongside  of  the  organisation  of  civil  authority  there  is 
another  organisation,  which  derives  its authority from  God 
as  well  as  from  men,-an  organisation  which,  as  it  has 
its  own  laws,  has  also  its  own  courts  and  jurisdiction. 
This conception is expressed in a phrase of  that work on the 
Code  which  Professor  Fitting  attributes  to Irnerius.  The 
author speaks of  the court or authority of  the Bishop as being 
given to him by divine as well as by human 1aw.l  We may 
add to this a phrase of  Pillius, in which he speaks of  the Pope 
as  having,  in  divine  matters,  that  same  complete  (plerha) 
jurisdiction  which  the  emperor  has  in  his.2  The  civilians 
may  make  little  direct  reference  to  the  theory  of  the  re- 
lations  of  the Church  to the State, but there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  they  look  upon  it  as  related  to  it,  but  also 
distinct,  and as possessing  a  character and authority which 
are divine. 
We must begin  by examining the conception  of  the canon 
law  which  is  held  by the civilians,  or  rather  their  view  of 
its  relation  to  secular  authority  and  law.  The  civilians 
recognise  very  clearly  the  supremacy  of  the  law  of  God 
over  the  civil  law.  The  prince,  according  to  Placentinus, 
is not to ordain laws  contrary to the Lord  or  to nature ; 
according  to a  passage  in the collection  of  Dissensiones  of 
Hugolinus,  rescripts  which  are  contrary  to  the  natural  or 
'  Irnenus,  '  Summa  Cod ,'  1  4  2, 
"  De  Eplscopall Audientia "  "  Audl- 
entla vero seu potestas eis perm~ttitur 
tam  lure  d~vlno  quam  humano  in 
omnibus personis que dlvinam militlam 
gcrunt,  ut sive  inter  so  aliquas  lltes 
habeant,  sive  ab  alils  compulst~ltur 
apud eplscopos  conven~antur  " 
Cf  I  4  6  and  'Lo  Cod1 ,'  I  4  G 
"  Alie  raciones  et alla  placit.t,  qlrut 
divlna lex preciplt, debent nb eplscopo 
terminan  et  cl~ffinlr~  melius  quam 
novent  Quod  81  facere  neglexer~t, 
divlne ulc~onls  subjacebit " 
Pillius,  '  Ordo  de  clv~lium atque 
crimlnahum  causarum  ju[lic~~s,'  p 
67,  "  De  rausarum  cogn~tlone  " 
"  Est enlm  jurrsd~ct~o,  potestas  allcui 
indulta  cum  licentia  reddendi  jur~s, 
et facultate  statuendre  requitatis,  vel 
jur~sdictio  est,  judic~s  dandl licentia, 
ut ff  dr jurls  omn  ju  1 111  (Cod ,  111. 
13  3)  Item jurisd~ct~o  alla est plena, 
ut In princlpe Romano quoniam popu 
lus Roman~is  er  et In eum omne suum 
Impenum  et potestatem  concessit  et 
rontul~t  ut ff  de  constlt  prlnc  1  1 
(Dig , r  4  1)  Et hoc lclem  habeatur 
in  divm~s, quomam  domlnus  Papa 
habeat  plenitudinem  potestatis  ut 
dlcltur cap  xi11  ln Dec  Col.  11  Alia 
est non plena ut in alus ~udlcibus." 
Plarentinus,  '  Summa  Instltu- 
tlonum,  1  2  "  Placult lnquam prlncipi 
ut  jus  constltuat  ita  ut  non  contra 
dominum statuat vel  naturam " 
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divine law are to be rejected by the c0urts.l  Azo says very 
that an imperial reacript or privilegiuln  against 
the law of  God, of the apostles and evangelists or prophets, is 
to be wholly rejected ; the emperor cannot abrogate the laws 
of  his  superior,  though  he may apply them with  some  dis- 
crimination of persons, and of  the public needs.2  This is an 
important qualification ; and in another passage he applies it 
specifically to the question of  usury, which may be permitted 
by  the civil law on account  of  the actual necessities  of  the 
world,  though  it is  properly  unlawful  because  it is  against 
the law of  God.3  It  is, however, clear that the civilians fully 
recognised that the law of  God in the Scriptures represented 
an authority superior to that of  the civil law, and that what- 
ever was contrary to this was properly invalid. 
Rut we must now ask what was their attitude to the canon 
law  of  the Church,  as distinguished  from  Scripture.  There 
is one set of  canons wllich all the civilians  seem to recognise 
as having the force of  law.  These are the canons of  the first 
four  general  councils.  We  find  this  stated  first  in  the 
1 Hugolrnus,  '  Diss  Dom ,' 6  "  SI  tamen mlnuit  Lege  autem Del,  que 
jur~  natural1 vel  d~vino  contradlxerlnt  veter~  ac novo Testamento contlnetur, 
(rescnpta) refutantur ommno "  omnes usurarum obllgatlonrs proh~bitre 
1  Azo,  '  Summa  Cod ,'  I  22  1 .  sunt,  et  execrate  nlhll  ergo  valet, 
"  Sciendum est autem quod si rescnp-  quod  sequitur  er eo,  vel  ob  ld,  ut 
turn,  vel  privileglum  contra jus  Del,  supra  de  leg1  et sanatua consultls,  1. 
apostolorum, evangol~starum,  prophet  non dubmm (Cod, 1  14  6), cum et 
mum  indulgeatur,  omnlno  respu1t;r 
qula superiorls leges tolle~e  non potest, 
curn alias sit prod~tum,  quod par par1 
impelare non potest , ut ff  de ~ecept 
arbitr  1  nam  mngistratus,  et ff  ad 
Trebell~anum, 1  111~  8  tempestivum 
(D ,  iv  8  4, and xxxvi  1  13, 4)  Llcet 
autern  non  tollat,  d~st~nguere  tameii 
potest  pro  qualltate  pcrsonarum,  et 
publica  utll~tate  Nam  et  apostolus 
alt  Omnis anima subdita sit regi tan 
Wan1 pracellentl  et ducibus  tanquain 
ab eo in~ssis,"  etc 
a  Azo,  ' Summa  Cod ,' iv  12  18 
"Et  hoc  de  lure  humano  Nam 
Proptor  mundi  neceas~tates et  angus 
tlas,  Impelator  ex  toto  non  potuit 
cassare  obl~gationem usuraiuin  sed 
Imperator  d~cat  sacias  canones  pro 
legibus  observandis,  ut  In  authentic, 
ut cler~~i  apud  eplsr  5  ult~mo  (Nov. 
83  1) et, quomodo oportcat ep~scopos 
ad  ordlnat~onem  adduci,  g  sed  etiam 
slc  eum  (Nov  G  1  8)  Certum  cst 
\iqu~dem  quod lox minorls non derogat 
legi superiorls  Nam nedum superiori, 
5ocl  etlam pall quis inlpelale non valet, 
ut ff  de arb~tr  1 nnm inagistratus (D, 
iv  8  4) et ad Trebcll  1  ille  a  quo 
tempestlvum (D  ,  xxxvi  1  13, 4)  Quo- 
modo ergo servus abolebit legem domlnl 
SUI  Certe  hoc durum esset, et contra 
nnturam  Unde  et  Paulo  Apostolo 
dlctuin  est,  durum  est  tibi  contra 
st~mulum  calcitrare,  Acta  ix.  cap." POLITICAL  THEORY  OF ROMAN  LAWYERS.  [PART  I. 
'Exceptiones'  of  Peter,  then  in  Joannes  Bassianus,  and 
finally in  Azo,  and we  may assume  that the principle  was 
universally  accepted by the civilians.  This is, indeed, what ' 
we  should expect, for the principle is laid down by Justinian 
himself  in the ' Novels,'  from which,  or from the ' Epitome 
Novellarum ' of  Julian, the civilians  derive it.l  It  must be 
noticed,  however,  tlhat these  canons  have the force  of  civil 
laws,  because  Justinian has  given  them this ;  there  is not 
in any of  these passages  any suggestion that they have this 
force  in virtue  of  their own  authority,-that  is,  that their 
relation to the civil law is the same as that of  the law of God 
in  nature  or  of  the  Scriptures.  We  have  not  found that 
any civilian  commenting  on the civil law  suggests  that the 
canon law as such has the force  of  civil  law,  or is superior 
to civil law within  the sphere of  the latter.  As  far as we 
can understand these writers,  their conception  of  the canon 
law  seems to be that of  a  system parallel  to the civil law, 
supreme,  no  douht, in  its  own  sphere,  but not  possessing 
authority outside of  this. 
1 '  Petri  Exceptiones  Legum  Ro-  dic, ut j.  eo usque ;  ad 5 ad haec." 
manorurn,'  i.  2 : "  Canones sanctornm  Azo,' Summa Cod.,' iv. 33. 18 : "  Cum 
quatuor conciliorum  pro legibus  habe-  et imperator  dicat  sacros canones pro 
antur :  id  est  Nicenum,  Constanti-  legibus observandos ;  ut .in authentic ; 
nopolitanum,  Ephesianum primum, et  ut,  clericis  apud  episc.  5  ultimo  et 
Chalcedonense.  In  hoc cspitnlu notare  quomodo oporteat episcopis ad ordina- 
potes,  quod  si  canones  sunt contrarii  tioncm adduci ;  5  sed etiam sic sum." 
logibus,  canones  tenendi  sunt,  non  The phrase in the Epitome of  Julian 
leges.  Quia  si  canones  habentur pro  is  as follows : '  Epitome Novellarum,' 
legibus,  et novae  leges  infirmant  con-  119.  1 : "  Quatuor sanctorum  concili- 
trarias  leges  antiquas,  tune  novi  ornm canones pro lcgibus habeantur." 
canones  infirmant  anteriores  leges,  This  comes  from  Novel.,  131.  1 : 
quibus contrarii sunt."  "  Sancimus igitur vicem  legum  obtin- 
Joannes Uassianus, ' Summa in Libro  ere sanctas ecclesiasticas regulas qua, a 
Novellarum,' p. 13  11, "  Do ecclesiasticis  sanotis quatuor conciliis expositae sunt, 
titulix " (Nov. 131) : "  Quia veriis legi-  aut  finnatz," etc. 
bus tractatur do privilegiis ecclesiarum  It  is on this that Jo. Bass. is com- 
ideo  omnia  sub hac  lege  comprehen-  menting.  Azo  refers  to Nov.  83.  1 
dere  vult ; dicit ergo  de occlesiasticis  and  Nov.  G.  5, in  which  the  same 
titulis  et privilegiis,  quod  expone  ut  principle is laid clown. 
dixi  j.  eodern  in  prin.  In primum  For a discubsion of  the question of  a 
dat  eis  privilegium,  ut  omnes  leges  collision  between  the two  systems  of 
sint  subjects:  sacris  canonibus,  quae  law,  and  for  a  further  treatment  of 
aunt  in sacris  quatuor  conciliis,  sive  the  passage  from  Peter,  cf. pp.  227- 
in  ordine  residendi,  sine in  aliis,  qu:n  233. 
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When we  now consider the theories of  the civilians  on the 
immunities of  the clergy,  we  come to the conception  of  the 
two  societies,  with  their respective authorities  and jurisdic- 
tions ; and here it is important at once to observe that the 
civilians  are  clear  that this  authority  and jurisdiction  are 
founded not  only  on  human  law,  but on  the  divine.  We 
have  already  quoted  the passages  of  Irnerius and Pillius  in 
which these conceptions are espressed.l  It must be observed 
that Irnerius  is  clear  that the  episcopal  jurisdiction  in  its 
plenitude extends only over those persons who, in his phrase, 
divinam  militiam  gerunt;  all  secular  legal  proceedings, 
whether  among  these  persons  or  against  them,  must  be 
brought before the bishop,  but in the case  of  other persons 
the bishop can only take action if  they desire it.2  We shall 
have  to  consider  this  matter  presently  in  detail;  for  the 
moment we must fix our attention upon the fact that Irnerius 
clearly  recognises  two classes of  persons-the  one  consisting 
of  those  over  whom  the  bishop  has  full  jurisdiction,  and 
clearly  he means by these those who  have the ecclesiastical 
character ; the other class, by which he means the laity, over 
whom, in secular matters, the bishop has no regular jurisdic- 
tion, except at their own desire.  We have here very clearly 
the conception of  two societies, two jurisdictions-not,  indeed, 
that such a passage presents us with a complete view of  the 
subject, for the laity, as members of  the Church,  belong  to 
the ecclesiastical  as well as the secular society, but we  have 
at least, very clearly marked, the conception of  the two juris- 
diclions,  and the principle  that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
exists  by divine law,  while it is supported by human law. 
The  clergy  are,  properly  speaking,  that  is,  as  clergy, 
subject  only  to the  jurisdiction  of  the  Church.  We  may 
Put  this  as  summarily  expressing  the  conception  of  the 
civilians.  We must  consider this in detail. 
The first and simplest case is that of  the prosecution of  an 
I  See p.  18.  potest:  qui  postquam  ejus  andion- 
'  Imerius,  Summa Codicis,' i. 4.  3 :  tiam elegerint,  ct apucl enm venerint, 
"Inter alias vero personas juditiumepix-  ctiam ex necessitate postoa  coguntur.'' 
"pi  imrno arbitrium ex voluntata (osse) 
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bishop.1  A somewhat later civilian, Bagarottus, puts the prin- 
ciple briefly, that no civil case by an ecclesiastic or by a lsy- 
man against an ecclesiastic is to be heard in the civil court.2 
It is noticeable  that Roger  is  the only  one  of  the civilians 
who, as far as we  have seen, maintajns that if the lay suitor 
thinks the Bishop's sentence is unjust he can go to the secular 
court. 
We  turn  to the  question  of  criminal  proceedings  against 
the clergy.  The  author  of  the ' Brachylogus ' says that in 
criminal  cases  the  cleric  may  be  brought  either  before  the 
bishop or before the secular court : if the case is taken to the 
bishop,  and he  finds  the  accused  digmus  capitali  supplicio, 
he  is  to  degrade  him,  and  hand  him  over  to the  prases 
to be  punished;  if  the case  is  taken in  the first  instance 
to  the  secular  judge,  he  cannot  punish  the  cleric  until 
he  has  been  degraded  by  his  bishop ;  if  the  bishop  is 
doubtful  about the justice  of  the treatment of  the case, he 
can postpone  the degradation (sub legitima cawtela) until the  , 
matter has been  referred  to the prince.3  This is  very  close 
to the ' Epitome ' of  Julian and the ' Novels.'  Irnerius says 
that  criminal  cases  against  a  cleric  are  to go  to  the  civil 
judge,  who  must  decide  the  case  in  three  months :  if  he 
find the accused guilty, he must not condemn him until he 
has  been  deprived  of  the  priesthood  (sacerdotio)  by  the 
1 Aeo,  '  Summa  Codicis,'  i.  3.  12 :  negotium  non  pertinet,  clericus  ac- 
"Item  sub  certis  tantum  personis  cusetur, liceat et in hoc casu episcopum 
compelluntur  (i.e.,  clerici) respondere :  cognoscere ; ut temen, si dignum capi- 
hoc est, in pecuniarie causa apud episco-  tali supplicio  clericum  invenerit,  omni 
pum : v01 si ipse non posset cognoscere :  clericatus honoro  deriudatum  ad puni- 
v01 nolit, v01 differat, cognoscat  civilis  endum priesidi tradat.  Sin vero clcri- 
judex,observetis clericorumprivilogiis."  cus ante prasidem aceusetur, non liceat 
Bagarottus, '  De exceptionibus di-  priesidi  ante  clericum  punire,  quam 
latoriis,'  87 :  "  Item  (excluditur)  si  a  proprio  opiscopo  clericatus  honore 
clericus  vel  laicus  conveniat  alium  fuerit  denudatus :  quod  si  episcopus 
' clericurn  coram  civili  judice,  ut  in  vidorit  acta sibi  non  juste  constitisse, 
auth. ut cler.  apud propr.  @pis.  et in  liceat  ei  differre  gradus  denudationem 
auth.  de san.  episcopis  8  si  qnis  &c.  sub legitima cautela, quo usque  super 
(Nov.,  83 and  123.  21) et C.  do  epis.  ea re prinoipi suggeratur, justam cause 
et de auth. causa;  et auth. clericus "  finem imposituro." 
(Cod., i. 3 after 33).  Cf. Nov. 79 and 83.  Cf  '  Epitome Juliani,'  115.  34,  and 
a  '  Brachylogus,'  iv. 8.  6 : "  Quod si  Novel,  123. 21.  1. 
in causa criminali quze ad ecclesiastioum 
bishop.'  Boger  lays  down  practically  the  same  rule  as 
~~~~eriu~.~  John  Bassianus  holds  that  in  criminal  matters 
the  case  is  to  go  to  the  secular  court,  unless  the  accuser 
prefer to take  it first to the bishop's  court:  if  the secular 
court  finds  the  ~ccused  guilty,  the  sentence  is  not  to  be 
pronounced  until  the  record  of  the  proceedings  has  been 
sent to the bishop, who  is to degrade if  he  is  satisfied with 
the evidence, then the secular court is to impose the proper 
punishment.3  The view of Azo is that criminal cases against 
the clergy belong to the civil judge,  who  can acquit without 
consulting the bishop ; but if he  conclude that the accused 
is  to  be  condemned, he  must first be  deprived  of  his  orders 
by the bi~hop.~ 
These civilians all agree in  the majn principles, that it is 
for the secular court  to try and  punish  the cleric, but  that 
the court cannot carry this out until the bishop has degraded 
the  cleric.  Some of  them-i.e.,  the author  of  the ' Brachy- 
logus ' and John Bassianus-also  clearly held that the bishop 
is  to  consider whether the evidence is  satisfactory before he 
degrades : it is not clear whether  Irnerius, Roger, and Azo 
l  Irnerius, '  Summa Codicis,' i. 4. 5 : 
"Si  tamen  do  crimine  (clerici)  ac- 
cusentur,  civi!is  adeatur judex,  ita ut 
inter duos menses per eum dirimatur, 
et,  si  rei  inventi  fuerint,  non  ante 
condompnentur,  quam  sacerdotio  per 
episcopum exuantur."  Cf. '  Lo. Codi.,' 
i. 4.  5. 
Roger,  Summa Cod.,' i. 4 : "  Crim- 
inalis questio alia forensis,  alia ecclcsi- 
ashica.  Si  criminalis  et  forensis  est, 
adeatur  civilis  judex,  ut  inter  duas 
menses causa omni mod0 decidatur, et 
si  rci  irivonti fuerint, donuclati ac de- 
positi ab oficio prius  a  suo episcopo, 
Condempnentur." 
a  Joannos  Bassianus,  De  Ordine 
Judiciorum,'  106 :  " Si  autem  do 
~'imine litigandum  fuerit,  si  quidem 
civile  crirnen  est,  civilis  judex  erit 
&deundus,  qui  licet  reum  invenerit 
aceusaturn,  tamen  non  condempnabit 
eum statim, sed gesta  apud se  habita 
ad  cpiscopum  suum  mittet ;  et,  si 
sufficere vidobuntur,  episcopus  ordine 
graduque  occlesiastico  expoliabit  ac. 
cusatum,  et post  civilis judex  penam 
corporalem  competentem  imponet. 
Puto tamen quod ab initio cogatur re- 
sponder~  sub episcopo suo si accusator 
maluerit  ut  in  Auth."  (Nov.  123. 
21.  2). 
*  Am,  ' Summa  Cod.,'  i.  3.  12 : 
"  In  criminali  autem  causa  civilis 
tanturn przesse debet judex, ut causam 
torminet intra duos menses a tempore 
litis  contestati  computandos ;  et  si 
viderit clericum condemnandum, primo 
dobet  spoliari  ordinibus  suis  ab epis- 
cop0 ; si autem viderit  eum absolvon- 
dum, etiam inconsulto episcopo, potest 
eum absolvere, ut in authent. ut cleric. 
apud proprios  episcopos  conveniantur 
(Nov.  83) : et authentic. eod.  tit.  f  si 
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take  th~s  view  or  not.  The  author  of  the '  Brachylogus ' 
stands alone in following Nov.,  123. 21,  in the view  that if 
the bishop is not satisfied the matter is to be referred to the 
prince.  The clergy  are, then, prmarily subject to the juris- 
diction of  the Church : it is not till they have been deprived 
by the Church itself  of  their ecclesiastical character that they 
come under the ordinary jurisdiction of  the secular authority. 
The theory of  Church and State so far might  seem to be 
comparatively  simple;  we  might  almost  think  that  they 
were regarded by the civilians as two parallel  societies, each 
with its own members  and its own  organx%tion,  separate in 
such a degree that normally the members of  the one are not 
subject to the jurisdiction  of  the other.  The truth is, how- 
ever, that no  such  simple  and easy  definition  was  possible, 
and this becomes very clear when we  consider  the principles 
of  the civilians  with  regard  to  the relation  of  the laity to 
Church law and Church courts. 
For the laity, as members  of  the Church,  are in some re- 
spects subject to Church law, and are in some measure under 
the jurisdiction of  Church courts.  A layman may be guilty of 
an ecclesiastical offence, and is then liable to be brought before 
the Church courts.  The layman, however, is not liable to the 
jurisdiction of  t,hose courts in the same way as the ecclesiastic. 
John Bassianus  and Azo  maintain  that when  a  layman  is 
charged with an ecclesiastical  crime he is to be  tried, not by 
the bishop  alone, but by the bishop  and the prases.  They 
found this judgment upon certain phrases of  Justinlan in the 
Novels ;  whether  their  application  of  these  was  correct  we 
do not pretend to say.l  The layman is then subject to the 
Church law and to the jurisdiction  of  the Church, though, as 
1 Joannes  Bassianus,  '  Summa  in 
Lib  Nov ' (p  1293), "  Ut clcrlci apud 
proprlos episcopos conven~antur,"  Nov 
83  "  Circa  quod  distingue : aut cst 
causa canonica, aut civ~lis  S1  qmclom 
canonica  ct  infertur  cltiico  episco 
pus  tantum  debet  cognoscore,  ut 
infra  eodcm  5  si  vero  ecclesiasticus 
(Nov  123  31  2).  Seciis si laico, tune 
przses Lum episcopo cognoscat, ut lnfra 
de mandat  prlncip  5 si  vero  canon1 
cam " (Nov xvii  11). 
Azo, ' Sum  Cod ,' i  3  13. "  Laicus 
autem  de  ecclesiastico crimine  coram 
cplscopo (convenitur)  et ooram przside , 
ut  infra  in  authen  . . . de  man. 
11r1nclp 5 neque occasione " (Nov xvil. 
11)  Cf  Accursius, '  Gloss  on  Nov ,' 
83, "  Ecclesiasticum." 
CHAP.  VIII.]  ECCLESIASTICAL  AND  SECULAR  POWERS.  87 
these  civilians  hold,  the ~f3Cular  authority is entitled to take 
its part in the decision of  cases brought against  the laity in 
the Church Courts. 
hd  again, in quite another connection, we find illustrations 
of the fact that the two societies are not really separate.  For 
the civilians  very  clearly recognise  that in certain cases the 
authorities could intervene even in purely secular 
The first example of this which we have to consider 
i,cj  the permission given by the Roman law to take a civil case 
between two laymen before the bishop, instead of  the secular 
judge, if  both parties to the suit agreed.  This is implied in 
the ' ~xceptiones  ' and the ' Brs~chylogus,'  and is laid  down 
by Irnerius in his treatise on the Code and by the Provenqal 
Summa  of  the  Code.  Irnerius  makes  it clear  that such  a 
procedure is entlrely voluntary, but he adds that if  the parties 
have  agreed  to  it,  and have  appeared  before  the  bishop, 
they  will  then  be  conlpelled  to  go  on:  against  the  judg- 
ment  of  the bishop  in  such  cases  there is  no  appeal,  and 
it must  be  carried  out by the  civil  auth0rities.l  More  im- 
l '  Petri Exceptlones,'  1v  37 . "  In  Irnerius, '  Summa  Codicls,'  1  4.  3 : 
sesta  actione  Chalcedonensis Concilii,  "  Inter alias vero personas  (m e ,  those 
Marcianus Imperator inter cetera dixit  who are not clerics), juditlum  episcopl 
Omnes  causae  quse  Praetoris  lure  vel  imo  arbitrium  ex  voluntate  (esse) 
clvlll tractanda Episcoporum sententns  potest  qu~  postquam elus audientiam 
terminantur , perpetuo stabllitatls lure  elegerint, et apud eum venermt,  etiam 
firmentur , nec llceat  alterius tractare  ex  necessitate  postea  coguntur.  Cog- 
negotium, quod sententiis Eplscoporum  noscere quidem possunt, item examin- 
decidet "  are ac pronuntiare.  Quorum sententie 
'  Brachylogus,'  iv.  8  5  "  Item  si  (ab) appellatione  immunis  erit  quem- 
~1~11:s  causa est (actor)  licet sit secularis,  admodum  sententia  prefectorum pre. 
reus  clericus  est,  apud  proprium  tono, set a judics  civili executioni seu 
eplscopum debet definlri  sin autem is,  effectui mandanda est  Hoc ita demum, 
convenitur, est laicus, volens qmd-  si  causa  pecunlaria  s~t  In criminali 
em ante antistitem lltigare admittendns  vero llte hoc  non eis permittltur 
lnvltus vero non est cogendus "  '  Lo. Cod1 ,' i  4  3. "  Eodem mod0 
Cf  '  Code,' 1  4, 8  "  Episcopalo judic-  si duo homines habent placitum,  epis- 
lUm  raturn sit omnibus, qui se audiri a  copus  potest  ease  ludex  inter  eos,  si 
sa'erdotlbus  elegerLnt , eamque illorurn  ipsi volunt  set non potest fierl appel- 
]udlcatlonl  adhibendem  esse  reveren-  latio a sentencia ipsius  Hob est verum 
tlam  lubl~~us,  quam  vostris  defferri  quod potest judlcare lnter all06 homlnee, 
necesse  potestatibus,  a quibus non  si  placitum  est  de  avere  vel  de  pos- 
'lcet  Provocare.  per  ~udicem quo-  sesione.  set  si  est  de  crimine,  non 
que ~fficla,  ne sit causa episcopalis cog-  potest  hoc  facere." 
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portant,  however,  is  the  doctrme  of  the  civilians  that,  at 
least in some cases, if  a suitor has  doubts about the justice 
of  the secular court he may  demand that the bishop should 
sit in court with the secular judge.  This doctrine is set out 
in the handbooks of  law, and also by Joannes Bassianus and 
Azo,  among the great civilians of  Bologna.  In the ' Excep- 
tiones ' the  principle  is  laid  down  that  while  no  one  can 
refuse the jurisdiction  of  the judex  ordinarius,  if  either the 
plaintiff or the defendant suspects the judge, he may demand 
that the bishop, or some other honest  man  (probus), should 
sit with the judge,  and if  they then agree in their judgment, 
the man who  has  called in  the bishop,  or other judge,  may 
not appeal.  The  same  principle  is  briefly  stated  in  the 
' ~rach~logus.' These  regulations  are  evidently  derived 
from the ' Novels '  of  Justinian and from the ' Epitome ' : but 
it must be observed that the rule that a man who thus calls 
in the bishop may  not  appeal is not  clearly asserted  in  the 
'  Novels.'  It lays  down the principle that if  a man  cannot 
get justice from the judge, he is to call in the bishop ; and if 
the bishop cannot persuade the judge  to do justice,  he is to 
give the suitor letters to the emper~r.~ 
l Petr~,  '  Exceptlones,' IV. l : "  Judici- 
um  ordlnarn  judicis  nemo  recusare 
potest  Sed si actor vel reus ordinar~um 
judloem  suspeotum  habeat,  el,  qui 
suspectum  judicem  putat, Episcopum 
vel alium probum vlrum lnvocare l~cet, 
ut simul ambo juclicent , et sl de judlcio 
concordaver~nt,  lpse qul Eplscopum vel 
alium  invocaverit,  nu110  mod0  potcr~t 
provocare sententiam, ~d  est quod vul 
garlter dlcimus, non potest rancunare." 
'  Brachylogus,'  IV.  4.  11  " Sed  si 
suspectum judicem qms habuent, hceat 
el  eplscopum civ~tatis  ad  causam  d~s 
cutlendam  una  cum  judlce  suspccto 
advocare " 
2  Novel,'  86  1  "  S1  vero  dum 
aliquls  adierlt  judicem  provlnuae  non 
meruent justltlam,  tunc jubemus  eurn 
adire  suum  sanctissimum  episcopum, 
et ipsum  mlttere  ad  clanss~mum  pro- 
vlncla: judicem  aut per  se  vemre  ad 
eum,  et praeparare  eum  ut  omnlbus 
mod~s  audiat lnterpellantem et liberet 
eum  cum  just~tia secundum  nostras 
leges,  ut non  cogatur  peregre  de  sua 
patria proficlscl  S1  vero etiam sanct- 
lsslmo  archieplscopo compellente  jud- 
lcem cum justlt~a  determinare mterpel- 
lantlum causas, judex  dlffert dlscernere 
negotlum  et non  servet a  lltlgantlbus 
just~tlam,  jubemus  sanctlss~mum  clv- 
itatis  illius  episcopum  dare  ad  nos 
lltteras el qui non mermt quod juatum 
est  insmuantes,  qula  coactus  ab  eo 
judex  dlstul~t audlre  mterpcllantem 
et judlcare  Inter  eum  et  qul  ab  eo 
conventus  est ,  ut  haec  cognoscentes 
nos  supphcla  Inferamus  judicl  pro- 
vinclae,  quod  lnterpellatus  ab eo  qu 
injustlt~am passus  est  et  coactus  a 
sanctissimo archleplscopo non  judicav- 
erit quae In dub~tatlouem  venerunt. 
2.  S1  vero  cont~gent  quendam  nos- 
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Joannes  Bassianus  intended  evidently  to  summarise  the 
provisions of  the same ' Novel,' and suggests a regular process 
,first  to  the judge,  then to the  bishop,  and finally to the 
prince.1  This does not  seem  a very  accurate mode  of  deal- 
ing  with  the  texts, but it is  to us  important  as  exhibiting 
the  way  in  which  he  understood  it.  Azo,  in  his  work  on 
the code, does not discuss the matter in detail, but writes as 
though it were  a  clearly admitted principle  that while it is 
only minors, widows, and poor persons who have the right to 
refuse  the  jurisdiction  of  the  judex  ordinarius  and  to  be 
heard  directly  by  the prince,  yet any person has  the right, 
if  he  holds  the  judge  in  suspicion,  to  demand  that  the 
archbishop should sit with  him.2 
We  have  here  a  very  important  point  in  the  relation  of 
trorum  subjectorum  in  dubitatlone 
habere judicem, jubemus sanctlssimum 
archiep~scopum  audire  cum  clarlssimo 
judice,  ut  ambo  aut per  arn~oab~lem 
conventum dlssolvant  quz dubla sunt, 
aut  ei  adnotat~onem  scriptls  factam 
aut  cognitional~ter  judlcetur  Inter 
lltigantes et forma  detur justitia:  leg1 
busque  conveniens,  ut  non  cogantur 
nostrl  subject1  propter  hujusmodi 
causa recedere a  propria  patria  . . . 
4  S1  tamen contiger~t  quendam nos- 
trorum  Subjectorum  ab  lpso  claris 
simo  provincla:  judice  led],  jubemus 
eum  adire  sanctlss~mum  llius  clvitatis 
eplscopum,  et  lpsum  judicare  Inter 
olar~ss~mum  provlnclae judicem et eum, 
~UI  putatur lzdl ab eo  Et  SI  qu~dem 
contlgerit  jud~com leji~time  aut  juste 
adjudlcari  a  sanctlss~mo eplscopo, 
Eatisfacere  eum  omn~bus mod16  el 
W  lnterpellavlt  adversus  eum  81 
vero  refutaver~t  judex  hoc  agere,  et 
Pervonerlt ad nos  ipqa  Ire,  SI  qu~dem 
Invenenmus  qula  juste  et  secundum 
leges  ad~tus  a  sanctlss~mo  eplbcopo ea 
condemnatus est, non feclt, novis- 
A1mlr  eum supplicns subdi preclplmus, 
quonlam  qui debet vind~care  oppressum, 
'Pse  opprimere repentur." 
Cf. '  Epitome Jullsru,' 69. 2. 
l  Joannes Bass~anus,  ' Summa In Llb. 
Nov ,'p 1313, ' Ut differentesjust~ces," 
Nov  86  "  Haec  constitutlo tractat de 
ordlne  agendi  nam  primo  ad  suum 
proprlum  judlcem,  secundo  ad  epis- 
copum, tert~o  ad prlncipem est decur- 
rendum,  alras  punltur,  ut  J  cod  3  1 
&  8  si  quls  &  8  si haec  autem  (Nov, 
86  1  and  3)  .  . Si  tamen  judex 
suus  faclat  el  jus,  sed  habet  eum 
suspectum,  assoclet eplscopum  et slo 
ordinarlus  non  recusatur  sed  dele- 
gatus  tantum,  ut  j.  eo  c.  61  vero 
(Nov , 86  2)  &  C  de  judic  1  aper- 
tlssirn~  (Cod ,  111  1  16)  Secunda parte 
dicit,  sl  etiam  ipsum  vellet  convenire 
(quod est ~ntelhgendum  pro furtls, ~el 
etlam  pro  oppresslone nlmla  subjeot- 
orum)  potest  coram  eplscopo,  ut  j 
eodem  5  51  tamen  (Nov, 86  4) &  8. 
ut judlc  sine quoquo suffrag  9  neces- 
sitatem  de  alns,  ut  in  pr~dicto  5 
aliud " 
Azo,  '  Summa CO~ICIEI,'  111  14  1 : 
"Ita  llcet  111c  pupilhs  et  slmihbus 
recusare judlcem ordinarlum, quod non 
permlttitur  alns  licet  posset  pctere 
assoclarl  suspect0  judlcl  archleplsco- 
pum  B  de  judic~ls authent.  61  vero 
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the ecclesiastical and secular authorities.  We cannot discuss 
now  the motives which  led to Justinian, and perhaps earlier 
emperors, to establish this system : that they had any special 
intention  of  increasing  the  authority  of  the  Church,  as 
such,  would  not  seem  to  be  the  case.  These  arrange- 
ments  are,  indeed,  only  a  part  of  what  would  seem  to 
have been  an elaborate  system for checking the representa- 
tives  of  the Imperial  Government  by  means  of  the bishop 
and  other  persons  of  importance  in  the  various  localities.1 
The  survival,  however,  of  these  principles  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  when  the  question  of  the  relations  between  the 
ecclesiastical  and  the  secular  authorities  had  become  so 
important,  has  quite  another  significance.  We  shall come 
back  to the matter when  we  deal with  the canonists ;  but 
in the meanwhile we  find  here  an example of  the fact that 
the recognition  of  the  different  spheres  of  the two  author- 
ities  does  not  mean  that  these  authorities,  even  in  the 
judgment  of  strict lawyers,  did not run across each  other.  , 
On the great question of the appointment of  bishops these 
civilians  say  little ;  but  that  little  has  some  significance. 
Joannes Bassianus discusses  the question in commenting on 
'Novel'  123,  which  prescribes  that  when  there  was  a, 
vacancy  in  any see,  the ecclesiastics  and principal  persons 
of  the place  were  to elect  three persons,  of  whom  one  was 
to  be  made  the  bishop.  John  Bassianus  alters  this,  so 
that  apparently  he  means  that  the  clergy  and  principal 
persons  of  the  diocese  are  to  choose  three  persons,  who 
are then to elect  the bishop2  Azo  comments on the regu- 
lation  of  the Code-that  when  there  is  a  vacancy,  the in- 
l  Cf. vol. i. p.  282, and Code, i. 3. 49 
and i. 4.  26. 
'  Novel.,'  123. 1 : '' Sancimus igitur 
quotiens  opus  fuerit  episcopum  or- 
dinare,  clericos  et  primates  civitatis 
cujus  futurus  est  episcopus  ordinari, 
mox  in tribus personis dccreta  faccre. 
. . . Nov.  123. 1. 2.  Ut ex trium per- 
sonarum pro quibus talia dccreta facta 
sunt,  melior  ordinctur  electione  et 
periculo ordinantis,"  &c. 
Joannes  Bassianus,  '  Summa  in 
Lib.  Nov.,'  p.  1314,  "  De  sanctissi- 
mis episcopis " (Nov.,  123) : "  Elcctio 
autem  episcopi  fit  solenniter  vocatis 
primatibus,  archipresbyteris,  archi- 
diaconis,  et  aliis  clericis :  et  attend- 
untur quiedam in persona eligentium : 
dcbent  enim  tres  eligi  electores,  qui 
periculo  sue  mime  eligent  non 
habentes uxorem,"  &c. 
habitants  of  the diocese  are to elect three persons  of  proper 
of  whom  one  is  to  be  made  the  bishop.  Azo 
alters  this,  so  that the principal ecclesiastics  of  the diocese 
to elect  three  of  the  clergy,  who  are  in  their  turn to 
elect  the bishop.  But he  also  adds that the first body  are 
to  choose  the  electors  with  the  sanction  of  the  emper0r.l 
~t  is  interesting  and  important  to  observe  that  Azo  ex- 
cludes  the  laity  of  the  diocese  from  any  share  in  the 
election,  and  he  also  excludes  the  inferior  clergy ;  while 
on  the  other  hand  he  clearly  requires  that  the  emperor 
should have  some  share in the election. 
1 Cod.,  i.  3.  41 :  "  Ab  iis  qui  in 
ea  civitate  habitant  dccretum fiat  de 
tribus  personis,  de  quorum recta  fide 
vita  honesta  reliquisque  virtutibus 
constos,  ut ex  his  qui  magis  idoncus 
sit ad episcopatum promovatur." 
Azo, '  Summa Codicis,' i. 3. 2 : '  Viso 
undo  dicatur  cpiscopus,  nunc  viden- 
dum  qualiter  fiat  ordinatio  episcopi. 
Et  quidem  clerici  primates  civitatis, 
ecclesiastici scilicet, ut archidiaconi et 
archipresbytcri,  propositis  eis  sacro- 
sanctis  evangeliis,  debent  sua  vota 
confcrre  non  ex  gratis,  vcl  amicitia 
aliqua,  vel  promissione,  in  tres  pcr- 
sonas canonicas et religiosas, non filios 
non  uxorem  habentes,  vel  habentes 
sed virgincm :  vel si non habcnt  tres, 
eligant  duos,  vel  unum,  habentcs 
literas  principis  eis  asscnticntibus. 
Ha?  autem  persona:  propositis  sacro- 
sanctis  evangeliis  debent  promittere, 
quod  canonicam  et legitimam  cligant 
personam,  ut  in  authen.  eod.  tit.  j. 
respons. (Nov.,  123). PART 11. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  CANON  LAW TO  THE 
MIDDLE  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY. 
CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION. 
IN  the first  volume  of  this  work  we  have  endeavoured  to 
discuss, not only  the theory of  the relations  of  Church  and 
State, but also the general theory of  Society and its institu- 
tions, in the ecclesiastical  writers of  the first six centuries of 
the Christian era, and again in the ninth century.  We have 
sometimes referred to the canons of  councils and other sources 
of  the systematic body  of  Church law,  but the greater part 
of  our  information was  drawn from works  which  were  not, 
in their  primary  intention, legal  works  at all,  from  purely 
religious or theological works,  or from the more formal corre- 
spondences  of  great  churchmen.  In the  period  which  we 
have now to consider, we have found it necessary to separate 
the treatment of the theory of  society which  is presented in 
the formal treatises upon ecclesiastical law from the examina- 
tion  of  the other  works  of  churchmen.  It  is  necessary  to 
distinguish  carefully between incidental and sometimes hasty 
sayings,  made  under  the  stress  of  some  great  controversy, 
and  judgments  expressed  in  legal  and  other  works  which 
were  compiled  in  cold  blood  and  represent  reasoned  and 
considered  conclusions. 
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process  of  accumulation  and  selection  through  which  the 
Canon  Law passed  before it reached  the form which it now 
wears  in  the ' Corpus  Juris  Canonici,'  but a  few  words  are 
needed  to explain the nature of  the sources  from which  it 
was  drawn,  and the  stages  through  which  it passed.  The 
canon law is in the main derived from four different sources- 
the Holy Scriptures, the decrees of  the great general councils 
and of  certain local councils, certain letters of  the Bishops of 
Rome on public and judicial  matters, and the writings of  the 
Fathers.  The  relative  importance  and  authority  of  these 
sources we  shall have to discuss in detail when we  come to 
deal with the theory of  the canon law itself. 
From  these  sources  there  arose  various  collections  of 
canons,  and these  were  greatly  enlarged  by  the production 
in the ninth century of the great collection of  spurious Papal 
letters  which  we  know  under  the name  of  pseudo-Isidore- 
a collection which is now generally held to have been made in 
France, and which gradually found its way into the literature 
of  the canon law, both in Italy and in the North, in the course 
of  the tenth and eleventh centuries.  In  addition to these the 
znediaeval canon law books  also contain many passages  taken 
from the Roman law books,  and from the collections  of  the 
genuine and spurious capitularies.  It was not till the middle 
of  the twelfth century that Gratian,  who  had possibly  been 
trained  in the law school of  Bologna, took in hand the task 
of  selecting from and systematising this  great but confused 
mass  of  materials, and in his ' Decretum ' we  have the first 
attempt to present  a  complete and ordered  body  of  Church 
law.  The work  of  Gratian was  carried on by  a  number of 
canonists,  who  worked  upon  the materials  contained in the 
' Decretum ' after the fashion of  the work of  the civilians  of 
Bologna  on  the ' Corpus  Juris Civilis.'  They  wrote  glosses 
and commentaries  on the ' Decretum,'  in which  they carried 
on Gratian's attempt at the systematic exposition of the texts, 
and the application of  these texts to their  own  time.  The 
formal  collection  of  canon  law  was  carried  on  by  the 
publication  of  various  small  compilations  of  the  decretal 
letters  of  the  Popes  of  those  times,  until  at last  in  1234 
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pope  Gregory  IX. issued  what  was  intended to be  a  com- 
plete  and sufficient  collection  of  these letters.  This  is that 
part  of  the canon law which  we  know  as the "  Decretals." 
TO  this  collection  were  later added by Pope Boniface VIII. 
the collection  of  Decretals known  as the Sext, and by Pope 
Clement V.  that known  as the Clementines, but with  these 
latter collections we do not deal in this volnme.1 
1 For a full discussion of the sources  ' Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur 
,,f  the  mediseval  canon  law  we  may  des Canonischen Rechts,'  vol. i. 
refer the reader to J. F.  von Schulte, OHAP 11.1  TlXE  THEOEY Op  LAW  IN GENERAL.  97 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE THEORY  OF LAW  IN GENERAL. 
WE begin  by inquiring into the general theory of  law in the 
canonists.  We must  do  this  before  we  can form  any clear 
conception  of  the theory  of  the canon  law  and its relation 
to other systems of  law.  It  is evident to any student that the 
principles of  the canonists as to the nature of  law are derived 
from the Roman law ; but-and  this is a fact of  importance 
-it  is derived from the Roman law very largely through  St 
Isidore  of  Seville.  What  exactly  are  the  sources  of  St 
Isidore's treatment of  law is indeed doubtful : an interesting 
attempt  has  been  made  by  Voigt  to  set  out the relations 
between  his  work  and that of  Ulpian  and Marcianus,l  but 
much  remains  obscure.  St Isidore's  exposition  of  law  is 
sometimes  very  close  to that of  the Digest  and  Institutes 
of  Justinian,  but is  also in part independent. 
We  begin  by  taking  account  of  a  definition  of  law  con- 
tained  in the work  of  lvo of  Chartres.  In the great collec- 
tion of  canonical materials which is called the ' Decretum ' of 
Ivo, and which was probably compiled by him, an interesting 
passage from St  Isidore's ' Etymologies ' is quoted.  St  Isidore 
describes  the  true  nature  of  law  as  being  honesta,  just, 
possible,  agreeable  to nature,  conformed  to the  customs  of 
the country, suitable to its place  and time, necessary, useful, 
clear,  and devised  for the common  good  of  all the citizens, 
not  only  for  that  of  some  indi~idual.~  This  quotation  is 
1 Voigt, '  Die Lehre von Jus Natur-  168 (from St Isidore's  '  Etym.,'  V.  21) : 
ale,'  &C.,  vol. i., Beilage VI.  "  Erit  lex  honrsta,  justa,  possibilis, 
2  IVO  of  Chartres,  '  Decretum,'  iv.  secundum naturam, socundum consuet- 
repeated  in  the  ' Panormia','  the  handbook  of  canon  law 
which is recognised  as an undoubtedly genuine work  of  Ivo. 
These phrases  set out the conception on which the canonical 
theory  of  the proper  nature of  law is built  up.  Law must 
be  agreeatble to nature, just,  devised  for the common  good, 
must represent  the custom of  the country in which it is to 
be in force.  That is, to express this in broader terms, law is 
not an arbitrary command imposed by a superior, but rather 
represents  the adaptation of  the permanent  and immutable 
principles  of  "  nature " and justice  to the needs  of  a  com- 
munity, under the terms of  the circumstances  and traditions 
of that community. 
When  we  turn  from  Ivo  to  Gratian,  we  turn  from  an 
intelligent and scholarly compiler  to a technical jurist.  For, 
as we  have  already said, it was  the work  of  Gratian to im- 
pose  upon  what  had  hitherto  been  the  somewhat  formless 
collections  of  canons  the  character  of  an  ordered  system 
of  law.  Hitherto all that had been done had been to collect 
canons of  councils, papal letters, and opinions of  the Fathers, 
bearing  upon the discipline  and organisation of  the Church, 
and  to  arrange  these  roughly  under  the  various  subjects 
to which  they belonged.  Gratian had possibly  been  trained 
in  the  technical  law  schools  of  Bologna,  and  recognised 
that if  the  canon  law  was  to have  any scientific  character 
this  heterogeneous  mass  of  materials  needed  to  be  sifted, 
co-ordinated,  and  criticised.  He  accordingly  set  out  to 
arrange the materials,  to compare  them,  and to draw such 
general  conclusions  from  them as were  possible.  When  we 
come  to  discuss  the  theory  of  the  canon  law  itself,  we 
shall have to discuss more fully his attitude to the materials 
he found in the collections of  canons which he used.  For the 
moment it is  enough  to notice  the fact that it was  Gratian 
who  first reduced  the chaotic mass  of  canonical  authorities 
to a system, and set his hand to the statemeilt of  such general 
principles  and rules as could be deduced from them.  When 
udinem  patrize,  loco  temporiquo  con-  cautione contineat,  nullo privato corn- 
veniens,  necessaria,  utilis,  manifests  modo,  sed  pro  communi  civium ~tili- 
CJUOque ne aliquid per ob~cllritabm  In  tate conscripts." 
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we  turn,  then,  from  Ivo's  treatment  of  law  to  Gratian's, 
we  turn  from  a  writer  who  is  content  to  put  together 
authorities,  to a  writer  who  endeavours to draw from these 
authorities an adequate and practical criticism of  the nature 
and origin of  law. 
Gratian's  treatment  of  the  nature  of  law  is  founded 
primarily  upon  St Isidore :  whatever  his  knowledge  of  the 
civil law may have been,  it is on Isidore's  sayings that his 
discussion  of  general  principles  is based.  St Isidore in  one 
place  sets out a  classification  of  law  as human  and divine, 
and  says  that  divine  law  was  established  by  nature  and 
human law by  custom  (mores) ;  l  while  in  another  passage 
he  sets  forth- the  tripartite  character  of  law,  as  divided 
into  the jus  naturale,  the jus  gentium,  and the jus  ci~ile.~ 
Gratian accepts the tripartite division ; but 6s the basis of  his 
most general discussion of  law, and at the outset of  his work, 
states the twofold  division,  of  divine  or  natural law on the 
one  side,  and human law,  which  is founded  on custom,  on 
the other.3 
This  passage  contains  two  principles,  which  are  each  of 
the  greatest  importance,-the  identification  of  natural  law 
with  divine,  and  of  human  law  with  custom.  The  first 
principle,  that  natural  law  is  divine,  is  one  of  the  most 
important conceptions  of  the canon law:  we  shall have to 
consider this presently in detail, and only make one observa- 
Isidore, '  Etym.,' v. 2. 
a  Isidore, '  Etym.,' v. 4. 
S Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D.  i.  Gra- 
tianus :  "  Humanum  genus  duobus 
regitur, naturali videlicet jure et mori- 
bus.  Jus  naturac  est,  quod  in  lego 
et evangelio  continetur,  quo  quisque 
jubetur alii facere, quod sibi vult fieri, 
et  prohibetur  alii  inferre,  quod  sibi 
nolit  fieri.  Unde  Christus  in  Evan- 
gelio : '  Omnia  qurerumque  vultis  ut 
faciant vobis  homines,  et vos  eadom 
facite illis.  EIze  est cnim lex  et pro- 
phet~.'  Hinc  Isidorus  in  v.  l~bro 
Ethimologiarum  ait : c.  1 :  ' Omnes 
leges  nut  divinre  sunt,  aut  humanie. 
Divina: natura, human2 moribus con- 
stant, ideoque ha discrepant,  quoniam 
alize  aliis  gentibus  placent.  Fas  lex 
divina est : jus  lex humana.  Transire 
per agrum alienum fas est, jus non est.' 
Gratianus : Ex verbis hujus auctoritatis 
ovidonter datur intelligi, in quo differ- 
ant inler se lex divina et humana, cum 
omne quod fnl est, nomine divine vel 
naturalis legis accipiatur,  nomine  vero 
legis, humane mores jure  conscripti et 
traditi  intelligantur.  Est  autem  jus 
generale  nomen,  multas  sub  se  con- 
tinens  species." 
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&ion  for the moment.  The explicit  statement by Gratian is 
of  the greatest importance,  although the conception  itself  is 
not original.  It  is asserted in the passage of  St Isidore quoted 
by Gratian, and St Isidore is only reproducing what we  have 
endeavoured to show was the normal doctrine of  the Christian 
Fathers,1 and this again was derived in part from St Paul, but 
even more from Cicero and other ancient  writers, for Cicero 
had taught very emphatically that the law of  nature is the 
law of  God.2  It is not, however, any the less important that 
Gratian  should have  taken  these principles  as the starting- 
point for his  treatment  of  the nature of  law;  we  shall see, 
when  we  come  to deal  with  the detailed  discussion  of  the 
natural law, that this law, being itself  divine, is superior in 
dignity and in permanence even to certain positive forms of 
the law of  God, while it is superior to all authorities whether 
in Church  or State.  Gratian's principle  should be compared 
with the carefully  developed view  of  the medizval civilians, 
that justice  and equity are superior to all positive laws,  and 
that God is Himself eq~ity.~ 
The second principle is as important as the first.  Human 
laws are regarded by St Isidore, in the passage here  quoted, 
as  based  upon  custom,  and the  variety  of  human  laws  is 
explained  as  due  to  the  fact  that  different  nations  have 
different  customs.  Gratian  accepts  this  principle,  and uses 
the word  mores  to cover  the  whole  range  of  human  law, 
explaining  these  more fully by defining  them as mores jure 
conseripti  et  traditi.  In another  passage  of  the same  ' Dis- 
tinction,'  he  quotes  St Isidore's  definition  of  consuetudo  as 
being  that form of  jus which  is founded upon  custom, and 
which is accepted as leg in the absence of  lex, and St Isidore's 
observation that custom is equally valid whether it is drawn 
out in writing or whether it is only established by "  reason," 
for, after all, it is "  reason " upon which the value of  lea, the 
written law, depends.  From these phrases Gratian draws the 
conclusion  that all  law is  really  custom, that part which  is 
'  Cf. vol. i. pp.  102-106.  See Part I. chap. i. 
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written down being called cojutitutio sive jus, while that part 
which is not written is known as consuetzcdo.l  This is a far-  , 
reaching principle which is thus laid down by Gratian ; it is 
no doubt implicit in the ancient Roman law, but it was not 
expressly drawn out, and it has very important consequences 
onthe theory of  the source of the authority of  law. 
Human law is, then, custom, whether reduced to writing or 
not.  But this does  not mean that Gratian thinks that any 
custom  is  entitled  to  be  recognised  as  law.  Having  laid 
down the general principle which we have just  discussed,  he 
quotes  Isidore's  saying  that jus  is  so  called  because  it  is 
and in the fourth ' Distinction ' he goes on to consider 
the purpose, and therefore the essential quality, of  law ; and, 
citing another passage  from  Isidore,  he  defines  the purpose 
of  law as being to restrain men's  audacity and their oppor- 
tunities of  injuring others ; while he describes the nature of 
law in the terms of  the same passage from St Isidore which 
we  have already  discussed  as cited by Ivo of  Chartres.  In 
' 
establishing  laws,  he  says,  we  must  be  careful  to consider 
whether  they  represent  the  principles  of  honestas,  justice, 
possibility, and those other qualities described by St I~idore.~ 
1 Gratian, '  Dec.,' D. i. 5 : "  Consue. 
tudo autem est jus  quoddam  moribus 
institutum,  quod  pro  lege  suscipitur, 
cum deficit lex.  Nec differt, an  scriptura 
an ratione consistat, quoniam et lcgem 
ratio  commendat.  Porro  si  ratione 
lex  constat, lex  erit  omne  jam,  quod 
ratione  constiterit,  dumtaxat,  quod 
religioni congruat, quod disciplinze con- 
veniat, quod saluti proficiat.  Vocatur 
autem  consuotudo,  quia  in  communi 
est usu " (Isid., '  Etym.,' v.  3, ii.  10). 
Gratianus.  "  Cnm  itaque  dicitur : 
Non  diffcrt  utrum  consuetudo  scrip- 
turn  vel  ratione  consistat ; apparet, 
quod  consuetudo  partim  ost  redacta 
in  scriptis,  partcm  morihus  tantum 
utentium est reservata.  Quze in scrip- 
tis  redacta  est.  constitutio  sive  jus 
vocatur ; qum  vero in scriptis redacta 
non  cst,  general1 nomine,  consuetudo 
videlicet appellatur." 
Gretian,  '  Dec.,'  D.  i.  2 :  "  Jus 
autem  est  dictum,  quia  justum  est" 
(Isid. of  Seville, '  Etym.,'  v.  3). 
Gratian,  '  Dec.,'  D.  iv.  Pars  I. 
Gratianus : "  Cause vero constitutionis 
legum  est  humanam  cohercere  auda- 
ciam  et nocendi  facultatem refrenare, 
sicut in eod. lib.  (v. 20) Ysidorus tos- 
tatur dicens : '  Factz sunt autem leges, 
ut  earum  metu  humane  coherceatur 
audacia,  tutaque  sit  inter  improbos 
innoccntia,  et in ipsis improbis formi- 
cluto  supplicio  rofrenetur  nocendi 
facultas.' " 
Pars II., Gratianus :  "  Przterea In 
ipsa constitutione legum maxiino quali- 
tas  eonstituendarum  est  observanda, 
ut contineant in  se honestatem,  justi- 
tiam, possib~litatem,  convenientiam, et 
cetera, quae in eod. lib. Ysidorus enum- 
erat, dicens.  (v. 21) '  Erit autem lex 
honesta,  justa,  possibilis,  secundum 
We shall have to return to this question presently, when we 
consider  in  more  detail  the nature  of  the particular  law of 
any State, the source of its authority, and the relation of  this 
$0 custom.  In the meanwhile it is enough to observe that 
when  Gratian  identifies  human law  with  custom,  this  does 
not at all mean  that he  conceives  of  custom as having any 
force, except  so  far as it corresponds  with  the principle  of 
justice.  But in order  to treat  this  subject  adequately,  we 
must  turn  to  that  tripartite  definition  of  law  which  the 
oanonists  inherit  from  Isidore  and  the  corpus juris  eivilis. 
naturam,  secundum  oonsuetudinem  veniens  contineat,  nullo  privato  com- 
~atriz,  loco  temporique  conveniens,  modo, sed  pro  comrnuni  ut~litate  civ. 
necessaria,  utilis,  manifesta  quoque,  iurn  conscripta,,'  '? 
ne  &liquid per  obscuritatem  incon me. III.]  THE  THEORY  OF  NATURBL  LAW. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
WE have pointed  out that St Isidore of  Seville restated the 
tripartite division of  law set out by Ulpian and repeated by 
the Institutes of  Justinian.  Here therefore is a point where 
the  patristic  and  the  legal  tradition  of  the  Middle  Ages 
coincided,  and  the  canonists  accept  this  tripartite  division 
h  without  questi0n.l 
We  must  however  again  notice  that  while  Gratian  ac- 
cepts  the tripartite definition of  law,  this  threefold  division 
is  subordinate to the twofold  division  of  Natural  or Divine 
Law  and  Custom,  for  the jus  gentium  and  the  jus  civile 
are  both  included  under  mores,  while  natural  law  is 
equivalent  to  divine law.2  We  must  consider  more  closely 
what  the  canonists  understand  by  jus  natura  or  jua 
naturale.  Gratian  cites the definition of  I~idore,~  but  does 
not  himself  furnish us  with  any technical  discussion of  this 
point,  though,  as  we  shall presently  see,  he  discusses  very 
important  questions  arising  out  of  it.  We  have  already 
quoted  the words  in  which  he  describes the jus  naturm  as 
1 E.g.,  Gratian,  'Dec.,'  D.  i.  5 :  et femina  conjunctio,  liberorum  suc- 
"  Est et alio divisio juris, ut in eodem  cessio et educatio,  communis omnium 
libro  testatur Isidorus,  ita dicens :  possessio, et omnium una libertas,  ac. 
'  Jus  aut  naturale  est,  aut  civile,  quisitio eorum, qure celo, terra marique 
aut gentium.' "  capiuntur.  Item  depositae  rei  vel 
a  See far text, p. 98.  commendatae  pecunire  rcstitutio,  vio- 
8  Gratian, 'Dec.,'  D. i. 7  : "Jus natu-  lentiae  per  vim  repulsio.  Nam  hoc 
rale  est  commune omnium  nationurn,  aut si  quid  huic  simile est,  nunquam 
eo quod ubique instinctu naturae,  non  injustum,  sod  naturale  equumque 
constitutione  aliqua  habetur,  ut  viri  habetur " (Isidore, '  Etym.,'  v.  4). 
equivalent to that principle of  the law and the Gospel which 
bids us  do to others what we  would that they should do to 
Us,l and to this we  shall have to return.  But before  doing 
this  we  shall find it useful to turn to the work  of  Rufinus, 
one of  the most important twelfth-century commentators on 
Gratian.  In his comment on the phrases with which Gratian 
introduces his first ' Distinction,'  Rufinus has carefully stated 
the sense in which he understands the phrase "  Natural Law." 
The  legistica traditio, he  says, has  defined the conception of 
the jus  ~atzcrale  when  it says that natural law  is  that law 
which nature has taught all animals, but the canonists, neglect- 
ing so general a conception, are concerned about its meaning 
in relation to matters which relate to the human race alone. 
The jus  natzcrale  is  a  certain  quality implanted in mankind 
by nature, which leads men to do what is good and to avoid 
what  is  evil.  This jus  naturale  consists of  three  parts-of 
commands, prohibitions,  and demonstrationes.  It  commands 
men  to do what is useful, as for example, "  Thou shalt love 
the Lord thy God " ; it forbids that which is hurtful, as for 
example, "  Thou shalt not kill " ; and it points out  (demon- 
strat) what is expedient, as for example, that all things should 
be held in common, that there should be liberty for all man- 
kind.2  We must presently consider how it comes about t,hat 
some of  the latter provisions of  the natural law have been set 
aside.  But it is of  great importance first to observe the formal 
l  See p.  98. 
'  Rufinus,  '  Summa  Dooretorum,' 
D.  i.  Dict.  Grat.  ad  cap.  i. :  "Ku- 
manum  genus."  "  Gratianus  trac- 
taturus  do  jure  canonic0  quasi  altius 
rote  ducto  expandit  iter  opcri,  in- 
cipiens  a  jure  naturali,  quod  quidem 
et  antiquius  est  tempore  et  exccl- 
lentius  dignitate.  Hoc  autem  jils 
legistica  traditio  generalissimo  difinit 
dicens : '  Jus naturale est quocl natura 
omnia animalia docuit.'  Nos vero istam 
generalitatem,  que  omnia  concludit 
animalia,  non  curautes,  de  eo  juxta 
q~od  humano  generi  solum  mod0 
ascribitur,  broviter  videamus ;  inspi- 
cientes,  quid  ipsum  sit  et  in  quibus 
consistat et quomodo processerit, et in 
quo ei  detractum aliquid aut adauctum 
fuerit.  Est  itaque  naturale  jus  vis 
quedam  humane  creature  a  natura 
insita  ad  facicndum  bonum  caven- 
dumquc  contrarium.  Consistit autem 
jus  naturale  in  tribus,  scilicet,  man- 
datis,  prohibitiouibus,  domoustrationi- 
bus.  Mandat namque quod prosit, ut : 
'  diliges  Dominum  Deum  tuum ;  ' 
prohibet  quod  ledit,  ut :  '  non  oc- 
cides ;  '  demonstrat,  quod  convenit, 
ut : '  omnia in commune habeantur;' 
ut :  '  omnium  una  sit  libertas '  et 
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repudiation  by  Rufinus  of  Ulpian's  definition, whioh  makes 
"  natural law " a matter of animal instinct.  Rufinus returns 
to this in discussing a later part  of  the same ' Distinction,' 
and reminds  his  readers  how  he  has  already  warned  them 
that  the  ancient  lawgivers  use  the  phrase  jus  mturale  in 
a  different  sense  from  that in  which  the  canonists  use it. 
They  (the old  lawgivers) use  this  phrase  in such  a  general 
sense  that it  would  seem  to  be  something  common  to  all 
animals,  while  the canonists  use it  in  a  restricted  sense  as 
applied  only to mankind.l 
We should compare with this the discussion of  the subject 
by  Stephen  of  Tournai,  another  of  the important  twelfth- 
century  commentators  on  Gratian.  He  explains  that  the 
phrase  jus  naturale  can be used in various  senses : in that 
of  Ulpian,  as the principle  or  instinct  common to men  and 
all animals ; as equivalent to the jus  gentium ; as equivalent 
to the divine law which God has taught men in the law and 
the prophets and the Gospel;  in a still wider sense as that 
lam  which  includes  both  human  and  divine  law,  and  that 
instinct which is given to all animals ; and finally, in a fifth 
sense, as that law which is by nature given to men and not 
to the other animals-the  law which teaches men to do good 
and to avoid evil ; this is a part of  the divine law, and con- 
sists  of  commands,  prohibitions,  and  demonstrati~nes.~  In 
l  Rufinus,  '  Summa  Decret ,' D  1 
7  "Et ammonitum  est  supra  aliter 
legum latores et allter nos accipere ]us 
naturale , et ipsl quidem simplicius et 
generahus,  ut  communlter  ascribatur 
lllud ornlllbus anlmalibus , nos autem 
speclalius, ut attrlbuamus solummodo 
homlnibus " 
Stephen of  Tourna~,  'Summa,' D  I 
"  Et notandum,  jus  naturale  quatuor 
modls dlcl  Dlcitur enlm ]us naturale, 
quod  ab lpsa  natura  est introductum 
et non solurn hom~nl,  sed etlam ceterls 
ammal~bus  insltum,  a  quo  descendit 
mans et feminre conjunctlo, llberorum 
procreatio  et educatlo.  Dicitur  et ]us 
naturale ]us gentium, quod ab humana 
solum  natura  quasl  cum  ea  Inupions 
traxlt  exordium.  Jus etiam  divlnum 
dic~tur  naturale  quod  summa  natura 
nostra, 1 e  deus nos docuit et per legem 
et per  prophetas et evangellum suum 
nobis obtullt  Dicltur  etlam ]us natu- 
rale quod simul comprehendlt humanum 
et  dlv~nurn,  et  ~llud,  quod  a  natura 
omnibus  est  anlmallbus  ~nsitum. Et 
secundum  hanc  ultimam  acceptionom 
ponit ,  natural1  ]we,  I e.  dlvino,  et 
1110  all0  primltivo  Vel  si  quintam 
lurls natural15 acceptlonem non  abhor- 
reas,  mtelhge,  h10  dicl  jus  naturale, 
quod  hom~nibus  tantum  et  non  alils 
animallbus a  natura  est insitum, so11 
ad  faclendum  bonum,  vltandumque 
contranum.  Qute quasi pars divlm juris 
est  Quod m  tnbus constat maxime, 
mandatls  sc~hcet, prolubltlonlbus  et 
demonstratlonibus." 
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this  last  definition  of  the  meaning  of  the  jus  naturale 
Stephen agrees mth, is indeed probably  following, Rufinus. 
In bs  analysis of  the conception and his recognition that the 
phrase must have many senses, he suggests a comparison with 
the  civihans.  We  have  pointed  out  the recognition of  the 
manifold significance of  this term jus  naturale in Azo's  com- 
mentary on the Illstitutes ;  l whether  Stephen, who  had cer- 
tainly studied the civd law at Bologna, had learned this mode 
of  thinking  from the civilians, or  whether  the civilians, like 
Azo, learned it from the canonists, we do not pretend to say. 
Stephen's  treatment  of  the  subject  is  interesting,  but 
we  can  hardly  doubt  that it  is  the  definition  of  Rufinus 
which  corresponds most  closely  with  what is usually meant 
by the jus  naturale in the works of  the canonists.  We have 
seen  that  Gratian,  in  dividing  all  law  into  natural  and 
customary,  identifies the jus  natzcrale  with the jus  divinum. 
Its characteristic  expression is found,  he  says, in the great 
phrase of  the Gospel, "  Do unto others what thou wouldest 
wish  others  to do  unto  thee."  Natural  law,  therefore,  is 
superior to all other law-it  is primitive and ~nchangeable,~ 
all customs and laws contrary to the jus  naturale are 
In another  passage  Gratian urges  the agreement  of  natural 
law  and the  Scriptures,  and  concludes  that natural  law  is 
supreme  just  as  the  divine  will  and  the  Scriptures  are 
supreme.  All  constitutions,  whether ecclesiastical or secular, 
if  they are contrary to the jus  naturale, are to be rejected6 
1 See p  30 
See p  98 
Grat~an, 'Dec ,'  D.  v.  Part  I 
5  l.  Gratlanus  "  Naturale  ]us  mte~ 
omma  prlrnatum  obt~net  et  tempore 
ot  d~gnitate.  Ceplt  enim  ab  exordio 
ratio~lalis  creaturz,  nec  variatur  tem 
pore, sed immutabile  permanet " 
Gratlan,  '  Dec ,'  D  vili.  Part 
I1  Gratianus  "  Dlgn~tate vero  ]us 
naturale  simplic~ter prevalet  consue 
tudlni  et  constitutlon~  Quecumque 
enim  vel  moribus  recepta  sunt,  vel 
ecriptis  comprel~ensa,  si  natural1  ]url 
fucrint  adversa,  vana  et  irrlta  sunt 
habenda  . . ." 
Gratianus  "  L~qu~do  lgltur apparet, 
quod  consuetudo  natural1  juri  post- 
p0lutUr " 
'  Dec ,'  D  IX.  Part I  Gratianus 
" Quod autem constitutio natural1 ]uri 
~edat  mult~plicl  auotolitate probatur " 
5  Gratlan,  '  Deo ,'  D  IX  at  the 
end  Gratianus  "  Cum  ergo natural] 
jure  n~chll allud  precipiatur,  quam 
quod Dous vult fierl , mch~lque  vetetur, 
quam quod Deus proh~bet  fierl ,  denlque 
cum in canonica scriptura nichil allud, 
quam  in  d~vinls  log~bus inveniatur, 
dlvine  vero  leges  natura  conu~stant: 
patet  quod  quecumque  dlvlnz  voliln- 
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Ignorance of  the civil law may  sometimes be condoned, but 
ignorance of  the natural law is  always to be  condemned in 
those  of  mature years.l  And  finally, no  dispensation  from 
the natural law can be accepted, except in the case when  a, 
man is compelled to choose the lesser of  two evils.2 
These  are  strong  and  sweeping  phrases  of  Gratian,  but 
they  only  express a judgment  which  is repeated by  all the 
canonists  of  this  time.  The  first  commentator  on  Gratian, 
Paucapalea,  restates  Gratian's  principles,  the  jus  naturale 
is  contained  in  the law  and the  Gospel,  and  commands us 
to do to others  as we  would  that they should do  to us ; it 
began with the beginning of  rational  creation, is superior to 
all other laws, and adm~ts  of  no variation, but is imm~table.~ 
We  have  already  quoted  part  of  the important  passage  in 
which  Rufinus  discusses  the  character  of  natural law;  in 
the same passage he goes on  to treat of  the relation  of  this 
to other systems of  law.  He had begun by  saying that the 
jus  naturale  was  a  principle  implanted  in  human  nature, 
teaching men  to do  good  and to avoid  evil ; but, he  says, 
the power  of  this principle was  so  much weakened after the 
sin of  the first man, that mankind almost came to think that 
nothing was unlawful ; natural law was, in part, re-established 
by the Decalogue, and completely by the GospeL5  This treat- 
probantur,  eadem  et  natural]  juri 
~nvenluntur  adversa  Undo quecumque 
d~vma:  voluntati,  seu  canonicz  scrip 
ture,  seu  div~nis  legtbus  postponenda 
censentur, elsdem naturale jus  przferrl 
oportet  Constltut~ones ergo  vel  ec 
cleslastlcz  vel  seculares,  sl  natural] 
1ur1 contrarla: probantur,  penltus  sunt 
excludendz " 
Gratlan, ' Dec ,' C  I.  Q  4  Pars 4 
Gratlanus  '' Item  ignorantla  jurls 
alla  naturalls,  alla  c~vllis  Naturalls 
omnlbns adultls dampnabills  cst , ]us 
vero  clvlle  alus  permlttitur  lgnorare, 
ahls non." 
Grat , '  Dec ,'  D  xnl  Part  I , 
Gratlanus  "  Item  adversus  naturale 
jua  nulla  dlspensatlo  admlttltur ,  nisi 
forte  duo mala ~ta  urgeant ut alterum 
eorum  necesse s~t  ehgl " 
a  Paucapalea, '  Summa Decretl,' In- 
trod  "  Naturalc ]us, quod in lege et 
evangello  contmetur,  quo  prohlbltur 
qusque aln ~nferre,  quod slbl nolit fien, 
et  jubetur  all1  facere  quod  vult  slbl 
fierl,  ab  exordlo  rat~onahs creaturze 
cmplt et Inter omnla prlmatum obtlnet , 
nu110  enlm  var~atur  tempore,  sod  Im- 
mutablle permanet." 
See p  103. 
G  Rufinus,  '  Summa  Dccret ,'  D.  I. 
1)lct  Grat ,  ad  c  I  . "  Hoc lgltur JUS 
naturale peccante prlmo homlne eo us- 
quo confusum est, ut deinceps homines 
n~clul putarent  fore  ~llic~tum  ,  unde 
apostolus  'Peccatumnon~mputabatur, 
1  um  lex non esset '  Postmodurn  vero 
per  dccem  pre~epta  In  duabua  tabu118 
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merit of the subject is interesting, and is probably derived from 
the patristic discussions of  the subject.l  In another passage 
he  interprets  a  phrase  of  Augustme  as  making  truth  and 
reason  equivalent  to the precepts  of  the jzls  natu~ale.~  In 
another place he takes a reference of  Gratian's to the Canon- 
ical Scriptures as implying that he holds them to be the same 
as  instituta  nat~ralia.~  Such  is  the  authority  and  sanctity 
of  the  natural  law,  and  we  therefore  find him  repeating  in 
emphatic phrases Gratian's principles, that all laws contrary 
to  the  natural law  are  null  and  void.  In one  passage  he 
draws this out with much force ; in these three points especi- 
ally  does  the natural law  differ from  the law  of  custom  or 
constitution-namely,  in its origin, its breadth,  and its dig- 
nity : Gratian had already discussed its superiority in origin 
and breadth, but now  drew out again its superiority in dig- 
nity, saying that whatever custom or constitution there might 
be which  was  contrary to the commands and prohibitions of 
the  natural law  was  null  and  void,  for  the Lord  said, " I 
am the truth," not, " I am custom or  constitution."  And 
again,  in  a  later  passage,  Rufinus  says  more  emphatically 
still:  "  Whatever there may be in the laws of  the emperors, 
in  the  writings  of  authors,  in  the  examples  of  the  saints, 
contrary  to natural  law,  we  hold  to be  null  and  void." 
designata  jus  naturale  reformatum 
est,  sed  non  In  omnem  suam  plenl 
tudmem  rest~tutum,  qua ~bi  quidem 
omnmo  opela  ~lllclta,  sed  non  omnl 
mod0  operantlr  voluntas  condemna 
batur  Et propterca evangellum sub 
stltutum est ubl jus naturale in omnem 
suam generalltatem reparatur et repar. 
ando perficltur." 
Cf  v01  I  pp  104 6 
Rufinus, '  Summa Decret ,' D  vnl 
C.  4  "  Ventatem  dlclt  precepta  ]urls 
naturalls m  scrlptls  redacta, ratlonem 
diclt  jurls  naturalls  mstituta  sme 
BC~lptls." 
Rufinus, '  Summa  Decret ,' D  IX 
C.  3. "  Canomcam scr~pturam  vetens 
et novl  testament]  lnstltuta  naturaha 
dl0lt." 
4  Rufinus, ' Summa Decret ,' D. vln. . 
"  Dlftelt  quoque "  "  In  his  trlbus 
maxlme jus naturale dlffert a lure con- 
suetudmls  et  constltutlonls,  vldellcet, 
m  orlgme,  amplitudlne  et  d~gnltate. 
Et quldem  quomodo orlglne dlscrep~t, 
superlus  premlssum  cst  et  quallter 
In  dignltate  prellbatum  est  nunc 
autem  latms  repetlt  quonam  pacto 
digrntate jus naturale a cetero jure dls- 
tmguatur, qula quecumque de consuet- 
udme  aut  constltutlone  jurl  natural1 
contrarla  sunt,  utlque in  mandntis  et 
prohlbltlon~bus,  vana et lrrlta jud~can- 
tur  qula  Domlnus  d~cat  '  Ego  sum 
verltas,'  non  '  Ego  sum  consuetudo,' 
vel '  constltutlo.' " 
6  Rufinuq, 'Summa Decret ,' D  IX. : 
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Finally,  he  restates Gratian's  principle  that no dispensation 
can  be  given  from  the rules  of  the natural  law,  except  in 
the case when  a  man  has  to choose  between  two  evils,  as 
for  instance  if  a  man  has  sworn  to kill  his  own  br0ther.l 
Damasus,  a  canonist  and  civilian  of  the  beginning  of  the 
thirteenth century, discusses the question of  the authority of 
Natural Law in his "  Burchardica,"  citing the authorities on 
each side, and himself, as we  understand, concludes that the 
jus naturale is unchangeable, even by the Pope himseK2  And 
finally Pope Gregory IX., in one of  his Decretal letters, adopts 
and confirms the principle  that no custom  can  override  the 
jus  naturale,  and  that any transgression  of  it  endangers  a 
men's  ~alvation.~ 
A  consideration  of  these  passages  seems  to  make  it 
abundantly clear  that these  canonists look upon  the law  of 
nature primarily as equivalent to the general principles of  the 
moral law-principles  which  are derived  directly  from  God, 
and which are antecedent to and superior to all positive laws 
of  any  sort,  whether  ccclcsiastical  or  secular.  So  far  the 
tinctione  prosequitur,  qi~o  mod0  jus 
naturale constitntionis  juri  prescribat : 
quecumque  enim  leges  imperatorum, 
quecumque  scripta  auctorum,  que- 
cumque  exempla  sanctorum  contraria 
sunt juri  naturali, ipsa omnia vana et 
irrita sunt hnbenda." 
l Rufinus, '  Summa Decret.,' D. xiii. : 
"Item adv. jus. nat.,"  etc. "  Demonstra- 
vit  superius,  quomodo  jus  naturale 
differat a constitutione et a consuetu- 
dine  dignitate :  nunc  aperit  qualiter 
ab eisdcm  discrepat  sententie  rigore : 
quippe  contra  jus  naturale,  exaudias 
quoad prsccepta et prohibitiones, nulln 
dispensatio  tolleratur.  Quod  in  ill0 
capitulo insinuatur,  qnod  sit : '  Ceter- 
um  consuetndini  et constitutioni  pro- 
prius  sepe rigor  subtrehitur,'  ut infra 
habetur : '  Sicut  quedam '-'  nisi  duo 
mala  its  urgeant  ut,'  etc.  Magist. 
Gratianus sic dicit hic quasi alrquis sic 
perplexus sit aliquando inter duo mala, 
ut non  possit vitare alterum, quin do- 
linquat.  Exsmpli  causa : jursvit  qu. 
dam  homo  interficere fratrem  suum." 
Cf.  Rufinus,  '  Summa  Decret.,'  C.  i. 
q.  7.  '  Dict.  Grat.,'  ad c.  6 : "  Quia 
omnia  hsec  statuta  partes  sunt  juris 
naturalis  adversus  quod  nulla  dispen- 
satio admittitur." 
Damasus,  '  Burchardica,'  Regula 
142 : "  Jus  autem  naturale  in  se  est 
incommutabile,  ut  Dist.  non  est,  et 
ext. de  consuctud. : c.  ult.  (D. vi.  3 
and  Decretals, i.  4.  11) ; igitur  papa 
non  posset  constitutionem  facere, qua 
matrimonium  prohiberetut  in  illa, 
nuptiarum, ctc., xxvii. q. 2 ;  sunt qui " 
(Gratian, C.  xxvii. q. 2. 19). 
Decretals,  i.  4.  11,  Gregory IX. : 
" Quum  tanto  sint  graviora  psccata, 
quanto  diutius  infelicom  animam  de- 
tinont  alligatam,  nemo  sana:  mentis 
intelligit,  naturali  juri,  cujus  trans- 
gressio periculum salutis  inducit,  qua- 
cumque consuetudine, quse dicenda est 
verius  in  hac  parte  corruptela,  posse 
diquatenus  derogari." 
subject is clear, and no special difficulty has presented itself ; 
but we must now consider a real difficulty, which arises from 
the fact that the jus naturale has been said to be contained in 
G< the law and the Gospel,"  while  actually there is  much in 
the "  law " which is no longer  obeyed.  And again, the jus 
rnaturale is said to be immutable, while actually conditions of 
life now exist, and are allowed to exist, which are contrary to 
the principles  of  the jus  naturale.  We  must consider  these 
two questions separately ; and first, How is it  that the "  Divine 
Laws " contained in the "  law and the Gospel " have actually 
been changed ? 
It  is  Gratian,  in his  attempt to construct  an intelligible 
system  of  Church  law,  who  first  among the canonists faces 
this question.  Natural law, he says, is first in dignity, as it 
was  first in  time, beginning  with  the rational  creation,  and 
it is immutable ; but the natural law is  said to be compre- 
hended in the "  law and the Gospel,"  and yet men  are now 
permitted  to do  things  which  are  contrary  to the  "law." 
It would  seem, then, that the natural law is not immutable. 
Gratian takes as an example the law that a woman was not 
allowed  to enter the temple  for  a  certain number  of  days 
after the birth of  her  child;  nowadays a woman may enter 
a  church  and  receive  the  Holy  Communion  at any  time. 
Gratian  replies  to  the  difficulty  by  making  an  important 
distinction  with  respect  to the  "  law " and its relation  to 
the jus  naturale.  It is  true, he  says,  that the jus  naturale 
is contained in the "  law and the Gospel,"  but not all that is 
in  the "  law  and the Gospel " belongs  to the jus  naturale. 
There are in the "  law " moral precepts, such as "  Thou shalt 
not  kill " ; but  there  are also  mistica,  such  as  the rcgula- 
tions  about  sacrifices ;  the  moral  precepts  belong  to  the 
natural  law,  and  are  immutable;  the  mistica,  as  far  as 
their  external  character is  concerned,  do  not  belong  to the 
 US  naturale-they  only  belong  to it  in  their  moral  signifi- 
cance ; they are therefore liable  to alteration in the former 
sense,  while  in  the  latter  they  are immutab1e.l  Gratian's 
l Gratian, '  Decretum,' D. v., Pars I.  omnia primatum obtinet et tempore et 
Gratianus,  1 :  "  Naturale  jus  inter  dignitate.  Cepit enim ab exordio ratio- f  10  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  CANON  LAW.  [PART  11. 
critical explanation is of  great importance ; and it is especially 
noteworthy that he  should so frankly recogmse that positive 
law,  even  when  it claims the authority  of  God  Himself, is 
not unchangeable.  This is repeated  by  Rufinus.l 
We  must  turn to the second  question.  The jus  naturale 
is  said  to be  immutable.  How is  it, then,  that  conditions 
are  allowed  to  exist  which  are  contrary  to  this  law? 
Gratian, in  dealing  with  the institution  of  property,  points 
out  that there  is  a  difference  between  the jus  naturce  and 
custom  or  constltution,  for  by  the law of  nature all things 
are  common,  and  he  illustrates  this  not  only  from  the 
practice of  the primitive Church, but also from the Platonic 
doctrine  of  the most  just  form  of  State.  It is by  the law 
of  custom  or of  " constitution " that one thing may be said 
to be "  mine " and another "  thine."  Gratian then cites the 
passage  from  St  Augustine's  treatise  on  St  John,  which 
maintains  that  property  is  the  creation  of  the  law  of  the 
State.2  Gratian  points  out  the  contrast  between  the jus 
nalis  creaturae,  nec  var~atur  tempore,  moral~a,  ut,  'non  occides,'  et  cetera, 
sod  ~mmutablle  permanet  2  Sed  quedam  rn~stlca,  ut pote  sacr~fitlorum 
cum naturale jus lege et evangello supra  precepta,  et al~a  h~s  s~mllia. Moral~a 
d~catur  esse comprehensum (D. I,  Part  mandata  ad  naturale  ]us  spectant 
I,  see p  98), quedam autem contraria  atque  ~deo  nullam  mutabilltatem  re- 
hls,  que in lege statuta sunt, nunc in  clpisse  monstrantur  M~st~ca  vero, 
ven~antur  concessa,  non  v~detur  jus  quantum  ad  superficlem,  a  natural1 
naturale  ~mmutabile  permanere  In  jure  probantur  ahena,  quantum  ad 
lege  namque  przc~piebatur  ut  muher  moralem  lntelllgentlam  invenluntur 
81  masculum  pareret,  quadrag~nta,  st  sib~  aunexa , ac per hoc, etsl secundum 
vero  femmam,  octogluta  dlebus  a  supe~ficiem vldeantur  esse  mutata, 
temp11 cessaret lngressu  nunc  autem  tamen  secundum  moralem  intelhgent- 
stat~m  post  partum  eccles~am  lngreil~  lam mutabilltatem nesclre probantur." 
non  prohibetur  Item  muller  que  Rufinus, '  Summa Decret ,' D. v. 
menstrua  pat~tur,  ex  lege  ~mmunda  a  Gratlan,  Decretum,'  D  vm., 
reputabatur, nunc autem nec eccleslam  Pars I  Gratlanus  "  D~ffert  etlam jus 
lntrare,  nec  sacrac  communlonls  mls  naturale  a  consuetudlne  et  const~tu- 
ter~a  perclpere,  slcut  llla,  quo  parit,  t~ona  Nam  lure  naturz sunt  omnla 
vel  ~llud,  quod  gignitur,  nec  statlm  colnmun~a  omnlbus,  quod  non  solum 
post  partum bapt~zari  prohibetur "  lnter eos servatum crod~tur,  do  qmbus 
Do  do ,  D  VI ,  at end  Gratlanus  lrgltur  '  Multltudlnls  autem  creden- 
"  His ita respondetur.  In lege ct ovan-  tium  erat  cor  unum  et  anima  una, 
gel10  naturale  Jus  contmetur,  non  etc ' ,  verum etiam ex precedent1 tern- 
tamen quecumque In  lege et evangello  pore a phllo~ophls  trad~tum  lnven~tur. 
tnveniuntur,  natural1 jurl coherere pro  Unde  apud  Platonem illa  c~v~tas  ,us- 
bantur.  Sunt  erum  In  lege  quedam  tlss~me ordinata  tradltur,  m  qua 
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naturale  and the actual order  of  society in this matter, but 
he  does not furmsh US  with any explanation.  This omission 
is repfled by Rufinus, who deals with the matter very care- 
fully.  We  have  already  discussed the first  two  sections  of 
his treatment of  the natural law in commenting on Gratian's 
first  D1stmction.l  We  must  now  cons~der  the rest  of  this 
important  passage.  After  describing  the  character  of  the 
natural  law  as the moral  principle  implanted in man,  and 
its division into commands, prohibitions,  and demonstrationes, 
he  argues  that  the  force  of  this  was  so  much  weakened 
after the Fall  that it  had  to be  re-established  in  part  by 
the  Decalogue,  and  finally  and  completely  by  the  Gospel. 
He  then  proceeds  to  show  how  the  abstract  and  general 
character  of  the  principles  of  the  jus  naturale  made  it 
necessary for additions to be  made  to it by good  customs ; 
and he  gives  as  an illustration  the institution  of  the rules 
and ceremonies of  marriage.  So far for the additions  (quod 
adauctum  est)  to the law  of  nature which  are to be found 
in the institutions of  society.  The subject of  conditions con- 
trary  to  the  principles  of  the  natural  law  (quod  detractum 
est)  presents  greater  difficulties.  Rufinus  explains  this  as 
follows.  Referring  to  his  analysis  of  the jus  naturale  into 
commands,  prohibitions,  and  demonstrationes,  he  explains 
this  last  phrase  as  indicating  those  things  which  the jus 
naturale  neither  forbids  nor  commands,  but  shows  to 
be  good ;  as  a  special illustration  he  mentions  the Liberty 
of  all men  and the common possession  of  all things :  these 
phrases  are  taken  from  Isidore's  definition  of  the  natural 
law  as  quoted  by  Gratian.2  These  conditions  belong  to 
the  natural  law,  while  under  the  civil  law  this  man  may 
be  my  slave,  this  field  may  be  your  property.  Rufinus 
explains  this  by  saying  that  such  conditions,  contrary  as 
they  may  seem  to the natural law, in reality  carry  it out. 
quisque proprlos nesc~t  affectus  Jure  passage  in  full  In  considering  the 
vero  consuetud~nis vel  const~tutionis  Patrlstlc  theory  of  property.  Cf.  vol. 
~OC  meum  est,  lllud  vero  alterius  I  pp  140,  141 ) 
Undo  Augustlnus  ait,  Tract  6  ad  l See pp  103 and 106. 
c.  1  Joanms,  '  Quo  jure  defendis  See p.  102 
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To  take  the  case  of  slavery,  some  men  livhg without  a 
master  followed  their  own  unrestrained  desires  and  com- 
mitted all manner of  crimes with impunity, and it was there- 
fore  ordained  that  such  men  should  be  made  perpetual 
slaves.  The object of  this was that such men, who had been 
full  of  pride  and were  injurious  to others  so  long  as  they 
were free, should be rendered humane, humble, and innocent 
by the discipline of  slavery.  No  one can doubt that as pride 
and  ill-will  are  contrary  to the jus  naturale,  so  innocence 
and humility  are proper  to it.l 
Rufinus's statement is interesting and suggestive ; it is, of 
course, not in any sense original, for he is only putting into 
other terms the explanation of  the contradiction between the 
law and institutions of nature, and the actual law and institu- 
tions of  the world, which had been suggested by Seneca, and 
drawn  out  at length  by  the Fathers.  Rufinus's  statement 
serves to remind us that the mediaval theory of  society rests 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  conventional  institutions  of 
"ufinus,  '  Sulnma  Dccret.,'  D.  i., 
Dict. Grat. ad. c. i. : "  Quoniam autem 
ista  lex  naturalis  nudam  rerum  nat- 
uram  prosequiiur,  ostendendo  solum- 
mod0  hoc  in  natura  sui  equum  esse, 
illud autem iniquum, ideo necessarium 
fuit ad modificationem et ornamentum 
juris  naturalis  bonos  mores succedere, 
quibus  in  eo  crdo  congruus  ct  decor 
servaretur.  Puta : conjunctio maris ct 
feminre est de jure nature ; no  vero isto 
bono  passim  et precipitanter  homines 
sicut  bestio  utercntur,  lex  hujusmodi 
naturalis  modificata  est  per  ordinem 
discreti  et  honesti  moris,  scil.  ut 
non  nisi  tales  persone  et  sub  tanta 
celebritate  conjugii jungerentur.  Ecce 
jam  liquet  quod juri  naturali ab extra 
adauctum  est,  scil.  modus  et  ordo 
morum.  Dotractum autem ei  est non 
utique in mandatis vcl prohibitionibus, 
que  derogatiollem nullam  sentiro  quc- 
~nt,  sed  in  demonstrationibus,  que 
scil.  natura  non  vetat  non  precipit, 
sed  bona  esse  ostendit-et  maxim0 
in omnium  una  libertate  et communi 
possessione ; nunc enim jure  civili hic 
est  servus  meus,  ille  eat  ager  tuus. 
Omnia  tamen  hec,  que  juri  naturali 
videntur  adversa,  ad  ipsum  finaliter 
referuntur.  Exempli  gratia.  Quie 
effrenes  quidam  ease  cepersnt  et 
tamquam  acephali  sine  rectore  vive- 
bant,  impune  omnia  ooncepta  soelera 
committentes,  statutum  est,  ut  qui 
pertinaciter  suis  potestatibus  rebelles 
existerent,  pulsati  hello  et capti  per- 
petuo  servi  essent.  Ad  quid  hoc, 
nisi  ut  qui  prius  erant  efferi, 
superbi  et nocentes  per  vagam  licen- 
tiam,  post  hec  fierent  mansucti, 
humilcs  et  innocentes  per  servilis 
necessitatis  disciplinam ?  Quod,  scil. 
horrerc  superbiam  et malignitatem  et 
eligore  innocentiam  et  humilitatem, 
nullus  esse  dubitat  de  jure  naturali, 
et hunc in  modum flumina honestatis 
humane  rodeunt  ad  mare  juris  nat- 
uralis,  quod  in  primo  homine  pene 
perditum  in  lege  Mosaica  relevatur, 
in  evangelio  profic~tur, in  moribus 
dccoratur." 
society are the results  of  sin, ancl  are intended to check and 
control sin.  We shall come back  to this when we  deal with 
the theory  of  slavery and property. 
Rufinus'  explanation  is  briefly  repeated  by  Stephen  of 
Tournai in the conclusion of  that passage of  which  we  have 
already  quoted  a  part.l  He  also  divides  the  natural  law 
into commands, prohibitions, and demonstrationes :  commands, 
such as to love God ; prohibitions, such as not to kill ; and 
demonstrationes, such as that all men should be free.  Custom 
has,  however,  added  to and taken  from the "natural  law," 
it has  added  to it such things  as the rules  and  ceremonies 
of  marriage, it has  taken  away from it not  with  regard  to 
its commands or prohibitions, but with respect to its demon- 
strationes,  as  in  the  matter  of  liberty,  for  the jus  gentium 
has introduced ~lavery.~ 
To  the mediaval canonist then, as to the Fathers, the jus 
naturale is identical  with  the law of  God,  it is  embodied in 
the "  law and the Gospel," for it represents the general moral 
principles  which  God  has  implanted  in  human  nature,  and 
it is, in  its essential  character, immutable.  It is  true that 
it is set aside by some of  the legitimate institutions of  society, 
but this is to be explained as a necessary accommodation to 
the corrupt state of human nature, and this is justified by the 
ultimate purpose of  setting forward the principles of  the jus 
naturale.  The jus  naturals  is to the canonists the norm  by 
which  any law  or institution  must  be  tried. 
Qee  p. 104. 
a  Stephen  of  Tournai,  'Summa 
Decreti,'  D.  i. :  "  Quod  (i.e.,  jus 
naturale)  in  tribus  constat  maxime, 
mandatis  scilicet,  prohibitionibus,  et 
demonstrationibus.  Mandat  quod 
prosit,  ut  deum  diligere ;  prohibet 
9uod lredit,  ut non  occidere ; dcmon- 
atrat quod convenit, ut omnes homines 
liberos  esse.  Huic  autem  naturali 
VOL.  II. 
juri  per  lnores  et  additum  est.  ot 
detractum.  Additnm,  ut  in  ~naris 
et  feminrc  conjunctione,  cui  additre 
solemnitates canonic= cum inspectione 
idoneitatis  personarum  faciunt  matri- 
monlum.  Detractum  in  demonstra- 
tionibus,  tamen  non  in  prcceptis  vel 
prohibitionibus, sicut in libertate, quat 
per  ju~  gentium  immntata  est,  et 
servitus inducta." CHAP.  ~v.1  THE JUS  OBNTIUM.  116 
CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  JUS  O&A'TI  UM. 
WE have considered  one term of  that tripartite definition of 
law  which  the  Middle  Ages  inherit  from  the  corpus  juris 
and Iaidore of  Seville.  We must briefly consider the meaning 
which  the canonists attach to the second kind  of  law,  the 
jus  gentium.  Gratian's  definition  of  this  is  taken  from 
Isidore, and is therefore not quite the same as the definition 
of  the Digest  or Institutes of  Justinian.l 
Gratian  looks  upon  the jus  gentium  as  one  part  of  the 
custolnary  law  of  mankind.  As  we  have  already  seen,  he 
has  set out a  distinction which,  as we  may gather, he  con- 
siders to be more fundamental than the tripartite definition 
of  law,  the  distinction  between  natural  law  and custom,- 
a  distinction which  corresponds to that between  the Divine 
law  which  exists  by  nature,  and  the  human  law  which 
exists  by  c~stom.~  The jus  gentium  is  a  form  of  custom- 
ary  law,  distinguished  from  the  jus  civile,  because  the 
former  represents  the  custom  of  mankind,  the  latter  the 
custom  of  some  particular  State.  This  seems  to be clearly 
implied  by  Gratian  and by  Rufinus.  The  law  of  nature, 
Gratian  says,  began  with  the  beginnings  of  the  rational 
creation,  and continues  unchangeable ;  the  law  of  custom 
came  after  the  law  of  nature,  and began  from  that  time 
1 Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D.  i.  D :  religio, connubia inter alienigenas pro- 
"Jus  gcntiuln  oat  sodium  occupatio,  hib~ta. Hoc  inde  jus  gentium  appal- 
redificat~o,  rnunitio, hella,  captlvitatcs,  latur : quia eo jure  omnes fere gentes 
servltutes,  postlimin~a, federa  paais,  utuntur."  (Isid., ' Etym.,'  v.  6.) 
inducie,  legatorum  non  vioiandoruxn  See p. 98. 
when men commenced $0 dwell  together;  it was  only  later 
that  the  jzcs  constitutionis,  that  is,  a  system  of  written 
law,  began:  the  first  example  of  this,  Gratian,  repeating 
Isidore,  finds in the legislation  of  Moses,  and this  was  fol- 
lowed by other 1egislators.l  Paucapalea repeats the greater 
part  of  Gratian's  phrases  with  little  change  or  addition  of 
any significan~e.~  Rufinus also has an account of  the begin- 
nings  of  human  societies,  and of  the origin  of  the general 
laws  and  customs  of  mankind,  and  he  explicitly  identifies 
these  with  the jus gentium.  He describes how  by  the Fall 
man's sense of  justice and capacity for knowledge were greatly 
impaired ; but inasmuch as his natural powers were not wholly 
destroyed, he began to understand that he was different from 
the brute animals both in knowledge and manner of  life, and 
he  began  to  seek  his  neighbour's  society  and  pursue  the 
common service ; the embers of  justice which had been almost 
extinguished began again to burn, that is, the rules of  modesty 
and reverence,  which  taught men  to enter into agreement 
with  each  other,-and  these  are  called  the  jus  ge~tium, 
because  almost all races  of  men  obey them.3 
l  Gratian, '  Decretum,' D. vi. at end :  autem  constitutionis  cepit  a  justi- 
"Gratianus,  8 1.  Naturale ergo jus ab  ficationibus,  quas  Dominus  tradidit 
exordio  rationalis  creature  incipiens,  Moisi  dicens :  '  Si  smeris  servum 
ut supra dictum est, manet immobile.  ebreum,  &C.'  Unde  Ysidorus  in  lib. 
Jus  vero consuetudinis post naturalem  6,  '  Etym.'  i.  1.  ait : 
legem exordium habuit, ex quo homines  '  Aloises  gentis  EIebreze  primus 
convenientes in unum, ceperunt simul  omnium  divinas  leges  sacris  literis 
habitare ; quod ex eo tempore factum  osplicavit.  Foroneus  Rex  Grecis 
cmditur  ex  quo  Gain  civitatem  edifi-  primus  leges,  judiciaque  constituit, 
CaflSe legitur, quod cum diluvio propter  &C.'  " 
horninurn  raritatem  fere  vidcatur  ex-  Paucapalea,  '  Summa  Decreti ' : 
stinctum,  postea  postmodum  a  tem-  Introduction. 
Pore  Nemroth  reparatum  sive  potius  a  Rufinus, '  Summa Decret.,'  Przef. : 
immutatum  existimatur,  cum  ipse  "  Dignitas  humane  creature  ante pec- 
simul cum aliis aIios  cepit  opprimere ;  catum  hic  duobus quasi funiculia  sus- 
sus  imbecillitate  eorum  ditioni  pensa  eminsbat,  scil.  rectitudine 
cePerunt  esse  subjecti,  unde  legitur  justitie,  et scientie claritate : per illam 
de e0 : '  Cepit  Nemroth  esso robustus  presidcbat  humanis,  per  istam  celes- 
venatur  coram  Domino,'  id  est  hom  tibus  propinquabat.  Diaboli  autem 
inurn oppressor et exstinctor ; quos ad  invidia  increscente,  pondere  distorta 
turrim  edificandam allexit."  malitie  depressa  est rectitudo justitie, 
D-  vii.,  Part I.,  Gratianus : "  Jua  et caligina erroris obsouratum est lumen 116  POLITICAL THEORY 
sc~entie.  Quia  igltur  per  claudica- 
tionem  ~nalitie iucurrit  ignorantio 
cecitatem,  naturali  ordine  common- 
ente  oportebat  per  justitio  exercit~a 
integritatem  scientie  reparari.  Gum 
itaque naturalis vis in homine penitus 
exstincta non  esset, nimlrum  satagere 
cepit,  qualiter  a  brutis  animalibus, 
sicut prerogativa sciendi, ita et vivendi 
lege  distaret.  Dumqiie  deliberavit 
homo  oum  pro-~imis conveuire  et 
mutuls utllitatibus consulere, contlnuo 
quasl dointer emortuos cineres scintille 
justitie,  lnodesta  scil. et verecundiora 
precepta,  prodierunt  que . . . et con- 
cordie  subire  federa  docuerunt  et 
certas  pactiones  inire :  que  quidem 
jus  gentlum  appellantur, eo  quod illis 
omnes pene  gentes utantur, sicut sunt 
venditiones,  locationes,  permutationes 
et his similes."  CHAPTER  V. 
THE  THEORY  OF SLAVERY. 
WE  have  now  considered  the character  of  the jus  naturale 
as  the norm  and  standard  of  all  just  law,  and have  seen 
that in the judgment  of  the canonists it is immutable-that, 
properly  speaking,  no  institution  is lawful,  no law  is valid, 
which is contrary to it.  But we have also seen that certain 
institutions are mentioned by the canonists as being contrary 
to the natural law, especially  the institutions of  slavery and 
property, and we  have already  considered those  distinctions 
within  the  natural  law,  by  means  of  which  Rufinus  and 
Stephen  of  Tournai seek  to vindicate  their  legitimate  char- 
acter.  Natural  law,  they  say,  consists  of  three parts- 
commands, prohibitions, and demonstrationes ;  and while the 
commands  and prohibitions  are unalterable,  the  demonstm- 
tiones  have  not  the  same  character,  and it  may  even  be 
necessary  that  the  natural  law,  under  this  aspect,  should 
be formally disobeyed, in order that its true ends or'purposes 
may  be  fulfilled.  We  must  now  consider  more  closely  the 
theory  of  the  canonists  with  regard  to  the  institutions  of 
slavery and property, and must endeavour to ascertain more 
Precisely their views with regard to them.  And first we  must 
deal with slavery. 
The canonists inherited from the later philosophers of  the 
ancient  world,  from  the  corpus juris  civilis,  and  from the 
pathers,  the principle  that by  nature  a11  men  are free and 
equal,  that  slavery  is  an institution  not  of  nature  or  the 
natural law, but of  the jus gentium or the civil law.  We have 
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the Middle Ages, and it is not necessary to cite many passages 
to prove  that  this  was  the doctrine  also  of  the  canonists. 
The equality  of  human nature is indeed  the doctrine  which 
is  assumed  by  them  all  as  the  fundamental  principle  of 
human  life-that  is,  the equality  of  men,  as being  all the 
children  of  one Father in heaven. 
Burchard of  Worms embodied in his ' Decretum '  that canon, 
which  we  have  already  quoted  in  the previous  volume,  in 
which Christian men are admonished to remember that behind 
the diversity  of  the conditions  of  human  life  there  lay the 
fact that men  were  all brethren,  for  they were  the children 
of  one Father, that is God,  and of  one mother,  that is  the 
Church,  and that therefore  they were  bound  to treat each 
other  mercifully  and  considerately,  and not  to exact  from 
each other more than was reasonab1e.l  This is again included 
in the '  Decretum ' of  IVO.~ 
This  principle  is  regarded  as  determining  the  nature  of 
the marriage relations  of  slaves,  and a  canon in Burchard's 
' Decretum ' lays down the rule that if  a free woman know- 
ingly married a slave, he was to be reclzoned as her husband, 
"For,  we  all  have  one  Father  in  heaven ; "  this  is  also 
contained  in  the  'Decretum '  of  Ivo.~  IVO  and  Gratian 
include in  their  collections  a canon which  prohibits the dis- 
solution  of  the  marriage  of  slaves,  on  the ground  that  as 
God is the Father of  all men, the same law is binding upon 
all in things related to God.5  We shall have to return to the 
Burchard of  Worms, '  Decret.,'  xv. 
32 :  "  Quia  ergo  constat  m  Eccles~a 
d~versarum  conditionum  hommes esse, 
ut  s~nt  nobiles  et  ~gnobiles, servl, 
colonl,  inqmlin~  et  cetera  hu~usmocl~ 
nomma, oportet, ut qulcumque eis pra- 
latl  sunt, clerici,  slve  lam, clementer 
erga  cos  agant,  et mlserlcorditel  eos 
tractent, slve in exigendis ab 01s open 
bus,  slvo  In  acciplendis  tributis  et 
quibusdamdebltis, sc~antque  eos fratres 
suos esse ot unum patrem habere Deum, 
CUI  sic clamant : '  Pater noster, qui es 
in ccelis,'  unam  matrem  sanctam  Ec- 
aleaam, qu~  eos intemerato sacrl fontis 
utero  glgn~t.  Disclplma  igltur  sis 
msericordissima  et gubernatio  oppor- 
tuna adhibenda est."  Cf. vol. I.  p.  201. 
IVO,  '  Decretum,'  xvl. 33. 
a  Burchard  of  Worms,  '  Decret.,' 
IX.  27 .  " Si  femina  ingenua  accipit 
servum, sclcns quia servus esset, habeat 
eum:  qula  omnes  unum  patrem  ha- 
bemus In ccehs." 
Ivo, '  Decretum,'  vln. 62. 
Gratian, '  Dcciotum,' C.  XXIX.  Q.  2. 
c.  I. : "Omnibus nob18 unus pater est in 
cabs, et unusquisque,  dives et pauper, 
liher et servus, equahter pro se et pro 
animabus  eorum  ~atlonem redd~turl 
question of  the marriage  of  slaves ; in the meanwhile these 
*assages  will  serve  to  bring  out  clearly  the  fact  that  the 
canoni~ts  assume  the  principle  of  the  equality  of  human 
nature. 
The doctrine of  the natural freedom of  men is in the same 
way  inherited  by  the  canonists  from  the  Civil  Law  and 
the Fathers,  and  assumed by  them as true.  It is  sin, not 
nature, that has made some men free and some slaves ; the 
of  slavery  is  to be  found  not  in  some  inherent  and 
natural  distinction  in  human  nature,  but  in  the fact  that 
sin, as it has depraved men's nature, so it has also disordered 
all  the  natural  relations  of  human  society,  and  man  now 
needs  a  discipline  which  in  his  original  condition  would 
have  been  as unnecessary  as it would  have been  unnatural. 
Burchard  of  Worms  cites  that very important  saying  of  St 
Isidore's,  which  describes  slavery  as  a  consequence of  the 
sin  of  the first  man,-a  punishment,  but also a remedy  by 
which  the  evil  dispositions  of  men  may  be  restrained.l 
Paucapalea, the first  commentator on Gratian, comments on 
the  phrase  servitutes  in  Isidore's  definitioh  of  the  jzfs 
gentium,  as  cited  by  Gratian,  by  quoting the words  of  tl e 
Institutes that by the law of  nature all men were born frm3 
We  have  already  considered  the  important  passage  in 
which  Rufinus  discusses  the  question  of  the apparent  ccn- 
tradiction between the law of  nature and the civil law nith 
regard to slavery.  Rufinus does not express his views in the 
sunt.  Quapropter omnes, cu]uscumque 
condic~onis  sint, unam legem  quantum 
ad Domlnum habere non dub~tamus. S1 
autem omnes unam legem habent, ergo 
81cut ingenuus  dimltt~  non  potest,  sic 
nec  servus  semel  conjuglo  copulatus 
ulterior  dnnltti  poterit "  Cf.  Ivo, 
'  Decretum,'  vill.  156 
'  Burchard  of  Worms,  '  Decret ,' 
XV  44.  "  Propter  peccatum  prlmi 
homlnls,  humano  goner1  pcena  div- 
Initus illata est serv~tut~s  ~ta  ut qmbus 
aSPiClt  non  congruere  libertatem,  his 
mlserlcord~us irroget  servitutem.  Et 
lice6  peccatum  humaaa!  originls  per 
bapt~sm~  gratiam cunct~s  fidellbus  dl. 
mlssum  sit,  tamen  aquus Deus  idro 
dlscrevlt homln~bus  vitam, alios servos 
const~tucns,  al~os  domlnos, ut licent~a 
male agondi servorum potestate  domi 
nantium restringatur.  Nam  si  omnes 
sinc metn fu~ssent,  qu~s  esset qu~  a mallr 
quemquam  proh~beat."  See  for  the 
whole  passage  vol. I  p. 119, note 1. 
a  Paucapnlea,  '  Summa  Decret~,' 
D.  1.  9: "JUY  gentlum est  . . . servl- 
tutes  .  '  'Jure  emm  natnmll  ab 
lnlt~o omnes  liommes  liberi  nasw- 
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same strictly theological  phrases  as Isidore and the Fathers, 
but  his  explanation  of  slavery  is  substantially  the  same. 
Natural  law  shows  that  freedom  is  a  good  condition,  and 
slavery would  at first sight seem to be contrary to this,  but 
its real purpose is to correct men's  evil desires  and criminal 
passions,  and  to  produce  those  qualities  of  humility  and 
innocence in which  the natural law is fulfilled.  Freedom is, 
indeed, that condition which is agreeable to natural law, but 
men are not yet fit for that condition.l 
The canonists, then, like the Fathers and the jurist#, recog- 
nise that slavery is contrary to natural law-that  is, it is a 
condition adapted not to the ideal of  human life, but to the 
actual imperfections of  men's nature.  But the canonists, like 
the Fathers,  while  they hold  that slavery is not a  natural 
institution, not only tolerate it, but justify it ; they not only 
acquiesce in the institution, but hold  that it serves a  useful 
purpose.  The  strongest  illustration  of  this  attitude  of  the 
canon law to slavery is to be found in this, that it recognises 
and provides for the fact that the Church was itself  a slave- 
owner.  We find  a  series  of  regulations  from  the canonical 
collections  of  Regino  of  Prurn  in the ninth  century to the 
Decretals of  Pope Gregory IX. in the thirteenth century which 
deal with this. 
Regino  includes  in  his  collection  some  sentences  from  a 
canon of  a  Council of  Toledo which  strictly forbid  a  bishop 
to emancipate slaves who belong to the Church unless he gives 
of  his  own  property  to the Church ; if  any bishop  should 
emancipate Church slaves except under  these conditions, his 
successor is to reclaim them.2  Regino also cites a canon which 
forbids an abbot to emancipate slaves who have been given to 
a  monastery, for it is unjust that while the monks  do their 
daily  agricultural  work  the  slaves  should  live  in  idlene~s.~ 
1 See p  112.  res  suas  Eccles~e Chnst~  non  cou- 
Reglno  of  Yrum,  '  De  Synod.  tulent, damnum Inferat.  Tales  ~g~tur 
Causls,'  I.  368 : "  Eplsco~1  qul  n~hll  llbertos  successor  Eplscopus  absque 
ex  proprlo  suo  Eccleslrc  Chrlstl  con-  al~qua  opposlt~one ad  ]us  Ecclcs~a 
ferunt,  l~bertos  ex  fam1111s Eccles~~  revocablt " (Conc.  Tolet.,  IV.  c.  67). 
ad condemnat~onem  suam fa~fre  non  Reglno  of  Prum,  'De  Synod. 
presumant.  Impium est enlm ut qul  Causls,'  I.  367 : "  Manclpia  monachls 
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 hard of  Worms includes the first of  these canons  in his 
~~~~etum,'  while IVO  of  Chartres reproduces both.2  Gratian 
states the same principles  in connection with  the ordination 
of  slaves.  He discusses  the question whether  the slaves  of 
R, monastery can be ordained, and points out that it may be 
argued  that this  is impossible,  for no  one  can be  ordained 
unless  he  is  emancipated,  and he  cites  as  a  canon  of  the 
eighth general council what is really a passage from the ' Regula 
~onachorum,'  attributed to St Isidore of  Seville, which lays 
down the rule that no abbot or monk can emancipate a slave. 
He replies to this by urging  that while it is quite true that 
the  slaves  of  a  monastery  cannot  be  emancipated  in  such 
a  sense  that  they  could  leave  the monastery,  they can  be 
ordained  and so  emancipated under  the condition that they 
are to continue in the monastery-that  is, as we understand, 
under the condition that they are admitted as monks ; and 
he  cites  a  passage  from  Gregory  the Great  which  expressly 
authorises  the  admission  of  a  slave  of  the  Church  into  a 
mona~tery.~  Gregory IX., in his Decretals, repeats the canon 
donata  ab  Abbate  non  llcet  manu- 
mltt~. Injustum  est  enlm  ut,  mon- 
ach~s  quot~dianum  rulale  opus  facl- 
ent~bus, servl  eorum  l~bertatls  otlo 
pot~antur." 
l Burchard, '  Decret.,' nl  189. 
IVO  of  Chartros,  '  Decretum,'  111 
249  and  163. 
Grat~an, '  Decretum,'  D.  11v , 
Part  IV.  .  "  Grat~anus.  De  servls 
monastern  quer~tur,  an  eccles~asticls 
offitns possunt aggregan,  an non.  Sod 
famull eccleslamm non suut ordlnand~, 
8lcut supra dlctum est, nlsl  a  proprns 
eplscop~s  l~bertatem  consequuntur. 
Porro  servus  monastorn  llbortatem 
consequ~  non valet, non  ergo  ad clen- 
catum 8lbl accedere het.  Quod autem 
liber fier~  non poss~t,  probatur auctor~ 
$ate octave Slnodl, In qua SIC statutum 
legtur : 
c.  22.  'Abbat~  ve1  monacho  mon- 
mtern  servum  non  llceb~t facere 
llberum.  QUI  emm  n~chll  proprlum 
habet,  libertatern  re1  allenw  dare non 
potest,  nam,  slcut  et  secul~ leges 
sanxerunt,  non  potest  al~enar~  pos- 
sess~~,  n1s1  a proprlo domlno.' 
GraL~anus Hac  auctor~tate pro- 
h~bentur  servi  adlplsct  l~bertatem  re- 
cedend~  nb obsequ~o  monasten~,  sed non 
proh~bentur nanclscl  l~bertatem  pro- 
movend~ ad  sacras  ordlnes.  Potest 
enlm  In  sacrls  ordlnibus  const~tutus 
monastern obsequlls pelpetuo dcserv~re, 
ac  SIC  servus monusten~  et l~be~tatom 
ad~plsc~  et  sacrils  offit~ls  valet  asso- 
clan. . . . 
Part  V.,  Grat~anus  .  Quod  autem 
hervl  ecclesramm  (quo nomlne  etlam 
monasten~ servos  s~gn~ficar~  ~ntelll- 
g~mus),  ad sacra rellg~onls  proposltum 
debcant  nssuml,  auctor~tate beat1 
Gregorn  probatur,  qu~   general^  S~nodo 
res~dens  d~x~t. 
C.  23 :  '  Multos  eu  eccles~a~tlca 
famll~a  novlmus acl omnlpotentls servl- 
t~um  festinare, ut ab humana servltute 
11ber1 In  d~v~no  serv~t~o  valeant  m 
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of  Toledo, which we have already cited from Regino of  Prum, 
the canon  which  forbids a  bishop  to emancipate  slaves  be- 
longing  to the Church  unless  he  gives  property  of  his  own 
to the Church.l 
These passages  will suffice to make it clear that the canon 
law  accepted  and sanctioned  the institution  of  slavery,  for 
they assume that the Church itself  was  a  slave-owner.  But 
the mediaval canon law goes further than this, and repeats 
from earller Church authorities the very severe condemnation 
of  those who encouraged slaves to fly from their masters, and 
of  fugitive slaves.  Burchard of  VCTorrns cites  that canon of 
Gangrae, which we have discnsscd in the previous volume, in 
which the anathema of  the Church is pronounced against those 
who  teach  slaves  to despise  their  masters  and to fly  from 
them, and also part of  the letter of  Hrabanus Maurus which 
comments  on this and discusses the question whether it was 
lawful to say mass for a slave who had died while in flight.2 
Burchard also cites a canon of  the Council of  Altheim which 
professes  to  repeat  a  saying  of  Gregory  the  Great,  that a 
cleric  flying  from  his  church,  or  a  slave  flying  from  his 
master,  is to be  excluded from conimunion until he return.3 
Ivo of  Chartres repeats these two canons in his ' Decretum,' 4 
while  Gratian  cites  the  canon  of  Gangra5  The  canonists 
clearly  look  upon  the  institution  of  slavery  as  in  such  a 
sense  authorised  and  sanctioned  by  God  that  any  revolt 
against  it was  sinful. 
We  have  just  cited  a  passage  from  Gratian  which  refers 
to the question of the ordination of  slaves, and we ~~1st  now 
'  Decretals,' ni  1.3  4 
Burchard of  Worms, '  Decret ,'  XI 
62 :  "  Et In  Gangrensl  concl110  ~ta 
scrlptum  est  S1  quis  scrvum  sub 
prztextu dlvlnl cultus doceat dominum 
proprlum  contemnere,  ut dlscedat  ab 
ejus  obsequio  anathema  s~t  "  For 
Hrabanus  Maurus'  dlscusslon  of  this, 
see  vol.  I  pp  204,  205 
Burchard of  Worms, '  Decret ,' XI. 
78 : "  Sanctus  Gregorlur  dlclt  clen- 
cum  fuglentem  ab  Ecclesla  wla,  vel 
servum fuglentcm domlnum proprlunl, 
et nolentem  revert],  judlramus  com- 
mllnlone  prlvarl  quoadusque  ad pro- 
prlam ec~leslam,  vel ad domlnum suum 
redoat " 
IVO,  ' Decretum,'  XI]].  48. and xlv. 
126 
Gratlan, '  Decretum,'  C.  XVII.  Q 
4. c.  37. 
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tun to this  subject,  for it serves  to illustrate very  clearly 
the degree in which  the Church  accepted the institution  of 
slavery.  There  is  no  need  to go  through  the  evidence  1n 
detail, for the canonists restate those same general principles 
with  regard  to the subject  which  we  have  discussed  in the 
first volume.]  The slave must not be ordained until he has  -- 
1,een emanci~ated,~  and the emanclpation must, in the case of 
slaves of  lay masters, be absolute and complete-that  is, the 
master  cannot  retain  the jus  palrocinii ;  the  Church,  on 
the other hand, always retains these rights, even over those 
who  are  emancipated  and  ~rdained.~  That is,  the  master 
can retain no rights of  an ordinary kind : from other canons 
it  would  appear  that  the  master  might  retain  the  right  - - 
to  tlic  services  of  the  emancipated  slave  as  a  minister  of 
a  cl~urch  on his  pr~perty.~ 
1 Cf  v01  I. pp. 122, 206 
Roglno  of  Prum,  'De  Synod. 
Causis,'  I  391 ,  Burchard,  '  Decret .' 
11  21,  Ivo, 'Decretu~n,'  V1  64,  100, 
Ivo, '  Panoimla,' 111  48 , Gratlan, '  De- 
crotum,' D  liv ,  Part I. 
IVO  of  Chartres,  '  Panormla,'  IU. 
46  "  Qulcumque libertatem a domlnis 
I~CL  perc~plunt,  ut nullum siblmot obse- 
q~ilum  patronus In els ~etentet,  ~stl,  SI 
blne  crlmlne capitall sunt, ad clencatus 
ordlnem llberi  susclplantur qul dlrecta 
mnnumissione absolutl  esse noscuntur. 
QUI  vero  retento  obsequlo  manumlssl 
sunt, pro eo quod adhuc patron] servl- 
tute  tenentur  obnouli,  nullatenus  ad 
eccleslastlcum  ordmem  sunt  promo- 
vend],  ne,  quando  voluerlnt  eorum 
domlnl,  fiant ex clerlcls servl." 
Gratian,  '  Docretum,'  D.  11v.  4. 
arat~anus  : "  Qul autem a domin~s  suls 
ordlnandl l~bertatem  consequuntur, ab 
mum patrocln~o  pcnitus  debent  esse 
allem, ut In  nu110  eorum obsequilr  In- 
venlantur  obnoxn " 
'  Gratlan, ' Decretum,'  C  XII  Q  2 
0.  68  Gratlnnus  "  Scd  notandum 
eat, quad servi eccleslar~~m  m~nurr~itti 
"0"  Possunt,  non  Tr'cilto  ecdeslastlro 
Patroclnlo,  nlri forte mailunliusor  rluov 
ejusdem  mer~t~  et  ejusdem  peculll 
eccles~e  conferre voluerit." 
Rufinus,  ' Summa Decret.,'  D.  llv. : 
"  Cum  autem  ecclesla  servum  suum 
ordlnandum  manumlscr~t, numquam 
slne allyuo retento obsequ~o,  etlam non 
splrltuale, l~berare  eum poterlt " 
Burchnrd  of  Worms,  '  Decret ,' 
11  234  "  Nullus  clerlcus  ad gradum 
presbyter11 promoveatur, nls~  ut scnp- 
tum In  canonlbus  habetur.  S1  enlm 
propter Del dllectionem quls de servls 
suls  quemquam  elegerit,  et  docuer~t 
literas, et llbertatl condonavent, et per 
intercessionem erga episcopum presby- 
texum  effccer~t,  et secundum apostolos 
vlctum  ot ?estltum el  donaverlt , 1110 
autem postea In  superblam elatw mls- 
sam domlnls suls et  canon~cas  horas ob- 
servare et psallere renuerlt, et ei juste 
obed~re,  hens  se l~berum  esse, noluent, 
et quasl  libere  cujus  vult  homo  fiat, 
hoc sancta synodus  enathemat~zat,  et 
lllum a sancta commun~one  arcerl judl- 
cat,  donec  resipiscat  et  dom~no  mo 
obedlnt  secundum  canonlca  precepta 
Sin autem obbllrlato anlmo et 11oc  con- 
tempsent, accusetur  apud  cplscopum, 
qui  eum  ordinn~lt,  et degradetur.  et 
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According  to a  canon in Regmo's  and Ivo's  collections,  if 
a slave is ordained by the bishop, knowing that he is a slave, 
but without the knowledge  and consent  of  his  master,  he is 
to continue in his office, but the bishop is to pay double his 
value to the master ; if  the bishop was ignorant that he was 
a  slave,  then  those  who  testified to his  character,  or  who 
presented him for ordination, are to pay this compensation.1 
According  to a  canon in  Burchard,  which  comes  from the 
' Capitula Ecclesiastica ' of  818-19 A.D.,  a slave who procures 
his  ordination  by  fraud is  to be restored  to his  master ; if 
he  procured  ordmation, being  himself  ignorant  of  the fact 
that he was  a  slave, his  master may grant him his  liberty, 
and the slave will then remain in his order, or he may reclaim 
him as a slave, and he will then lose his order.2  This canon 
natns  fucrat "  Cf  Ivo  of  Chartres, 
'  Deemturn,'  VI  302 
Ruhnus, '  Summa Decret ,'  D  hv 
"  Cum  ~taque  servus  ord~nandus  rna- 
numitt~tur  a  pnvato,  nu110  retento 
obsequ~o  debot  llberarl  Sed  tamen 
notandum quod obsequ~um  allud splr- 
ituale, al~ud  non splr~tualc spi~ituale, 
sicut minlstrare  altar10  et hujusmodi, 
non  sp~rituale  autem  manumlssorum 
h~c  obsequlum dlcimus, quodlegessecul~ 
libertorum operas appellant  . . . Cum 
ergo servum suum ordinandum privatos 
manumlttlt,  nillum  obsequium  non 
splr~tuale  m  eo  potent  ret~ncre,  o e 
operam  aut fabr~lem  aut offioialem- 
offic~alcm, inquam,  que  consist~t  In 
faclendo  .  Splntualc  vero  obse- 
qulum retmere potent,  SI  ad hoc eum 
ordman voluerit,  ut s~b~  et sue quail1 
fortc ed~ficavlt  ccclesle offic~a  celebret, 
ut In  Burc , 11  c , ' Nullus  cler~cus, 
aperte invenitur " 
Cf  Dccretals,  I  18  4  Same  as 
Burchard,  11  231 
1 Reg~no of  Prum,  'De  Synod 
Caus~s,'  I.  404.  "  S1  servus,  abqente 
aut nesclente domino, eplscopo  autem 
sclente,  diaconus  aut presbyter  fuerrt 
ordmatus, ~pse  In clericatuii officio per 
maneat,  episcopus autcm earn dupllcl 
sat~sfactione  domlno persolvat  S1 vero 
eplScOpu3  servum  euin  cssc  nescierlt, 
qui test~monlilm  do 1110  perh~bent,  aut 
cum postulant  ordinar],  slm~l~  rccom- 
pensatlone teneantur obnoxii."  Cf  110 
of  Chartres, '  Decretum,' I I  125 
a  Burchard  of  Worms,  '  Decret ,' 11 
31 . "  Et SI  qu~lrbet  servus dom~nurn 
suum  fuglens,  aut  latltans,  aut  ad 
hib~t~s  testlbus  munere  condi~ctis,  vcl 
corruptis,  aut quallbet  calliditate  vcl 
fraude, ad gradus ecclesiasticos perven 
ent,  dccretum  est  ut  deponatui,  et 
domlnus  ojus  eum  reclpiat  S1  vcro 
avus aut patcr, ab alia patrla In  allam 
mlgrans  In  eadem  provlncla  fillum 
gcnuerlt, et lpsa fillus ~bldem  cducatus, 
et ad  gradus  eccleslastlcos  promotns 
fuerit, et utrum servus s~t  ~gnotum  slt, 
ct postca vemons dominus 1111~s  legibuq 
curn  acqulsler~t, sauoltum  cst  ut  sl 
dom~nus  ejus 1111  l~bcrtatem  dare volu 
ent, in gradu suo permancat  61  vcro 
eum catcna servltut~s  a castr~s  Domln~ 
cls abstrahero voluerit, gradum amlttat 
qula ]uxta sacros cauonos ~111s  persona 
maucns  saoerdotn  dlgnitate fung~  non 
potest "  Cf  '  Capltula  Eccleslastic~  ' 
of  818-19 A D,  In M  G  H  Leg, scct. 
11.  No  138  Cf. vol.  i. p.  206. 
is also found in Ivo's ' Decretum,' and was inserted as a Palea  ,  ~ratlan's  ' Decretum.'  It would seem, however, that this 
does not represent  the judgment  either of  Gratian or 
of  his  commentators.  Indeed  even  Burchard  and Ivo have 
also cited canons which represent another judgment.  Burchard 
cites a  canon which  prescribes that though a  slave who has 
been ordained is to be restored to his  master,  he is to con- 
tinue  in  his  order.2  Ivo cites  a  passage  from  a  letter  of 
pope Gelasius I.,  which enjoins the restoration of  the ordained  - 
slave to his master, but also provides that the slave who has 
been ordained priest, while he is to be sent back to his master, 
is to serve him as a priest ;  S  and he also cites another letter 
of  Gelasius  which  does  not  allow  a  priest  to be  degraded, 
but punishes  him with the loss of  his peculium, while slaves 
in  the  inferior  orders  are  simply  to be  restored  to  their 
masters.4  Gratian  cites  both  these  letters of  Gelasius,  and 
states his  own  judgment  as being  that, if  a  slave has been 
ordained  without  his  master's  consent,  s priest  is  to  be 
deprived of  his "  peculium,"  a deacon is to find a substitute, 
or, if  he cannot do this, to be reduced to slavery, while those 
in other orders are simply to be reduced to ~lavery.~  There 
1 Ivo, ' Decretum,' vi.  132  Grat~an, 
'  Decretum,'  D  11v  c  6 (Palea) 
Burcl~ard of  Worms,  '  Decret ,' 
7.111  3  "  S1  vero  servus,  qu~  superius 
taxato  mod0  tonsuratus  est,  et  ad 
gradus ccclcsiasticos pervenerit, domino 
suo  per  legem  emendetur,  et el  red 
dltus In suo gradu permaneat " 
IVO, '  Decrctum,'  vi.  354  'Pan 
ormla,'  In  l65  Cf  v01  1  p  122 
'  Ivo  of  Cllart~cs,  '  Panornua,'  111 
164  "  Actorcs  s~quidem  illustrls  viri 
fill1 nostri  Amand~  gravlter  conquer 
untur,  homlnes  Juri suo debltos,  al~os 
Jam m  clencos,  alios jam  subd~aconos 
ord~natos,  cum non  solum  post  mod 
ernurn  concllium  quod  tantorum  col 
lectlone  pont~ficum  sub omnlum  salu 
bernrnze  provis~on~s  asscnsu  constst 
perfectum,  hujusmod~ pclsonas 
8usclpere non  deberent,  verum  e$am 
81  ~UI  fortc In  dlv~ne  oultum  rnilltle 
ante fuennt,  ~gnorantla  faciente,  sus- 
cepti,  ellmmat~  prorsus  et evuti  re11 
g~oso  priv~lcg~o  ad dominorum  posses- 
sloncs  justa  debuerlnt  admonltlone 
compclli, ct ideo fratres charlssimi,  eos 
quos  supradicti  vlrl  actorcs In  clerlc- 
atus  officio  monstraverint,  detiner~, 
discussos et obnoxios  approbatos, cus. 
tod~to  legum  tram~te,  sane  ~ntermis- 
sione  restitu~te,  ita  ut  61  qms  jam 
presbyter  reper~tur,  in  eodem  gradu 
peculn  sola  am~sslone permaneat. 
D~aconus  vero  aut  vlcarlum  priestot, 
aut  SI  non  habuent, ipse  reddatur. 
Residua  oflicia  sclant  nemlnem  posse 
ab hoc noxlctate, sl convincltur, vlnd~ 
can,  quatenus  hoc  ortline  custodito, 
nec  domlnorum  Jura,  nec  prlvilegia 
ulla  ratlone  turbcntur " (Gelaslus  I, 
Ep. xu , ed  Thlcl). 
Gratian, '  Decretum,' D  11v ,  cc.  9 
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might seem to be some uncertainty about Gratian's meaning ; 
at first  sight  it would  seem  as  though  the priest  were  not 
to be restored to his master, but only to forfeit his "peculium," 
but the fact that he  cites  the passage  from  Gelasius  which 
orders him to be restored to his master, but only in order to 
serve him as a priest, would seem to indicate that he approves 
of  this, but does not understand this as equivalent to the re- 
duction of the priest to slavery.  Paucapalea restates the judg- 
ment of  Gelasius (Epistle xx.) as to the priest.'  Rufinus sums 
up the whole matter in a passage introductory to Gratian, D. 
Liv.  If,  hc says, a slave is ordained with the master's know- 
ledge,  and the master says nothing, the slave is free ; if  the 
slave is ordained against the declared  wishes of  the master, 
he must be reduced to slavery and lose his order, even if he 
is a priest, and he refers for proof  to that canon of  Burchard 
which we  have already quoted,-it  would  seem that Rufinus 
did not know this  as  a  Palea in Gratian's  Decretum.  This 
canon  prescribes  that a  slave who  has  been  ordained with- 
out his  ~naster's  knowledge  may be reclaimed  by his  master 
and degraded ; Rufinus urges that if  this were true of  a man 
ordained to the priesthood  without  his  master's knowledge, 
much  more  would  it hold  in  the  case  of  a  man  ordained 
against  his  master's  declared  will.  Then,  however,  Rufinus 
considers over again the case of  a slave ordained without his 
master's knowledge, and repeats Gratian's own judgment that 
in  this  case  the man in  subdeacon's  orders,  or  in inferior 
orders,  is  to be reduced  to slavery,  the deacon  is  to find  a, 
substitute or to return to slavery,  while  the priest  is to be 
punished only with the loss of  his peculium, and is in nowise 
to be reduced to slavery-unless,  Rnfinus adds, the man or 
his parents fled from their mast,er, as in the case contemplated 
in Burchard's  canon.  Finally,  he  adds,  some may maintain 
that the regulation represented  by  Rurchard's  canon is  an- 
nulled  by  the  decree  of  Gelstsius  on  which  Gratian's  own 
Ceterum, si  a  dominis suis libertatem  tabit,  aut  in  servitutem  revocabitur, 
consecuti non fuerint, et ad ecclesiasti-  ceteri vero gradus non  possunt  quem- 
cos  ordines  aliquo  mod0  irrepserint,  quam a nexu  servitutis absolvere." 
presbiter  peculii  amissione  mulctetur,  Paucapalea,  '  Summa  Decrati.' 
rliaconus vero aut vicarium pro se pres-  D.  liv. 
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,,j&g  is founded (Grat,ian, ' Decretanl,' D. liv. c.  g).'  These 
canonist~  evidently  held  what  was  substantially  the  same 
as the Fathers ; if  anytbing their views are rather 
more  st,rict with regard to the rights of  the master  over his 
slave if he should have been ordained.  It is, however, worth 
while  to notice  that some  of  the canonists have  taken  over  .. - 
from Justinian  the principle that the master can only reclaim 
his slave who has been ordained within a certain time ; Ivo 
includes in the ' Panormia ' the provision of  the Novels  that 
if  sr,  slave  is  ordained  without  his  master's  knowledge  the  --- 
master  can reclaim  him, b~t  only  within a  year.  This rule 
is also cited by Grakian." 
Very similar rules are cited by the canonists with respect to 
the admission  of  slaves into monasteries.  Burchard and Ivo 
cite a  canon  prohibiting  a  slave from entering a  monastery 
1 Rufinus '  Summa Decree.,' D. liv. : 
Gum autem non manumissi ordinan- 
tur,  aut  fit  scientibus  dominis  auk 
nescientibus ; cum vero scientibus, aut 
contradicentibus  aut  tacentibus.  Si 
ergo  scientibus  clominls  et tacentibus 
servi fuerint ordinati, ex hoc ipso effici- 
untur liberi et ingenui, ut infra eadem 
diat.  '  Si  servus  sciente '  (Gratian, 
'Dec.,'  D.  liv.  c.  20).  Si  autern 
sciens  contradixerit  dominus,  si 
voluerit dominus, in servitutem revo- 
cabitur  ordinatus,  non  solum  si  dia- 
conus,  sed  etiam  si  presbiter  factus 
fuerit.  Et quidom  de  diacono  habes 
infra  ead,  dist.  quis  aut ' (Gratian, 
'Dec.,'  D.  liv.  c.  11).  De  sacerdote 
vero  sic  habctur  quia,  si  aliqiiis cum 
uxore ancilla in aliam patriam  migra- 
verit,  ibique  filium  genuerit,  qui 
filius  postea  suo  tempore  ad  sacer- 
dotium  promotus  fuerit-si  veniens 
Postea  suus  dominus  recipere  eum 
voluerit,  sacerdos  non  crit,  sed  in 
mrvitutem  redibit ; querc  in  secundo 
libro Burchardi, capitulo '  Do servorum 
ordinatione  (Burchard, '  Decretum,'  ii. 
31).  Ecce  nesciente  forte  domino 
fuerat  sacerdos  ordinatus  et 
tamen postea  in servitutern  depulsns : 
multo  magis ergo, si eo contradicente. 
Denique  si  nesciente  domino  aervus 
fuerit  ordinatus,  tunc  dominus,  pro- 
tinus  ut  sciverit,  illum  poterit  re- 
vocare,  si  ad subdiaconatum et infra 
servum  contigerit  ordinatum ease.  Si 
autem  diaconus  factus  fuerit,  aut 
vicarius pro eo domino suo detur, aut 
ipse  in  servitutem  revocabitur.  Si 
autem sacerdos, sola peculii  amissione 
mulctabitur,  ipse  autem  nu110  mod0 
in  servitutem  revocabitur,  ut  infra 
ead. dist. cap. '  Ex antiquis ' (Gratian, 
'Dec.,'  D.  liv.  c.  9) :  nisi  forte  a 
dominis suis vel ipsi vel eorum parcntes 
prius  fugerint,  ut in  supra  designato 
capitulo Burcllardi (Burchard, ' Decre- 
tum,' ii.  31) diximus-nisi  quis astrunt 
illud  Burchardi  per  decretum  Gelasii 
abrogatum." 
2  Ivo  of  Chartres,  '  Panormia,'  iii. 
166 : " Si servus sciente et non contra- 
dicente  domino,  in  clero  sortitus  sit, 
ex  lloc ipso liber  et ingenuus fiat :  si 
enim  ignorant8  domino  consecratio 
facta fucrit, liceat domino intra annum 
tantum conditionem probare et propri- 
um suum recipere,"  (Novel, 123.  17.) 
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without  his  master's  permission,'  but  again  Ivo  in  the  , 
'  Panormia ' quotes the regulation that while an unknown man 
who  seeks  admission  to  a  monastery  is  not  to receive  the 
habit within three years, and if  he should prove to be a slave 
his master  can reclaim him within that time, yet after that 
time  he  cannot  be  claimed ;  and  this  rule  is  restated  by 
Gratian and Rufin~s.~  Stephen of  Tournai also repeats this 
rule, but adds that there was  some  doubt  as to the proper 
course if  the abbot had given the slave the tonsure and made 
him a monk before the three yeam were over ; some, he says, 
maintained  that in this case the slave was not to be restored 
to his master, but that the abbot should be required to find 
another  slave  of  equal  value  and give him  to the master.8 
We  must  notice  that  the  canonical regulations  are  not  so 
favourable to liberty as the provisions of  Justinian's  Novels, 
for these  only  allowed a slave to be reclaimed from a mon- 
astery, even within the first three years, if  he had committed 
some crime.4  We have already cited the passages in Gratian 
which  deal with  the question of  the ordination  of  the slaves 
of  a monastery ; they may not be emancipated and ordained 
under such terms as that they could leave the monastery, but 
they can be ordained on condition that they are perpetually 
to minister  in and for the mona~tery.~ 
With  regard  to  the  ordination  of  the freedman  and  the 
1 Burchard of  Worms, '  Decret.,'  viii. 
24 : "  Placuit in monastcriu~n  non esse 
recipiendum  servum  ad  monachum 
faciendum, prmter  proprii  domini  vol- 
untatem.  Qui  vero  hoc  constitutum 
nostrum excesserit, eum a communione 
suspendi decrevimus, ne nomen Domini 
blasphematur."  Cf. viii. 28 and Ivo of 
Chartres, '  Decretum,' vii. 44 ; xvi. 40. 
2  Ivo  of  Chartres,  '  Panormia,'  iii. 
184 : "  Si aliquis incognitus monasteri- 
um  ingredi  volucrit,  ante  triennium 
monachi  habitus  ei  non  priestetur,  et 
si  intra  trcs  annos,  aut  servus,  aut 
colonus, nut libcrtus, quaratur a dom- 
ino suo, redclatur  ei cum omnibus qua: 
attulit, fide tamcn accepta de impuni- 
tate.  Si  autem  triennium  non  fuerit 
requisitus, postea quaeri non potest, nisi 
sit tam longe  ut inveniri  non  possit ; 
sed  tamen  ea  quae  ad  monasterium 
adduxit, servi dominus accipiat."  Cf. 
Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D.  liv.  20 ; 
Rufinus,  '  Summa  Decret.,'  C.  xx.  Q. 
l ; Novels,  v.  2. 
S  Stephen of  Tournai, '  Summa De- 
oreti,'  D.  liv.  9 :  "  Quid  tamen,  si 
abbas ipsum infra triennium totonderit 
et  monachum  fecerit  ?  Quibusdam 
videtur  favore  religionis,  quod  non 
dobeat  eum  dominus  extrahere,  sod 
abbas alium  eisdem  astimationis  ten- 
eatur restituere." 
Novels, v.  2.  Cf.  vol. i.  p.  122. 
Vee  p.  121. 
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ins&1,titius,  Gratian cite8 two regulations, but they are not 
in harmony with each other : the first forbids the ordination 
of any person who is under any servile obligation without the 
consent of the person to whose service he is bound,l while the 
other provides that the inscriptitius can be ordained without 
the permission of  his master, but that if so ordained he must 
to discharge his  agricultural  ta~k,~-this latter reg- 
ulation is taken from the Novels.  Gratian himself  says that 
no  freedman  can  be  ordained  unless  the master  surrenders 
his  rights as "  patron."  It is important to remember that 
the civilians look  upon the ascriptifii,ics as a free man rather 
than  a  slave,  and that Azo  held  that he  could be  ordained 
without his  master's  consent.4 
It is  clear,  then,  that  the  medisval  canon  law,  while 
maintaining  the  philosophic  and  Christian  doctrine  of  the 
equality of  human nature, and while declaring that under the 
law  of  nature  all  men  are  free,  yet  very  clearly  defended 
and  sanctioned  the  institution  under  the  actually  existing 
circumstances  of  human  life,  while  the  mediival  Church 
recognised it, by itself  holding slaves and by refusing to allow 
the ordination of  the slave.  We must now  consider how far 
the influence of  canon law tended  to mitigate the conditions 
of  slavery,  and  how  far, in  spite  of  its formal  theory,  ita 
influence tended  to  bring  the instikution  to  an end. 
The Church gave the weight  of  its authority to the provi- 
sions of  the Roman law which restrained the arbitrary power 
of  the master and protected  the slave, and lent the sanction 
of  its own penalties to the enforcement of  those laws, while in 
relation to the marriage of  the slave it went further than the 
'  Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D.  liv.  7  :  ita  tamcn,  ut clcrici  facti  impositam 
"  si quis  obligatus est  tributo servili,  sibi  agriculturam  adinpleant."  Cf. 
aliqua  condiciono,  vel  patrocinio  Novel.  123.  17. 
cujuslibet  domus,  non  est  ordinandus  S  Gratian, '  Decretum,'  D. liv.,  after 
clericus :  nisi  probala vita fuerit, et  c.  4.  Gratianus : " Qui  autem  ordi- 
Patroni  consensus accesserit."  nandi, a dominis suis libertatem conse- 
a  Gratian,  Decretum,'  D.  liv.  20 :  quuntur, ab eorum  patrocinio  penitus 
"Inscriptitios  vero  in  ipsis  possessi-  debent  esje alieni,  ut in null0  eorum 
Onibus  clericos,  etiam  przter  volun-  obsequiis  inveniantur obnoxii." 
tatem  dominorum  fieri  permittimua :  See p. 40. 
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Corpus Juris Civilis.  We  have  seen  that both  Placentinua 
and Azo deal very stringently with the master who ill-treats 
or kills  his  slave ; they hold  that a  master  is  liable  to  be 
proceeded  a$gainst for  homicide,  as  though  he  had  billed 
a  freeman.l  Regino  of  Prum cites  a  canon which  imposed 
upon  the Bishop in the visitation  of  his diocese the duty of 
inquiring whether  any slave-owner had killed his  slave with- 
out  legal  pro~eedings,~  and  another  canon  which  imposes 
the  sentence  of  excommunication  for  two  years  upon  any 
slave-omner  who  has  done  this.3  These  regulations  are re- 
peated by Burchard of   worm^.^  Regino also reproduces from 
the Theodosian Code a regulation that, in the division or sale 
of properties, care should be taken that husbands and wives, 
parents and children, should not be separated from each other.5 
aregory IX., in the Decretals,  reproduces  and amplifies the 
doctrine of  the ancient Roman law, that a slave deserted or- 
exposed  in infancy  or  illness  is  to be  reckoned  as  emanci- 
pated.6  Ivo and Grsltisln  include in their collections  canons 
which  extend the protection of  the Church to the freedman, 
and provide that any person who attacks their liberty, with- 
1 See p. 37. 
a  Regino of  Prum, 'De Synod. Causis,' 
ii. 5.  10.  One of  a series of  questions 
to  be asked by the Bishop in his visita- 
tion : "  Eat aliquis, qui proprium serv- 
um extra judicem  occiderit,  et aliqun 
femina  qure  ancillam  propriam  neca- 
vent furore zeli inflammata ? " 
8  Regino of  Prum,'De Synod. Causis,' 
ii. 26 : "  Si quis servum proprium sine 
conscientia  judicis  occiderit,  excom- 
munioatione  biennii  reatum  sanguinis 
emendabit." 
6  Burchard,  '  Decretum,'  i.  94. l0 ; 
vi.  18. 
8  re gin^ of  Prum,.De Synod. Causis,' 
ii.  122 :  "In divisione,  inquit,  patri- 
moniorum,  seu  fiscalium  dominorum, 
seu  privatorum,  observari  specialiter 
debet  ut  yuia  injusturn  est  filios  a 
parentibus,  uxores  a  maritis, cum  ad 
quemcunque  possessio  pervenerit,  se- 
questrari,  ut  mancipia,  quse  permixta 
fuerint, id est uxor cum filiis et marito 
suo,  datis  vicariin,  ad unum  debeant 
pertinere, cui necesse fuerit cornmutare 
quod  sollicitudo  ordinantium  debet 
specialiter  custodire,  ut separatio fieri 
omnino non possit." 
Cf.  Cod.  Theod. ii.  26:  "  De  Com. 
Divid.,"  Interpretatio. 
'Decretals,' v. 11 : "  Si a patre, sive 
ab alio, sciente ipso aut ratum habonte, 
relegato pietatis officio infans expositw 
exstitit :  hoc  ipso  a  potestate  f~it 
patria liberatus.  Nam  et hoc  oasu in 
ingenuitatem  libertus,  et  servus  in 
libertatem  eripitur,  quod  et do  prm- 
dictis  cujuscumquc  ;etatis  languidis. 
si expositi  fuerint, vel  si alicui eOrUm 
alimenta impire denegari contigerit, est 
dicendum.  Sanc  qui  hos  suscipiunt. 
non  possunt  propter  hoc  in  e0rum 
personis  jus  aliquod  vendicare."  Cf. 
lhgest, xl.  8.  2. 
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,,h  a judgment  of  the courts,  is  to be  excluded  from  the 
church.' 
so  far, the Church  law  does  not do  more  than reinforce 
the civil law, but the most  important aspect of  the relation 
of  the canon law to the condition  of  slavery is  to be found 
in the treatment of  the marriage of  slaves with slaves,  or of 
slaves with  free people.  We  have just  considered  the rule 
Regino takes from the Theodosian Code, that the slave 
husband and wife were not to be separated from each other ; 
this is a humane conclusion from the principle that the mar- 
riage of  a slave, if  contracted under legal conditions, is indis- 
soluble,  like  the marriage  of  free people.  This  principle  is 
expressed  very  emphatically  in  a  canon  contained  in  the 
collections of Burchard, Ivo, and Gratian.3  It must, however, 
be noticed  that according to this canon, if  the marriage is to 
be  indissolt~ble  it must have been  contracted with  the con- 
sent  of  the master :  a  marriage without this consent  is, we 
may  infer,  illegitimate.  This  is  expressly  stated  in  the 
latter  part  of  Regino's  canon ;  the  slave  wife  is  to  be 
bought  or sold with her husband,  unless  she is the slave of 
another  master;  the law  strictly forbids  a  slave  to marry 
the  slave  of  another  master  (presumably  without  the 
master's  leave) ;  such  a  marriage  is  to be  held  null  and 
void,  and to be  reckoned  as  ad~ltery.~  On  this  point  we 
Ivo of  Chartres,  '  Docretum,'  xvi.  dominos habeant:  sod in uno conjugio 
51 : "  Libertos, legitime a dominis suis  permanentes, dominis servant suis.  Et 
factos,  ecclesia,  si  necesse  fucrit,  hoc in illis observandem est, ubi legalis 
tueatur.  Quod si quis 'ante audientiam  conjunctio  fuit,  et  per  voluntatem 
auk  pervadere  eos, aut exspoliare vol.  dominorum." 
vel  przsumpserit,  ab  ecclesia  Cf.  Ivo  of  Chartres,  'Decretum,' 
repellatur."  Cf.xvi. 53,  54,  'Panormia.'  xvi. 335 ; '  Panormia,' vi. 40.  Gratian, 
ii. 82-84, and Gratian, '  Decretum,' D.  ' Decrctum,' C. xsix. Q. 3. c. 8. 
Ixxxvii. c. 7.  Regino of Prum,'Do Synod. Causis,' 
See last page.  ii.  123:  "Id etiam in venditione  vel 
Burchard, '  Decree.,' ix. 29 : "  Dic-  emptione videtur  observari  debere,  ut 
est nobis,  quod quidam  legitimrs  quando quis maritum emerit emat pa- 
servorum  matrimonis potevtativa qua-  riter  et conjugem,  nisi  forte  alterius 
dam  Praesumptione  dirimant,  non  sncille,  fuerit.  Hac  de re  lex  jubet 
attcndentes  illud evangelicum.  '  Qnod  atque interdicit ut nullus servus 1,eque 
conjunsit,  homo  non  separot.'  proprius ncque ecclosiasticus  neque de 
Undo nobis v~sum  est ut conjugia ser-  fisco  ancillam  alienam  in  conjugi~m 
"OrUm non dirimantur, etiamsi diversos  ducat, similiter ancilla alterius servum 132  POLITICAL  THEORY OF THE  CANON  LAW.  [PART  11, 
can  trace  a  definite  development  in  the  canon  law,  for, 
in  one  of  his  Uecretals,  Hadrian  IV.  laid  down  the  rule 
expressly that, inasmuch as in Jesus Christ  there is  neither 
free nor  slave,  and the sacraments  are open  to all,  SO  a180 
the marriages of  slaves must be not prohibited ; even if  they 
are contracted against the will of  their masters, they axe not 
to ba  dissolved by Chnrch authority, but the married slaves 
must  discharge  their  accustomed  services  to their masters.' 
The  canonists  also  deal  carcfully  with  the  question  of  the 
marriage  of  free men or women with slaves.  Burchard cites 
a  canon which  lays down  the broad principles  on which  the 
matter was  decided.  If  a free man marries a  slave woman, 
not knowing that she was  a slave, he is to redeem  her from 
slavery if  he can ; if  he cannot, he is free to marry another 
wife.  If, however,  at the time of  marriage he knew that she 
was  a  slave, the marriage is valid ; and so in the case of  a 
free woman who marries a slave.2  This canon is reproduced 
by Ivo in the '  Panormia,' S  and Gratian discnsses the whole 
question  carefully, and concludes in terms whioh  agree with 
those  of  Burchard's 
Again, the Church offered a  certain protection to the slave 
by its rights  of  sanctuary.  In an appendix to the work  of 
Regino  of  Prum there is  a  canon which lays down  the rule 
that if  a  slave  who  has  committed  some  fault  flies  to the 
Church,  the master  is  to swear  not  to punish  him  for  the 
neqoilyuam  accip~at:  quod 81  fecent, 
lrrltuin habeatur hujusco~nodi  conjug- 
mm, et pro adulter10 deputetur " 
l '  Decretals,' iv  9  1 (Hadnan IV ) 
"  Sane,  juxta  xerbum  apostoli,  prosit 
tua  discret~o recognoscit,  slcut  111 
Chrlsto Jesu neque liber, neque servus 
est,  qui  a  sacramento  eoclesioe  sit 
removendus,  ita  quoquo  noc  Inter 
servos  matnmonia  debent  ullatenus 
prohiberi.  Et  si  contrad~cent~bui 
dominls  et inv~t~s  contract& fuermt, 
nulla  ratlone  sunt proptcr  hoc ecclesl- 
astlco  judi~lo cl is sol^ enda ,  deblta 
tamen  et consueta  servitia non  minus 
debent  proprlis  dominls  exhibeii " 
Burchard,  '  Decret ,' IX.  28  "  S1 
quls  ingenuus  homo  anclllam  altenus 
ilxorem  acc~peret,  et existimat  quod 
Ingenua  s~t,  si  lpsa  femina  postea 
fuer~t  lnsorvita, si eam a serv~tute  redi- 
mere  potest,  faclat.  si non  potest,  s1 
voluent, aham acclpiat  S1  autem Rer 
vam eam esbe sclerat, et collaudaverat 
post. ut leg~timam  habeat.  S~mll~tel 
et  muller  lngmua  de  servo  altenus 
facere debet " 
a  Ivo, ' l'anormla,'  vi. 41 
Gratlan, 'Dccretum,' C  xxix. Q  2. 
Foi  the  subject  of  the  Canon  Lam 
and  the  marrlage  of  slaves,  cf. 
E relsen,  '  Geschichte  des  Canonisehen 
Eherechta.' 
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fadt, and he is  then to be  restored  to his  master;  if  the 
breaks  his  oath he is  to be  excommunicated.  This 
canon is repeated by Burchard, and by Ivo in the '  Panormia.' 1 
lvo's ' Panormia ' contains another canon which sets out that 
not  only the Church and its court, but also the house of  the 
bishop,  are to be reckoned  as sanctuaries, that no  one  may 
to  take  from  thence  a  fugitive  slave  or  criminal, 
and  that  the rulers  of  the Church  are to obtain for him  a, 
promise of  immunity.  This canon is repeated by Ivo in the 
~p~norrnin,'  and in part by Grati;tn.2  These canons, however, 
must  not  be  misunderstood:  the  Church  offers  a  certain 
to the slave through  the right  of  sanctuary, but 
the  Church  must  not  finally  detain  the  slave,  or  allow 
him  to  escape  from  his  master  by  seeking  its  protection. 
Pvo's  ' Decretum ' contains  a  canon  drawn from  a  letter  of 
Pope  Gelasius  I., which  lays  this  down  very  explicitly ; 
the  authorities  oi  the  Church  must  restore  the  fugitive 
slave,  even  against  his  will,  to his  master,  after  they have 
obtained  from  him  an  oath  that  he  will  not  punish  the 
slave ;  Gratian  reproduces  the  canoqs and Pope Innocent 
1  Regino of  Prum, 'De Synod  Causlu,' 
Append~x  I.  14. "  Servus qui ad eccles- 
lam pro qualibet culpa confugent, 81  a 
dommo pro admlssa culpa sacramentum 
susceperit, statim ad servit~um  dom~ni 
em redlre  cogatur.  Et  si, posteaquarn 
dato sacramento dommo suo fuerit con- 
signatus, si aliquam pmnam pro eadem 
oulpa  pertulent,  pro  contenlptu  Ec- 
clesioe  et prsvar~catione  fide~  dominus 
a  communione  cathollcorum  habeatur 
extraneus " 
Cf.  Burchard,  ' Dec~et  ,'  111  192 
Ivo,  ' Panorm~a,'  U.  73 
IVO,  '  Panormia,' 11  76 . "  Servuni 
Lonfugientom  ad  ecclesiam  seu  111 
atrium  eccles~ze,  aut in  officinos regu- 
larlum  fratrum  vel  in  curt~m  vel  in 
domum eplscopl,  qma hsec  In  aiit~quis 
Qanonlbus pro  immunitate  tenentur, 
nemo  abstrahere  audeat,  noque  inde 
donare ad pcen-im  vel  ad mortem,  ut 
honor  Del  et  sanctorum  ejus  pra, 
omn~bus  servetur, sed reotores eocles~. 
arum pacem  et vitam  ac  membra  ei' 
cum  juramento  obtinere  studeant. 
Tamen  legltime  componat  guidque 
lnlque  fecerat,  et si  insecutor  magls- 
tris ecclesize obedtre noluerit,  canonlce 
~onstringatur." 
Cf.  Burchard,  '  Decret.,'  ~n.  194. 
Gratlan, '  Decretum,'  C.  xvu. Q. 4. c. 9. 
a  Ivo, '  Dacretum,'  ZVI.  68  : "  Metu- 
entes  famull  domlnos,  si  ad eccles~m 
septa  confugennt,  intercessionem  de- 
bent  quzerere,  non  latobras,  ne  he0 
~psa  przesumptio  tard~tatls  temer~tatem 
augeat renitendi.  Fllius eten~m  nostor 
vir  spectab~l~s  Petrus quentur servum 
suum In  occlesla  S.  Clementis  diutlus 
commoran,  cui  cum deputasset  sacra- 
menta  prastari,  lllum  egredl  nulla 
ratione  voluisse.  Et  ideo  dlrectun 
supradict~  liomo  do  proesentl  cum eo, 
yuenl elegerit esse mittendum,  cum de 
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111.  lays  down  the  same  principle  very  clearly  in  the 
Decretals.' 
One  form of  enslavement  the  Church  law,  followillg  the 
secular  jurisprudence,  did  prohibit  and  punish-that  is, 
the  kidnapping  and  enslavement  of  free  Christians.  The 
Theodosiail  Code punished with death those  who  kidnapped 
children ;  Regino  of  Prum embodies this law in  his  work, 
and  condemns  especially  the  sale  of  Christians  to  the 
heathen ;  Burchard's  ' Decretum ' contains  similar  regula- 
tions ;  and  Deusdedit's  ' Collectio  Canonum '  contains  a 
provision  against  the  sale,  presumably  of  Christian  men, 
embodied  in  the oath  of  allegiance  of  Demetrius,  Duke  of 
Dalmatia,  to the Pope.= 
Finally,  though  the Church  acquiesced in and sanctioned 
the institution  of  slavery,  and though  it did  itself  possess 
slaves, yet  the canonists furnish us  with continued evidence 
that  the  Church  looked  upon  the  emancipation  of  a  slave 
as  an  action  meritorious  and  acceptable  to  God.  Regino 
and Ivo include in their collection a formula of  manunlission 
which  expresses  very  clearly  the  conviction  that  he  who 
releases  his  slave from  bondage  will  be  rewarded  by God; 
and tlus formula is quoted by Rufinu~,~  and Gratian repro- 
eum faclas  ad dominum  suum mod~s 
omn~bus  remeare.  Aut,  si  in  hac 
pervicacla forte perstiter~t,  post sacra- 
mentum  b~bi  przstltllm  reddatur  m- 
vitus "  Cf.  Grat~an, '  Decretum,'  C. 
xvn.  Q.  4.  c.  32. 
'  Decretals,'  111  49. 6.  (Inn. 111.) : 
"  S1  vero  servus fuerit, qui confuger~t 
ad eccles~am,  postquam de impunitate 
sua dom~nus  ejus clencis juramentum 
pracst~ter~t,  ad  serv~tium  domm1  8Ul 
red~re  compell~tur  etlam lnv~tus  , alio- 
quln a  dommo potent occupar~." 
Cod  Theod.,  IX.  18, Ad  Leg. Fab. 
Interpretat10 :  "  HI, qu~  6110s  al~enos 
furto abstuler~nt  et ub~cumque  trans- 
duxermt, slve lngenuus slve servus s~t, 
morte pun~atur." 
a  Reg7no  of  Prum,  'De  Synod. 
Causis,'  11.  351,  352. 
'  Burchard, '  Decret.,'  VI.  49 ; xix. 
136. 
G  Deusdedit, '  Coll. Can.,'  111.  278. 
a Reglno of  Prum, 'De Synod. Caus~s,' 
i. 414 : " Qui deb~tum  sibi nexum atque 
cornpetens relaxat serv~tium,  prmmluln 
in futuro apud Domlnum sib~  provenlre 
non  dub~tet. Quapropter  ego  in  Del 
nomlne ~lle  pro remed~o  animae meae  vel 
aeterna  retnbutione  In  eccles~a  sanct~ 
Petr~  vel  ill~us  sanct~  sub  praesent~tt 
eplsoopl  vel  sacerdotum 1b1  cons~sten- 
tlum ac nob~llum  la~corum,  ante cornu 
altar~s  lstlus eccles~ae,  absolvo servurn 
meum  ~llum  per  hanc cartam absolu- 
t~on~s  et 1ngenu1tatis ab omnl v~nculo 
servltutis,"  etc.  Cf.  Ivo, '  Dccretum,' 
v1  131 ,  Rubus, ' Summa  Decretl,' 
D. liv. 2. 
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duce8  an even more simificant  statement by St Gregory  the 
Great, in which  he  describes  the purpose of  the Incarnation 
as  being  to  break  the  chain  of  slavery  by which  men  are 
bound,  and to restore them to their primitive liberty ; and 
~Eges  that it is therefore a good action to give back  to men, 
who  in  the  beginning  were  brought  forth  by  nature  free 
and  whom  the jvs  yentium  had  subjected  to the  yoke  of 
slavery,  that liberty  in which  they had been  bor11.1 
i  Gratlan,  'Decretum,'  C.  xn.  Q.  ueret  l~bertat~,  salubr~tol agltur,  si 
2  c  68 :  "  Cum  redemptor  noster,  homines,  quos ab in~t~o  nstura liberos 
totlus cond~tar  creatnra?, ad hoc  pro-  protul~t,  ct jus  gent~urn  lug0  substi- 
pltlatus  humanam  volu~t  oarnem  as-  tu~t  serv~tut~s,  In  ea, qua nat~  fuerant, 
~umere, ut  dlv~nltat~s  suae  gratin,  manurn~ttentl~  henefic~o.  l~bcrtate  red- 
dlrupto, quo tenebamur  capt~bi,  vm-  dantur."  (Gregory I., Ep. v.  12.) 
culo  serv~tutls,  pristinae  nos  restlt- cnAP.  v1.1  THE  THEORY  OF PROPERTY.  137 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY. 
IN  private  property  we  have  a  second important  example 
of  an  institution  which  is  recognised  by  the  canonists  as 
being  contrary  to nature  and natural law,  and as yet  act- 
ual]  y  and  legitimately  existing.  We  must  examine  the 
apparent  contradiction,  and  consider  how  far  the  canon ' 
law  has  a  definite  theory  of  the  institution  of  property, 
and of  its rights  and limitations.  The theory  of  the canon 
Iaw  is founded  directly  upon  that of  the Christian Fathers. 
We have endeavoured to set this out in our previous volume,l 
and  cannot  now  restate  this.  The  canonists  assume  the 
general  principles  of  the theory,  but  they  also  draw  them 
out in e careful and deliberate fashion. 
There  are  several  incidental  references  to  the  theory  of 
private property  and its origin in  the earlier  collections  of 
the canon  law,  but it is  not  till  we  come  to Gratian  that 
there is anything of  the nature of  a systematic exposition of 
the subject.  It is, therefore, with his treatment of  the insti- 
tution that we  begin.  In defining the difference between the 
law of  nature  and the law  of  custom,  Gratian  says thalt by 
the law of  nature all things are the common property of  all 
men ; and that this principle was  not  only followed in the 
primitive  Church of  Jerusalem, but was  also  taught  by  the 
philosophers ; it was thus that Plato excluded the desire for 
property  from the most  jnst  form of  Stata2  Gratian  takes 
See vol. i. pp. 132.146.  nature a consuetudine et constitutione. 
Gratian, 'Decretum,' D. viii., Part  Nam  jure  nature  aunt  omnia  com- 
I. :  Gratianua.  "  Differt  etiam  ju~ munia omnibus, quod non solum inter 
his  principle  from the patristic  theory,  and illustrates  this 
&h  that important passa'ge from St Augustine, with which 
we  have  dea,lt in  the first  volume,  in  which it  is  very  ex- 
plicitly  and  emphatically  laic1  down  that  private  property 
is the creation of  the St~~te.  In another part of  the ' Decre- 
hum ' Gratian  cites  an important;  passage  from a  spurious 
letter  of  Rt  Clement  in  the  pseudo - lsidorian  collection, in 
which it is  stated  that the  use  of  all  things  in  the  world 
ought  to  be  common  to  all  men,  but  through  iniquity  it 
has  come  about  that  men  claim  things  as  their  private 
possessions,  and  the  writer  refers  to  Plato  and  to the  ex- 
ample  of  the Apostles  and their  discip1es.l 
Rere, then, we  have the technical doctrine of  Gratian with 
regard to private property.  It is not  a prirnjtivc or natural 
institution-it  does  not  belong  to the  ideal  or perfect  life ; 
the  origin  of  private  property  must  be  looked for in  sinful 
appetite,  and  rests  upon  the  sanction  of  custom  and  of 
the  civil  law.  This  does  not  mean  that  in  the  view  of 
Gratian  or  other  canonists  property  is  a  sinful  institution. 
We  have already  explained, in dealing with slavery, how  in 
the  opinion  of  the  canonists,  following  the  Fathers,  an 
institution may  arise out of  some sinful condition or  desire, 
and may  yet be useful in correcting the consequences of  such 
sinful passions. 
It is important now that we  should make clear to ourselves 
eos  servatum areditur, de quibus legi- 
tur ; '  Multitudinis  autem  credentium 
erat  cor  unum  et anima  una,  etc. ;  ' 
verum etiam ex precedente tempore a 
philosophis traditum invenitur.  Unde 
apud  Platonem  illa  civitas  justissime 
ordinatn traditur, in qua quisque pro- 
prios  nescit  affectus.  Jure  vero  con- 
suetudinis vel constitutio~lis  hoc meum 
; illud vero alterius.  Unde Augus- 
tinus ait, Tract.  6,  ad. c.  1, '  Joannis,' 
C.  i. : '  Quo jure  defendis villas,"'  etc. 
(Cf. vol. i, p.  140.) 
'  Gratian, '  Decretum,'  C.  xii.  Q. i. 
0.  2 : "  Dilectissimis fratribus et con. 
. discipulis.  . . . Communis  vita  om- 
nibua est neoessarie fratres, et maxime 
his,  qui  Deo  irreprehensibiliter  mil- 
itare  cupiunt,  et  vitam  apostolorum 
eorumque  discipulam  imitari  volunt. 
S  1.  Communis  enim  usus  omnium, 
que sunt in hoc mundo omnibus hom- 
inibus  esse  debuit.  Sed  per  iniqui- 
tatem  alius  hoc  dixit  esse  suum,  et 
alius istud, et sic inter mortales facta 
est  divisio.  8  2.  Denique  Grecorum 
quidam  sapientissimus,  hec  ita  esse 
sciens, comrnunia debere, ait, esse ami- 
oorum  omnia.  . . . 8  3.  Istius  onim 
consuotudinis more retento etiam apos- 
toli  eorumque  disci~uli,  ut predictum 
out,  una  nobiscum  et vobiscum  com- 
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that Gratian's  theory  of  the origin  and nature of  property 
represents the general tradition of  the canon lawyers.  Ivo of 
Chartres in the ' Decretum ' and the 'Panormia ' had already 
cited that passage  from St Augustine to which we  have just 
referred,  and in  the  ' Decretum ' another  passage  from  St 
Augustine  which  repudiates  the  claim  of  the  Donatists  to 
hold  their  property  because  they  had  acquired  it by  their 
labour; l  we  may infer  that he  took  these  passages  to be 
characteristic of  the doctrine of  the Church as to private pro- 
perty.  Rufinus deals with the theory of  property in the same 
passage as that in which he discusses the theory of  slavery.  IIe 
holds with Gratian that by the law of  nature all things should 
be held  in  common, but this principle,  he  says, belongs  not 
to the commands or prohibitions  of  the natural law, but to 
its  demonstmtiones;  the  two  former  cannot  be  altered  by 
human custom  or law,  but the latter may be  changed,  and 
thus,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  private  property  now  exists  by 
the  civil  law,  and  the  change  is  legitimate  because  it  is 
thus  that  under  the  actual  conditions  of  human  life  the 
natural law itself  is pre~erved.~  Private property is not an 
institution  of  the natural law-does  not belong to the ideal 
character of  society or human nattwe, but under the actually 
existing circumstances of  the imperfection and vice of  human 
1 Ivo  of  Chartres,  '  Decretum,'  in. 
194 : "  Quo jure  defendls  vlllas.  . . . 
quibus posscssiones  possidentur."  Cf. 
Pan. 11.  63.  Ivo,  Dec. 111.  l79 : "  Et 
quamvis  re8  qusecunque  terrena  non 
recte a quoquam poss~der~  poss~t,  nls~  vel 
lure divlno (quo cuncta ]ustorum sunt), 
vel jure humano (quod 111  potestate est 
regum terrae)  ~deoque  res falso  appel- 
letia vestras, quas nec juste  possidetls, 
et secundum  legcs  terrenorum  regum 
am~ttere  jussi estls , frustraque d~catis, 
nos  in  els  congrogandis  laborav~mus, 
cum scrlptura lcgatls  '  Labores lmpl- 
orum just1 edent.' "  Cf.  vol.  I.  p.  140. 
a  Rufinus,  '  Summa Decret ,' D.  l., 
Dict.  Crat.  ad.  c.  I. :  "Est  ~taque 
naturale jus vis quedam  humane crea- 
ture  a  natura  lnsrta  . . . Con~lstlt 
autem  jus  naturale  in  tribus,  scil~c. 
mandatls, prol~~bltionibus,  demonstrati- 
onlbus.  Mandat namque  quod  prosit, 
ut  '  dil~ges  Domlnum  Deum  tuum,' 
prohibet  quod  ledit, ut 'non occ~des,' 
demonstrat quod convenlt, ut '  omnia In 
commune habeantur,' ut '  omnium una 
slt  llbertas,'  et hujusmodi.  . . . De- 
tractum  autem  ei  est  non  utlque  in 
mandatis vel  proh~bltion~bus  . . . sed 
in dcmonstrat~onlbus,  que scil  natura 
non vetat non  pre~lpit,  sed  bona csse 
ostendit-ct  maxime  in  omnlunl  una 
l~bertale et  communi  possesslone ; 
nullc  enim  ]urc  civ111, hic  est  servus 
meus, ille est ager tuus.  Omnia tamen 
hec, que lull natural] v~dentur  adverse 
ad lpsum final~ler  referuntur." 
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it represents the best arrangement that can be made, 
and does actually in  the long-run tend to fuliil the principles 
of the natural law.  This is put again by Rufinus in another 
place  where  he  explains  that  when,  in  the  passage  from 
the letter of  St Clement  (from pseudo-Isidore), it is said that 
it was  by iniquity that men  came  to claim  things  as their 
private property, this may have been true originally, but now 
by  long  custom  this  has  become  lawful  and unblameab1e.l 
Stephen  of  Townai, a  littlc later than Rufinus,  follows him 
in  explaining  how  the  demo?zslrationes of  the  natural  law 
have  been  modified  with respect  to such principles  as  that 
of  the comnlon  ownership  of  all  things ; but he  also  main- 
tains that prescriptions and other modes of  acquiring property 
have been  sanctioned by the jzcs  divinum or  the canon law, 
which is divine, and that thus, while there is no private pro- 
perty  by the jus  divinu.r;l,  that is  the jus  naturale,  there is 
private property by the canon law which  has been  made by 
men, but with God's inspiration.2  We shall have to deal with 
the  relation  of  the  canon  law  to  the  jzcs  divinum  when 
1 Rufinus,  '  Summa  Decret.,'  D 
viii. D~ff.  quoque : "  Amphtudine quo- 
que ]us naturale a ceteris ]uribus aiffert 
quia,  jure  nature  omnla  sunt  com- 
munla,  lure  autem  consuetudinls  vel 
constltutlonis hoc meum est lllud autem 
tuum.  Sed  opponitur :  si  lure  con- 
st~tut~onis  hec villa mca est, ~lla  autem 
tua,  cum  ]us  const~tution~s  ]us  sit, 
relmqmtur,  quod  lure  villa  ista  ost 
mea, llla autem tua ; si lure, tunc non 
ex  in~quitati  Qmd  est  itaque  quod 
ahbi  habetur :  quia  per  inxquitatem 
allus d~x~t  hoc esse mum, alius illud  7 
-ut  lnfra  C.  xii.  Q.  1, cap. '  Dilectis- 
Elm1 ' bed sciendum quod, sicut exact10 
obfiequ~orum  et domlnatus premens per 
lnlqu~tateum  fulsse cep~t  a Ncmroth- 
slcut supra ex ver bls Cratianl pcrpendl- 
tur, quod tamen, qula In longum usum 
derlvatum  est,  non  jam  in~qultatls 
Porvers~tate, sed  consuetudlnis  lure 
exercetur ;  ~ta  et  quod  al~qu~d  pro 
Prlum posslderetur,  ardente allquorum 
Qupldltate pnmltus  factum  est  quod 
tainen postea ex longevo usu et legum 
institut~one  lrreprehensiblle  jud~catum 
est." 
Stephen of  Tournai,  'Summa  De- 
creti,'  D.  viii.  1 : " '  Nonne  lure  hu- 
man~.'  Non ergo per imquitatem, aut 
jus  humanum  lniquum  est.  Unde 
videtur  contra  infra  C.  xli.  q.  1, 
c.  2.  Ibi enlm  dicitur,  per  iniqul- 
tatem hoc  allus  dicit suum esse,  allus 
 stud.  Sed  ibi  vocat  iniquitatem 
consuetudinem juns  gentlum  naturali 
aequitati  contrarlam  Item  videtur 
hic  dlci,  qula  solo  lure  humano  hoc 
lneum  et illud  tuum, et ~ta  nlhll  est 
propnum.  Jure  divlno vel lure ctlam 
canonlco,  quod  d~vlnum  est,  et  prse- 
scnptlones  et  all=  acquls~tioncs et 
lndncuntur  et  confirmantur.  Unde 
potest  d~ci,  jure  dlvino,  r.e.,  naturall, 
nihll  est  proprlum,  lure  autem  can- 
onum,  quod  ab  homin~bus, quamvis 
deo  insplrante,  lnvcntum  est,  aliquld 
proprlum est.  Unde et humanum dlci- 
tur aliud hujus, al~ud  1111~s." 140  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF THE  CANON  LAW.  [PART  11. 
we  discuss the theory of the canon law itself;  in the mean. 
while  we  can only  observe that Stephen clearly thinks that 
the  canon  law  has  given  its  sanction  to private  property, 
and that involves, in  some  sense  at least,  the authority  of 
God.  The  conception  is  important,  bat it  is  not  strictly 
novel,  at least  in  sul,stance,  for  it is,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
part of  the patristic theory  of  the great conventional  insti- 
tutions  of  human  society  that,  while  they  are  related  to 
vicious impulses in human nature, they represent the divine 
remedies for these vicious characteristics. 
Private property is then, according to the canonists, a thing 
legitimate and useful, resting upon the authority of  the State, 
and, according to Stephen, upon the sanction of  the canon law. 
This does not, however,  mean that the principle that private 
property  is  not  an institution  of  the nat~ual  law  is  of  no 
importance,-is  a mere abstraction which  exercised no influ- 
ence  upon  their conception  of  the rights  and  hm~tations  of 
property.  On the contrary, it would seem probable that two 
principles  which  the canonists  lay  down  with  regard  to the 
ownership and use of  private property are closely related to 
this theory.  The first is,  that no one has the right  to  take 
for  himself  more  than  he  needs.  Gratian  cites  a  very  im- 
portant  passage  as  from  St Ambrose,  which  denounces  as 
most unjust and avaricious the man who  consumes upon his 
own  luxury  what  might  have  supplied  the  needs  of  those 
who  are in want,  and maintains  that it is as great a  crime 
to refuse  the  necessaries  of  life  to  those  who  need,  as  to 
take from a man by force.'  In another place  Gratian refers 
to a  saying which  he  attributes  to St Jerome-it  is  really 
1 Gratlan,  '  Decretum,'  D  xlvll  8 
5 3  "  Proprlum nemo dlcat, quod est 
communo,  plus  quam sufficeret  sump 
tum et vlolenter  obtentum  est  . . 
8 4  Tu vero susceptla numeribus  Del, 
et m  slnum  tuum  rodactls,  nichil  te 
putas  agero  iniquum,  81  tam  mul- 
torum  v~ta  subsldla  solus  obtlneas ? 
Quls  enlm  tarn  ~njustus,  tam avaIus, 
quam  qm  multorum  alimenta  sum 
non  usum,  sed  habundant~am et 
dellclas  faclt  Neque  cnlm  majus 
est  crlmlnls  habentl  tollere,  quam 
cum  possls  et habundas,  lndigcntlbus 
donegare  Esunontium  parus  est 
quem  tu  detlnes ,  nudorum  ~ndu- 
mentum  est.  quod  tu reclurlls ,  mia- 
erorum redemptlo  est et absolutio pe- 
curila quam  tu In  terra  defodls  Tan- 
torum  te  ergo  sclas  Invadere  bona, 
quantls  poasls  praestare  quod  vells." 
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a  spurious  work-that  the man who  keeps for himself 
more  than  he  needs  is  guilty  of  taking  that which  belongs 
to rn0ther.l  These  are broad  and far-reaching statements, 
but there are some qualifying phrases.  In  another Distinction 
Gratian  quotes  a  sentence from 8t Augustine  which  is im- 
portant as furnishing a practical commentary on such phrases 
a,  those which have just been cited.  The rich, St Augustine 
says, are not  to be  required  to use  the  same  food  as  the 
poor,  but must be  allo~ed  to use  such food  as their hahits 
have made necessary $0 them : they ought, however, to lament 
the fact that they require this ind~lgence.~  Rufiuus evidently 
felt that there was some difficulty in reconciling these phrases, 
and endeavours  to explain them.  His own judgment  seems 
to be that the obligation of  providing for those in want, and 
especially for those in danger of  starvation, is  absolute, and 
co&ludee  that the man  who  does  not  help  those  who  are 
dying of  hunger,  when he is able to do this, is actually their 
  layer.^  The second principle is stated in the Decretals,  and 
is this, that a man can only be said to possess that of  which 
he makes a good use ; the man who makes a bad use of  his 
property has really  no right  to his  property at all.& 
These  principles  are  most  probably  connected  with  the 
1 Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D  xlil 
Part  I  Gratlanus  . . . "  quomodo 
etlam  secundum  Jeronlmum  ahena 
rapere  convlncltur,  qui  ultra  neces 
sarla sibl retlnere  probatur " 
Gratlan,  '  Decretum,'  D  xll  3 
"Non cogantur dlvites pauperum clbls 
vesci,  utantw  consuetudlne  Infirm1 
tatls SUB, sed  dolcbnnt  se allter non 
Posse , sl consuetuchnem mutant ego 
tant  Utantur  superflu~s,  dent  Inopi- 
bus  necessar~a,  utantur preclosla, dent 
Paupcrlbus vlha " 
Cf  St Augustme, Sermo 1x1 
Rufinus, '  Summa Decret ,' D  xlll 
18  S AIlena rapere conv~nc~tur,  qu~  ultra 
necessnrla slul retlnere probatur '  Hoc 
vldetur contrarlum el, quod supra dlc 
Cst  ds dlvlt~bus,  ut utanhr super 
supra  prox  dlst  c  non  cogan 
tur  Sed oliud eat rotmendo superflua 
paupenbua  de  neceasarlls  succmrere 
quod  ~bi  admltt~tur  ,  alrud,  nec  do 
necessaius  nec  de  supcrfluls  ellmosl- 
nam  erogare,  quod  hlr  ponltus  repro 
batur.  Vel  ad  tcrrorem  vel  in  eo 
tantum  casu  dlctum  ~ntelllgltur,  cum 
allquern vlderls fame perlclltarl , undo 
dicitur  '  Pasce  fame  morientem ' 
Qu~squ~s  enim famc morlontem servare 
poterls, sl non paveris, occld~st~  " 
" '  Decretals,'  v  40  12  "  Jus 
dlctum  est  a  jure  possldendo  Hoo 
enlm Jure possldetur,  quod  ~uste,  hoc 
~uqte,  clued  bone,  quod  autem  male 
possldetur,  allenum  est  Male  autem 
possldct,  qul  vel  suls male utltw, v01 
allena pr~sumit  ' 
Cf  St  Aug,  Ep.  cl111  6,  and  St 
Is~dore  of  Seville, ' Etynl ,' v.  26, and 
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judgment that nature gave all things to men for the common 
use.  It is true that the appearance of  vice,  wd  especially 
of  avarice,  made  it  necessary  to  establish  the  system  of 
private property ; but behind  the right  of  private property 
there still remains the more general right of  all men to what 
they need.  The institution of  private property may be neces- 
sary under the actual circumstances  of  human life, but it is 
really intended to set some restraint upon that instinct, and 
must not be taken as equivalent to a right to stand between 
a  man  and his  needs.  We  shall in a  later  volume  discuss 
the theory of  property in St Thomas Aquinas ; we  may at 
once  observe  that  he  was  not  afraid  to  carry  out  these 
principles to the conclusion that the charitable man who sees 
his  fellow-man in want, and has not wherewith to help him, 
may without moral  fault  take the rich  man's  property  and 
give  it to  the  needyal  The  canonists,  as  far  as  we  have  * 
seen,  down to the time of  the Decretals,  did not draw this 
conclusion.  On  the contrary,  Gratian cites  a  sentence from 
a sermon of  St Augustine which strongly condemns the latter 
doctrine,  and  treats it  as  a  snggestion  of  the  devil.2  At 
the  same  time,  it is  perhaps  worth  while  to  notice  that 
Regino  and Burchard  cite a  canon which  suggests that the 
Church  recognised  that the moral  offence  of  the  man  who 
was  in want  and stole another man's  property was  small,- 
the penance  imposed in such  cases  is  very   light.^ 
l  St  Thomas Aquinas, '  SummnTheo- 
logica,'  2.  2. q.  60. 7. 0.  Cf. Notes in 
'Econ.  Review,'  Jan. 1894, by  R. W. 
Cerlyle,  "  Somo  Economic  Doctrines 
of  St Thomas Aquinas." 
a  Gratian,  'Decretum,'  C. xiv. q. 5. 
c.  3 :  "Forte  aliquis cogitat et dicit. 
Multi  sunt  Christiani  divites,  avari, 
cupidi ;  non  ilabeo  pcccatum,  si  ilhs 
abstulero, et  pauperibus dedero.  Undo 
enim rill boni agunt, n~orcedem  habere 
potero.  Sed  hi~jusmodi  cogitatio  ei 
Diaboli calliditate suggeritur.  Nam si 
totum  tribuat  quod  abstulerit,  potius 
peccatum  addit quam minuat." 
Cf. St Augustine-Serm.  287. 
Regino of Prum, '  De Eccl. Discip.,' 
ii.  437 :  "  Si  quio  per  nocessitntcm 
furatus fuerit  cibarin  vel  vestem  vel 
pecus  per  famom  aut  nuditatem, 
penitent  hebdomadas  quatuor.  Si 
reddiderit,  non  cogntur jejunaro." 
Cf. Burchard, '  Decretum.'  xi. 66. 
CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  NATURE  OF SECULAR  AUTHORITY. 
THE canon lawyers of  this period do not present us with any 
complete discussion  of  the origin  and nature of  civil society 
and government.  Much  that is  of  importance they  do not 
refer to at all, and much else they only touch for a moment, 
and incidentally.  And yet, when we put together their refer- 
ences to the subject, it becomes  clear that behind their inci- 
dental phrases  there lies  a  generally  accepted  theory of  the 
nature of  society, a theory which  we  can in a large measure 
reconstruct from their incidental phrases.  And as we  do this 
we  shall recognise  that the canonists in substance represent 
that theory of  the nature  of  society and political  authority 
which  we  have  already  recognised  as  developed  by  the 
Fathers. 
There  is  little  direct  reference  in  these  canonists  to  a, 
primitive  condition in which men lived without an organised 
social life, but there is enough to show us that they held the 
same view  as that of  the Fathers and such Stoics as Seneca 
and  Poaidonius,  that  behind  the  conventions  of  organised 
society  there  lay  a  time when  men  had  lived  without  any 
definite and ordered social relation, and without any coercive 
authority.  Gratian  says  that while  the natural  law  began 
with the creation of  rational beings,  the law of  custom arose 
when  men  began  to  live  together,  when  Cain  built  a  city, 
ancl  again when,  after the Flood, and in the time of  Nimrod, 
men  began  to be  subject  to each  0ther.l  This  passage  ia 
'  Gratian,  'J)ecretum,'  D,  vi.:  exordia  rationalis  creaturac  incipiena. 
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reproduced by Paucapalea, the first commentator on Gratian, 
in the introduction to his work,l and Rufinus speaks of  lord. 
ship  having begun  with  Nimrod,  and having  had its begin- 
nings  in  iniquity.2  This  is  the  same  view  as  that  of  the 
Fathers, who  all held that men were  originally free from the 
coercive control of  their  fellow-men, and trace the develop. 
ment of  coercive government to the appearance of  sin in the 
world.3 
This last passage brings us to a question of great importance 
with  regard to the political theory  of  the Middle Ages : the 
question,  namely,  whether  the State is  a  divine  institution 
like the Church, or whether it has properly no such character, 
but is merely  an institution of  man's  devising, representing 
at best  some  convenience to mankind,  at worst  the sinful 
passions and ambitions of  men, their lust of  domination.  We 
have pointed out in our first volume that the normal view of 
the Fathers is clear, namely, that while coercive government 
is not a "  natural " institution, and is a consequence of  the 
Fall  and related  to men's  sinful  ambitions,  yet it  is  allso a 
divine remedy for the confusion caused by sin, and is there- 
fore a  divine institution.  The  patristic doctrine is  summed 
up  in  those  phrases  of  Pope  Gelasius'  letters  and tractates 
which describe the spiritual and the temporal powors es both 
deriving their authority from God Himself, and this doctrine 
is clearly and emphatically restated by the ecclesiastical and 
political writers of  the ninth ~entury.~ 
We  have  now  to  inquire  what  was  the  judgment  of 
medisval  political  thinkers  upon  this  subject.  In our  next 
naturalem  legem  exordium habuit,  ex 
quo  homines  convenientes  in  unum 
coeperunt simul  habitare,  quod  ex eo 
tempore  factum creditur ex quo Cain 
civitatem  ccd~ficasse legitur.  Quod 
cum  diluvio  propter  hominum  rari- 
tatem fere vidcatur  extinotum, postea 
tempore  Nemroth  reparatum,  sive 
potius  immutatum  existimatur ; cum 
ipsc  simul  cum  aliis  alios  cmpit  op- 
primere,  alii  sua  imbecillitate  ejiw 
ditioni  ceperunt esse subjecti." 
1 Paucapalea,  '  Summa  Decret.,' 
Introd. 
Rufinus, ' Summa Decret.,' D. viii. : 
"DiR.  quoque."  "Sed  sciendum quad, 
sicut exactio obsequiorum et  dominatio 
premens per iniquitatem fuisse cepit 
Nemroth-sicut  supra ex verbis Grati- 
ani perponditur,  quod  tamen,  quia in 
longum usu~n  derivatum ost, non jam 
il~iquitatis pcrversitate,  sed  consuet- 
udiriis  jure  exercetur." 
Cf. vol. i.,  chap. 11. 
'  Cf. vol. i., chaps. 11, 14, 18, md  17. 
CRAP. VII.]  THE  NATURE  OF  SECULAR  AUTHORITY. 
volume we  hope to discuss the theory  as illustrated by  the 
oeneral literature  of  the  eleventh,  twelfth,  and  thirteenth 
:enturies,  and we  shall  then  deal  with  the highly  contro- 
versial  writings  which  belong  to the long  struggle  between 
the  Empire  and the Papacy.  For the present  we  have  to 
the mediaeval  theory  as  represented  in  the  canon 
law  and  the writings  of  the canonists.  There  is  a  famous 
saying  of  IIildebrand  in  a  letter  to  Bishop  Hermann  of 
Metz, in which  he  uses  very strong phrases  as to the sinful 
character  of  the circumstances  under  which  secular  govern- 
ment  first ar0se.l  Some  parts  of  this  letter are frequently 
quoted  by  the  canonists ;  it  is  perhaps  noteworthy  that 
this  particular  sentence is not  quoted  by  them.  This  may 
be  merely  accidental,  but  it is  possible that they felt that 
these  phrases  were  a  little  too  crude  and  controversial  to 
be  suitable  for technical  collections of  laws  and legal argu- 
ments.  Not  indeed  that there  is  anything  in  these  senti- 
ments of  Hildebrand which is strange or unprecedented ; he 
is  only  putting in  rather  rigorous  phrase  the  doctrine  not 
only  of  the Fathers  but  of  the later  Stoics-the  doctrine, 
namely,  that in the primitive  state  of  innocence  there  was 
no  coercive  authority,  that this  was  a  consequence of  the 
loss  of  innocence  and of  men's  sinful  and vicious  desire to 
lord  it over each  other,  and this  does not at all necessarily 
mean  that Gregory VII.  denied the truth of  the doctrine of 
the Fathers, that, while coercive government is a consequence 
of  sin, it is also a divinely appointed remedy for sin. 
The  canonists,  we  may  safely say,  accepted  the patristic 
doctrine of  the origin of  secular government ; we  must now 
consider their theory as to its actual nature and present value. 
Bere  they  are,  fortunately,  not  only  emphatic,  but  clear. 
Secular government, they hold, is an institution which repre- 
sentb the divine authority ; it is sacred, and the man who sets 
it at naught is really guilty of  setting at naught the authority 
'  Gregory  VII.,  '  Registrurn,'  viii.  nribus, mundi principe diabolo videlicet 
21 : "  Quis nesciat : reges et duces ab  agitante, super pares,  scilicet homines, 
iis  habuisse  principium,  qui  Deum  dominari caeca  cupidine  et intolerabili 
ignOrantes,  superbis  rapinis  perfidia  prresumptione  affectaverunt." 
hOmicidiis,  postremo univorsis fere scel- 
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of God Himself.  This judgment  can be followed throughout 
the whole course of  that part of the canon law with which we 
are dealing-that  is, from the ninth century to the middle of 
tho thirteenth. 
Regino of  Prum's work contains a canon which pronounces 
the  anathema  of  the  Church  on  any  who  venture  to re- 
sist the royal  power,  inasmuch as this derives its authority, 
according to the Apostolic teaching, from God Him5elf.l  This 
canon is reproduced by Burchard of  Worms ;  while he, Ivo, 
and a  Palea  to Gratian's  Decretum  cite passages  from  the 
Councils  of  Toledo  which  denounce the sentence of  excom- 
munication  against  all  those  who  revolt  against  the  king, 
inasmuch  as  he  is  the  Lord's  an~inted.~  Ivo also  cites  a 
passage from a letter of  Pope Anastasius 11.  to the Emperor 
Anastasius,  in  which  he  speaks  of  the  Emperor  as  being 
appointed  by  God  Himself  to reign  over the earth  as  Rib 
vicar.4  Ivo and Gratian  again  bring  out the general  prin- 
ciple very clearly when they cite a passage from St Augustine 
which  lays down the doctrine that obedience  to the secular 
authority is commanded by God,  even when that authority 
Reg~no of  Prum,  'De  Synod. 
Cans~s,' ii.  301 :  "  S1  qu~s  potestat~ 
regre  qus non  est  juxta  Apostolum, 
nisl a DRO,  contumacl et inflnto spirltu 
contrad~cere  vel  res~stere  prasumser~t, 
et  ejus  lustis  et  rat~onab~hbus  im- 
pervs  secundum  Deum  et  auctori- 
tatem eccloslasticam  ac  ]us  oivile  ob- 
temperare  noluerlt,  anathematlzetur." 
Cf. 11  300. 
Burchard  of  Worms,  '  Decret.,' 
xv.  22. 
S Burchard  of  Worms,  '  Decret ,' 
xv.  23,  "  In libro rcgum lcg~tur  : Qui 
non obccdlerlt prlnclpi, morte moriatur. 
In concilio  autem  Agathens~  prreclpl- 
tur ut anathemat~zetur  " (cf  xv  26), 
'  Decret ,' ~II.  21.  "  SI qu~s  lalcus Jura- 
mentum violando prophauat, quod regi 
et dornlno  suo  jurat,  et portmodurn 
perverbe  ajus  regnum,  et dolose  trac- 
tave-~t, et  in  mortem  ipslus  allquo 
machinarnento ~nsldlatur  : qua sacn- 
legium  peraglt,  manum  suam  In 
Chrlstum  Domin~  mittens,  anathema 
sit, nisl  per  d~gnam  pcenltentlae sntls- 
fact~onem  emendaverit,  slcutt  consti- 
tutum  a  sancta  synodo  est,  id  est, 
saeculum  relinquat,  arma  deponat,  in 
monasterium eat, ut pceniteat omnibus 
d~ebus  v~ts  suae.  Verumtamen  com- 
munionem In  exitu v~tz  cum Euctiar- 
istla  acclpiat  Ep~scopus  vero,  pres- 
byter,  vel  diaconus,  si  hoc  crimon 
perpetravent,  degradetur." 
Cf.  Ivo,  '  Decretum,'  XII  78. 
Gratlan,  '  Decretum,'  C.  xxn.  Q.  6. 
c.  19 (Palea). 
Ivo, '  Decretum,' xvi  16 : "  PectUe 
clement~s  vestre saoranum est publlce 
felic~tat~s,  ut per  instantlam  vestram, 
quam  velut  vlcarlum  ~rasldere  ]usat 
in terns, evangellcis apostol~cirque  p's- 
ceptis non dura superbla reslstatur, sed 
per  obedlentiam  qus sunt  salutlfera 
compleantur." 
is  in  the hands of  an unbe1iever.l  Cardinal Deusdedit, in his 
collection of  canons,  cites those  passages  from Romans  xiii. 
and  1  Peter ii.  which  assert  emphatically  the  principle  of 
to  the  secular  power  as  deriving  its  authority 
from God;  and Burchard,  Ivo,  and Deusdedit  also  cite o 
passage  from  a  letter  of  Pope  Innocent I., which  defends 
the  exercise  of  justice  in  criminal  cases  as  being  derived 
from the authority of  God  Him~elf.~  Finally,  the principle 
is  laid  down in the Decretals in a  very important letter  of 
Innocent 111.  to the  Emperor  Alexius  of  Constantinople-- 
a  letter  to  which  we  shall  have  to  recur  when  we  deal 
with  the relations  of  the ecclesiastical  and secular  powers. 
Innocent  111.  here  affirms  clearly  the  doctrine  that  the 
authority of  the king as well  as of  the eoclesiastic  has been 
established by God Himself.4 
These  passages  will  serve  to bring  out the  principles  of 
the canon law with respect to the nature of  secular authority, 
and can hardly  leave us in any doubt as to their character. 
But the matter is put beyond all question when we  observe 
that in these canonical collections, jubt as in the writers of  the 
1 Ivo of  Chartres, '  Decretum,'  v. 7 : 
"  Juhanus exstitit  infidelis  imperator, 
nonne exstitit apostata, inlquus ~dolo- 
latra ?  Mll~tes Chrlstiani  servierunt 
Imperator1  xnfidell.  Ubi  venlebatur 
ad  causam  Christ]  non  agnoscebant 
nisi  ~llum  qui  In  c~lo  erat.  Quando 
volebat ut ldola colelent, ut thurificar- 
But,  preponebant  1111  Deum.  Quando 
autem dlcebat . '  Producite aclem, ~te 
Qontra Illam  gentem,'  statlm  obtem 
perabant.  D~stinguebant Domlnum 
"brnum  a  domlno  temporall,  ct 
tamen subditl erant propter Domlnum 
eternurn etiam domino temporal1 " 
Cf. Gratlan, '  Dec.,'  C.  XI.  Q  in. 98, 
St Augustine, Enarratio In PS. 124 
Deusdedlt,  '  Collectio  Canonum,' 
'V.  33,  34. 
Burchard, 'Decret ,' vii. 44. "Qure- 
'Iturn  est  etiam  super  hls  qu post 
ba~tlsmum  admimstraverunt,  et  aut 
tsrmenta  sola  exercuerunt,  aut etiarn 
capitale  protulere  sententiam.  De 
h~s  nichil  leg~mns  a  ma~or~bus  dlffi- 
nitum.  Meminerant emm a Deo potes- 
tates  has  fuisse  concessas,  et propter 
vlndlctam  noxlorum  gladlum  fuissa 
permissum, et  del minlstrum esse datum 
In  huiusmodi  vindicem.  Quomodo 
lgitur  reprehenderent  factum  (quod] 
auctore Deo vlrierent esse concessum  ? 
De h~s  ergo ~ta  ut hactenus  servatum 
est,  SIC  habemus,  ne  aut diqc~pllnam 
evertere  nut  contra  auctoritatem 
Domm~  venlre  videamur." 
Cf  Ivo,  '  Decretum,'  xi.  14,  and 
Deusdedit,  '  Col1  Can.,'  IV.  42 
Decretals,  I.  33.  6.  5 4  (Innocent 
111  ) : "  Ad  firmameutum  igltur cmh, 
hoc est umversalls eccles~re,  fecit Dous 
duo  magna  luminaria,  ~d  est,  duas 
magnas instltmt  dign~tates,  qua sunt 
pontificalis  auctoritas,  et  regahs 
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ninth century, it  is those definitions of  Gelasius, whose import. 
ance we have endeavoured to set out in the previous volume, 
which furnish the complete statement of  the theory, both of 
the nature  of  secular  authority  and also  of  its relation  to 
the  Church.  Gelasius  had  carefully  drawn  out  the  con- 
ception of  the two authorities which  God had established  in 
the world-the  two  authorities  which  had  sometimes  been 
united  in pre-Christian times,  but which  in complete  truth 
were  united  only  in  Christ  Himself,  who  was  both  King 
and Priest.  For Christ Himself  had divided them-allotting 
to the priest  his  particular  authority,  and to the king  also 
his,-in  such  a  fashion  that while  each  needed  the  other, 
each was  independent within  his  own  sphere.' 
Any  careful  examination  of  the  canonists  will  bring  out 
very  clearly  that it  is  this  treatment  of  the  subject  by 
Gelasius  which  lies  behind  all  their  theory.  In Ivo  of 
Chartres'  ' Decretum,'  in  Cardinal  Deusdedit's  ' Collectio 
Canonum,'  and in Gratian's  '  Decretum,'  the Gelasian  psss- 
ages  are  citcd12 and,  as  we  shall  see  when  we  come  to 
discuss  the  theory  of  the  relations  of  Church  and  State, 
they furnish the normal  expression  of  the principles  of  the 
canonists with regard  to these. 
It  is  very  clear,  then,  that  the  canon  lawyers  of  these 
times  hcld  that  the  secular  and  civil  power  is  a  Divine 
institution  and represents  the Divine  authority.  Whatever 
may have  been  said  and meant in the course  of  the great 
conflict  between  the  Empire  and the  Church  which  mjght 
seem  to indicate  a  dispositio~z  to doubt the Divine  nature 
of  the  civil  authority,  nothing  of  the  kind  has  been 
admitted  into  the  canon  law  or  is  suggested  by  the 
commentators. 
We may here  notice  a  theory-the  importance of  which, 
however,  as  far  as the Middle  Ages  is  concerned,  has been 
greatly  exaggerated,-the  theory  that  the  emperor 
not,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  a  mere  layman,  l01 
1 See vol. 1.  pp.  190 193.  lectlo  Canonurn,'  IV  41,  97.  Gratlanl 
2  IVO  of  Chartres,  ' Decretum,'  IV.  '  Decretum,'  D. xcvl  6 
168.  190 : V.  378.  Deusdedlt,  'Col- 
~s  unctio~l  was  equivalent  to  some  kind  of  consecration. 
~~fi~us  discusses  the  propriety  of  the  bishops  taking  the 
of  fidelity  to the  emperor,  and  argues  that the  fact 
that  this  was  regularly  done  does  not  prove  that it  waa 
right;  for he  says the canons  do not sanction  all that was 
done  by  custom.  He says, however, that it  may be  urged 
in  defence  of  this  that  the  emperor  was  not  wholly  a 
layman,  since he  had been  consecrated  by  his  unction.1  It 
must  be  noticed  that  Rufinus  only  says  that  this  sug- 
gestion  may be  made :  he  does  not  say  whether  he  agrees 
with it.  It is perhaps worth while to notice that among the 
~ecretals  is  a  letter of  Innocent III., in which  he  carefully 
sets  out  the  distinction  between  the mode  of  anointing  of 
the bishop  and of  the king:  the bishop, he says, is anointed 
upon  his  head,  while  the  prince  is  anointed  on  the  arin. 
The  purpose  of  Innocent  seems  to be  to draw attention to 
the  symbolical  significance  of  these  different  modes  of 
anointing,  and his  words  certainly  do  not  suggest  that he 
recognised  that the  anointing  of  the  prince  was  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  render  hiin  an  ecclesia~tic.~  Whatever  may 
have  been  said  by  other  writers,  there  is  no  evidence 
that the canon lawyers, to the time of  the Decretals, recog- 
l  RuSnus, '  Snmma Decret.,'  C. XXII. 
Q.  6. c  22  "  S1  opponatur  de Jura- 
mento  fidelltatls,  quod  hod10 eplscopl 
faclunt  ~mperaton,  respondeatur  non 
omnla  que  consuetudo  habet  canones 
permlttur.  Vel  dlcatur  Imperatorem 
"On  omnlno  la~cum  esse,  quem  per 
sacram unctlonem constat consecratum 
ease " 
Decretals, I. 15  1  Q 5  " Unde In 
"eter1  testamento non solum ungebatur 
sacerdos,  ~ed  etmm rex  et Prophets, 
slcut  m  libro  Regum  Dom~nus  pre 
CIPlt Helm  . . . Sed  ubl  Jesus  Naz- 
arenus  quem  unxlt  Deus  Splrltu 
sancta,  s~cut  In  act~bus  apostolorum 
legltur,  unctus  est  oleo  pletatls  prre 
COnsort~b~~  SUN,  qul  secundum  apos- 
tolum  est  ~aput  ccclesl~, quae  est 
'OVus  Ipslus, pnnctpls unctlo a caplte 
(sc~hcet)  ad  brach~um  est  translata, 
ut  prlnceps  extunc  non  ungatur  In 
cap~te,  sed In brachio, slve 1x1  humero, 
vel  m  armo,  ~n  qulbus  prlnc~patus 
congrue  designatur  luxta  ~llud,  quod 
leetur-'  Frtctus eat pr~nclpatus  super 
iiumerum  ejus,'  etc.  Ad  quod  etlam 
s~gn~ficandum  Samuel fecit ponl armum 
ante Saul,  CUI  dederat locum In caplte 
ante  eos,  qu~  fuerunt  lnvltatl.  In 
caplte vero pont~ficls  sacramental~s  est 
dellbut10  conservata,  qtna  personam 
cap~t~s  in pontlficall offic~o  rcpresentat. 
Refelt  autem Inter  pont~fic~s  et pnn- 
crpls  unct~onem,  qula  caput pontlficls 
chrlsmate  consecratur,  brach~urn  vero 
pr~nclplq  oleo  del~nltur, ut  osten- 
datur  quanta  sit  dlfferentla  ~nter 
auctorltatem  pontlficls  et  pnnclpls 
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nised  as  important  the  conception  of  a  quasi-ecclesiastical 
character in the secular ruler. 
The  theory  of  the  canon  lawyers  of  this  time  is,  then, 
perfectly  clear  and unequivocal,  that  the secular  and civil 
power  has  a  sacred  charactel,  and  represents  the  Divine 
authority.  This  does not,  however,  mean  that any manner 
of  exercising this power has the Divine sanction or can claim 
the Divine authority. 
The  canonists  very  clearly  describe  the  nature  of  thoge 
functions  of  the State which  give  it this  sacred  character, 
namely,  that it is  its purpose  or  function  to  restrain  and 
punish evil and to set forward justice.  Burchard, Deusdedit, 
Ivo,  and a  Palea to Gratian all cite, in part or whole,  that 
group of  passages from St  Isidore's ' Sentences ' which describe 
the proper  purpose of  secular authority a6  being to restrain 
evil, and the proper character of the king as being that of  one 
who  does  right,  while  they also lay it  down that it is just 
that the prince  should conform to the laws of  his  kingdom.1 
Rufinus  draws  out at some  length  the important  principle 
that  an  evil  power-that  is,  the  abuse  of  power-has  no 
sanction  or  authority  from  God.  He  is  discussing  the 
meaning of  some words  of  St Augustine's,  in which  he  lays 
it down that all authority is from God, and represents either 
His sanction or His permi~sion.~  Rufinus's comment upon the 
passage is to this effect.  An evil authority or power is said 
to be permitted by God, and is therefore said to proceed from 
Him ; but the fact that God permits sin does not mean that 
it proceeds from Him ; an evil authority can only be said to 
be  from  God  in  this  sense,  that  God  is  the  source  of  all 
authority, but not in the sense that He approves of  its abuse. 
Rufinus  draws  this  principle  out in positive  form  when,  in 
the same passage, he goes on to lay down the two character- 
istics of  a good secular authority, without which no authority 
1 ~urchard,  '  Decretum,'  xv.  38 43,  Cf  v01  1  pp.  172, 173. 
xvl  25 -  29.  Deusdedit,  '  Collect10  a  Gratian, ' Dec ,' C.  xxii.  Q  1.  c. 4: 
Canonurn,'  iv.  108.  Ivo, '  Decr~tum,'  "  Non enim est potestas, nisi a Deo, slve 
XVI.  39-45.  Gratian,  'Decretum,'  D  jubente  sive  sinente"  (St A~~gustine~ 
lx. 2.  '  Contra  Faustum,'  xxii.  76.) 
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G,,  be  held  approved ; these  are, legitimate institution and 
the supremacy of justice.  It is true that his  explanation of 
these two principles is highly technical, and largely concerned 
+th  the question of  clerical  exemptions, but it includes the 
princil~le  of  just and equitable action by the public authority, 
that is, action governed by the principle of  the proper adjust- 
ment  of  punishment to fault, and of  the elimination  of  all 
merely  private interest  in the action of  the magi8trate.l 
The  canonists,  then, while  maintaining the divine nature  - 
of  secular  authority,  and  while  condemning  revolt  against 
this  as  a  revolt  against  God,  seem  clearly  to maintain  the 
principles of  the Fathels like St Ambrose and St Isidore, and 
of  the ninth century writers, that the legitimacy of  secular 
authority  depends upon  its being  conformed  to the  law  of 
justice. 
We  have  already  considered  the relation  of  positive  law 
1 Rufinus,  Summa  Decret ,'  C 
xxll~  Q.  1.  c.  4 :  "  Potestas  autem 
mala  a  Deo  esse  sinitur  et  ldeo 
a  Deo  esse  dicitur ; non  tamen quia 
Deus  sinit  peccatum, et ipsum a  Deo 
erit.  A sinente enim Deo mala potestas 
eo  esse  intell~gltur, qma,  cum  Deus 
ips~us  re1 sit auctor, abusionis ejus non 
est approbator . quod de peccato sentlri 
uon debat.  Et quoniam hie de secular1 
potestate  specialiter  sermo  habetur, 
sciendum quod  duo sunt, quibus tam- 
quam  duabus  columnls potestas  bone 
nititur  et  sine  quibus  nulla  potestas 
approbatur :  legltima  scil  lnstitutio 
et  Iustltie  moderatio.  Et  quidem 
lnstitutio  legitima  clrca  tria  versatur, 
videlicet  circa  ~nst~tuentem,  insti- 
tutum,  et  eos,  super  quos  instl- 
tultur  Circa  instituentem,  ut  qul 
lnstltu~t  publicarn  iustituendi  habeat 
auctoritatem,  ut  lmporator  et  pre 
foetus  et  his  slmllis ,  circa  inbti- 
tutum.  ut  persona  sit  idonea,  que 
"cularls  potestat~s  cingulo  est  decor- 
and%, puta  non  rcgulans  clerlcus  sed 
atrenuus laicus , clrca eos, super  quos 
COnstltultur . ut potcstas sec,ularis lal- 
domrpet~r  wn  clerloorum  mllitie 
preponatur.  Justitie  vero  model at10 
quinque articulis determinatur : serun- 
dum  personam,  sccundum  causam, 
secundum  modum,  secundum  lo~um, 
secundum  tempus.  Secundum  per- 
sonam allquid lloet et non licet scculari 
potestati . ut in  personam  laicam,  si 
peccaverlt,  manum  mittere  liceat,  In 
cler~cum  autem non hceat.  Secundum 
causam, moderatur justit~a,  ut videl~cet 
ncgotia  secularia,  non  splntualia,  t% 
terrena  potestate  examinentur.  Se- 
cundum  nlonsuram  vel  modum : cum 
quilibet  culpa congrua sib~  et conveni- 
enti  pena  inulctatur,  ut  neque  pri- 
vatum odlum  adiciat  pone  sufhclenti, 
neque  privatus amor subtrahat  deb~te 
sever it at^.  Secundum  locum  deter- 
minatur  just~tia,  si  ubi  convcnit 
judiclum  oxercetur  et  10~1s vencia- 
billbus honor defcratur : ut in ec~le~la 
nllquis  reus  non  puniatur neque  fugl- 
tivus  inde  extractus  ad  pcnam  cor- 
poralem tradatur  Secundum ten~pus  ; 
ut sacris  et bollempnlbus  diebue  rev- 
erent~a  exhlbeatur,  quatinns  et  h18 
parcatur,  qulbus  pro  suls oulpls  Sup. 
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to natural law,  and it will  be  evident  that this  ia  closely 
related to the question we  are now  considering,  for,  as  we 
have  seen,  natural  law  is  to  the  canonists  that  body  of 
principles  which  must  govern  the  actions  and relations  of 
men in all  the circumstances  of  life,  and against  which  no 
human  law or  cnstom  can prevail. 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
CIVIL  LAW  AND  CUSTOM. 
WE  have  now  considered  the  character  of  that "  Natural 
Law"  which  is  the  norm  by  which  all  law  is  to  be 
measured and judged,  and have  also considered the relation 
of  the  actual  institutions  of  society  to  these  normative 
principles.  We  have  seen  that to the Canonists,  as to the 
later  Stoics  and the Fathers, there is a  profound  difference 
between the ideal character of society and its actually existing 
institutions : the ideal continues to  be valid, but human nature 
being what it actually is, the vicious impulses of  man having 
that  power  which  they  actually  have, human life  would  be 
impossible  without the existence  of  institutions  and regula- 
tions which,  while  they are far from belonging to the ideal 
in themselves, are yet necessary if  men are to lead an orderly 
life, and to make any progress towards the ideal. 
We  can now,  therefore,  consider the nature of  law under 
the terms  of  the positive  law  of  any  one  state.  We  have 
already  discussed,  in  our  second  chapter,  the general  prin- 
ciples  of  the  theory  of  law,  as  set  out  by  Gratian,  and 
especially  that fundamental division  of  law  into Divine  or 
natural on the one  side and customary on the 0ther.l  It is 
true that under customary law more is included than thc Civil 
law of  any one state, for under  this term falls the whole  of 
that bystem which is called the jus ge~ltium,  the law which is 
of  those conventional customs which are considered 
to  be  common  to all  mankind,--but we  need  say no more 
about  this  now.  Civil  law  is  that  body  of  rules  or  laws 
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which belong to any ono state : Gratian takes over from st 
Isidore  the  definition  of  the  Civil  law  as  that which  any 
people  or  state makes for itself,  for  some human or  divine 
reason,l but this  Civil law is,  according to the classification 
which  Gratian  has  elaborated  on the basis  of  St I~idore'~ 
phrases,  in the beginning  simply custom.  This is  a  concep- 
$ion of  great importance,  and though we  have already dealt 
with the statement of  this by Gratian, we must consider the 
matter  again  in  connection  with  other  passages  in Gratian 
and in the works  of  other Canonists. 
Burchard includes in his collection a phrase of  St  Augustine, 
in which it is said that in those matters as to which the Holy 
Scriptures have not laid down any definite rule, the customs 
of  the people  of  God, or the instituta of  former generations, 
are to be taken as law, and that this law is to be enforced like 
the Divine law.2  This phrase is repeated by Ivo, both in the 
'  Decretum ' and the ' Panormia,' and by Gratian.  In a later 
chapter we  shall have to consider  the significance  of  this in 
relation to the theory of  the Canon law : in the meanwhile, 
we  are interested in it as indicating very  clearly the import- 
ance  of  custom  in  relation  to  law.  Again,  Ivo  in  the 
'Decretum' quotes from the Institutes of  Justinian the phrase 
which  describes that form of  Jus which is established by the 
long-continued  custom  of  those  who  are  con~erned.~  We 
have already quoted and discussed the very important passages 
in  which  Gratian  draws  out  the  principle  that  all  law  is, 
properly  speaking,  c~stom.~  Gratian  looks  upon  Civil  law 
Gratian, '  Decretum,' D. i. 8 : "Jus 
civile  est,  quod  quisque  populus  vel 
civitas sibi proprium, divina humana- 
que causa constituit." 
a  Burchard,  '  Decretum,'  iii.  126 : 
"  In  his enim rebus de quibus nihil certe 
statuit  Scriptura  divina,  mos  populi 
Dei,  vel  instituta  majorum  pro  lege 
tenenda  sunt, et sicut  praevaricatores 
legum  divinarum,  ita  contemptores 
consuetudinum  ecclesiasticarum  coer- 
cendi sunt."  Cf. Ivo, Dec. iv. 68, Pan. 
ii. 158  ad  Gratian, Dec. D. xi. 7. 
a  1 vo,  '  Decretum,'  iv.  194 :  "  Ex 
non scripto jus  venit quod usus prob- 
avit.  Nam  diuturni  mores  consensu 
utentium approbati legem imitantur." 
-(Inst.,  I.  2.)  This  passage  is  also 
quoted by Gratian, '  Decretum,'  D. xii. 
6.  but  with  the  important  insertion 
after "  diuturni mores " of  the words 
"nisi  legi  sunt adversi."  (I owo  the 
observstion  of  this  insertion  to  Pro. 
fessor  Brie, ' Die  Lohre  vom  Gewohn- 
heitsrecht,'  Erster  Theil,  p.  79,  nom 
Q.) 
'  See pp. 98 and 100. 
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as being in its origin  nothing  but the general expression  of 
the custom of  any society.  We must now  consider to what 
,,tent  this  conception  is  modified  where  there  is  in  any 
6ociety  a  Person  or  body  of  Persons  who  have  legisltlt,ive 
authority. 
In another passage of  the ' Decretum ' Gratian lays down 
the principle  that a  Lex,  which  he  has  before  defined  as  a 
mitten  constitution,  is  instituted  when  it  is  promulgated, 
but  is  confirmed  by  the  custom  of  those  who  are  con- 
cerned, just  as it is abrogated by their disuse ; and he cites 
as  an' illustration  of  this  principle  the  fact  that  a  rule 
of  fasting imposed  as it  was  thought by Pope  Telesphoru~, 
and  by  Gregory  the  Great,  on  the  clergy,  was  never 
accepted  by  custom,  and therefore  never  became  law.  He 
admits  that it would  be  possible  in this  particular  case  to 
argue  that these  injunctions  were  rather  of  the  nature  of 
counsels than of  commands,  but he  seems  clearly to adhere 
to the principle that a law is not really  established unless it 
is ratified  by  cust0m.l  We shall recur to this passage when 
we  deal with the theory  of  Canon  Law:  in the meanwhile, 
it is  important to notice it as indicating  that Gratian does 
quite  clearly hold  that even  when  there is in a  community 
some  person  who  has  legislative  authority,  his  legislation 
must  be  confirmed,  and may be  rendered  void  by  custom. 
Gratian  is  here  dealing  with  a  question  about which  there 
was  much  discussion  among the  Civilians : they  all  main- 
tained  that custom  originally  had  the force  of  law ; while 
l  Gratian, '  Decretum,'  D.  iv.  after 
c.  3 :  Gratianus,  "  Leges  instituuntur 
cum  promulgantur,  firmantur  cum 
lnoribus utentium approbantur.  Sicut 
enim moribus utentium in contrarium 
nonnullre  leges  llodie  abrogatz  sunt, 
its moribua  utentium  ipsa:  loges  con- 
firmantur.  Undo  illud  Thelesphori 
Papa, (quo decrevit, ut clerici general- 
iter  a  quinquagcsima  a  carnibus  et 
deliciis  jejunent),  quia  moribus  uten- 
tium  approbatum non est. aliter &gen. 
transgressionis reos  non arguit."- 
Cf. c. 4, the letter of  Thelesphorus; c. 6, 
part of  a spurious letter of  Gregory the 
Great. . . . Part IV., Gratianus.  "Hec 
etsi  legibus  constituta  sunt,  tamen 
quia communi usu approbata non sunt, 
so non observantes transgressionis reos 
non arguunt ; alioquin  his non  obedi- 
entes proprio privarentur honore, cum 
illis qui sacris nesciunt obedire csnoni- 
bus,  penitus  of'iicio  jubeantur  carere 
suscepto ; nisi forte quis dicat hec non 
decernendo esse statuta, sed exhortando 
conscripta.  Dccretum  vero  nccessita- 
tem  facit,  exhortatio  autem  liberam 
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some  of  them  also  held,  as  Gratian  does,  that no  law,  by 
whomsoever  promulgated,  has  any real  validity  unless  it is 
accepted by the custom  of  those  c0ncerned.l 
We must, however, compare with this passage certain ot,hers 
in which  Gratian's position  might  seem  to be  different.  In 
one place  he  quotes a passage from Isidore which  says that 
custom  must  yield  to  authority,  and  that  Zex  and  ratio 
are superior to bad custom,  and he  seems  clearly  to make 
this principle his own : in another part of  the same Distinction 
he  quotes that important passage  in the Code which,  while 
recognising the great authority of  custom, denies that it can 
prevail  against  ratio  or  leg,  and  then  adds  himself  that 
custom is to be faithfully  observed, where it is not contrary 
to  the  sacred  canons  or  human  laws  (lege~).~  We  have 
already  noticed  the words  which  he  inserts  in  the passa~ge 
of  the  Institutes  which  describes  the  system  of  law  which 
arises  from custom." 
These views may seem rather difficult to reconcile with each 
other, but as a matter of  fact they are not absolutely irrecon- 
cilable,  for Gratian may have held that while a law was not 
really valid unless those concerned did by their custom accept 
it, once they  had  thus  accepted it custom  alone  could  not 
abrogate it.  This doctrine was maintained, as we have seen, 
by some of  the  civilian^.^  On the whole, it would seem that 
Gratian wavered between  diEerent views.  When we  turn to 
the commentators  on Gratian,  we  find  that they follow him 
in the general theory of  the nature of  law as custom, but that 
in  some  respects  their  theory  may  be  different.  Rufinus 
repeats  Gratian's  general  principle  that  all  positive  law  is 
really custom, whether it is written or ~nwritten.~  But he is 
See pp. 62, 63. 
Wratian, '  Decretum,'  D.  xi.,  Part 
I. :  Gratianus.  "  Qnod  vero  legibus 
consuetudo  cedat,  Ysidorus  testatur 
in  Sinonimis,  lib.  ii.  16,  '  Usus  auc- 
toritati  cedat ;  pravum  usum  lcx  et 
ratio vincat,' " . . . c. 4.  Item Imper. 
Constantin.  A.  ad  Proculum,  "  quae 
sit longa  consuetudo " (Cod., viii.  62, 
(63), 2) : "  Conmietudinis ususque lon- 
gevi  non  vilis  auctoritas est :  verum 
non usque  adco sui valitura momento, 
ut aut rationem vincat aut legem scrip- 
tarn."-Part II.,  Gratianus. "  Cum vero 
ncc sacris canonibus nec humanis lepi- 
bus consuetudo obviare monstratur, in- 
concussa servanda est." 
See p. 3, note 3. 
See pp. 62, 63. 
'  Itnfinus,  '  Summa  Uocret.,'  U.  i' 
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that under  the actually  existing condition of  his  time, 
the  authority  of  custom  in  abrogating  laws  was  greatly 
limited.  When Gratian, in a passage  we  have just  quoted,l 
lays  down  the broad  principle  that laws  are  abrogated  by 
,,,torn,  Rufinus  is  careful  to point  out  that  custom  only 
Canon  laws  with the consent  of  the Pope, just  as 
only  abrogates  Civil  laws  with  the  consent  of  the 
Emperor,  for the  Roman  people  have  transferred  all  their 
,uthority  to him, and can therefore neibher make nor unmake 
laws  without  his  consel~t.~  Rufinus  represents  the  same 
psition  as  that  of  one  school  of  Civilians.3  Stephen  of 
Tournai  follows  Gratian  in  placing  both  the  jus  gelztium 
and the jus  oivile  under the category  of  mores.4  His treat- 
ment  of  the  relation  of  custom  to  existing  written  law  is 
interesting  but  a  little  ambig~xous.  He  lays  down  dog- 
matically -the principle that if  a people,  which has the power 
of  making  laws,  deliberately and knowingly  follows a  usage 
which is contrary to %L  written law, this usage abrogates the 
law :  this principle is also, we have seen, maintained by some 
of  the  civilian^.^  Stephen leaves  the  question  whether  the 
(Dict. Grat. ad c.  1) : "  Mores autem 
isti  partim  sunt redacti  in  scriptis et 
vocantur  jus  constitutionui:~  : partim 
absquc  scripto utcntium plarito reser- 
vantur,  et dicitur  simpliciter  consue- 
tudo." 
See p.  165, note 1. 
Rufinus,  ' Summa Decret.,'  D. iv., 
"'Officium  vero' : . . . Ubi dcmonstrat 
quorundam  decretorum  exemplo  non- 
nullas  ctiam  leges  ecclesiasticas  esse 
hodie abrogatas per mores utique utcn- 
tium in contrarium.  Et hoc consensu 
exaudias summi pontificis ; sicut enim 
'lodie  sine  auctoritate  vel  consensu 
imperatoris  leges  non  possunt  statui, 
sic  etiam  nec  infirmari  quia  populus 
Romanus ci et in cum omne suum im- 
Perium  et  potestatcm  concossit :  ita 
absqu~  conscientia  at  assensu  summi 
Patriarche  canones  sicut  non  potuer- 
Unt fieri, ita ncc  irritari." 
a  see pp. 60-63. 
4  Stephen  of  Tournai, '  Summa De- 
cret.,'  D, i. Dict. Grat. :  "'et moribns,' 
scriptis  vel  non  scriptis,  in  quo  in- 
telligas  et jus  gentium et civile." 
Stephen  of  Tournai, '  Summa De- 
eret.,' D. i. 5 : "'Consuctudo,'  i.e. juu 
consuctudinarium,  '  ncc  differt,'  i.e. 
non interest, an soripta sit consuetudo, 
cum tamon ratione nitatur, an non, si 
tamen  non  sit  juri  scripto  ooutraria. 
Sed et si  juri  scripto contraria  sit, et 
populus  qui  habest  potestatem  con- 
dcncli  legcs,  scicns  legom  coutrariam 
csse,  contra cam consuetudine  utntur, 
consuetudo  etiam  prsponitur  leg1 
script=.  Nihil  cnim  interest,  an  suf- 
fragio  populus  voluntatcrn  suam  de- 
claret,  an  rebus  ipsis.  Tanto  cnim 
consensu  omnium  per  desuetudinem 
leges  abrogatur.  Secus  est  si  nesci- 
erim(nt)  legem in contrarium dictare." 
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people in his time did or did not possess this power uncertain. 
It is interesting to observe in the Canonists the traces of these 
views  of  the  Civilians,-Gratian  holding  the principle  that 
legislation,  by  whomsoever  promulgated,  has  no  authority 
unless it  is  ratified  by  the usage  of  the  society;  Stephen 
holding  that  any  society  which  retains  in  its  own  hands 
the power  of  making  laws,  does  by its usage  abrogate  any 
law,  if  it  acts  deliberately  and consciously;  Rufinus  main- 
taining  that, at least in the case  of  the Roman  people,  the 
authority of  custom  has  really  ceased  except  so far as it is 
sanctioned  by  the Emperor. 
When we  now turn to the Decretals,  we find the doctrine 
that  Custom  overrides  all  law  except  that  of  Nature  and 
Reason ; only this Custom must be sanctioned by a sufficient 
prescription.  Gregory IX. lays  down this  doctrine in words 
drawn from the famous  passage in the Code, but with  such 
additions  as  completely  to  transform  its  sense.  While 
Constantine  had  recognised  the  great  authority  of  long 
custom,  but  had  also  maintained  that it  could  not  prevail 
against  reason  or  law,  Gregory  IX. held  that it could  not 
prevail  against  positive  law,  unless  it was  reasonable,  and 
founded upon  a legal prescription-that  is, a definite, legally 
recognised period of  times1  For the discussion of  the import- 
ant question of  the appearance of  this conception of  a definite 
period of  time as constituting a legally valid custom, we  must 
refer to the very careful treatment of  the matter by Professor 
Siegfried Brie,  in  his  work  on  the doctrine  of  the  Law  of 
Custom.  To  this  we  would  also  refer  the reader  for  a  full 
discussion of  the significance of  ratio :  we  are, indeed, under 
great obligations to this work in relation to the whole subject 
of  Cu~tom.~ 
l  '  Decretals,' i. 4. 11 (Gregory IX.) :  tudinis  ususque  longzvi  non  vilis 
"  Sicut  etiam  longzvz  consuetudinis  auctoritas  est,  verum  non usque  adeo 
non  it vilis auctorltas, non tamen est  sui valitura momento, ut aut rationem 
odeo  valiturus,  ut  vel  juri  positivo  vincatautlegem." 
debeat  przjudicium  generare,  nisi  Prof.  Slegfried  Brie,  '  Die  Lehre 
fuerit  rationabilis  et legitime  sit prz-  vom  Gewohnheltsrecht,'  Erster  Theil, 
scripts."  esp.  pp.  67-78 and  83-92. 
Cf.  Cod.,  viii.  62 (63)  : "  Oonsue- 
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is indeed true that in some earlier Decretals the matter 
treated in  the terms of  the rescript of  Constantine in the 
Code; 1  but  it would  Seem  to be  clear  that  Gregory  IX. 
decided the matter in the other sense, and that 
thus,  ahate~er  may  be  the ambiguities  in the position  of 
Gratian  and  other  earlier  Canonists,  the final judgment  of 
the  Canon  Law,  So  far as  we  are  here  dealing  with  it,  is 
in  favour  of  the  continuing  supremacy  of  Custom  over  all 
positive law.  The text of the Canon Law is not here dealing 
with the authority of  Civil Law, but the impression which is 
left  upon  us  is  that  the  Canon  Law  is  on  the  same  side 
B.F(  those' Civilians  who  maintained  that  all  positive  law  is 
W"  -- 
ultimately founded upon, and continues to be valid in virtue 
of, the custom of  the people. 
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CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE CANON  LAW. 
WE  can  now  turn to the  consideration  of  the  nature  and 
character of  canon  law.  We could  not approach  this until 
we  had  endeavoured  to  get  at the  conception  of  law  in 
its most  general  sense,  for it  has,  in the  judgment  of  the 
mediaevaI  canonists,  in  large  measure  the  same  nat~rre  as 
other laws, and therefore, till we had endeavoured to fix the 
general  principles  of  all  legal  systems,  we  could  not  with 
any  hope  of  success  attempt  to apprehend  the  distinctive 
features of  the canon law.  We must  approach  the subject 
without  assuming that the nature  of  canon  law was  quite 
clearly and completely understood or defined by any writer in 
this period.  We must be specially  on our guard against the 
danger of  reading back into the twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries the possibly more complete analyses and the precise 
definitions of  later times.  It is possible that by the middle of 
the thirteenth century the theory of  the subject was complete, 
but if we are to consider the matter seriously we shall do well 
to keep  an open mind,  even upon  that question.  Nothing, 
indeed,  has  been,  from  a  strictly  historical  point  of  view, 
more mischievous than the notion that the Middle Ages had 
a  clear-cut  and precise  notion  of  the nature and authority 
of  canon law.  What we  may take as fairly  certain  is  that 
until  Gratian  men  had  hardly  realised  the  complexity  of 
these  questions,  and that his  treatment  of  the subject  does 
present  us  with  the first  reasoned  attempt to analyse  the 
essential  character  of  canon  law : this  does  not,  however, 
mean  that the  theory  even  of  Gratian  is  com- 
plete. 
The canonical collections which preceded Gratian's have, as 
we have already seen, the character of  compilations  smell or 
large rather  than of  critical  treatises,  and there  is  no  use, 
therefore,  looking  to them for any explicit  discussion  of  the 
nature of  canon law: this does not of  course mean that the 
church  had  no  working  conception  of  what it  was,  but it 
does mean that it had no fully formed and defined theory of 
its nature.  At the same time the collections both of Burchard 
and of Ivo include passages from various ecclesiastica1 writers 
which may be taken as indicating the currency of  some general 
both  of  the  nature  and  of  the  sources  of  the 
canon law,  and these and similar passages provide the foun- 
dation upon which Gratian constructed his own more definite 
theory. 
Some passages from the writings of  St Augustine,  St Basil, 
and Pope Leo IV. are especially noteworthy in this connec- 
tion.  In the last  chapter we  have referred  to the passage 
cited by Burchard and others to the effect that in those things 
with  respect  to which  the  Scriptures  lay  down  no  definite 
rules, the custom of  the people of  God and the institutions of 
the "  majores " are to be taken as law, and are to be 0beyed.l 
Here  is an i~nportant  statement of  the place  and nature of 
ecclesiastical law, as distinguished from the law of  the Scrip- 
tures ; the reference  to the "  mos  populi Dei " is especially 
interesting  and significant,  as indicating  an important point 
of  similarity  between  the  conceptions  of  canon  law  and 
secular  law. 
Ivo places  immediately  after this a  passage  derived  ulti- 
mately from St Basil,  which represents  a  very similar  prin- 
ciple.  Some Church institutions, he  says, we  have received 
from the Scriptures and from the apostolic  tradition ; some 
Burchard,  '  Decretum,'  iii.  126 :  tores ecclesiasticarum  coercendi aunt." 
"  In his  enim  rebus  de quibus  nilljl  This is again cited in Ivo, 'Decretum,' 
'Orto  statuit  Scripture  divina,  mos  iv.  68 ;  Ivo,  '  Pan.,'  iv.  158, and in 
PoPuli  Doi,  vel instituta majorum  pro  Gratian's  '  Docretum,'  D.  xii.  7.  Cf. 
'ge  tenonda  sunt, et aicut ~raevarica-  St Augustine,  Ep.  36.  1,  2. 
tares  legum  divinarum,  ita,  contemp- 
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have been  approved by custom,  and these deserve a similar 
respect.l 
Another passage from St Augustine is cited by Ivo in the 
' Decretum,'  which  contains a  very interesting enumeration 
and classification of  the authorities in the law of  the Church. 
The authority of  Scripture is superior to that of  all the letters 
of  bishops, and no  question  can be raised  as to the truth or 
correctness  of  that which  is  contained in it.  The letters of 
bishops can be corrected by wise men or other bishops, while 
the judgments  of  councils may be corrected by those of  later 
councils.  The  authority of  provincial  councils  can be  over- 
ruled by  that of  the universal councils of  the Chribtian world, 
and that of  universal councils by later ones when the Church 
may have received new light.2 
In  the absence of any comment on these passages, we cannot 
say with  confidence how far Burchard  or Ivo may  have de- 
rived from them a theory  of  canon law, and of  the relation 
of  its various sources to each other.  But we can for ourselves 
recognise at least four elements in the sources of  canon law as 
indicated in these passages-first,  the Holy Scriptures ; second, 
1 Ivo, 'Decretum,'  iv. 69 : "Eccles~ 
asticarum  ~nst~tut~onum  quasdam 
Scriptur~s, quasdam  vero  apostolica 
traditione  per  successlones  m  mys 
terio,  traditas  receplmus ,  quedam 
vero consuetudine roborata approbav~t 
USUS " 
Quoted  also  IU  Grat~an, ' Decre- 
tum,'  D  XI  6 
2  Ivo, ' Decretum,'  IV  227  "  Quls 
nesclat  sanctam  -cilptu~am canon1 
cam  tam  veterls  quam  Novi  Testa 
menti  cert~s  suis  termln~s  contmer~, 
eamque omnlbus poster~or~bus  eplsco 
porurn  l~tterls ~ta  prieponl,  ut  de 
illa  omnlno  dub~tari  et d~sceptar~  non 
poss~t,  utrum vcrum vel utrum rectum 
SI~  quidquld In  ea scrrptura constlterlt 
esse  7  Ep~scoporum autem  litteras, 
quae  post  confirmatum  canonem  vel 
6cr1ptm sunt vel scribuntur, ct per ser 
moncm  forte  sap~ent~orem  cujusl~bet 
In  ea re per~tiorls,  et per aliorum epis 
coporum graviorem auctoritatem doc- 
t~oremque  prudentlam,  et per  concll~a 
l~cere   reprehend^,  SI  qu~d  In eis forte a 
ventate dev~atum  est " 
Ivo, '  Docretum,' IV.  138  "  Concllla 
posterlora  pr~or~bus  apud  posteros 
preponuntur,  et  unlversum  part1 
bus  semper  optlmo  lure  praeponl- 
tur  Ipra  concll~a  quae  per  singulas 
reglones  vel  pro5lnclas  fiunt,  plena 
riorum  co~~c~l~orum  auctoritatl,  qus 
f~unt  ex unlverso  orbe Chrlst~ano,  sine 
ulhs an~baglbus  ~edunt  , lpsaque plen 
aria  sape pnora  a  poster~bua  emend 
autur, cum  al~quo  expor~n~er~to  rerLlln 
aperltur quod clausum erat, et cognos 
c~tur  quod latebat, slne ullo typo sacrl 
leg2 superha "  The last sentence  1s 
also contamed in Deusded~t,  '  Collectlo 
Canonum,' I  296 
Cf  St Aug , ' DC Bapllsmo  COntrs 
Donatlrtoi,'  11  3. 
the decrees of  councils ; third, the writings of  certain bishops ; 
and fourth, the custom of the Church. 
In another  passage  quoted by Ivo in the ' Decretum ' and 
the '  Panormia,' we have a statement of  the actual sources of 
the  canon law as recognised by  Pope Leo IT.  in the ninth 
century.  In this letter Pope Leo lays it down that alongside 
of  the canons of  certain  councils,  the courts  of  the Church 
must  recognise as authoritative the decretal letters of  Popes 
Sylvester, Siricius, Innocent, Zosimus, Celestine, Leo, Gelasius, 
&ary,  Simmachus, Slmphcms, Hormisdas,  and Gregory the 
Second ; and that if  it should chance that in some case iues- 
tlons should arise which could not be  settled by reference to 
these, then recourse should be had to the sayings of  Jerome, 
Augustine, Isidore, and other holy doctors, or to the Apostolic 
See of  R0me.l 
This  is  from  the point  of  view  of  historical  criticism  an 
important passage; for our present purpose it has not the same 
significance, for, as we  shall presently see, Gratian enumerates 
many other sources of  canon law, and it cannot be doubted 
that Burchard and Ivo also recognised many others ; but the 
passage indicates clearly the importance of  the position of  the 
decretal letters of  the Popes in the canon law.  This point is 
of  so  much  importance  that we  must dwell upon it a little 
further. 
Burchard  has not,  so far as we  have observed,  any direct 
references to this,  but  he  reproduces  an  important  canon 
which  lays  down  the  principle  that the  authority  of  sum- 
'  Ivo, '  Panorm~a,'i~  118 . "Dehbel 
et commentarlls ahorum,  non con- 
Wnit  ahquos  jud~care et  sanctorum 
COnclhorum canones rehnquere, vel de 
oretallurn regulas,  quas habentur apud 
"08  8~mul  cum  canonibus,  quibus  In 
Omnibus occles~ast~cis  utuntur judlcns, 
'dest, aportolorurn,N~cienorum,Ancyr~ 
tanorurn,  Neocesarens~um, Gangren. 
R1um, Sardrcenslum,  Carthaglnenslum, 
et cum  1111s rcgulie  prmsulum  Roman 
Orurn,  Sylvestn,  CI~ICII,  Innocentn, 
ZOzlml,  Ccelestln~,  Leonls,  Gelasn, H11 
8Pil~ Slmmachi, Slmplicn,  Orm~sdze,  et 
Gregor11  Iun~or~s  Ist~  omnino  sunt 
per  quos  jud~cant  eplscopl,  per  quos 
eplscopl  s~mll~ter  et clerlcl  judlcantur 
Nam  SI  tale  emersent  vel  contmgor~t 
~nusitatum negotlum,  quod  rnlnlme 
posbit  per  lstos  finlrl,  tune  ~llorum 
quorum  memm~stis,  dicta  H~eronym~, 
Augustln~,  Is~dons,  vel cmtcrorum siml 
llter  sanctorum  doctorum  s~rnlllum,  si 
reperta  fuennt, magnanimiter sunt re- 
tlnenda vel promulganda, vel ad apos- 
tolicam  sedem  refcratur  de  tallbus " 
Cf  Ivo, 'Dec ,' iv.  72,  and Gratian. 
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moning  synods  belongs  to the  Apostolic  See,  and that  no 
council  can  be  recognised  as general  which  has  been  Called 
without this auth0rity.l  Ivo includes the same canon in the 
'  Panormia,' and there is a similar one in his ' Decretum ' and 
in Gratian.a Ivo, both in the ' Decretum ' and in the '  Panor- 
mia,'  and Gratian cite a  canon saying that all commands of 
the Apostolic  See  are to be  received  as  though  they  were 
confirmed by St Peter.3  He also (in the ' Decretum ')  cites a 
letter  of  Pope Nicholas I., which  has reference primarily  to 
the  psuedo-Isidorian  collection.  It  had  been  apparently 
suggested  that  these  were  not  to  be  received  as  having 
-  - 
canonical  authority, because  they  were  not  contained  "in 
codice canonum."  Nicholas  urges that this objection  has no 
weight,  that there is no difference between  the authority of 
those  decretals and decretal letters which  had been  hitherto 
included in the "  codices canonum " and othew4  Ivo also in- 
cludes in the ' Decretum ' a letter of  Pope Alexander 11. which 
asserts very emphatically that the decreta of  the Roman See 
are to be accepted and reverenced by all sons of  the Church, 
even as are the can one^.^ 
It was the great work of  Gratian to take in hand seriously 
the task not merely of  codifying the immense mass of  material 
1 Burchard, 'Decret.,' i. 42 :  "Synod- 
orum vero congregandorum, auctoritas 
apostolicae  sedi  privata  commissa  est 
potestate.  Nec  ullam synodum gener- 
alem ratam esso legimus, quse ejus non 
fuerit auctoritate congrogata v01 fulta. 
Hsec  canonica tcstatur auctoritas, hzc 
historia ecclesiastics roborat, haec sancti 
Patres conformant." 
2  IVO,  Pan.,' iv. 14 ;  'Dec.,' iv. 240 ; 
Grat., '  Dec.,'  D. xvii. 1. 
a  Ivo,  '  Decretum,'  iv.  238 :  "Sic 
omnes apostolicae sedis sanctiones  ac- 
cipienda,  sunt,  tanquam  ipsius  divini 
Petri voce  firmatae sint." 
Cf.  'Pan.,'  il.  101.  (This  reads 
"  przcepti " instead of  " Pctri.")  Cf. 
also Grat., '  Dec.,'  D. xix.  2, which has 
"  Petri." 
4  Ivo, '  Decretum,'  v.  33 : "  His ita 
divine favente gratia praehbat,is, osten- 
dimus  nullam  differentiam  esse  inter 
illa  deoreta,  qua,  in  codice  canonum 
habentur  sedis  Apostolicw  prsesulum, 
et  ea  quse  prie  multitudine  vix  per 
singula  voluminum  corpora  reperi- 
untur :  cum  omnia,  omnium  qul  de- 
cessorum suorum decretalia constituta, 
atque decretales epistolas, quas beatin- 
simi Papa diversis temporibus ab urbe 
Romio  dederunt,  venerabiliter  fore 
suscipicndas,  et custodiendas,  eximios 
Prwsules scilicet  et Leonem  Gelasium 
mandasse  probavimus." 
Cf. Gratian, 'Dec.,'  D. xix.  1. 
IVO,  '  Deereturn,' v. 31 :  noran^ an^ 
miser1 quod hujus sanctse sedis decretal 
ita pla fede a filiis matris Ecclesls "C- 
cipienda sint et veneranda, ut tanquam 
regul;o canonum ab eisdem absque ullo 
scrupulo admittantur." 
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which had accumulated, but what was even more important, 
analysing these materials, and of  seriously facing the ques- 
tion  of  their  relation  to each  other.  But more  than this, 
~~atian  also for the first time among canonists set out to form 
some general philosophical conceptions of  the ultimate nature 
of  law, and to apply these philosophical principles to the 
of  some of the most difficult questions with regard 
to the whole body of  the law of  the Christian Church. 
In order  to  deal  accurately  with  Gratian's  treatment  of 
Church  law,  we  must  begin  by  observing  once  again  his 
general  principles  on  the  nature  of  law,  though  we  have 
already considered  these in previous chapters.  He begins by 
dividing  all  law into natural  and human.  Natural law  he 
identifies with the divine law, and says that it is represented 
first by the great principle that a man should do to others as 
he  wot~ld  wish that they should  do to him.  Human law is 
essentially custom : this has been in part reduced to writing, 
while part of  it continues unwritten.l 
We have to consider how far these general principles apply 
to the canon law as well as to civil law.  We might imagine 
that  canon  law  belongs  entirely  to the  category  of  divine 
natural law,  but when we  come to look  at Gratian's  treat- 
ment of the subject more closely we find that this cannot be 
what he meant.  We must refer the reader to our discussion 
of  the  exact relation  of  the  "law  and the Gospel"  to the 
natural law.  The natural law is said to be contained in the 
" law and the Gospel," but not everything that is contained in 
the " law and the Gospel "  belongs to the natural law.  There 
are regulations  of  the "  law " which  are not permanent  or 
unalterable, which are not really part of  the natural law.2 
Gratian does not, as far as we  have seen, explicitly  apply 
this to canon law, but we think that it is quite clear that he 
such  an application,  and that while  the  canon  law 
Contain rules  which  are  directly  representative  of  the 
divine  '' natural  law,"  yet  it is  not  to be  identificd  with 
this.  There are rules  of  the civil law  and of  the canon  law 
are directly representative of  the natural law, but the 
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natural law is not to be identified with either the civil law or 
the canon law.  Not, indeed, that any law, whether  civil or 
canon, is valid which contradicts the " natural law " : we hape 
pointed  out that Gratian is perfectly  clear that all such laws 
are necessarily void ;  l the civil law and the canon law must 
be in harmony with the natural law, but they represent  not 
the mere assertions of  it, but the applications of its principles 
to particular circumstances and times-applications  which are 
not  necessarily permanent,  and whose  authority  is  not  the 
same as that of  the natural law itself. 
If  canon law, then, is not divine law in the full sense, we 
must ask how far it can be  said to belong to the domain of 
custom,  whether  written  or unwritten.  We  find that while 
Gratian does not draw out the subject completely, yet clearly 
he  implies  that  at least  in  part  canon  law  represents  the 
authority  of  custom.  We have  already referred to the two 
passages  which  he  quotes,  in  which  it  is  laid  down  that 
custom forms part of  the law  of  the  Chur~h,~  and the  im- 
portance which he attaches to custom is brought  out clearly 
by the terms in which he treats the general  question  of  the 
validity of  law.  Gratian, as we have seen, treats law by whom- 
soever promulgated  as really invalid unless it is confirmed by 
the custom of  those who are concerned, and he finds his illus- 
trations of  this in certain  decrees of  Popes  Telesphorus and 
Gregory the Great enjoining upon  the clergy the observance 
of  the Lent fast for seven weeks before Easter.  This, he says, 
never became law, because it was not recognised by custom. 
Gratian does indeed suggest, after he has laid down the theory, 
that possibly these decretal letters may be taken as conveying 
a  counsel rather  than a  command, but he  does not suggest 
any  modification  of  the  general  principle  which  the  case 
was intended to illustrate.Vt seems clear that in past canon 
law represents the authority of  custom just as civil law does. 
We  can  now  consider  the  definition  and  classification of 
canon law  with  which  Gratian  furnishes  us.  In his  formal 
definition  of  Church  law  he  says  that an ecclesiastical con- 
1 See pp.  105, 106. 
a  See pp.  161, 162. 
B  See pp.  185, 166. 
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stituti~n  is  called  canon.  He  describes  the  collection  of 
as  consisting  of  decretals  of  pontiffs  and statutes of 
comcils.  Some  of  these  councils  are  universal  and  some 
prodcial.  Of  these  latter  some  have  been  held  with  the 
authority  of  the Roman  See-that  is,  in the presence of  a 
legate  of  the  Roman  See;  others  with  the  authority  of 
ptriarchs  and  primates  or  metropolitans  of  provinces. 
Further  on  he  describe,s the purpose  of  the ecclesiastical as 
as of  the civil laws as being to ordain what men must 
do, and to forbid what is evi1.l 
This definition seems expressly to leave out of  account such 
canons as may be  merely restatements of  the rules of  Holy 
Scriptures, or of  the natural law, and to confine itself to those 
whiEh represent the authority of  the Church.  It is important, 
then, to observe that Gratian here describes broadly as sources 
of  canon law the decretals of  pontifFs, the canons of  universal 
councils,  and of  some provincial  councils.  Gratian does not 
here mention custom as a source of  Church law, but that he 
does  include  this  is  evident  from  the  passages  referred  to 
above and from a passage in another '  Distinction,'  where he 
lays down the principle that custom yields to law, but finally 
adds that when custom does not contradict the sacred canons 
or  human laws, then it is to be mai~tained.~  Clearly custom 
is,  in  his  view,  also  a  source  of  Church  law,  but  he  con- 
ceives  of  it  as being invalid, as against actual written canon 
1 Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D.  iii.  Part 
I.,  Gratianus :  "  Omnes  he  species 
Eecularium  legum  partes  sunt.  Sod 
pia constitutio  alia  est  civilis,  alia 
ecclesiastica ;  civilis  vero  forense  vel 
civil8  jus  appellatur,  quo  nomino 
ecclesiastica  constitutio  appelletur, 
videamus.  Ecclesiastics  constitutio 
nomine  canonis censetur." 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Part  II., Gratianus :  "  Porro  can- 
Onum  alii  sunt  decreta  Pontificum, 
alii  statuta  conciliorum,  conciliorum 
"er0  alia  sunt  universalia,  alia  pro- 
"incialia.  Provincialium  alia  cele- 
brant~~  auctoritate  Itomani  Pontificis 
Presente  videlicet  leg~to  sanctrc  Ro- 
man=  ecclesirc ; alia  vero  auctoritato 
Patriarcharum, vol primatum, vel mot- 
ropolitanorum ejusdem provinciz?." 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
I'art  III.,  Gratianus :  "  Officium 
vero seoularium, sive Ecclesiasticarum 
legnm est,  precipero quad necesse  est 
fieri, prohibere  quod malum  est fieri." 
Gratian, '  Decret.,'  D.  xi.  I'art  I., 
Gratianus : "  Quod vere lcgibus consue- 
tudo cedat, Ysidorus testatur in Sino- 
nimis, Lib. ii., ' Usus auctoritate cedat 
pravum usum lex et ratio vincat.'  . . . 
Part  II.,  Gratianus :  Cum  vero  nec 
sacris  canonibus,  noc  humanis  legihus 
consuetudo obvinre monstratur, incon- 
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law ;  1 we must, however, bear in mind the principle which we 
have already seen Gratian to hold, namely,  that written law 
must be approved by the custom  of  those  concerned before 
it can become law.  Canon law thus, in Gratian's treatment, 
has for its sources  the authority of  certain persons who  are 
looked  upon  as  having  legislative  authority,  the decrees  of 
councils, and custom. 
Before we consider Gratian's theory of these various sources, 
we  must be  careful to notice  once again that there is a law 
behind  the canon  law which  is  superior to it, just  as it is 
superior to the civil law.  The Scriptures and the Natural law 
represent the immediate law of God, and every law or consti- 
tution, whether civil or ecclesiastical,  which contradicts these 
is null and void.2 
We have  already considered the theory of  Natural law in 
Gratian and the other canonists13  and we need not therefore dis- 
cuss over again his theory of  this subject.  We must, however, 
again bear in mind that there are certain difficulties connected 
with  this  subject.  The canonists,  as we  have  seen,  clearly 
understand  by  the  natural  law  those  general  principles  of 
moral obligations which man is supposed to recognise by his 
reason as binding upon  him.  This natural law  is contained 
in the Scriptures, but this raises the difficulty that there are 
many laws in Scripture which are not now recognised as bind- 
ing.  Gratian  explains  this  by  the  distinction  between  the 
moral and the ceremonial aspects of  the Scriptures.  Another 
difficulty lies in the fact that while the Natural law represents 
the immutable moral principles of  the Divine law, as a matter 
Cf. p. 154, note 3. 
Gratian, '  Decret.,'  D. ix. Part I., 
Gratianus :  "  Quod ~utem  constitutio 
naturali juri cedat,multiplici auctoritate 
probatur. .  .  .  Part II.,  (after  c. 11)  Grat- 
ianus :  Cum  ergo  natilrali  jure  nihil 
aliud pr~cipitur  quam quod Dous vult 
fieri ;  nihilque vetctur quam quod Deus 
prohibet fieri ; denique cum in canonica 
scriptura  nihil  aliud  quam  in  divinis 
lrgibus  inveniutur ;  divine  vero  leges 
natura consistant, patct, quod quzcun- 
que divinao voluntati seu canonicao scrip- 
tura  contraria  probantur,  eadem  et 
naturali  juri  inveniuntur  adversa 
Unde qurecumque divina: voluntati, sou 
canonicm scripturm, seu divinis legibus 
postponenda censentur, eisdem natural0 
jus  preferri  oportet.  Constitutiones 
ergo  vel  ecclesiasticze vel  seculores,  si 
naturali  jure  contrarite  probanturt 
penitus sunt excludenda.'! 
a  See pp.  102-113. 
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of fact,  there are institutions of human society which seem to 
be  contrary to these principles.  Gratian himself  points  out 
the  but  does  not  suggest  the explanation; but 
t~,  is  done by commentators like  Rufinus,  who  distinguish 
between  the  commands  and  the  demonstrationes  of  the 
Ilptwal law,  and argue  that while  the latter represent  the 
ultimate  principles  of  moral  relations,  the actual conditions 
of human life, in virtue of  the force of  evil in human nature, 
require other regulations,  and that institutions like  property 
s,nd slavery which are on the surface contrary to the principles 
if the Natural law are really  the means by which  men  are  -- 
to  be  trained  t,o obey  it.  There  are thus rules  of  human 
conduct  which  might  seem  contrary  to the  Scriptures  and 
to  Natural  law,  but  this  contradiction  is  to be  explained 
by  such considerations  as those which  we  have mentioned ; 
subject  to  such  exceptions  it  remains  true  that  any  law, 
ecclesiastical or civil, is void, if it be contrary to natural law. 
We can now consider the nature and the relative importance 
of  those  sources  of  the  canon  law  which  we  have  already 
enumerated.  Gratian  sets  out  at length  in  the  fifteenth 
and sixteenth "  Distinctions " the place  of  general  councils, 
and  cites  several  lists  of  canons  of  local  councils  and  of 
letters  and other writings which  were  recognised  as  having 
authority  in  the  (3hurch.l  In the  seventeenth  Distinction 
he  sets out the principle that such general councils  can only 
be  summoned by the authority of  the Roman See12  and cites a 
number  of  passages  in  support of  this  view.  To enter into 
the details of the sources cited by Gratian, or to discuss  the 
question  of  the  historical  accuracy  of  his  judgment  that 
universal  councils  could  only  be  summoncd by the Roman 
See,  would  be  entirely outside  the  scope  of  this  work.  It 
is  enough  for us  to observe that Gratian is  quite clear  that 
the canons of universal councils, or works recognised by them, 
form  the first important elerrlent in the body  of  the canon 
'  Grat., ' Decret.,'  D. xv., xvi.  auctoritas caoteris prremineat Sanctorum 
P Gpatian, '  Decret.,' D. xvii. Part I.,  auctoritatibus,  supra monstratum est. 
aratianus  : "  Generalia concdia quorum  Auctoritas  vero  congregandorum  con- 
tempore  celebrata  sint,  vel  quorum  ciliorum pones Apostolicam sedom est." 170  POLITICAL  THEOEY  OF  THE CANON  LAW.   PAR^ 
law,  and that  he  is  clear that the authority of  the Pope  is 
an element in their validity. 
In  the  eighteenth  Distinction  Gratian  deals  with  th,  -- 
place of  provincial  councils or synods in the canon law, and 
he  maintains  that  these  have  in  themselves  no  power  of 
making laws, but only of  administering and enforcing thern.1 
We may take it that he means that so far as canons of  local 
councils, such as Gangrae  or Ancyra, were admitted into the 
body  of  the canon  law,  it is  only  because  they  have  been 
ratified  by  the judgment  of  some general  council or of  the 
Pope. 
We pass now to the second source of  canon law dealt with 
by  Gratian-that  is,  the decretal  letters  of  the Bishops  of 
Rome.  Gratian  deals  with  this  subject  in  the  ninetoenth 
Distinction.  He  formally  states the  question  whether  the 
decretal  letters have  authority when  they  are not found in 
the collections  of  the canon  In the first  passage he 
cites,  the  question  refers  primarily  to  the  pseudo-Isidorian 
decretals, whether, namely, these, which had not hitherto had 
any place  in the collections of  canons  current in the ninth 
century, were  to be received as having canonical authority ; 
but the question Gratian raises is not their genuineness, but 
whether,  if  taken  as  genuine,  they  are  to  be  received  as 
canons.  He treats this by citing a number of  passages from 
various Papal letters, and from the capitularics, which he takes 
as  showing  clearly  that Papal letters have  authority in the 
whole  Church.  He  therefore  concludes  that  the  decretal 
letters have  the same  authority  as  the canons  of   council^.^ 
Gratian,' Decret.,' D. xviii.  Part I., 
Gratianus : "  Episcoporurn igitur Con- 
cilia,  ut  ex  prromissis  apparet,  sunt 
invalida  ad diffiniendum  et constitu- 
endum,  non  autem  ad corrigendum. 
Sunt  enim  necossaria  Episcoporum 
Concilia  ad  exhortationem  et corrcc- 
tionem, que etsi non babent vim con- 
stituendi,  habent  tamen  auctoritatcrn 
imponendi  et  indicendi,  quod  allas 
statutum  est,  et  generaliter  seu  spe- 
cialiter  observari  prroceptum." 
8  Gratian, ' Decret.,' D. xix.  Part I., 
Gratianus : "  De epistolis vero Decret- 
alibus quoritur, an vim auctoritatis ob- 
tineant, cum in  corpore canonum non 
inveniantur." 
a  Gratian, ' Decret.,' D. xx.  Part 1.9 
Gratianus : "Decretales itaque epistolz 
canonibus  conciliorum  pari  jure  exe- 
quantur." 
D. xxi.  Part I.,  Gratianus: "~ecretis 
crgo  l%omanorum  Pontificum et sacris 
canonibus conciliorum ecclesiastic& ne' 
gotia ut supra rnonstratnm est termin- 
antur." 
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GrBtian'~  position is quite clear, but he makes one important 
qudfication.  These decretal letters have the force of  canons, 
unless they are contrary to the "  evangelical precepts " or the 
decrees  of  earlier  Fathers : a  letter  of  Pope  Anastasius II., 
violated  the law  of  the Church  and was  issued  un- 
ladully and uncanonically,  and was  contrary to the decrees 
of  ~od  and to the regulations  of  his  predecessors and suc- 
cessors,  is  repudiated  by  the Roman  Church ; and Gratian 
a  tradition  that Anastasius  was  struck  down  by  the 
Divine judgment.' 
In order, however, that we  may form a complete estimate 
of  Gratian's  judgment  on  this  subject,  we  must  take  ac- 
count of  a very important  discussion of  the whole  question 
which  we  find in the second  part of  the ' Decretum.'  The 
discussion  arises  out of  the question  how  far the Pope  has 
the  power  to  confer  upon  the  Ecclesia  baplismalis  of  a 
diocese  the right  to all  the tithes in that diocese, and how 
far, if the Pope  has  once  done this, it is  lawful for  him  to 
exempt  certain  monasteries  from  the  obligation  of  paying 
tithes  to  the  Ecclesia  baptismalis.  It  is  argued,  in  the 
first place,  that the Popes  cannot  confer  upon  the Ecclesia 
baptismalis  such  a  privilege,  inasmuch  as  according  to the 
ancient  canons the tithes are to be divided into four parts- 
one  for the bishop,  one for the clergy, one for the repairs of 
church buildings, and one for the poor.  This raises the whole 
question of the authority of  the Pope to override the ancient 
canons by the grant of  such a privilege, and this involves the 
question of  the relation of  his authority to that of  the canons. 
Gratian, ' Decretum,' D. xix. (after 
C.  7).  Gratianus : "  Hoe autem intelli- 
gendum  est  de  illis  sanctionibus  vel 
decretalibus  epistolis,  in  quibus  nec 
Precedentium  Patrum  decretis,  nec 
Ovangelicis  preceptis  aliquid  con- 
trarium  invenitur.  Anastasius  enim 
secundus favore Anastasii  imperatoris, 
quos  Acatius  post  sentantiam  in  se 
Prolatam sacerdotes vel Levitas ordin- 
averat, acceptis offitiis rite fungi debere 
decrevit,  ita inquiens."  [Here  followa 
the letter of  Anastasius 11. to the Em- 
peror.]  . . . 
Gratianus : 'L Quia ergo illicite et  non 
canonice,  sed contra docreta  Dei,  pre. 
decessorum et succcssorum suorum heo 
rescripta  dedit  (ut  probut  Felix  et 
Gelasius, qui Acatium ante Anastasium 
excommunicaverunt,  et Homisdu,  qui 
ab  ipso  Anastasio  tertius  eundem 
Acatium  postea  dampnavit)  idco  ab 
ecclesia  Romana repudiatur, et a  Deo 
percussus fuisse leg~tur  hoc modo." 172  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE CANON  LAW.   PAR^  TT, 
Gratian first cites a number of  authorities which would seem 
to show that the Pope is bound to maintain the canons.  some 
of  these are so  strong that we  shall do well  to notice  them 
before  considering Gratian's own  conclusions.  One  of  them 
is  a  passage  from  a  letter of  Pope Urban I., in which  he 
asserts very emphatically that the Roinan pontiff  has sutho- 
rity  to make  new  laws,  but  only  when  the  Lord,  or  His 
apostles,  or  the Fathers  who  followed  them,  have  not laid 
down any rule : when they have done this, the Pope cannot 
make any new law, but must rather defend these laws at the 
risk of  his life :  if  he were to endeavour to destroy that which 
they  had  taughtl, he  would  fall  into  error.  Almost  more 
emphatic is  a  fragment  from  a  letter  of  Pope  Zosirnus I., 
which  asserts that even the authority of the Roman See call 
do nothing against the statutes of  the Fathers. 
Gratian's own conclusion is stated at length at the end of 
the " question."  He begins by enumerating the reasons that 
may be urged to show that the Roman See cannot grant any 
privilegia  contrary  to  the  canons.  In reply  to  these  he 
urges  first of  all that the Pope gives validity  and authority 
to the canons, but is not bound by them; he has the authority 
to make  canons,  as  being  the head  of  all  churches,  but in 
making  canons  he  does  not  subject  himself  to them.  He 
follows  the example of  Christ,  who  both made and changed 
the law, who  taught as one who  had  authority,  and not as 
the scribes, and yet fulfilled the law in His own person.  So 
also a8t  times the Popes subject themselves to the canons; but 
at other times,  by their commands or definitions,  show them- 
selves to be the lords  and founders of  the canons.  Gratian 
therefore  interprets  the passages  which  he  has  cited  as im- 
posing upon others the necessity of  obedience, while the Popes 
may obey if they think fit.  (Pontijificibus . . . inesse auctoritas 
observandi.)  The Roman See, therefore,  should respect  what 
it has  decreed,  not through  the necessity  of  obedience,  but 
auctoritate  impertiendi.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  the 
Popes  may  grant  special  privilegia  contrary  to the  general 
law.  But again, Gratian urges, it must be remembered that, 
strictly  speaking,  such  privilegia  are not really  contrary to 
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the oanons, for the interpretation of  the law belongs  only to 
who  has the right of  making laws,  and therefore to the 
Boman  See.  In the decrees  of  some councils  it is specially 
stated  that these are issued subject to the proviso  that the 
Roman Church may ordain otherwise, or with the reservation 
of  the apostolic authority; it must therefore be  understood 
that  canonical  Pules  with respect  to tithes  or  other Church 
affairs are  made  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  Roman 
Church  to ordain or permit  otherwise.  Privilegia, therefore, 
ganted by the Roman See are not really contrary to canonical 
order. 
The Roman Church, therefore,  can issue special privilegia, 
but must, in doing this, remember to maintain equity ; privi- 
legia  should  not enrich  one  at the expense  of  many.  The 
pope  should  remember  the  saying  of  the  apostle  to  the 
corinthians  (2 Cor. viii.  13) : "  We do not wish  that others 
should  be  relieved,  and  you  distressed,"  and  the  parallel 
saying of  the sacred law of  the emperor: Rescripts obtained 
against law are to be rejected by all judges,  unless  they are 
of  such  a  kind  as to hurt no  one ; and, petition  must not 
be  made  for  things  contrary to law  and  damaging  to the 
revenue.l 
Gratian,  '  Decree.,'  C.  xxv.  Q.  1, 
Part I., Gratianus : "  Quod vero auo- 
toritate illius ~rivilegii  decimas sibi ex 
integro  clerici  vindicare  non  valeant, 
hinc  probatur :  quia  decima,  juxta 
decreta  sanctorum  Patrum  quadri- 
pertito dividuntur : quarum una pars 
episcopis,  secunda  clericia,  tertia  fab- 
ricis restaurandis, quarta vero pauperi- 
bus est assignata.  Decreta vero sanc- 
torum canonum neminem magis quem 
Apostolicum servare  oportet."  . . . 
C.  6.  Item Urbanus Papa : "  Sunt 
quidern dicentes, Romano Pontifici sem- 
Per  licuisse novas condere leges.  Quod 
et nos non solum non negamus sed etiam 
valde  affirmamus.  Sciendum  vero 
summopere est, quia inde  novas  loges 
COndere  potest,  unde  Evangelist% 
&liquid  nequaquam  dixerunt.  Ubi 
"er0  aperte Dominus, vel ejus apostoli, 
et  eos  sequentes  sancti  Patres  sen- 
tentialiter  aliquid  diffinierunt, ibi  non 
novam legem Romanus pontifex  dare, 
sed pocius quod preclicatum est usque 
ad  animam  et  sanguinem  confirmare 
debet.  Si  enim  quod  docuerunt 
apostoli  et prophetaa  destruere  (quod 
absit) niteretur,  non  sententiam  dare, 
sed  magis  errare  convinceretur.  Sed 
1100  procul  sit  ab  eis,  qui  semper 
Domini  ecclesiam  contra  luporum 
insidias  optime  custodierunt." 
C.  7.  Item Zosimus  Papa:  "Con- 
tra Patrum statuta concedere aliquid 
vel  mutare  nec  hujus  quiclem  sedis 
potest  auctoritas.  Apud  nos  enim 
inconvulsis  radicibus  vivit  antiquitas, 
cui  decreta  Patrum  sanxere  rever- 
entiam."  . . . 
Part  II.,  Gratianus :  " Si  ergo 
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It  is interesting to observe that Gratian uses  with respect 
to the Pope  the phrase of  the corpus juris ciq-il~  with regard 
to the emperor, he attributes to him the power juris  conden& 
pre  omnlbus  servare  oportet,  si  pro 
statu omnium  eccleslarum necesse est 
illam  lnplgro  vlgllare  affectu ,  sl  ea, 
que  a  Romanls  Pontlficlbus  docreta 
aunt, ab ommbus servan convenlt , SI 
1111,  qu~  nesclunt  sacrls canombus obe- 
dire,  altarlbus mlnlstrare  non debent 
patet, quod contra  statuta sanctorum 
canonum quibus status ecclcs~arum  vel 
confundentur  vel  perturbentur,  prlvl- 
legla ab apostollco concedl non debent. 
5  1. HIS  ~ta  respondetur.  Sacrosancta 
Romana  Ecclesla  ]us  et auctolitatem 
sacrls  canonlbus  ~npertit,  sed  non  els 
alllgatur.  Habet  enlm  jus  coudend~ 
canones, utpote que caput et cardo est 
omnlum  eccles~arum, a  cujus  regula 
dissentre  nemlni  licet.  Ita  ergo 
cenonlbus  auctorltatem  prestat, ut se 
lpsam  non  subjlclat  em.  Sed  slcut 
Christus, qui legem dedit, ipsam legem 
carnahter  ~nplev~t,  octava d~e  clrcum- 
cisus, quadrageslma dle cum hostns in 
temp10 presentatus, ut in se ipso eam 
sanctlficaret,  postea  vero,  ut se  dom- 
Inurn  legls  ostenderet,  contra lltteram 
legls  leprosum  tangendo  mundav~t, 
apostolos quoque  contra litteram  sab- 
bat1  per  sata  pretcrgredlentes,  spicas 
vellentes et confrlcantes manlbus  suls, 
probabll~  exemplo Davld, circumelslonis, 
et temp11 excusavlt,  dlcens, '  Non  leg- 
~stis  qmd  fecer~t  Abimclech,  quando 
vemt ad eum David, et dedit ei panes 
proposiclonis,  de  qulbus  non  llcebat 
ederc,  nlsl  solls sacerdotlbus,  et com- 
edlt ipsl  et puen  elus' . . 
"  Hmc  etlam  de eo  dlc~tur '  Erat 
Jesus  docens  tamquam  potestatem 
habens,'  ~d  est  tamquam  dommus 
legls, addens morallbus ea qua: deerant 
ad  porfectlonem,  umbram  figurallum 
in lucem splrltualls  ~ntelllgentla  com- 
mutans,  non  tamquam scrlba: eorum, 
qm  11ttera legls  astrictl  non  audebant 
ahqu~d  addere vel commutare.  SIC  et 
summa: sedls Pontlfices  canonlbus a 
slve  ab allls  sua  auctoritate condltls 
reverentlaw  exhlbent, et eis so  humlll. 
ando ~psos  custodlunt, ut allis observ- 
andls  exhibeant.  Nonnunquam  vero, 
seu jubendo, seu diffinlendo,  seu &cern. 
endo, seu allter agendo, se decretorum 
domlnos et condltores  esse  ostendunt. 
In  premlssls  ergo  capltulls  all18  lm- 
ponltur nocessltas obsequendl : summls 
vero  Pontlfic~bus ostenditur  lnesse 
auctorltas  observandl,  ut a  se  tradlta 
observando alns non contempnenda de- 
monstrent, exemplo Chr~stl  qui Sacra. 
menta, que eccleslae servanda mandavlt, 
primum  In  se lpso susceplt , ut ea in 
se  ipso  sanctlficaret.  Oportet  ergo 
primam  sedem, ut dlxlmus,  observme 
ea,  que  decernenda  mandavlt,  non 
necessitate obsequendl, sod auctorltate 
~mpertlendl. Llcet  itaque sibl  contra 
generalia  decreta  spec~alla prlvllegla 
mdulgere,  et  special1  beneficlo  con- 
oedere  quod  general1  prohibetur  de- 
creto.  5  2.  Quamquam si  decretorum 
intentlonem  dlllgenter  advertamus, 
nequaquam contra sanctorum canonum 
auctoritatem  al~quld  concedere invem- 
antur.  Sacrl  siquldem  canones  zta 
ahquld  constltuunt,  ut  sua:  ~nterpre- 
tationis  auctorltatem  sancta:  Romans 
ecclesla: reservent  Ipsl  namque  soli 
canones  valeant  ~nterpretan,  qm  JW 
condend~  eos  habent.  Unde  In  non- 
nullis  capltulls  conclllorum,  cum  all- 
quld  observandum  decernltur,  statim 
submfertur . '  Nlsi auctorltas Roman= 
eccleslae mperavcrlt alltcr,' vel, '  salvo 
tamen  In  omnlbus  apostollca  auc- 
tor~tate  ' 
" Quecumque  ergo  de  declmls  vel 
qu~buslibet  eccles~astlcls  nego~l~s  sacrls 
canonlbus d~ffimuntur,  lntoll~genda  sunt 
necessario servarl,  msi  auctorltas 
mana:  eccleslae  aliter  fieri mandaverlt 
vel permlserlt.  Cum ergo ellqua pnv- 
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ifi~er~~eto~tdi,  and  that he  probably  has  in  his  mind  also 
the  legal  doctrine  that  the  emperor  is  not  subject  to the 
This does not mean  that Gratian borrows these  con- 
ceptions from the civil law, but that he finds in these phrases 
of  the civil law terms convenient to express that conception 
,f  the legislative authority of  the Pope,  and of  his relations 
to Church law, which he judges to be true.  It would be quite 
incorrect to suppose that  these  canonists  constructed  their 
conception of  the legislative authority of  the Popes by imi- 
tating the civil law ; that conception was,  as we  have seen, 
earlier than the new  critical  study of  the ciyil law in 
the twelfth  century,  but this  systematic  study  assisted the  "-- 
canonists  like  Gratian  to find  suitable  terms  and  phrases 
under which to express their conceptions. 
Gratian,  then,  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  Pope  has  an 
&uthority which  is  legislative  as  well  as  judicial.  But  it 
is important  to understand  what  is,  in Gratian's  view,  the 
nature  of  this  legislative  authority  of  the  Church  and 
the  Pope,  and  how  it  is  related  to other  authorities.  In 
one  passage  he  raises  an  interesting  question  with  regard 
to  the relation  of  the canons of  the Church  and the inter- 
preters  of  Scripture.  The  authority  of  these  depends upon 
their  spiritual  enlightenment,  upon  their  knowledge  and 
wisdom, and in this respect, as Gratian says, it may be urged 
that the works of such Fathers as St Augustine or St Jerome 
llegla  ab  Apostollco  dlqulbus  con-  vando ~ta  divltem faclant, ut multorum 
~eduntur,  etsi contra generalem legem  detrlmenta  non  clrcumsplclendo,  in 
allquld  sonare  vldeantur,  non  tamen  paupertatis  mlserlam  nonnullos  de 
contra lpsam  allqnld  concedere  mtel  llolant,  lllud  apostoll  ad  memorlam 
kuntur, rum  ip.sms leg15  auctorltate  revocanteq, quod ad Chorlntlos scribens 
Prlvllegla  slngulorum  penes  matrem  ait  ' Non  enlm  volumus  ut ahls sit 
Omnium  ecr,leslarum  reserventur  .  .  remlsslo, vobls autem tribulatlo.'  CUI 
" 1  4  Valet ergo ut ex premlsslq col  sarra  lex  prlnclpum  ooncordans  alt : 
lkgltm, sancta  Eomana ecclesla  quos  '  Rescrlpta contra  us eliclta ab omnibus 
libet SluS  prlvlleglls munlro,  et extra  ~udlclbus  prec~p~mus  refutarl, nlsl forte 
gerleralla decreta quadam speclall hene-  allquld  est,  quod  non  ledat  ahum  et 
"lo  mdulgero, conslderata tameu ratl-  proslt  petent~,  vel  crlmen supphcantl- 
Onls equltate, ut que mater justlcla? est.  bus  indulgeat '  (Cod , l  19,  7).  5  5. 
In null0 ab ea dlisentlre ~nvenlatur,  nt  Item constitutio imperatons  ad popu- 
privlleb?a vldellcet,  que  ob  rellglon~s,  lum  '  nec  da~npnosa  fixo,  nec  jurl 
neCessltatis,  vel  exhlbltl  obsequn  contrsrla  postularl  oportet "'  (Cod., 
gratlarn  conccduntur,  rremnlenl  rele  I  19  3). 176  POLITICAL  THEORY  OP  THE  CANON  LAW.  [PART 
are superior to those of  some of  the Popes.  Does this mean 
that the sayings  of  these Fathers hare an authority greater 
than  that  of  the  Papal  decrees  or  judgments?  Gratian 
replies by pointing out the distinction between knowledge and 
jurisdiction,  and urges that in determining legal cases not only 
knowledge but jurisdiction  is necessary, and thus while some 
interpreters of  Scripture may equal the Popes in knowledge, 
they  are inferior  to them in  authority  mith  regard  to the 
decision of  legal cases.l  Gratian does not, so far as we have 
seen,  draw  this  out in  a  complete  analysis  of  the  various 
aspects  of  the authority  of  the Church,  but the  discussion 
is sufficient to prove to us that Gratian does not look upon 
the authority of  Church  lam  as being  of  precisely  the same 
nature as the authority of  Church doctrine. 
This does not mean that the canon law has not authority 
over  all  Christian  men.  On  the  contrary,  the  man  who 
refuses to accept and to obey it is said in a passage of  a letter 
of  Pope  Leo  IV.,  quoted  by  Ivo in  the  ' Decretum'  and 
' Panormia,' and by Gratian, to be convicted of  not holding the 
faith.2 The canons, then, are binding upon  all Christian men, 
Gratlan, '  Decret ,' D  xx  Part I., 
Grat~anus  "  Decretales  xtaque  epls- 
tola  canonibus  conc~liorum  par1  lure 
exequantur  Nunc  autem  querltur 
de  exposltor~bus  sacrao  scr~ptura  an 
euequentur, an subj~clantur  els ?  Quo 
enim  qmsque magis ratione nit~tur  eo 
majorls  auctoritatis  ejus  verba  esse 
vldentur.  Plurlml autem tractatorum 
slcut  plenlori  gratia  spir~tus  sanct~, 
~ta  amphon sclentla  dns precellentes, 
ration1  magis  adhesisse  probantur 
Unde  nonnullorum  Pontlficum  con- 
stitutls Augustlni,  Jerornm~  atquo ali- 
orum  tractatorum  dlcta  els  v~dentur 
esse preferenda " 
Part I1  " Sed ahud est causls ter- 
mlnum lmponere ahud scripturar sacras 
dlligenter  exponorc  Negot~ls diffinl- 
cndis non aolum cst necessar~a  sc~entxa 
sed  etlam  potest~s  Undo  Chrlstus 
dlcturus Pstro, '  Quodcunque lxgaverls 
super terrnm, er~t  llgatum et In ccelis,' 
etc , prlus  dedlt sib~  claves regnl cml- 
orum ,  m  altera  dans  el  sclentiam 
dlscernendl lntra lepram et lepram, m 
altera  dans  s~bx  potestatem  ejlclendt 
aliquos  ab  Ecclesia  vel  reclpiend]. 
Cum  ergo  quellbet  ncgotla  finem 
acc~piant vel  in  absolut~one Inno- 
centium,  vel  in  condenlpnatione  de. 
linquentium,  absolut~o  vero  vel 
condempnatio  non  sclentiam  tantnm, 
sed  etlam  potestatem  presidontlum 
des~dernnt  :  aparet,  quod  dlvlnarum 
Scnpturarum tractatores,  ets~  sclentla 
Pont~ficlbus  prommant,  tamen, 
dign~tat~s  eortun  aplcem  non  Bunt 
adeptl,  In  sacrarum  scnpturarum  OX' 
pos~tion~bus  els preponuntur, in c"U9lS 
7 ero  diffin~encl~s  secundum  p056  eoS 
locum merentur.' " 
IVO,  '  Decretum,' iv.  72 . 
" QUnm 
ob  causam  luculenter  et magrlJ  'OLe 
pronuntlare  non  tlmeo,  qula  q111  illa 
quae  d~scimus  sanctorum patrum  btat. 
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but  again  Gratian  makes  an interesting  observation  upon 
their  nature : they are indeed  authoritative,  but they exist 
for certain  definite  reasons,  and when  these  cease  to exist 
then  the laws  also  cease.  Gratjan gives  as  an example  the 
rule  that laymen  may not be  elected  as bishops, 
as a matter of fact various great saints, like St Ambrose 
and  others,  were  chosen  as  bishops  while  they  were  still 
laymen.  He concludes  that the reason  of  the rule was  that 
the  layman,  not  having  been  trained  in  the  ecclesiastical 
discipline, cannot well teach it to others:  when, however,  a 
layman  was  superior  in  the  character  of  his  life  to  the 
ecclesiastics, as was  the case with St Ambrose, the rule was 
not binding.l 
Such, then, in its main outlines,  is  the theory of  Gratian 
with regard to the canon law.  Its sources are the custom of  - 
the Church, and the authoritative promulgation of  rules and 
laws  of  ecclesiastical  order  by  general  councils  or  by  the 
Popes.  Behind these there lies the authority of  the Natural 
law  and  of  the Scriptures : these may be  represented in the 
canons, but are not to be confused with the canons ; they are 
rather the norm by which  the validity of  any canon may be 
tested.  The canons of  the Church belong to  the same category 
as the civil law of the State ;  they do not represent an absol- 
utely  final  authority, but  are rather  the  expression  of  the 
authority residing in the Church and its proper officers for the 
uta,  quae  apud  nos  canoncs  pratltu- 
lantur, sive sit episcopus, slve clerlcus, 
ave  lalcus,  non  ind~fferenter recipere 
lpse  convlnc~tur noc  cathollcam  et 
apostol~cam fidem,  nec  sancta  vera 
Chnstl  evangella  cluatuor  ut~llter  et 
eEcaclter, et ad effectum (profectum) 
8uum retlnere vel  credere." 
Cf  Pal ,'  11  118,  and  Gratlan, 
IDeo  9'  xx  1  From a letter of Leo 
IV  '' Eplscopls Brlttanlz " 
Cratlan, 'Decret ,' D  1x1  (after c. 
Gratianus  "  Hlr  omnlbus  auc- 
torltatlbus  lalc~  proh~bentur  in  epls- 
Copaturn ellgl  . . . 
Part 11. 5 1  "E contra B  N~colaus 
lal~o  est  electus  In  eplscopum,  B 
VOL.  II. 
Severus ex cnrnificlo aqsumptus eat In 
archiepiscopum,  B.  Arnbroslus,  cum 
nondum  esset  baptizntus,  in  archl- 
eplscopum est electus  5 2  Sed sclen- 
dum  est,  quod  eccleslastlcae  p~ohlbi- 
t~ones  plopr~as  habent causas,  qu~bus 
cessantibus cessant et ~psz Ut enim 
lalous In eplscopum non eligeretur, llec 
causa  fult,  qula  vlta  lalcalir  ecclesl- 
asticls  dlsciplinls  per  ordinem  non 
erudlta,  nesclt  exempla  relig~on~s  cie 
$e prastare alns, qule In se lpsa expert- 
manto non d~dic~t.  Cum exgo qull~bet 
lalcus  rnerlto  SUB  perfectlonls  clen- 
calem  vltam  transcendlt,  exemplo  B. 
N~colai et  Sevon  et  -Irnbros~i, e)us 
clectio potest  rata habere " 
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government  of  the society,  subject always  to the authority 
which  lies  behind  the society.  Rut they  are binding  upon 
all the members of  the society; to refuse to obey them is to 
refuse  to recognise  the  authority  of  God,  from whom  this 
authority is derived. 
We must now  examine the commentators  on Gratian and 
the other canonical works  down to the Decretsls,  and con- 
sider  how far these carry on or modify  the views  expressed 
by Gratian. 
The  first  of  these  commentators  is  Paucapalea? whose 
' Summa ' on Gratian's ' Decretum ' seems to  have been written 
not many years after the ' Decretum ' itself.  He begins  his 
work  with  a  description  of  the  origin  of  law,  general  and 
ecclesiastical.  This is in the main a summary of  Gratian, but 
it is worth while considering, for it brings out very distinctly 
the main aspects of  the subject.  Ecclesiastical law,  he says, 
is  to be  divided  into natural,  mitten, and customary  law. 
Natural law is contained in the "  Law and the Gospel,"  and 
commands men to do to each other as they would  be  done 
by.  This  law began  with  the rational  creation,  is  supreme 
over all law, and is immutable.  Customary law began later, 
when  men first  came together, "  when  Cain is  said to have 
built a city,"  and it was renewed after the Flood, in the time 
of  Nimrod.  Written constitutions began with the regulations 
which  God  gave  to Moses  with  regard  to the  condition of 
the Hebrew  slave.  The law of  the Church  began  with  the 
"  decreta " of  the holy fathers and the " statuta " of  councils. 
After the Apostles came  the supreme Pontiffs and the holy 
fathers, who had authority to make canons, for till the time 
of  Pope  Sylvester  it was  impossible  for  councils  to meet; 
after that time the bishops  of  the Church began to meet  in 
councils  and to issue  their decrees.  The decrees,  whether 
councils or of  the Holy Fathers, have the same subject matter, 
namely, ecclesiastical orders and causes.l 
1 l'aucapalea,  '  Summa Decrct.,'  In-  tur, quo tempore horum guodque C@' 
troduetion :  "  De  origine  vero  juris  perit,  rncrito  quaeritur.  ~atural~  jUs' 
restat  dicendum.  Sed  quia  ecclesias-  quod in Icge et in evangelio continetur' 
ticorum  jurum  aliud  naturale,  aliud  quo  prohibetur  quisque  alii  inferre' 
scriptum, aliud consuctudinariurn  dici-  quod  sibi  nolit  fieri,  et jubetur  @lii 
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Tllis summary is interesting, not because it modifies in any 
important  point  the  principles  of  Gratian,  but  because  it 
brings out clearly the mode in which he was understood.  In 
the  first  place,  it is  noticeable that Paucapalea looks  upon 
canonical law  as  having  the same  varieties  as  secular  law. 
Canon law is not to be identified with Natural law.  A part 
of it is so, and that part is prior to and superior to all others. 
In the second place, it is very noticeable that Paucapalea looks 
upon  custom  as having a  place  in Church law.  And again, 
paucapalea recognises the decrees of  the Pontiffs and Fathers 
as  having  the  same  canonical  authority  as  the  decrees  of 
councils, and as even preceding them in point of time. 
The only other matter of  importance in Paucapalea's treat- 
ment of  the theory of  canon law is a brief  discussion  of  the 
facere quod vult sibi fieri,  ab exordio 
rationalis  creaturz  ccepit,  et  inter 
omnia primatum  obtinet ; nu110  enirn 
variatur  tempore, sed immutabile per- 
manet.  Consuetudinis autem jus  post 
naturalem  legem  exordium habuit,  ex 
quo  homines  in  unum  convenientes 
cceperunt  simul  habitare,  quod  ex eo 
factum croditur tempore,  ex quo Cain 
edificasse civitatem legitur.  Quod cuni 
propter hominum raritatem diluvio fere 
videatur  exstinctum  postea  tempore 
Nemroth  immutatum  sive  reparatum 
Potius existimatur,  cum ipse  una cum 
aliis coepit alios opprimere, alii propria 
imbecillitate  eorum  cceperunt  ditioni 
ease  subditi.  .  . .  Sed  et  scriptz 
Constitutionis  origo  ab  institutioni- 
bus capit, quas dominus Moysi dedit, 
dicens, '  cum tibi venditus fuerit frater 
tuus hobrzus aut hebr~a  et vi.  annos 
'ervierit  tibi,  in  vii.  anno  dimittes 
eum  liberurn.'  . . . Hanc  et  alias 
divinas  iustitutiones  genti  Hebraez 
'~yses  primus  omnium  saeris  libcris 
explicavit.  Ostenso  constitutionum 
d'vinarum  &C  consuetudinis,  naturalis 
pUOque  juris  exordio, nunc de decretis 
"lud  videndum  est,  quod primo sanc- 
torum Patrum decreta, inde eonciliorum 
condi oceperunt.  Post apostolos 
namque  summi  pontifiees  et  sancti 
patres,  penes  quos condendi  canonum 
erat auotoritas, continuo sibi successer- 
unt.  Non tamen eis fuit licentia  con- 
vocandi  concilia ;  usque  ad tempora 
beati Silvestri papse concessa est.  Qui, 
dum  sub  Constantino  imperatore  in 
abditis  Sirapei  montis  latitarot,  per 
ipsum imperatorem  revocatus est, sic- 
que  imperator per  eum  conversus  et 
christianissimus factus licentiam  eccle- 
sias  aperiendi  et  christianos  ibidem 
conveniendi  concessit ; atque ex tunc 
pontifices  in unum  convenire,  concilia 
celebrare  et eonciliorum  decreta  con- 
dare  caperunt.  Sub hoc enim sancti 
patres  in  concilio  Nicaeno.  . . . Quae 
omnis tam  eonciliorum quam sanctorum 
patrum decreta communom habent ma- 
teriam,  ecclesiasticos  videlicet  ordines 
et  dignitates atque  eorurn causas.  Com- 
muuem  qaoque  habent  intentionem, 
ostendere  scil.  (qui  siut)  ecclesiastici 
ordines,  et qui provehendi  ad ipsos, et 
quod officium cujusque, quse etiam ec- 
clesiastiew dignitates, et quibus et per 
quos conferendz, et qualiter in iis viv- 
endum.  De ecclesiasticis quoque causis, 
apud quos et per quos sint tractandse. 
Ecce quae materiz et quae generalis de- 
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relative  value  of  different  authorities  in  the  Church : this 
occurs in connection with a difference of  opinion between  st 
Jerome  and St Augustine  as to the ordination  of  those who 
had been twice married, once before and once after baptism. 
Paucapalea solves the question by citing a sentence which he 
thinks comes from St Isidore, in which it is said that if there 
is a difference between two councils, that council should pre- 
vail which is the older, or has greater authority;  and that the 
authority of  the Pope  (apostolicus) or  of  bishops  is  greater 
than that of  a presbyter, even though the persona1 merit of 
the presbyter may be higher.l 
We turn to Rufinus and Stephen of  Tournai.  And first we 
must recall to our reader that very elaborate and careful dis- 
cussion of  the subject of  natural law by Rufinus, with which 
we  have  already  dealt.  Rufinus  holds  that the natural law 
is  to be  identified  with  that moral  principle  which  bids  a, 
man  do  what  is  right  and  avoid  what  is  evil.  It  is  this 
principle,  of  which  man  had  in  part  lost  his  knowledge 
through  the fall, which  was  again  set  up,  incompletely,  in 
the Ten  Commandments,  and perfectly in the Go~pel.~  It 
is therefore in its essence immutable,  and it is supreme over 
all systems of  law,3 and no dispensations  against it  can be 
granted, unless in some extreme case of  ne~essity.~ 
1 Paucapalea,  '  Summa Decret.,'  D. 
xxv~.  : "  Hujusn~od~  verocontrar~etates 
beatus  Ysldorus  determmare  v~detur, 
cum a~t  :  Quotlens In  gestls  concllio- 
rum  d~scors  sententla  mven~tur,  illlus 
conclln magis teneatur sententla, cujus 
et  antlqu~or  aut  pot~or  extat auctontas. 
Sed potlor  est auctoritas  apostohcl  et 
pontlficum,  llcet  merlta  poss~nt  esse 
dlversa,  quam presbyter] ; magls ergo 
eorum sontontlao  standum est." 
a  See pp.  103 and 106. 
a  Rufinus, ' Summa Decret ,' D  IX , 
'6  G  Llq  ~glt.'  : In hac d~stmctlone  pro- 
sequltur, quomodo jus  naturale constl- 
tutlonls  jun  praoscr~bat  :  quecunque 
en~m  leges  ~mperatorum, quecunque 
scnpta auctorum,  quecunque  exempla 
sanctorum contraria aunt JU~I  natural1 : 
lpsa omnla vana et  lr11ta sunt habenda. 
C.  3 :  canonlcam  scrlpturam  veterls 
et novl  testament1 instltuta naturalla 
dlclt." 
Rufinus, '  Summa Decret.,' D  x1n.t 
'l '  Item adv. jus  nat.' : Demon5travlt 
supenus, quomodo jus naturale d~fferat 
a  constitutlone et a  consuetudlne  dl6- 
nitate ,  nunc aperit, qual~ter  ab eledem 
dlscrepet sententle ngore . qulppe con- 
tra naturale, exaudlas, quoad 
et prohlbltlones,  nulla  dlspensatlo tol- 
loratur.  Quod In  1110  cap~tulo  ~nsln~' 
atur quod alt : '  Coterum consuetudln' 
et  const~tutioni proprlus  sepe  rigor 
subtrahitur' , ut lnfra habetnr : 's'cut 
quedam' .  . .  'm31 duo mala ~ta  urgeant, 
etc.  Maglster  Grat~anus  SIC  dlclt 
quas~  allquls s~c  perplexus sit allquandO 
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Canon law, according to Rufinus, arose with the growth of 
church, and the need of  order and of  the adjustments of 
disputes between  ecclesiastical persons,  for which the Gospel 
did  not  sufficiently  provide.  Regulations  were  made  for 
these  purposes  by  the  apostles  and  their  vicars  and  the 
other ministers of the Church, and these are called canons.= 
Stephen  of  Tournai  uses  the  phrase  jus  Divinum  some- 
times  in the same  sense as Gratian, but sometimes  he also 
uses it to describe the whole body of  Ecclesiastical law.  EI~  is 
aware that Gratian uses  the phrase  as equivalent to the jw 
natumle,  and in this  sense  he  distinguishes  it from  the jus 
canonicum, but in one  place  he  speaks of  property  existing 
by  the  jus  Divinum  or  by  the jus  canonicum,  "which  is 
Divine."  He explains  this,  however,  by  saying that while 
by  the jus  Divinum,  that is  the jus  naturale,  there  is  no 
private  property,  by  the jus  canonum,  which  is  made  by 
men,  but with the inspiration  of  God,  there is such a thing 
as  private  pr~perty.~  It  seems  clear  that  he  agrees  with 
Gratian  that,  in  the  primary  sense,  canon  law  is  not  the 
same  as  the jus  Divinum,  but  he  suggests  that it may  be 
called  a  part of  this in some  secondary sense,-it  has been 
made  with  the  inspiration  of  God.  In another  passage  he 
Inter  duo  mala,  ut non  possit  vltare 
alterum,  quln  dellnquat.  Exempll 
causa  joravit quldam homo lnterficere 
fratrem suum." 
Rufinus, '  Summa Decret.,'  Przf. . 
"Demquo  cum  auctore  Deo  ecclesla 
cresreret g~adusque  In ea disponerentu~ 
et  ord~nes  et tam In  els  dlscernendls 
4uam  In  litlbus  Inter  eccIeslastlcas 
Personas provementibus sedandls evan- 
gellum sufficere non blderetur, tam ab 
aP'J5t~l~s  quam  ab eorum  vlcarns nec 
"0"  cetcrls  ecclesie  rnlmstrls  multa 
addlta,  que,  het mult~modo  in 
'pecle  appelle~~tur,  uno  tamen  gene- 
'"11  vocabulo  nuncupantur . quod est 
C&nones." 
stephen of  Tournai,  '  Summa De- 
Oret  ,' D. vln.  l :  "'Nonne jure hum.' 
ergo  per  ~niqultatem aut  ]us 
humanum inlquum est.  Unde vldetur 
contra  mfra (C. XI].  q.  1.  c.  2).  Ibl 
enim  dlcltur :  per  inlqultatem  hoc 
allus  dlxlt  suum  esse,  allus  ]stud. 
Sed  I~I  vocat  inlqultatem  con- 
suetudlnem  ju~is gentium  naturah 
zequltatl  contranam.  Item  videtur 
lnc  dlci,  quia  solo  jure  humano  hoc 
meum  et illud  tuum,  et ita n~hll  est 
proprlum.  Jure dlvino vel jure  etlam 
canonlco,  quod  dlvinum  est,  et pre- 
scrlptlones  et  all=  acqu~s~tlones  et 
lnducuntur  et  confirmantur.  Unde 
potest  dlcl,  Jure divlno,  I e.  naturalr, 
111h1l  est  proprlum,  jure  autem  can- 
onum,  quod  ab  homln~bus, quamvls 
tamen  deo  Insplrante,  Inventurn  est. 
ahquld proprlum est.  Unde et human- 
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uses  the  phrase  jus  Divinum  to describe  the  whole  body 
of  religious  law,  whether  pre-Christian or  canonical,  and in 
discussing  the origin  of  this  system  of  law he  says that it 
began with the beginning of  the world, and describes Adam's 
charge  against  his  wife  as  marking  the  beginning  of  the 
legal  process.  Others,  he  says,  have  held  that the  organ- 
isation of  judicial proceedings  began with tlhe law of  Moses ; 
but  others  again  begin  the treatment  of  the jus  Divinunz 
with the primitive Church.  When persecution  ceased, under 
Constantine,  the Fathers  of  the Church  began  to meet  to. 
gether in councils  and to enact canons for the regulation of 
ecclesiastical affairs.l 
This is followed by a description of  the various authorities 
from whom canon law has proceeded, and we must now con- 
sider this aspect of  the theory of  Stephen and Rufinus. 
Some ecclesiastical laws,  Rufinus  says,  are the decrees of 
the greater  councils  of  Nice,  Constantinople,  Ephesus,  and 
Chalcedon;  others,  of  lesser  councils;  others,  again,  are 
Apostolic canons, or decrees of  pontiffs,  or they represent the 
authority  of  the  expositors  of  Scripture.  The  decrees  of 
the  four  greater  councils  and  the  Apostolic  canons  can 
under  no  circumstances  be  violated,  except  by way  of  re- 
laxation  of  their rigour  against  certain  persons  and against 
certain  offences,  and  he  cites  by  way  of  illustratioll  the 
Nicene  canon  against  the  ordination  of  the  man who  has 
l Stephen of  Tournai,  L  Summa De- 
cret.,'  Introduct~on  : "  De jure  autem 
dlvlno  d~cendum  est.  et qmdem  lm- 
prlm~s  de  orlglne  ipslus  et processu. 
D~vinl  jurls  onglnem  quidam  a  pnn- 
ciplo  mundi  coeplsse  d~cnnt.  Cum 
enim Adam  de lnobed~ent~a  argneretur 
a  domino,  quasi  act~oni  excopt~onem 
objlciens  relatlonem  cnmlnis  In  con- 
jugem,  lmmo  In  conjugls  auctorem 
convert~t  dicens.  ' Muller quam ded~stl 
m1111 soclam, ipsa me decip~t  et comedl.' 
Slcque l~tlgandi,  vel, ut vulgariter dica- 
mus, placitandi forma in lpso paradlso 
vldetur  exorta.  A111  dlcunt,  judic~o- 
rum ordlnem a veter~  lege lrutlurn habu- 
lsse I  Ait enim Moyses in lege : 'In ore 
duorum  vel  tr~um  testium  stat omne 
verbum.'  In  novo quoque testamento 
Paulus  apostolus  a~t  :  'Seculana  l@- 
tur judlcia  SI  habuer~tis,  contemtiblles 
qui sunt in ecclcsia, 1110s const~tu~te  ad 
ludlcandum.'  Aln  compendios~us  0'' 
d~entes  dlvlnl juns a prim~t~va  sumunt 
ecclesla.  Cum enim cessante martyrurn 
persecutione ecclesla resplrare ceplsset 
sub Constantlno  ~mperatore,  cceperunt 
patres  secure convenlre,  concllla  colB- 
brsre  et In  eis pro dlvers~tate  ne60t1- 
orum eccleslast~corum  dlversos canones 
ediderunt et scnpserunt." 
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been  twice  married,  and the  Apostolic  canon  that  a  pres- 
byter guilty of fornication must be deposed.  But whilst the 
of  these authorities cannot generally be  altered, 
it is  different with regard  to that which  they permit.  The 
Nicene  council,  for example,  permitted  priests  to live  with 
their wives,  a thing now prohibited (apud nos).  The decrees 
of  the  lesser  councils,  of  the  pontiffs,  and  the  judgments 
of  the expositors  of  Scripture can,  for sufficient  reason,  be 
changed by the supreme Pa6riarch.l 
Stephen's treatment is similar, but rather more detailed and 
different in  some  respects.  After  describing  the  origin  of 
ecclesiastical law in the passage we have just  quoted, he goes 
on  to  distinguish  between  general  and provincial  councils : 
General  councils  are  those  which  include  bishops  from  all 
parts  of  the world,  and are held in the presence of  the Pope 
or  his  legate,  while  provincial  councils  are the meetings  of 
the bishops of  a province summoned by the primate or arch- 
bishop.  The  canons  of  general  councils  must  be  obeyed 
everywhere,  those  of  provincial  councils  are  only  binding 
1 Rufinus, ' Summa Decret ,' D. xlv. 
c.  2. "'Slcut  quedam sunt quae  nulla 
ratione  convelli  possunt,  ~ta  multa 
sunt  que  aut  pro  necess~tate tem- 
porum,  aut pro consideratlone  etatum 
oporteat  temperan,  illa  semper  con- 
dltione  servata,  ut  in  his  que  vel 
dubla fuerint aut obscure, ~d  noverlinus 
Requcndum  quod  nec  preoeptls  evan- 
gel~cis contrar~nm,  noc  decretls  sanc- 
torum  patrum  lnven~atur  adversum.' 
Non  solum  de  scriptura  N.  T.  hoc 
lnhlhgendnm  est,  que  ex  nulla  dls- 
Pensatlone  potest  convell~,  sed  etlam 
de  qulbusdam  inst~tut~onibus  ecclesi- 
&stlcls  Instltutlonum namque ecclesl- 
aqtlcorum  que  m  decretorum  serle 
Contlnentur, alie sunt conclha patrum, 
llla  sell  majora-Nlcenum,  Con- 
stantmopolitanum,  Effesinum,  Calce- 
dOnonse-vel  cetera m~nora  , alie sunt 
Canones  apostolorum ,  ahe  decreta 
pontlficum ,  alle  auctor~tates  exposl- 
torum.  Illa  lgltur  quattuor  majora 
conclha  et  canones  aposloloium  m 
nullo casu mutilar~  possunt nlsi quando 
rlgore  magno  aliquid statuunt In  per- 
sonas.  . . . [Rufinus  cltes  the Nlcene 
prohibition  of  the  ordination  of  the 
Imgamus,  and  the  regulation  of  the 
Apostolic  canons,  that  a  presbyter 
guilty of  formcation  must be deposed. 
111ose rlgorous canons have been modi- 
fied.]  Quod vero  preter  hunc  casum 
suprad~ctas  constltutlones dicimus lm- 
mutari  non  posse,  exaudlendum  est 
111  preceptionibus.  Serus  est  ~n per- 
mlss~onlbus  ,  perm161t  enim  N~cena 
synodus,  ut  sacerdotes  suis  ntantur 
uuoribus,  juxta  lllud  '  Nlcena '  D~st. 
xxx~.,  c.  12,  hod~e  tamen  apud  nos 
prohibetur,  ut in  eadem  Distlnct~one 
plerumque reporltur.  Do~iique  minor& 
concilia,  decreta  pontillcum,  aucton- 
tates  cxpos~torum  auctoritate  spec~ah 
summl  patrlarche  causa  fac~ente  lm. 
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upon those who  are under the jurisdiction  of  the bishops O~ 
the  province.  Among  the  general  councils  there  are  four 
which are pre-eminent, those of  Nice, Ephesus, Chalcedon, and 
Constantinople : their authority is almost equal to that of  the 
Gospels.  The name canon belongs properly to the decree 
assemblies of  bishops.  By "  decreta " are meant those decrees 
on  Church  matters  which  the Pope gives in writing in  the 
presence and with the authority of  the cardinals.  "  Deeretalip, 
epistola " is a letter which the Pope writes to some bishop or 
ecclesiastical  judge  who is in doubt, and who has asked the 
advice of  the noman Church.  Canons are called " decreta 
and " decreta " canons.  These  me the ordinances by which 
ecclesiastical  affairs  must  be  decided.  The  order  of  the 
authority of  these rules should be  carefully  considered : the 
first place is held by the evangelical precepts, nest come the 
sayings  of  the  apostles,  then  the  before-mentioned  four 
councils,  then  the  other  councils,  then  the  decreta  and 
decretales Epistol~,  and last the sayings of  the holy Fathers 
-St  Ambrose, St Augustine, St Jerome, and others.  In cases 
of  difference between these, it is important to remember that 
they may be  arranged under four heads-counsels,  precepts, 
permissions,  and prohibitions ; and  even  the  precepts  and 
prohibitions  are  not  all  alike,-some  are  perpetual,  some 
changeeb1e.l 
Stephen of  Tournal, '  Sunima De- 
cret.,'  Introduct~on  :  "  Conciliorum 
autcm alia sunt generaha,  alla provm- 
cial~a. Generaha dicuntur, quae ln pre- 
sentla domini papa  vel ejus legatl, vlcenl 
lpsius gerentis, convocatls universal~ter 
eplscopis  ceterisque  praelatis  ecclesia, 
celebraiitur.  Prov~ncialia sunt,  qua, 
a  primate  sive  arch1epi5copo  aliquo, 
convocatis ad hoc suffraganeis tantum 
sus, in provincia fiunt.  In  generalibus 
canones  edlti  ad omnes  ecclesias  vlm 
suam generalltcr extendunt, et qui eos 
non observant pro t~ansgressoribus  hab- 
entur.  Qui  autem canones m  provln- 
cialibus  edit1  fuer~nt conciliis,  pro- 
vinciam  non  egrediuntur,  nec  alios 
coercent,  nisi  qm  ]ur~sdlctionx  illorum 
eomprovinclal~um  ep~scoporum sub- 
J~CLI sunt.  Inde  est  etiam  quod 
canonum  a111  dicuntur  generales,  1 e. 
111  general1  conc~lio  prod~ti,  ahi  pro- 
vinciales,  i e.  In  provlnclali  9ynod~ 
promulgati.  Inter genolal~a  vero con- 
cilia  1111.  sunt  principalia,  quam  fere 
evangeln~ eomparantur :  Nl~znum~ 
Effeslnum,  Chalcedonense  et Constan- 
tlnopolitanum.  Proprie  ergo  dlcun- 
tur canones, qui In conclll~s  auctorltato 
multorum  eplscopum  promulgantur 
Decreta  sunt,  quze  domlnus  aPo~tol1. 
eus  super  al~quo  negotio  ecclcsia~tlCo 
praesentibus  crtrdlnalibus  et  auctorl- 
tatem  suam  przstanttbus  constltuit 
et  In  scripturn  redlgit.  ~ecret~ll~ 
eplstola est quam dominus apostollcus 
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stephen's discussion is notable specially for its definition of 
the  of  papal decreta and decretalia,  and for its classi- 
fication of  the authority of the various canonical rules.  The 
definition of  the papal canons is interesting, and probably of 
some  importance,  but we  have  not found  any parallel  dis- 
cussion of  it in the works  which  we  are now  treating.  As 
to the circumstances under which the canons may be altered, 
he  discusses this point  in much  the same terms as Rufinus. 
~ha;t  which is contained in the Gospels, in the words of  the 
apostles  and in  the  four general  councils,  and  that  which 
belongs  to  the  articles  of  the faith, without  which  a,  man 
cannot  be  saved,  these  things  cannot  be  altered;  other 
rules  may be  changed, but not  these.  Yet  there 
are  some  possible  modifications  of  the  canons  of  general 
councils,  and even  of  the  apostolic  canons.  On  this  point 
there is no difference between him and l3ufinus.l 
Canon law, then, if we  omit for a moment the regulations 
which  are directly taken from the Scriptures, represents the 
legislative authority of the Church and of  the Roman See, but 
that legislative authority is not entirely free and unhampered. 
Rufinus points out that there is one very important difference 
between  secular  and ecclesiastical  law-that  is,  that while 
in  secular  jurisprudence  new  laws  always  override  the  old, 
this is not the case in ecclesiastical law, for, on the contrary, 
al~quo  episcopo vel  aho judice  ecclesi- 
astico  supe~  aliqua  causa  dubltanto 
et  ecclesiam  Romnnam  consulonte, 
reiic~~blt  et  ei  transmittit.  Indiffer- 
enter  tamen  et canones  decreta et e 
converso decreta  canones  appellantur. 
Hacc  sunt, q~ubus  ec~lesiast~ca  negotia 
et tractari habent et terminari.  HZC 
tamen  In  decisiono  causarum  ecclesi- 
a8tlcarum  dil~gentla est  tenenda,  ut 
Prlmum quidem locum obt~neant  evan- 
gellca  praecepta,  quibus  cessantibus 
aPostolorum  dicta,  deinde  quatuor 
Pradlcta  concilia,  postea  concllia 
rellqua,  tandem  decreta  et decretales 
ePlstolae , ultimo loco succedunt verba 
san~torum  patrum  Amhrosi~,  Augus- 
t'~<,  Hieronyml  et allorurn.  Et hsec 
omnla aunt communis matoria omnium 
do  lure  divlno  tractantlum.  Quae, 
quon~am  nonnumquam  sibi  adversari 
videntur,  quad~ifarin  clrca  hsec  con- 
sideranda est ~nspe~tio. 
"  Constitutiones  enim  ecclesiasticae 
proditae  sunt qu~dam  secundum con- 
silium, quadam secundum przceptum, 
qujedum  secundum  permlssionem  vel 
indulgentiam, qusedam  secundum pro 
Inbltionem."  (Stephen goes  on to ex- 
plain  these  te~ms,  and  to  show  how 
even of  the '  Praceptiones ' and '  Pro- 
hlbit~ones  ' some are perpetual,  others 
changeable.) 
1 Stephen of Tournal,  L  Summa De- 
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it is  frequently  the case  that the old  laws  cannot be  over- 
ridden by new.  The principle  (ratio) of  secular  law is not 
the same as that of  the divine 1aws.l  He is here drawing out 
the principle  which  is  contained  in his  classification  of  the 
canonical sources,  and which is repeated by Stephen, tllat in 
some points the Church has not authority over its own legis- 
lative system. 
We  must  for  a  moment  consider  the  significance  of  the 
omission,  in these  classifications,  of  one important source of 
canon law,  that is, the custom of  the Church.  We might at 
first  sight  be  inclined  to  think  that  this  is  due  to  some 
tendency to depreciate the importance of  this element, and it 
is, of  course, possible that something of  this may be the case 
here,  but  in  other  places  Rufinus  makes  it clear  that  he 
follows  Gratian  in  admitting the  importance  of  a  general 
custom of  the Church.  In the earlier part of  that passage of 
which we  have just cited the conclusion, Rufinus discusses the 
question of  prejudicatio-that  is,  as I understand, the ante- 
cedent  invalidity  of  certain  legislation.  His  immediate 
subject  is  the  question  of  dispensation,  to which  we  shall 
presently  return ; and  after saying  that some  laws  can  be 
dispensed  with  and  others  not,  he  says  that  some  laws 
prejudicaatur,  either  because  they  are  opposed  to  some 
previous constitution or to some custom ; and then resuming 
the  subject  a  little  later,  Rufinus  inquires  what  canons  in 
particular  prejudicantur,  and  mentions  first  those  which 
clearly  contradict  cither  general  custom  or  the  oonstitulio 
of  some greater  authority, and he  mentions  as an example 
of  prejudicatio  by  general  custorn  that  decree  of  Pope 
Telesphorus  which  Gratian  had  said was  invalid  because  it 
had never been received by the custom of  the Chur~h.~ 
l  Rufinus, '  Summa Dccret.,'  C. i. Q. 
7,  Dict.  Grat.  ad  C.  6 : "  Non  enim 
ad  canonos  illa  regula  trahitur,  que 
in  llumanis  legibus  hahetur,  soil.  ut 
semper  nova  statuta  prescribant  an- 
tiquis ;  sed frequentius antiqua novis 
prejudicant,  ut  supra  Dist.  1.  28. 
Nec  mirum,  quia  alia  ratio  eat  secu- 
larium  causarum,  alia  divinarum,  ut 
infra  de consecr.  Dist.  iii.  22." 
a  Rufinus,  '  Summa  Decret.,'  C.  i. 
Q. 7,  Dict.  Grat.  ad c.  6 :  "  Scion- 
dum est quod statuta canonum quadam 
sunt  indispensabilia,  quudam  dis- 
pensantur,  quzdam etiam prejudicen. 
tur.  Item que prejudicantur, alia pre' 
judicantur  contrarietate constitutionis. 
alia  contrarietate  consuetudinis.  . 
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~t is clear that Rufinus had no intention of  differing from 
the doctrine of  Gratiarl with regard to the importance of  the 
,dbority  of  custom  as a  source  of  canon law, but it  is,  of 
@~r-e, possible that he may have differed from him or from 
canonists with regard to the actually existing force  of 
custom.  Bufinus  was  clear  that  if  custom  now  abrogates 
canons, it only does so with the consent of  the Pope, just as, 
he  Says, now  that the Roman people have transferred their 
legislative authority to the emperor, their  custom  can  only 
the civil law with his consent.  There are also some 
canons of  the ancient Fathers, such as those of  Nice,  which 
be changed even by the Pope or by cust0m.l 
There  is  nothing  in the work  of  Stephen  of  Tournai  to 
indicate  his  attitude  clearly.  In  one  place,  indeed,  he 
speaks  somewhat  disparagingly  of  custom,--this  is  when 
he  says  that  Gratian  had  set  about  his  work  because, 
through  mere  ignorance,  the  Divine  law  was  falling  into 
disuse,  and  the  va,rious  churches  were  living  rather  by 
custom  than by  canon  law:  this,  he  says,  was  deemed  by 
Gratian to be perilous,  and therefore he  set about the collec- 
tion  of  the laws of the councils and  father^.^  But it  would 
Nunc vidcndum,  que canonum statuta  Romanus  ei  et in  eum  ornne  suum 
prejudicentur.  Illa  quidem  prejudi-  imperium et potestatem concessit ; ita 
cantur  que,  cnm  sint  in  particulari-  absquo  conscientia  et assensu  surnmi 
bus  conciliis prornulgata,  vel  de rebus  patriarohx? canones sicut non potuerunt 
non  adeo  necessariis  constituta,  im-  ficri, ita nec irritari.  Non autem istam 
placabilem  contrarietatem  patiuntur  desogationem  generaliter  intelligas  in 
vel  a  generali  consuetudine,  vel  a  onlnibus  decretis;  antiquorum  enim 
majoris et potioris  auctoritati.;  consti-  patrum et venerabiliorum statuta, que 
tutione.  A  generali  consuctudine,  pro  omnium  ccclesiarum  statu  con- 
@icut  illud  decretum  Telesphori  pape,  servando  plena  auctoritate  sunt  pro- 
quad cst supra D~st.  iv. c. ' Statuimus '  n~ulgata  et  totius  pene  mnndi  jam 
(C.  4) pluraque similia."  Ci. p. 155,  consecrata  reverentia,  sicut  cauones 
Rufinus,  ' Summa Decrct.,'  D.  4.  Niceni  et  his  similes-illa,  inquam, 
Off. vero. :  "  Ubi  demonstrat  quo-  neque  auctoritate  Apostolici  neque 
rundarn decretorum exemplo nonnullas  more  utentium  aliter  valent evacuari, 
etiam  logos  ecclesiasticas  esse  hodio  ut infra Dist. xl. c.  1, 2,  3,  4, et infra 
ahrogatas  per  mores  utique  utentium  Dist.  xv.  c.  sicut  (c.  2) et  C.  xxv. 
in  contrarium.  Et  hoc  consensu  g.  1.  c.  Divinis (c. 2) violatores  (c. 5) 
Oxaudias, surnrni pontificis ; aicut enim  contra patrum (c. 7)  et Q.  2  C.  Insti- 
sine  auotoritate  vel  consensu  tutionis (c. l)." 
imperatoris legcs  non  possnnt  statui,  2  Stephen of  Tournai,  ' Summa De- 
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be foolish to take this as a  serious criticism  on the place  of 
custom in the system of canon 1aw.l 
We turn now to consider the treatment by these commen- 
tators  of  the  legislative  authority  of  the  Pope.  We  have 
already seen in the classification  of  the sources  of  the canon 
law by Rufinus  and Stephen, that the decreta or decretalia 
of  the Pope  have the authority of  law,2 and we  have just 
quoted the passage from Rufinus in which  he says that just 
as civil laws cannot be made or abrogated without the consent 
of  the emperor,  so  also  canons  cannot be  made  or unmade 
without the knowledge and assent of  the Pope.  The autho- 
rity of  the Pope is therefore necessary for all legislation,  and 
,  - 
he  has  also  the power  of  promulgating  canons  by  his  own 
authority.  In other passages  Rufinus says he has the autho- 
rity  of  making  and interpreting  the  canons13 and  explains 
this as being due to the primacy of  the Roman Church.4 
Stephen, as we have seen, while describing canons as being 
in the strict sense the decrees of  general  councils,  adds that 
the Papal decreta and decretalia are also called can~ns,~  and 
in another passage he says that the Popes alone have autho- 
rity to make  canon^.^  This might mean that the Popes are 
now the sole legislalors, as Justinian claims that the emperor 
had become ;7  but this seems hardly consistent with stephen's 
own earlier statement as to the authority of  general councils 
haec est.  Cum per Ignorantlam ]us dlv- 
lnum  jam  In  desuetudlnem devenlret, 
et  slngula:  eccleslae  consuetudmlbus 
potlus  quam  canombus  regerentur, 
perlculosum  reputans  ~d,  Gratlanus 
dlversos codlces conclllorum et patrum 
cap~tula  contlncntes colleglt, etc " 
l  For Stepllen's treatment of  custom 
and rlvd law, rf  p. 157. 
See pp  163, 184. 
Rufinus, ' Summa Decret.,' D. lxx. . 
"  Sclat summum patrlarcham qul auc- 
torltatem  habet condendl  et ~nterpre. 
tandl canones " 
Rufinus, ' Summa Decrct ,' D. XIX 
"'De eplst.'  Supra de auctor~tate  can- 
onum eg~t,  hlc de moment0 decretallum 
eplstolarum tractat, ostendens eaa ejus- 
dem auctorltatls fore, cujus et canones, 
propter pr~matum  Romane ecclesle, de 
quo etlam h1c  mentlonom fac~t." 
See p. 184. 
Stephen  of  Tournal,  '  Summa 
Decret  '  D.  xx. :  "  Notandum,  qula 
In  determlnandls  cau.;ls  eccleslastlcls 
decretales  apostollcorum  eplstola 
aacrorum  hbrorum  exposlt~onlbuy 
praeponuntnr.  Soh  enlm  npost0llol 
JUS  habont  condencl1  canone,,  v01  at' 
qure  loco  canonum  habenda  sunt 
Sanctorum  autem  patrum  llbros  sac- 
ros  exponcnt~um  scr~pta  pra:ponuntur 
etlam lpsls apostollcls In sententlarUm 
pondere  vel  obsrurltatls  ~ntelpret~~ 
tlone." 
'  Cod., 1.  14, xn.  3 and 4. 
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in the presence  of  the Pope or his legatesll and it seems 
lllost probable that Stephen is only contrasting the legislative 
authority of  the Pope with the absence of  legislative authority 
in tile writing of  the Fathers. 
However this may be,  Stephen clearly agrees with Gratian 
Rufinus  that the Papal decreta and decretals have  the 
force of  canons.  In one passage he uses a phrase to describe 
the relation of  the Popes to the canon law, which he probably 
drew  from  the  civil  law.  He  speaks  of  him  as  legibus 
ectlesiasticis  absolutus  ut  prirzceps  cillilibus,  but  adds  that 
he  keeps  the laws  most  caref~lly.~  This phrase  of  Stephcn 
should be compared with the paisage of  Gratian on the rela- 
tions of  the Pope to the canon law, which we have c~nsidered,~ 
but what  exactly Stephen understood  it to mean it is diffi- 
cult to say-as  difficult  as it is to interpret the phrase with 
regard to the emperor in the civil law.  We have elsewhere 
suggested that probably the phrase finds its best interpretation 
in  the parallel  of  the dispensing power  of  the crown, and it 
is probably in the same direction that we must look for the 
explanation of  the phrase in relation to the Pope.4 
The Pope has then the authority of  making and unmaking 
canon  law,  but this  authority is  not unrestricted.  Rufinus 
restates the judgment of  Gratian, that the Pope cannot make 
canons against the authority of  the Gospels or the decrees of 
the  Holy  Fathers,  and  again  cites  the  case  of  the  invalid 
decree of  Pope Anastasius.Veither custom nor the authority 
of the Apostolic See can abrogate the statutes of  the ancient 
Eathers  which  were  promulgated  with full authority for the 
Preservation  of  the whole  Church,  and are preserved by the 
reverence of  almost the whole world-such  as the canons of 
See p. 184. 
Stephen of  Tourna~,  ' Summa De- 
Wet  De Cons ,' D  1 c  6 . "  'Cum enlm ' 
Probat  a  major1  canones  sorvanlios: 
CUn1  enlm  pontlfex  lcglbus  eccleslas- 
tlclfi solutus  ut prlnceps  clrlllbus, eas 
Utegernrne conservet,  patet  nemlnem 
"Jfenorum contra  eas venlre  debere." 
a  See pp.  173 175 
'  See vol. I.  p. 229. 
"ufinus,  Summa Decret ,' D  x~x  : 
"  'De eplst.'  Sunt enlm decretales epls- 
tolre  quas  ad provlnclas  vel  rersonas 
pro  dl\ersls  negotlls  sedos  Apostol~ca 
d~rexlt,  que omnl  devotxone  sunt cus- 
tod~ende,  nlsl  preceptls  cvangellc~s  vel 
decret~s  sanctorum patrum lnvenlantur 
adverse,  sicut  eplstola  llla  Anastaw, 
' secundum ' lnfra  hac  Dlst.  (C.  S)." 
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Nice  and other similar  can0ns.l  It is true that there is ., 
passage in Stephen which is exactly parallel to this, but there 
is  no  reason  to suppose  that he  would  have  dsered; it is 
after all  only  the  direct  application  to  the  Pope  of  these 
general principles, in which Stephen agrees with Rufinus, that 
certain parts of  the canon law-e.g.,  the canons  of  the four 
first  general  councils-cannot  be  abrogated  by  any  later 
a~thority.~ 
We conclude that Rufinus and Stephen agree entirely with 
Gratian  in  holding  that  the  Pope  has  the  same  legislative 
authority as the general councils of  the Church, and that his 
co-operation is necessary  for them ; while  his  legislative  %U. 
thority has  the same limitations as their authority, namely, 
that there  are some parts  of  the Church law which  cannot 
be abrogated or overridden by any new legislation. 
We  turn  to the  question  of  dispensation.  Rufinus  deals 
with  this  very  carefully  in  one  passage.  He  first  defines 
dispensation as a special relaxation of  canonical law, made by 
him who has authority to do this for some good reason.  He 
then adds that there are some canons from which  there can 
be no dispensation,  and others which can be dispensed with. 
Those canons are not dispensable which  are directly founded 
upon the moral law  or the Gospel  or the institution of  the 
Apostles, and he gives as exaixples, the fulfilment of  a vow, 
the prohibition to marry a second wife while the first is alive, 
the law that a man who is not ordained cannot ordain another 
or  celebrate  mass,  the law  that a  man must  not purchase 
ecclesiastical offices.  No  necessity  of  circumstance  or  time 
can ever enable a man to violate these wlthont sin ; some in- 
vincible  or unavoidable ignorance may perhaps  excuse him. 
The reason for this, Rufinus  says, lies in the fact that these 
rules are all part of  the natural law,  and against this no dis- 
Rufinus, ' Summa Decret ,' D.  IV. :  pene mundl jam consecrata reverentla, 
"'Off.  vero '  Non autemlstam deroga-  s~cut  canones  N~~eni  et h~s  slmlles- 
tionem generallter ~ntelllgas  IU omu~bus  llla, lnquam, neque auctorltate Aposto- 
decretls , antiquorum enlm pat~um  et  llcl neque more  utentlum allter valent 
venerak~horum  statuta, que pro omni-  evacuarl " 
urn eccleslarum statu conserva13do plena  2  See p.  185. 
auctorltate  sunt promulgata  et totluv 
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peasation  is  valid.  Other  canonical  rules,  which  were  pro- 
lnulgated  and confirmed  only  by the authority of  the holy 
Fathers  or  their  successors,  can  be  dispensed  with,  and he 
gives as examples, the rule that monks should not celebrate 
mass in public, or that a man who has done public penance or 
been  twice married should not be  admitted to the ranks of 
the clergy  .l 
We  may  compare  with  this  another  passage  in  which 
Rufinus  lays down  the  same principle that there can be no  . 
dispensation from the natural law, admitting only one excep- 
- 
tion-that  is, when a man has to choose between two evils, as, 
for instance, if  he has sworn to kill his brother;  and in yet 
1 Rufinus, ' Summa Decret ,' C  1  Q. 
7  (D~ct.  Grat , ad c.  61 . " NISI rlgor 
dlsc~pllnc  relaxetur  quandoque ex dls- 
pensatlone  rn~sclicordlo . . . Vlde- 
amus  igitur  ante  omnia,  qu~d  s~r. 
dispensat~o  et  unde  d~ratur,  et  quc 
canonum  statuta  reclplant  dlspensa- 
tionom  et  que  non.  Et  qne  slnt 
d~spensabllla,  quando posslnt d~sponsarl 
et  quando  non.  Est  itaque  dlspen- 
sat10 :  lusta  causa  faclente  ab  eo, 
cujus ~ntercst,  canonic1 rlyorls  casualls 
facta derogat~o. D~cta  est autem dls- 
pensat~o  per  simllitudlnem  a  fam~he 
proouratlone.  Sicut enim 1b1 fiat dis- 
pensatlo,  cum diversls diversa  pensan- 
tur-I  e  pensa  just~t~e,  oqu~tatls  et 
discretionls procurantur,  ~ta  In famllla 
ecclesiast~ca  non solum pro dlversltate 
personarum,  sod  et  rernm  vel  tem 
porum  diverso  mod0  canones  relax- 
antur.  Sclendum  autem  est  quad 
statuta  canonum  quedam  sunt  ~ndlb- 
Pensabll~a,  quredam dlspensantur qum- 
dam  etlam  prejudlcantur  Item  que 
PWudlcantur  al~a  prejudlcantur  con 
trarletate const~tut~onls,  alla contrarle 
tate consuetud~nls  Et quldem ~nd~s 
Pensabll~a  illa  sunt quorum  mandata 
Vel lnterd~cta  ex lege morallum vel evan 
gellea et apostollca lnstltutlone prlncl 
Pallter  pendent,  s~11  ut qu~  absolutus 
"Ohm  fecer~t  reddat,  ut vlr  v~vente 
aliam  non  ducat,  ut nullus  In- 
consecratus allum consccret vel missam 
celebret,  ut nullus  dona  eccles~astlca 
per  pecuniam  acqulrat,  et cetera  que 
prudent1  meditator1  fac~llime occur- 
runt.  Talla  neque  temporum  neque 
rerum necess~tato  ullo casu valent slne 
peccato  violan,  nisi  forte  lnvlnc~bllls 
lgnorantia  vel  lnev~tabll~s  excusaret. 
Et  quare hoc ?  Qu~a  omnia hec statuta 
pa~tos  sunt  jurls  natumlls,  ad~ersus 
quod  nulla  dlspensatio  admittitur,  ut 
supra  dicltur  Dlst.  XIII.  5,  '  Item 
adversus.'  Dlspensabllia  vero  sunt 
cetera statuta canonum que sola sanot- 
orum posterlorumque patrum  auctori 
tate  promulgata  sunt et firmata,  ut: 
ne  monachi  publlce  mlssam  celebrent, 
ne  publlce  pen~tentes  vel  b~gam~  ad 
clerum  prornovcntur,  et s~milia . . . 
Et  quldem  suadont  dlsponsat~oncm 
fieri  necess~tas et  utll~tas,  proh~bont 
eam  enorm~tas  porsono  et enormitas 
 re^." 
Rufinus,  Summa  Decrat.,'  D. 
xi11  " '  Item adv  jus  nut '  Domon- 
strav~t  superlus, quomodo ]us naturale 
d~tferut  a  const~tut~one  et a  consue- 
tudlne dignitate , nunc aperlt, qnallter 
ab  elsdem  dlscrepet  sententie  rigore. 
qulppe  contra  jus  naturale,  exaudias 
quoad prccepta et proh~bltlones,  nulla 
dispeusat~o  tolleratnr.  Quod  In  1110 
cap~tulo  ~rls~uuatur,  quod a~t  'Ceterum 
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another  passage  he  says  no  dispensation  can  be  granted 
against the New Testament.l  This is an important statement 
of principle, important in its reference to the natural law, and 
also in its exposition both of  the extent and of  the limits of 
the dispensing power.  The importance of  the subject will be 
recognised by any who have any acquaintance with medi~val 
history. 
We wish  that we  were  able to discuss  the theory  of  the 
commentators  on  Gratian  more  completely ; unfortunately 
only a  few of  these are as yet accessible in a  printed form. 
We shall not be in a position to discuss fully the development 
of  the theory of  the canon law on such a vital point as that of 
the legislative  authority  of  the  Pope  till  the  mass  of  un- 
printed material has been fully examined.  Especially do we 
regret that we cannot use the ' Summa Decreti ' of  Huguccio. 
The only portions of  this important work which we have been 
able to use are those fragments quoted by Schulte in his work 
' Die Stellung der Concilien,' &c.  Among these we find some 
important  phrases  on  the  authority  of  Papal  decretals. 
Huguccio  discusses  the regulations  as  to the  circumstances 
under which a case may be taken from the inferior courts to 
Rome, and he concludes by saying that he trusts the ancient 
decrees and the new  councils rather than the decretals ; and 
again, on the same subject, he says that appeals, even before 
the trial of  a case, are actually heard in Rome, but he is con- 
cerned, not so much with what is actually done, as with what 
ought to be  done.2  These  passages  illustrate  an interesting 
sepe  rigor  subtrahitur,'  ut infra  hab- 
etur : '  Sicut quedanl ' . . . '  nisi  duo 
mala ita urgeant, etc.'  Magist.  Grati- 
anus sic dioit hic quasi aliquis sic per- 
plexus sit aliquando inter duo mala, ut 
non  possit vitare  alterum, quin delin- 
quat.  Exempli  causa  juravit  quidam 
homo  interficore  fratrom  suum." 
(For the meaning of the phrase  ex- 
audias quoad precepta et  prohibitiones" 
see pp. 103, 106.) 
1 Rufinus, '  Summa Decret.,'  D. xiv. 
2 : "  Non solum de scripturis N.T. hoe 
intelligendum  est,  que  ex  nulla  dis- 
pensatione  potest  convolli." 
Huguccio,  ' Summa Decret.,'  C.  ii. 
Q.  6,  Pr. : "  Secundum canones  vero 
et ante et post sententium et quando- 
cuuque  quis  vult  appellare,  potash 
appellare,  lite  tamon  contestata,  ut 
infra eadem (quzstione) '  non  ita ' (C. 
18), et in  conrilio  Romano  '  Repre- 
hensibilis.'  Decretalev tamen ~lexandri 
et ante  litem  contestatam  admittun6 
appellationem,  ut  in  extra,  '  CU~ 
sacrosancta,  sieut Romana, consuluit.' 
Sed  plus  credo  antiquo  decreto  et 
novo concilio,  quam decretalibus  De 
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t,owards the Decretals, but whether it is  more  than 
isolated  opinion  we  are not in  a  position to say.  It is 
worth while to notice that in another passage, which 
schulte  has  quoted,  Huguccio  suggests  that in  one  of  his 
~ecretals  Pope  Alexander  is  speaking  rather  as  a  teacher  - 
who is giving his opinion, than as Pope.1 
One  other  canonist,  Darna'sus,  at a  rather  later  (late, 
but  still  earlier  than  the  publication  of  the  Decretals  of 
Gregory IX., has some important remarks  on the authority 
of  modern Decretals of  Popes.  Of  this Damasus two works 
have  been  printed,  one  on  the  civil  law  and  one  on  the 
canon law.  The latter, which is known as the ' Brocarda ' or 
'  ~urohardica,'  consists  of  a  series of  discussions, in which  a 
thesis is propounded,  all the relevant authorities are cluoted, 
first those in favour, then those against it, and finally a solutio 
is added.  The thesis with which we are now concerned is this, 
that when there is a difference between various constitutions, 
it is  not  the later but the earlier-those,  that is, which  are 
nearer  to the Apostolic  simplicity  and truth-which  should 
prevail.  Damasus  cites  a  number  of  passages  in favour of 
this view, and a smaller number against it, and then concludes 
that if  there is a contradiction between some constitutions of 
recent Popes and the general canons which  are approved by 
the  authority of  Holy Scripture, the latter must prevail,  as 
being agreeable to the Divine will and the principle of  equity. 
It must be remembered,  he says, that the former Popes had 
the  same power  as the modern,  and have greater  authority 
on  account  of  their  antiquity:  he  is,  indeed,  worthy  of 
anathema who endeavours, with whatever excuse,  to destroy 
those  things  which  are well  ordered.  He refuses  to accept 
the  authority  of  the  comment  on  the  canon  postea  quam 
fact0 tamen  quotidie  admittitur  talis 
appellatio." 
Id. id.  c.  18:  "Sed  jam  Romana 
ecclesia recipit  talis apprllntioncs,  scil. 
anto ingressum  causa ; sed non  con- 
"dero  quid fiat, sed quid fieri debeat." 
(From J. F. von Schulte, '  Gesohichte 
der  Quellen und Literatur des Canon- 
ischen Rechts,'  vol. i.  p.  165, note 26.) 
Huguccio,  L  Summa  Decrot.,'  C. 
xxvii.  Q.  1, Pr. : "  Quid ergo dicomus 
quod  Aloxander  in  suiu  decretalibus 
utitur  distinctione  solomnis  voti  et 
simplicis, ut in extra '  Gratum '  et '  fere 
tota ecclesia '  P  Dico  quod Alexander 
ibi  loquitur  non  ut  papa,  sed  ut 
magi~ter  secundum  suam opinionem." 
-Id.  id. id. 
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With  these  we  must  now  compare  the letter prefixed by 
Gregory IX. to the great collection of  Papal Decretals which 
now forms the second part of  the ' Corpus Juris Canonici.'   hi^ 
is addressed to the doctors and scholars of Bologna.  Gregory 
explains  that  he  has  caused  Raymund,  his  chaplain  and 
penitentiary, to make this selection of  the constitutions and 
Decretal epistles of  the former Popes,-the  number and variet,y 
of  these had been a cause of  confusion in the courts ; and he 
has  added some constitutions  and Decretals  of  his own.  Be 
desires that this collection alone should be used in the courts 
and schools, and strictly forbids any one to make any further 
collection without the authority of  the Apostolic 8ee.l 
The importance of  this letter and of  the collection of  the 
Decretals  by Gregory IX. is  certainly very great.  The De- 
oretals,  to which  were  added  later  on  the " Sixt " and the 
"  Clementines,"  became  for  a11  practical  purposes  the law- 
books  of  the  Church:  it is  true  that  the ' Decretum'  of 
Gratian  came in  some  way  to be  treated  as  the first  part 
of the ' Corpus Juris Canonici,' but the Decretals  became the 
principal  law-book of  the Church, and the  commentaries on 
sunt decisa, forma futuris negotiis pro- 
vide  sit  relicta,  quia  tamen  prodige 
rerum  natura  secundum  varietates 
multiplicium  casuum  parit  cotidie 
novas  causas,  nos  quasdam  epistolas 
decretales  super  his,  que  nostris 
suborta  temporibus,  per  nos  vel 
fratres  nostros  decidimus,  vel  etiam 
aliis do ipsam consilio commisimus de- 
cidenda,  compilari fecimus,  et tibi sub 
bulla  nostra  duximus  destinendas. 
Quocirca discretioni tuae per apostolica 
scripta mandamus, quatinus eis solemp- 
niter  publicatis  absque  ullo  scrupulo 
dubitationis  utaris  et  ab  aliis  recipi 
facias  tam  in  judiciis  quam  in 
scholis." 
1 Decretals,  Introductory  Letter : 
"  Gregor~us  Ep.  Servus servorum  Dei, 
dilectis  filiis doctoribus  et scholaribus 
universis Bononia: commorantibus salu- 
tem et apostolicam benedictionem. . . . 
Sane diversas  constitutiones et decre- 
tales  epistolas  przdecossorum  nostro- 
rum,  in  diversa  dispersas  volumiua, 
quam aliquas propter nimiam similitudi- 
nem, et  quzdam  propter contrarietatem, 
nonnullae etiam  propter  sui  prolixita- 
tem, confusionem inducer0 videbantur, 
aliquae vero vagabantur extra volumina 
supradicta,  quae  tanquam  incertm 
frequenter  in  judiciis  vacillabant,  ad 
communem,  et  maxime  studentium, 
utilitatem  per  dilectum filium fratrem 
Iiaymundum, capellanum  et pceniten- 
tiarum nostrum, illas in unum volument 
resecatis superfluis, providimus redigen- 
das,  adiicentes  constitutiones  nosbras 
et decretales  epistolas,  per  quas  non- 
nulla,  qua:  in  prioribus  erant  dubia, 
declarantur.  Volentes  igitur,  ut hat 
tantum compilatione  universi  utantur 
in  judiciis  et  in  scholis,  districtius 
prohibemus,  ne  quis  przsumat  aliam 
facere  absque  auctoritate  sedia  &Po8' 
tolica: speciali." 
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the ' Decretum ' now gave place to the commentaries  on the 
~~c~etals.  But this  is  not  the same  as  to say  that  these 
letters  mark  a  new  departure  in the theory  of  canon  law. 
We  have already  scen that Gratian  quite  clearly places the 
legislative authority  of  the  Pope  alongside  of  that  of  the 
and  that  the  commentators  whom  we  have  dis- 
cussed, except  Huguccio,  clearly  take the same view.2  We 
therefore, recognise that the letters make any change 
in the theory of  the legislative authority of  the Pope, though 
they  may  be  said  to represent  a  great  development  in  the 
importance of  his position as legislator. 
Two  phrases  of  the Decretals  we may finally take as rep- 
resenting  the  completed  Roman  theory  of  the  canon  law. 
The  first  is  indeed  of  a  considerably  ea,rlier date than the 
publication of  the Decretals  by Gregory IX.  It is  a phrase 
of  Pope Paschal 11.  on the subject of  the oath of  fidelity and 
obedience to the Pope which was required by an archbishop 
before  he  could  receive  the "  palllium."  Paschal  says  that 
some people urged that this was not ordained by the councils. 
He  indignantly  repudiates  the notion  that the councils had 
imposed  any laws  upon  the Roman Church,  for it  was  the 
Roman  Church which  called together  the councils  and gave 
them  a~thority.~  This is  a strong statement,  but it should 
be compared with Gratian's elaborate discussion of  the relation 
of  the Pope to the canon law in the 25th "  Causa."  The 
other  phrase  is  one  of  Innocent  III., who  speaks  of  the 
Roman  See as the fountain from which laws are derived,5- 
a terse  mode  of  expressing  the conception  of  the legislative 
authority of  the Roman See. 
'  See pp. 170-176. 
See pp. 188-193. 
Decretals, i. 6.4  : " '  Paschzlis Pan- 
Ormitano  Archiepiscopo.'  Aiunt  in 
conciliis  statutum non  invcniri,  quasi 
Romanie  ecclesiae  legem  concilia  ulla 
Prafixorint,  quum  omnia  concilia  per 
Roman= ecclesia: auctoritatem et facta 
sint,  et robur  acceporint,  et in oorum 
statutis  Romani  Pontificis  patentor 
excipiatur auctoritas." 
Soe pp. 171-175. 
Decretals, i. 33. 8 : "  Quum a nobis 
injuriarum  actio non  dehoat exoriri, a 
quibus jura tanquam a fonte ad ceteros 
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CHAPTER  X. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  RELATION  OF CHURCH 
AND  STATE. 
WE have endeavoured to set out the theory of  these canonists 
with regard  to the divine  nature of  secular  authority.  We 
have  endeavoured  to  show  that  they  clearly  follow  the 
Gelasian  traditions  of  the  two  authorities  as  being  both 
derived from  God,  and as having been  separated by Christ 
Himself,  who  alone was  both King  and Priest.  There is  a 
passage in Stephen of  Tournai which sets this out so clearly 
that we  shall  with advantage notice its terms.  In the one 
commonwealth and under thc one king there are two peoples, 
two modes of  life, two authorities, and a twofold organisation 
of  jurisdiction.  The commonweelth  is the Church, the king 
is  Christ, the two peoples  are the two orders in the Church, 
that is, the clergy and the laity, the two modes of  life are the 
spiritual and the carnal ; the two authorit,ies are the priest- 
hood and the kingship, the twofold organisation is the divine 
law and the human.  Give 60  each its due and all things will 
be brought into agreement.1 
Stephen's phrases are a summary of  the Gelasian tradition, 
and, as we have endeavoured to show, this is the theory repre- 
sented by the canon law as a whole.  But Stephen's conclud- 
l Stephen  of  Tournai,  'Sumrna  duo  pop1111  duo  in  ecclesia  ordines9 
Decret.,'  Introduction :  "  In  cadem  cler~corum et  laicorurn ;  due  vita, 
civitate  sub  eodem  rege  duo  populi  spiritualis  et  carnalis ;  duo  prinoi- 
aunt,  et secundum  duos  populos  dua  patus, sacerdotium et regnurn ; duplex 
vitse, secundum duas vitas duo princi-  jurisdictio,  divinum  jus  et humanurn 
patus,  secundum  duos  principatus  Redde  singula  singulis  et convenjent 
duplex  jurisdictionis  ordo  procsdlt.  universe." 
Civitas ecclesia ; civitatis rox Christus ; 
iag words have a somewhat ironical sound, for a writer of  the 
end of  the twelfth century must have been well aware that it 
,as  just  exactly here that the great problem  of  the eleventh 
twelfth  centuries  had  lain.(lt  was  easy  to say  that 
each authority should receive it's due ; the difficulty had been 
to determine  what  this was.)  As  we  have  pointed  out,  the 
theory  was  simple enough.  The difficulty  lay in the appli- 
oation,  or  rather,  within  the theory  itself  there lurked  the 
difficulty  of  the adjustment of  the relations of  the 
two  authorities  within  the  one  society.  For  Gelasius  had 
that while each authority was independent within ite own 
sphere,  yet  the persons  who  held  such  authority were  ~ub- 
ordinate each to the other within their respective spheres.  It 
was  indeed  here  that  the  difficulty  had  arisen.  We  have 
endeavoured to show how  in the ninth century there was  a 
general agreement  as to the theory of  the separation  of  the 
powers, but that as a matter of  fact each authority had come 
to have a great deal to say in the sphere of  the 0ther.l 
(1t  may indeed be suggested that this attempt at the separa- 
tion  of  the  authorities  was  impossible:  there  have  been 
political  theorists  who  have  argued  thus,  who  have  main- 
tained that it is impossible in theory as in fact to separate the 
spiritual and the temporal authorities.  For ourselves  such a 
judgment  seems to be both unphilosophical and unhistorical. 
However  this may be,  the difficulty  of  delimitation  proved 
to be enormous 
We  cannot write the history of  the great  controversy of 
these centuries : this has, indeed, been often done, though, a!s 
it seems to us,  a  complete treatment of  the subject has not 
Yet  been  produced,  and will not be possible  until the whole 
civilisation of  these times has been more completely examined. 
When we come to deal with the controversial literature of  the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries we shall have occasion to point 
out some of  the more important aspects of  this history. (1n 
the meanwhile it must suffice to say that while in the ninth 
century each authority interposed in the sphere of  the other, 
~th  comparatively little friction, by the eleventh century all 
this was changed, and we find each authority repudiating with 
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vehemence the claims of  the other to interfere in its concerns, 
while each endeavoured to vindicate and sometimes to extend 
such authority as it had actually been exercising. 
We deal in this chapter with the relation of the Canon law to 
the supposed tendency of  the Church to claim, not only super.. 
ority, but in some degree at least supremacy, over the State. 
The question of  the development of  this tendency in the Canon 
law may be conveniently considered under four heads-first, 
the tradition  of  cases  in which  the Papacy  had actually or 
apparently exercised some such supremacy ; secondly, the do- 
velopment of  the theory of  the consequences of excommunica- 
tion; tuly,  the theory  that Peter, and therefore his  suc- 
cessors, had received from Christ authority over the temporal 
as well  as the spiritual power ; and, My,  the interpreta- 
tion of the Donation of  Constantine.  When we have examined 
these we  shall be in a  position  to examine the more or less 
formal statements of  the Decretals upon the subject. 
In our first volume l we  have  pointed  out that the great 
Churchmen, and pre-eminently the Pope, had sometimes, as a 
matter of  fact, and were  supposed  to have frequently exer- 
cised a very great and at times a commanding influence upon 
the appointment and deposition of  kings and emperors.  The 
fact is not to be disputed that they had sometimes exercised 
such a power, and, as we have pointed out, the secular author- 
ities  in the ninth  century  sometimes  at least  quite frankly 
recognised this. 
These traditions are well  known to the canon lawyers: in 
a passage of  that famous letter of  Gregory VII. to Hermann, 
the Bishop of Metz, which is cited by Ivo in the '  Decretum ' 
, and by Gratian, it is related how the Popes deposed the last of 
the Merovingian race, and put Pippin in their place, absolving 
the Franks from their oath of  allegiance to the former king.' 
See ~ol  1  pp.  382 287.  Carol1 imperatoris patrem in ejuv 1060 
Ivo,  ' Decrotum,'  v  318  '' Aliun  uubstitu~t~  omnesque  Fran~igsna9 a 
itern  Romanun  pontifex  regem  Fran-  juramento  fidelitatin  absolvit "  Cf. 
oorum,  non tam p10 SUl0 iniquitatibus  Grat~an, Dec ,'  C  XL.  Q  6.  3.  and 
qunm p10 eo, quod tant~  potestati crat  Giegory VII.  Repiatrum,  viii  21. 
inutills,  a  rcgno  deposuit,  et 1'1pplnus 
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cardinal Deusdedit in his collection of  Canons cites the words 
of the Synod of Rome of 877, in which Pope John VIII., with 
the other bishops, the Senate, and the whole Roman people, 
elected  Charles  the  Bald  as  emperor,l  and  he  cites  from 
~nastasius  ' Bibliothecarius ' the tradition  that it was  Pope 
aregory who  led  the revolt  of  Italy against  the iconoclastic 
emperors, and renounced allegiance to them.2 
When, therefore, Innocent 111.  in his  Decretals  maintains 
that it was  the Popes who had transferred the empire from 
the Greeks to the Germans, he was only repeating a tradition 
which  was  in accordance with many others,  and which  had 
some reasonable colour of  ju~tification.~ 
l  Deusdedit,  '  Collectio  Canonum,' 
iv.  92,  "  Johanni  VIII.  Papa?  inter 
cetera  hab~ta  in eadem synodo " (.c  e , 
the Council at Ravenna of  877) : "  Et 
qma pridem  apostolicae memorize  pre 
decessoris nostro Nycolao id ipsum jam 
inspiratlone  celesti  reveleturn  fuisse 
componmus,  eligimus  Carolum  huno 
Magni  Caroli  nepotem,  et approbavi- 
mus, una oum annisu et voto ommum 
fratrum  et co - episcopum  nostrorum, 
atque sanetae Romanre  (Ecclesire min- 
istrorum,  apostolieique  senatus,  toti- 
usque Romani) populi gentisque togatze. 
Et secundum  prlscam  consuetudinem 
fiolempniter ad imperil sceptra provex- 
lrnus, et augustali nomine decoravimus, 
ungontos  cum oleo extrinsecus,  ut in- 
terioris  quoque  Spiritus  Sancti  unc- 
tlonem  monstraremus ,  const~tuentcs 
ad  ~mitat~onem  scilicet  veri  regis 
Cllrist~  dom~ni  del  nostri,  ita, ut quod 
lPso  possidet  per  naturam, iste conse- 
cluatur por  giatiam.  Demque non hie 
llerpetuus  Al.gustus  ad  tanta  fa5tigia 
velut ~mprobus  intuht, non tanquam 
LmPortunus  fraude aliqua, vol macliina- 
tlone prava, aut ambitlone ad imporl- 
alem lnhlailte apicem aqpiravit.  Absit 
Neque  enlm  sibi  honorem  prresuinp- 
boso  assumps~t,  ut  ~mperator  fierot, 
Ped tarnqualn desideratns  optatus, pos- 
tulatuv a IIOJIIS,  et n deo vo~atus  et  hon- 
Onficatus ad  defendendam  rel~g~oncm, 
et Christ1  ubique servos tuendos, humill- 
ter ac obedienter accessit, operaturus et 
roboraturus in imperio summaln pacom 
et tranquillitatem  et in  aeccles~e Do1 
just~tiam  et exaltat~onem  NISI enim 
nos  talem  eius  cognovissemus  inten- 
tionem, numquam animus noster fieret 
tam promptus ad  lpsius provect~onem  " 
Deusdedlt,  '  Collectio  Canonum,' 
iv. 271,  EX  Ystorica Anastasii Blhlio- 
thecarii  Romanre  Ecclesiae " .  "  In 
senior1 vero  R(oma) Gregorius  sacra- 
tissimus vir apostolicus, et P(etr1) vor- 
ticis  apostolorum  consessor,  verbo  et 
actu  ooruscans,  removit  Romam  et 
Italiam necnon  et omnia  tam reipub- 
lirre  quam  ecclesiastica  Jura in  Hes- 
perils,  ab hobedientia Loonis et imperii 
sub ipso  const~tuti . . . Lconem  per 
ep~stolns  tamquain impie ngente redar- 
guens,  et Romam Gum  tota Italla  ab 
illius imperlo recedere faciens " 
3  Decretals,'  1.  6  34  (Inn  111  ) : 
"  Verum illis principibus  ]us et potes- 
tatem eligend~  regem,  in imporetorein 
promovenclum,  reLognoscimus,  ut  de- 
bemus, ad quos de jure ac ant~qua  con- 
suetudino noscitur  pertlneie , przscr- 
tim quum ad cos jus et potestas hu~ur- 
mod1 ab apostolica sodo ~ervencnt,  qure 
Romanum imperium in personam mag- 
111fic1  Caroli  a  Grzcia  tranntulit  in 
Gerinanos." POLITICAL  THEORY  OF THE  CANON  LAW. 
U. 
(The canonists then represent clearly the tradition that the 
Pope had actually exercised a large authority over the appoint- 
ment  and  deposition  of  emperors  and kings : we  need  not 
discuss  how far this tradition was  historically  justifiable-in 
part undoubtedly it represented  actual events ; we  are here 
only concerned with the fact that the tradition  existed, and 
represents one element in the canonical theory of.  he relation 
of  the Church and the Papacy to the secular power  4 
We  find  the  second  element  in  the  canonical  theory,  in 
the  development  of  the  theory  of  the  results  of  excom- 
munication.  With this  is closely connected  the  question  of 
the  authority  of  the  Church  in  absolving  a  man  from  an 
illegitimate  oath.  It is  well  to  notice  at the  outset  that 
Stephen of  Tournai mentions that there are some who main- 
tain  that  properly  speaking  the  Pope  does  not  absolve  a 
man from his  oath, but simply declares that he is absolved,' 
the  oath,  that is,  being  of itself  null  and void.  It is  not 
clear  whether  Stephen takes  this  view  himself,  but  it may 
fairly  be  said that the principle  lies  behind  the attitude of 
the Church in the Middle Ages to this question.  The earlier 
canonists put the matter simply, that evil oaths should not 
be  kept,-that  it is  better to commit perjury  than to keep 
a wicked oath.2 
The principle  is  reasonable,  and it was  natural under the 
Stephen of Tournai,  '  Summa De-  Burchard,  L Decret.,'  xii.  10 : "  Non 
creti,'  r.  xv.  Q.  G.  2,  "A~ctorit."  :  est  conservandum  sacramentum  quad 
"  Sunt  qui  dicunt,  quod  apostolicur  malnm  incaute  promittitur,  18eluti 
neminem potest absolvere a juramento,  quispiam  adultere perpetuam  cum ea 
sed  ostendit  eurn  absolutum,  sicut  permanendi  fidem polliceatur.  Tolera- 
sacerdos  non  dimittit  peccatum,  sed  bilius  est euirn  non implere sacramen- 
dimissam ostendit."  tum, quarn permanere in stupri  flagitio." 
Reglno of Prum,' De Synod. Causis,'  Id. '  Decret.,' xii. 29 : "  Etcnim dum 
ii. 329 : "  Si aliquid forto nos incautius  pejerare  compellimur,  creatorem  qui- 
jurasse  contigerit,  quod  observatum  dem offendimus,  sed nos tanturnmod0 
pejorem vergat in exitum, illud consilio  maculamus,  cum vero  noxia  promises 
salubriori  mutandum  noverimus,  ac  complemus, et Dei  jussa  superbe  con- 
magis instante necessitate perjurandum  temnimus,  ut proxirnis  impia  crudell- 
nobis,  quam pro vitando juramento  in  tate noceamus, et nos ipsos  crudeliore 
aliud crimen magis esse divertendum."  mortis gladio trueidamus." 
This is  repeated  by  Burchard  in  the  Id. '  Decret.,'  six. 5.  A list of oatlls 
'  Decretum,'  xii.  18.  which should not be kept. 
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terms  of  the medkval conception  of  society  that it should 
have been held that the Church should determine which oaths 
were  as a  matter of  fact proper  to be  kept.  The ultimate 
,onsequence  of  this theory  and it's practical  outcome in the 
&itude  of  the later Middle Ages  to obligations  deliberately 
andertaken  we  do  not  here discuss.  The  principle  is clear 
bhat  the Church was held to have the power to declare when 
an oath was null and void. 
This  principle  assumed a  greet political  significance  when 
it was brought into connection with the theory of  the conse- 
quences of  excommunication.  The history  of  this is a large 
subject,  which  we  cannot  stop to consider  at length.  It  is 
enough to notice that in the earliest of  the canonists whom 
we  are  considering-that  is,  Regino  of  Prum in the  ninth 
century-the  consequences  of  excommunication  are already 
very emphatically drawn out, though with reference  directly 
to monastic institutions only.  No one is to pray, to speak, or 
to eat with an excommunicate person ; those who do so incur 
the  same  sentence.l  Regino  and  Burchard  of  Worms  cite 
formulas of  excommunication which again serve to bring out 
very  clearly the nature of  the sentence and its effects  upon 
the actual as well as future condition  of  the excommunicate 
person,  and especially the principle  that he  was  in such  a 
sense cut off  from all the ordinary relations  of  life,  that no 
one  could  live with him in those relations without incurring 
the same c~ndemnation.~  We need not multiply citations to 
l  Regino  of  Prum,  'De  Causis 
Synodalibus,'  ii.  396 : " Si quis autem 
pro  culpa  sua fuerit  ab oratione  sus- 
ponsus,  nullus  cum eo  orandi  aut lo- 
quendi habeat licentiam antequam re- 
Concilietur.  Nam  qui  se  orationi  vel 
confabulationi ejus, antequam a Priore 
recipiatur, inconsiderata pietato sociare 
Priesumserit,  similiter  damnatus  cffic- 
itur."  397 :  "  Cum  excommunicato 
"ewe  orare, neque loqui,  neque vesci 
cuiquam lice*."  399 :  "  Cum  excom- 
municato  nullu.;  loquatur,  neque qual- 
eum  compassione vel miseratione 
refoveat, neque ad contradictionem vel 
superbiam confortare przsumat." 
"egino  of  Prum, ' Do Causis Synod- 
alibuu,'  ii.  413 :  "  Et  qui  illi  quasi 
Christian0  communicaverit  aut  cum 
eo manduraverit aut bibcrit, aut eum 
osculatus fucrit, vel cum eo colloquium 
familiare  habuerit,  nisi  forte  ad satia- 
factionem et pceuitentiam  eum provo- 
care  studucrit, aut in  domo  sua eum 
rcceperit,  procul  dubio  similiter  sit 
excommunicatus."  416 : "  Pradictum 
pessimum  virum  a  liminibus  sancta 
matris  ecclesiae  excludimus,  et  ah 
omne societate  et communione Christ- 
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bring  out the fact that this was  the theory of  the media3val 
Church. 
We  have in our first volume pointed out that, in spite of 
certain  ambiguous phrases,  there  can be  no  doubt  that the 
Church clearly maintained  that the king  or  emperor was  in 
lss own person subject to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction  of  the 
Church hke any other person, and therefore, in extreme cases, 
to excomm~nication.~  Ivo in his  ' Panormia ' cites part  of 
a  letter in which  Gregory  VII.  vindicates  the right  of  the 
Church to excommunicate  even the supreme temporal ruler, 
and cites various real  or traditional examples of  this : there 
can  be  no  doubt  that Gregory's  conclusion was  historically 
justified.a  There was here nothing new or revolutionary. 
The  emperor  or  king  was  then,  in the theory  of  church 
law, liable to excommunication for just  cause, like any other 
person,  and like  every  other  excommunicate  person  was  to 
be  avoided  and shunned.  But this  fact would  easily bring 
with it consequences of  a still Iarger  kind: the excommuni- 
cation of  a king or emperor would make any relations between 
himself  and his officials, and even his people in general, almost 
impossible.  It was  only natural that in the end men would 
ask  whether  the  oath  of  alIegiance  to  such  a  ruler  could 
really be binding, 
It is  from  the standpoint of  this theory  that we  have  to 
examine the claim of  the Church and Pope to absolve a man 
from the obligation of  an oath taken to the king or emperor. 
Gregory VII. absolved the subjects of  Henry IV. from their 
III  eternum decernlmus,  ~d est,  et In 
prsosent~  s%culo et In  futuro  Nullus 
el  Chrlstranus  ave  d~cat  aut  eum 
oscular~ przsumat  . . .  Ncmo  el 
jungatur  In consortlo, neque In  allquo 
negotlo,  et sl  quls el  se  soclavent, et 
cornmnn~caver~t  ejus oper~bus  mahgnr.;, 
noverrt se srmdl percussum anathemate, 
h19  exceptls  qul  ob  hanc  causam  el 
junguntur ut eum revoocnt ab errore et 
provocent ad satlsfact~oncm  "  Cf  Id, 
414,  416,  and  Burchard  of  Worms, 
'  Decret ,' XI  3,  4,  5,  G. 
Vo:  I  p  278 ff. 
IVO,  '  Panorm~a,'  v  109  "  Nonne 
slcut  alt  beatus  Gregonus,  record- 
andre  memona Jullus papa, tum con- 
tra Theodoram, tum contra Augustam 
damllatroms  promulgavlt  ~ententlam. 
SIC quoque Car~bortus  Parls~orum  rex 
cum  Theobergam  legrt~mam  uxorem 
suam  relrqursset,  et  duas  sorores 
Metrot%dem et illarcovenam  In  uxores 
duxlsset,  a  beato Germano Par~slorum 
eplecopo  eacommun~catus  ost,  et cum 
reslplscore  nollet,  non  mult o  post 
dlvino judlc~o  defunctus est." 
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,ath  of  allegiance to him, and Ivo in the ' Panormia ' quotes 
horn the decrees of  Gregory's council held in Rome A.D.  1078,  -- 
the  words  in  which  the  general  principle  is  laid  d0wn.l 
Again, Ivo in the ' Panormia ' cites a phrase of  Pope Urban 
II., in which the principle is still more generally stated that 
oaths  of  fidelity made  to  one  who  was  afterwards  excom- 
municated  are of  no  obligati~n.~  These passages  are  again 
cited by Gratian in the ' Decretum.'  Gratian himself draws 
out  the  conclusion  from  these  principles  in  general  terms 
when  he  says that the Pope  absolves men  from  their  oath 
of  fidelity when he deposes the rulers.4 
It  is  important  to  notice  the comment  of US.  He 
urges  that it is  necessary  to observe that an oath may  be 
of  two kinds : it may be  made  to the ruler  as a man,  or it 
may  be  made  to him  as  holding  a  certain  office.  In the 
first case, the oath is always binding  on him who has taken 
it, unless the ruler is excommunicated, in which case he must 
not keep his oath of  fidelity.  In the second case, if the ruler 
is  legally  and  canonically  deprived  of  his  office,  then  the 
oath is of  no further ~bligation.~ 
1 Ivo, ' Panorm~a,'  v  110  "  Prxdo 
cessorum nostrorum statuta sequentes, 
eos  qu~  exconimurncat~s  fidehtate  aut 
sacrament0  constr~ct~  sunt,  apostohca 
aucto~~tate  a  ju~amento absolvlmus, 
quousque  ]pal  ad sat~sfact~onom  venl- 
ant,  et ne  01s  fidelltatem  observent, 
proh~bemus  " 
IVO,  L  Panormla,' V  11  1  "  Juratos 
mll~tes  Hugon~  mllltl,  no  lpsl  quando 
excommunlcatus  est,  sorvlant  prohlb 
ere.  Quod 61  sacraments prcetender~nt, 
moneantur  oportere  Deo magls servlre 
quam  homln~bus  fidelltatem  enlm 
quam  Chrlst~ano prlnclpl  juravermt, 
Deo ejusque sanctls adversantl, et eurn 
prsocepta  calcant~, nulla  coh~bel~tm 
auctorltate  persolvere " 
S  Gratlan, ' Decretum,'  C  xv.  Q  6, 
C.  4  and 5 
aratlan, '  Decretum,'  C  xv  Q  6, 
Part 2  "Grat~anus A ficlel~tatlv  etlarn 
Juramento Romanus Pontlfeu nor~nullor 
absolv~t,  cum allquos a sus  dlgmtst~bus 
deponlt " 
Rufinus, '  Summa Decret ,' C  xv. 
Q  6  3, "  'Ahus Item Romanus'  HIO 
sclendum est quod juramenta fidol~tatls 
fiunt allquando lntultu personarum, all- 
quando  dumtaxat ~ntmtu  dlgnltatum. 
. . S1  quls  ltaque  lntultu  persono 
juravent alic~n  fidel~tatem,  semper jur- 
amento  oblrgatus  el  tenebltur,  nlsl 
suus domlnus ab ecclesla fuer~t  anathe- 
mat~zatus ~nteroaenlm,  sod. dum lnex- 
comm~~nlcatlono  domlnus fuerlt,  fidehs 
etlam  non  debet  servlre  el,  ut  lnfra 
I.  I1  (c  4  and  5)  S1  autem  In 
tulti~  dlgnltatls  quls  alter1 fidelltatem 
juraverlt,  postquam  domrnus  d~gnl- 
tatem  Illam  canonlce  pordlder~t v01 
leg~tlme,  juratorum  el  clelnceps  obh- 
gatur  nequaquan?  erlt,  ut  notatur 
ex  prxsontl  capltulo  Istl  enlm  re@ 
Francorurn  juraverant  Franc]  lntultu 
roglo  potestat~s  ,  postqu'bm  ergo  rex 
:oglt~me regnum  perd~dlt,  jurament~ 
vlnculum  absolutum  fu~t." POLITICAL  THEORY  OF THE  CANON  LAW. 
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It is  clearly,  then,  a  principle  of  the canon  law  of  these 
centuries that a ruler can be excommunicated, and that this 
carnes with it the consequence that his  sub~ects  can be,  or 
rather are, ipso facto,  released  from  their  oath of  allegiance 
to him. 
We turn to the third aspect  of  the canonical  theory, the 
conception  that Peter,  and therefore  his  successors,  had re- 
ceived  from Christ  authority  over  the  temporal  as  well  as 
the spiritual kingdom. 
This appears first in the Canon law in Gratian's ' Decretum.' 
In the  twenty-second  Distinction  he  collects  the  passages 
which  show that the Roman  Church  had  authority superior 
to that of  all other Churches.  He beglns  by citing a part of 
what he considers  to be a letter of  Pope Nicholas 11.  to the 
Milanese  (this is really  a  letter of  Peter Damian  to Hilde- 
brand,  preserved  in the Acts  of  the Convention  of  Milan  of 
A.D.  1059-60).  In this letter it is laid down that it was  the 
Roman  Church  which  had  created  patriarchal  and  metro- 
politan  dignities  and  the  sees  of  bishops,  and  which  had 
determined  the rank of  all  the Churches,  while  the Roman 
Church  was  founded  by  Christ  Himself,  who  committed  to 
Peter  the  laws  both  of  the  earthly  and heavenly  empire.l 
It does not appear how Gratian understood these last words, 
or what importance he  attached to them,  for he makes no 
comment  upon  the  passage:  it must  be  noticed  that  the 
words  occur  incidentally  in  a  passage  which  otherwise  is 
concerned  with  the relation  of  the Roman Church  to other 
churches. 
This passage is commented on by Rufinus and by Stephen 
of  Tournai.  Rufinus  deals with  it in a  somewhat elaborate 
fashion.  He  intcrprets  the  phrase  terreni  simul  et  celestis 
imperii jura as meaning that he has authority both over the 
l  Gratian,  'Decretum,'  D  XXII  1  fundavit  et super  petram  fidel  mox 
"  Omnes  slve patrlarchae  In  cujusl~bet  nascentis  ereu~t, qui  beato  eterns 
aplcem, slve metropoleon prlmatus, ant  vlte tlzvlgero  terren~  slmul et celestls 
episcopatuum cathedlas,~  el cccles~~rum impern Jura commlb~t  " 
~ujuslibet  ordlnls  d~gnltatem  lnst~tu~t  Cf.   mans^,  'Concilla,'  vol.  19, p  888. 
Romana eccles~a Illam vero solus lpse 
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and  over  secular  persons  and  things : the  vicar  of 
peter  thus  has  the jura  of  the  earthly kingdom.  But,  he 
says,  we  must  distinguish  between  the jus  auctoritatis  and 
the  jus  amministrationis:  the  jus  auctoritatis  is  that 
which  a  bishop  exercises  over  all ecclesiastical matters ; the 
jus  amministrationis  is  that  which  the  "  yeonomus "  (ad- 
ministrator of  the temporalities of  the diocese) exercises-he 
has the authority to administer affairs,  but only issues  com- 
mands to others by the authority of  the bishop.  The Pope 
has  " puoad  auctoritatem, jus . . . terreni  imperii,"  for it is 
he  who by consecration confirms the emperor in his  earthly 
kingdom,  and  admonishes  the  emperor  and  other  secular 
persons if  they misuse their secular office, and absolves them 
when they repent.  The prince has the authority after the Pope 
(post ipsum) of  rule  over  secular  persons,  and preter  ipsum 
has the duty of  administration : for the Pope should not deal 
with  secular  matters,  nor  the  prince  with  ecclesiastical 
matters, in accordance with the canon "  cum ad verum ventum 
est " (Gelasius's statement of  the division of  the two powers 
cited  in Dist.  xcvi.  c.  6).  Rufinus adds that others under- 
stood  the canon to refer  to the fact that Christ  gave Peter 
authority that what he should bind or loose on earth should 
be bound or loosed in heaven.l 
l  Rufinus,  '  Summa  Decret ,'  D 
xxn.  r.  I, '"clav~gero, I e  Pctro,  terr. 
a.  et cel  lmper  jura  comm.' : Celeste 
lmperlum  celestium mllitrm,  1 e.  cleri 
corum  nnlvorsltatem  cum hs, que ad 
00s  pertinent,  dlcit ,  terrenum  vero 
regnum  vcl  Impenum,  seculares 
homlnes,  secularesque  res  app~llat 
Per  hoc  ergo  v~detur  quod  summus 
pontifex,  qu~  beat1  Petrl  est  \~car~us, 
habet  jura  terreni  regnl  Sed  anlm 
advertendum  est  quod  jus  al~ud  est 
auctontatls,  al~ud amm~n~strat~onls 
Et qu~dem  ]us auctor~tatls  quemadmo 
dum m  episcopo,  ad cujus jns  omncs 
re8 ecclea~astice  spectare vldentur, qula 
eJUs  auctorltate  omnla  d~sponuntur, 
JuS  autem  amrn~n~stration~s  slcut  In 
Ylonomo, lste enlm habet ]us ammlnls- 
trand~,  sed auctorltate caret imperandi : 
quicqu~d allis  preclp~t,  non  sua  sed 
eplscopl  auctorltate lndlc~t  Summus 
ltaque patnarcha  quoad  auctorltatem 
]us  habet  terreni  imper11  eo  sell 
mod0 qula prlmum sua auctorltstc ]m 
peratorem In terreno regno consecrando 
confirmat  et  post  tam  lpsum  quam 
rel~quos  seculares  1st~  secular~bus 
abutentes  sola  sua  auctorltate  pene 
addlclt et lpsos eosdem post penltentes 
absolvlt  Ipso  vero  prlnceps  post 
lpsum  auctor~tatem  habet  secnlarev 
regend~  et preter  lpsum  offic~um  am 
mlnstrand~  ,  etenim  nec  aportollcum 
secularia  nec  prlnclpem  eccleslastica 
procurare oportet, ut infra d  xcvl, 'cum 
ad verum ventum est' (c  6).  Aln YIC 
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It would  seem  that  Rufinus  is  anxious  to preserve  the 
principle that the Pope has the supreme authority over secular 
matters, but also to suggest that this authority is limited to 
confirming  the  election  of  the emperor,  and  to correcting 
the  emperor  and  other  secular  rulers  if  they  misuse  their 
authority.  He is  anxious  to  bring  the  phrase  into  agree. 
ment  with  the  principlc  which  had  been  laid  down  by 
Gelasius, and which was still regarded as authoritative.  Tile 
fact that he  cites  another interpretation,  even though it is 
not his  own,  seems to show that he felt the phrase to be a 
difficult one. 
Stephen of  Tournai also  suggests two interpretations-the 
first,  that  the  Pope  has  authority  both  over  layrnen  who 
govern  worldly  affairs  and  over  the  clergy  who  have  the 
charge of  heavenly matters, for the successors  of  Peter con- 
secrate priests and crown the emperor ; the second, that the 
Pope has such authority that what he binds and looses upon 
earth is bound and loosed in heaven.l 
The ' Glossa Ordinaria,'  commenting on the passage,  says 
that the Pope has both swords, the spiritual and the temp~ral.~ 
What conclusion then are we to draw ?  It is impossible to 
say certainly in what sense Peter Damian used the phrase, or 
in what sense Gratian understood it.  Rufinus clearly thought 
that it meant that in some sense the lope, as the successor of 
Peter, had authority over secular affairs as well as over secular 
persons ; but  being  aware  of  the  emphatic  terms  of  the 
Gelasian statement, he wishes to reduce the practical meaning 
of  the phrase as far as possible, and he t,herefore suggests that 
it is best understood as explaining the authority by which the 
Popes consecrate and confirm the emperors, and their right of 
interfering if  these misuse  their power.  Stephen is probably 
imperii jura commisit,' i.e. ei dedit, ut  are iinperatores.  Vel ita : '  brr. aim. 
quecurnque  ligaret  vel  solveret  super  et  C.,' i.e. dedit oi ut qumcumque ligaret 
terram, essent soluta vel ligata in coelo."  vel  solveret  super  terram,  ligata  vel 
1 Stephen  of  Tournai,  '  Summa  soluta  cssent  In  ccrlis." 
Decret.,' D. xxii. 1 : '"Terreni  simul et  2  ' Glossa  Ordinaria '  to  Gratian, 
celcstis,'  i.e.  laicorum,  qui terrena d~s- '  Decret.,'  D. xuii.  1.  I owe the refer- 
ponilnt,  et clericorurn,  qui  celestibus  ence  to  note  12  in  Ma~tland's  bran#- 
intendunt.  Narn  Pftri  succossores  et  lation  of  a  pal t  of  Giorke-' 
consecrare sacerdotes habent et coron-  Deutsche  Genossenichaftsrecht.' 
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the statement of Rufinus, and very probably would 
have assented to his interpretation, thongh of this we  cannot 
be  certain.  Both Rufinus  and Stephen are aware  that the 
phrase may be taken in another and a  more general sense, and 
intimate  that other  writers  had  taken it  so.  The  ' Gloss ' 
interprets  it as  referring  to the  power  of  the  two  swords. 
We  have  found  no  reference  to  the  phrase  in  the  other 
canonhts  with whom we deal or in the Decretals. 
We  turn to the fourth point we  have mentioned,  and we 
must now  consider the place of  the Donation of  Constantine 
in the Canon law.  In our first volume we pointed  out that, 
whatever ambiguities there may be as to the original purpose 
of  the Donation, one thing is very clear, and that is, that no 
writer in the ninth century suggests that it  means that the 
Pope  has temporal authority over the Empire in the West.l 
We  cannot  here  discuss  the  history  of  the  Donation  in 
mediaeval  literature  in general ; we  shall  recur  to this  in a 
later volume.  But we must consider its place in the canonical 
literature.  Regino of  Prum does  not cite it.  In Burchard 
there  is  a  passage  which  contains  the statement that Con- 
atantine left Rome, which  had been  the seat of  the imperial 
authority,  and granted it to St Peter  and his   successor^.^ 
The  passage  belongs  to the  literature  connected  with  the 
Donation,  but does not contain the important  phrases.  Ivo 
of  Chartres cites the same passage in the ' De~retum,'~  but he 
also  cites  the Donation itself,  including  the words  in which 
Constantine is said to have transferred to Pope Sylvester not 
only Rome, but all the provinces of  Italy and the West14  and 
both passages recur in the ' Panormia '  and in the collection 
of  Cardinal Deu~dedit.~  As  these  canonists  make  no  com- 
ment on the passages  which they cite. it is impossible to say 
See vol. i. pp. 287-90. 
Burchard  of  Worms,  '  Decret.,' 
iii.  6 :  "  Denique  idem  prrefatus 
princeps  (Constantine)  donaria  im- 
mensa, et fahricam templi prima sedis 
beati Potri principis apostolorum insti- 
tuit,  adeo  ut  sedem  imperialem  qua 
VOL.  11. 
Romani  principes  prresidcbant  relin. 
queret, et B. Petro suisque successori- 
bus  profuturam  concederet." 
Vvo, '  Decretum,'  iii. 7. 
4  IVO,  '  Decreturn,'  v. 49. 
5  IVO,  '  Panormia,' ii.  3 and iv.  1. 
Deusdedit,  ' Coll. Can.,'  iv.  1. 
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in what sense they understood it.  When we  come to Gratian, 
it is  certainly interesting  to find that he  omits it altogether 
from his  collection.  It stands, indeed, in all the editions  of 
Gratian, but  it is  contained in two  Palea-that  is,  two  of 
those  canons  which  were  inserted  by  a  later  hand.  It  is, 
indeed,  impossible to say precisely what importance  we  are 
to attach to this  omission, but  it is  certainly  remarkable, 
for the Donation is contained not only, as me  have just  seen, 
in Ivo and Deusdedit, but also in the collections known  as 
'  Anselmus,' iv. 32, and ' C%saieoaugustana,' ii. 72, and all of 
these  coIlections were  used  by  Gratian.  Of  the two  Pale% 
which have  been inserted  in Gratian,  the first  sums up the 
general  purport  of  the Donation,  saying that the Emperor 
Constantine granted the crown and all the royal  dignity in 
the city of  Rome, in Italy, and in the Western parts, to the 
Popell while  the second  gives  a  large  part  of  the text  of 
the Donation itself, including the most significant  phrase^.^ 
Gratian's  first  commentator,  Paucapalea,  who  has  been 
thought to be the author of  the ' Palea,' is the first canonist 
whose  treatmeat  of  the Donation  is  explicit.  Commenting 
on the twenty-second Distinction, he explains that Byzantium 
is called New  Rome because  Constantine transferred  thither 
the  Roman  imperium,  for  Constantine,  on  the fourth  day 
after his baptism,  gave to the Pontiff  of  the Roman Church 
a privilegiunz,  by  which  he  handed  over  to him  the  crown 
and all the royal dignity and the " palace " of  the Lateran, 
and all his glory ; and further, he handed over his kingdom, 
declaring that he had thought it meet to transfer the seat of 
government (imperium) to the East, and to build in the pro- 
vince of  Byzantium a city called by his  own name, in which 
to  place  his  imperium,  inasmuch  as  it  wa3  not  just  that 
where God had  placed the principatus of  the priests  and the 
Gratran,  '  Docretum,'  D  xcvl  C  episcoporum a catholicis leg1 commem- 
13 (Palea)  "  Constantinus Imperator  orat,  et pro  antiquo usu  multas  hoC 
coronum ct omnom  regiam  dlgnltatem  ~mitan  diclt ecclcblas), ~ta  legitur " 
In  urbo  Romana,  et in  Italia,  et in  2  Gratian,  'Decretum,'  D  xcvl  c. 
partibus  occidental~bus  Apostolico  14 (Palea) , of  Friedberg's  note,  for 
concrssit  Nam  in gestis B  Sll~  ester  references  to '  Anselmus ' and  ' Gas- 
(que B  Papa Golasius in concillo LXY  areoaugustana.' 
~hristien  religion, there the earthly emperor should hold his 
seat  and  p0wer.l  Paucapalea's  own  interpretation  of  this 
is completely set out later in his  work.  In commenting  on 
the  ninety-seventh  Distinction,  he  says  that  while  it  has 
above been shown that the emperor is not to usurp the rights 
of the pontiff, nor the pontiff those of  the king, yet, when the 
emperor has transferred all his power to the supreme pontiff 
he  has  renounced  his  rights and dignities.  Constantine did 
this  when,  on  the fourth  day after his  baptism,  he  handed 
over  to the Pope his  crown and all his royal  dignity in the 
West.  Besides this, he made many gifts, including the palace 
of  the Lateran,  and granted to the Pope the right to make 
consuls  and  patricians  of  the  Roman  clergy.  Finally,  he 
surrendered  his  whole  kingdom  and  power  when  he  said 
that he had thought it meet to transfer his imperium to the 
East, inasmuch  as it was  not just  that the emperor should 
have  his  seat  and  power  where  God  had  established  the 
prilzcipatus of  the priests  and the Christian  religi~n.~  Here 
we  have a  distinct exposition  of  the meaning  which  Pauca- 
palea  attached to the Donation.  This is especially emphatic, 
because Paucapalea refers expressly to tho Gelasian principle 
of the division of  the two authorities, and, as expressly, argues 
1 Paucapalea,  '  Summa Decret ,' D. 
xxn  3  "  Nova  Roms  ldeo  dlcitur, 
qua noviter llluc a Constontino trans 
latum est Romanum lmperium  Con- 
stantlnus emm imperator  Romanorum 
quarto die sm baptismatis privilcgium 
Romanae ecclesia: pontifici  contuht,  in 
quo coronam et omnem reglam  d~gnl 
tatem lpsulnque palatium  Lateranense 
omncmque  susm glorlam tribult  In 
super quoque regnum 01 dimisit dicens 
Congruum  esse  perspeximus  nostrum 
lmperium  et regnl  potostatem  orient 
allbus  transferr~ reg~olllbus, et  in 
Blzantiae provinclie optimo loco nomini 
nostro  clvitatem adlficari, et nostrum 
llllc constitui impenum,  quoniam, uhl 
Pnnclpatus  sacerdotum  et christiana 
rellgionls caput a deo est constltutum, 
lusturn non cut,  ut ~bi  lmperator  te~ 
renus sedeat  et potestatem habeat " 
Paucapalea,  ' Summa Decret ,' D. 
xcvll  " Suporius ostensum est.  quod 
nec  imperator  jura  pontificl-,  nec 
pontifex  jura  regalia  usurpare  debet 
Verumtamen  ubl  imperator  omnem 
suam potostatem summo ponhiii~i  con 
tulit, juri  ac dignitat1 suac renunttasse 
vidctur  Constant~nus  enlm imperator 
quarto die sui l~aptlsmatis  coronam et 
omnem reglsm  dign~tatem  in partibus 
occ~dentahbus  apostolico  ejusque  sur 
cessorlbus  contullt  Insuper  donnria 
multa, lpsum quoque palatlum Lateran- 
ense tradidit, et ut de clerlcls Romanic 
ecclesla  consules  ac patrlclos  faceret, 
ooncessit  Tandem umversum regnum 
ac propriam potestatem reliquit dicens, 
'  Congruum  esse  perspeximus,' " etc. 
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that the Donation,  presumably  because it  was  a  voluntary 
surrender by Constantine of his authority in the West, is not 
inconsistent with this.  Paucapalea understands the Donation 
as conveying to tho Popes all the imperial authority, not only 
in Italy, but in the whole of  the West. 
The position of  Paucapalea is clear, but it does not appear 
that any of  the canonists with whom we  are dealing followed 
him.  R~~nus,  commenting on the twenty-second Distinction, 
shows that he  is  acquainted  with  some part at least of  the 
Donation, for he explains  the title of  New  Rome as having 
been  applied  to  Constantinople,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
Constantine  transferred  to  it  the  Roman  imperium,  and 
'  he quotes the words of  the Donation, " Congruum esse  . . . 
habeat pote~tatem,"~  but he makes no  comment  on this, or 
on the " Palea " in Distinction xcvi.-if  indeed he found them 
there.  Stephen of  Tournai makes no reference at all to the 
Donation  or  the Pales.  Damasus was  acquainted  with  the 
Donation, but expressly repudiates  the notion  that it  could 
have  the  effect  of  permanently  transferring  the  imperial 
authority in the West to the Popes.  Some people, he  says, 
maintain that the emperor  holds the sword from the Pope, 
because Constantine left the imperium to the Roman Church, 
but it is more true to say that he holds it from God,  as  St 
Augustine  says  (referring to Dist.  viii. l),  and it  does  not 
appear  either  that the Pope  received  the imperium  or  that 
Constantine could have  bound  his   successor^.^  There  is  no 
reference to the Donation either in the Compilations or in the 
Decretals, so far as we have seen. 
Paucapalea  is  therefore  the  only  canonist  of  those  with 
whom  we  are  dealing of  whom  we  can  say that they  both 
knew  the  Donation  and  interpreted  it  as  conveying  the 
l  Rufinu~,  ' Summa Dooret.,' D. xxii.  reliquerit  Romans ecclesiae,  ut in illat 
3.  '  Constantinus.'  Verinus  tsmen  est 
Cf. p  211, note 1.  quod a Doo habeat, quemadmodum dicit 
a  Damasus,  'Burohardica,'  R.  127,  Augustinus,  sup.  viii.  dist.  quo  jure. 
"  Quod imperator non  hnbet  jurisdio-  Nec  enim  apparet  Papern  imperium 
tionem  a  Papa . . . Solutio.  Dicunt  nocepisse,  nequo  Constantlnus  potuit 
nonnulli, Imperatorem habere gladium  successori  suo  praejudicare." 
a  Papa,  quia  Constantinus  Imperium 
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illlperial  authority  in  the West  to the Pope.  As  we  have 
seen,  it was  known  and included  in  the collections  of  the 
canonists before Gratian, but we  have no knowledge as to the 
sense  in which  it was  understood  by  them.  Why Gratian 
should have omitted it  from  the ' Decretum ' we  cannot say. 
Rufinus  and Stephen may not have found it in their copies 
of the ' Decretum,' for we  cannot be sure whether the Paleae 
were  included  in  them.  Damasus  knew  the Donation  but 
repudiated  its authority.  We  cannot  say why  there should 
be  no reference to it in the Decretals. 
It is  possible that there was  some doubt in the minds  of 
the  canonists  as  to the genuineness  of  the Donation.  We 
shall return to this question when we deal with the Donation 
in  connection with  the general literature of  these times.  Its 
genuineness  had been  doubted  as  early  as  the beginning  of 
the eleventh  century, as we  know  from a constitution of  the 
Emperor  Otho III., if  we  may  assume  the authenticity  of 
the document, which is generally admitted.1 
At  any rate, whatever  may be  the reason,  we  cannot  say 
that  the  canon  law  and the canonists,  with  the exception 
of  Paucapalea,  till  after  the  time  of  the  Decretals  of 
Grcgory  IT;., used  the Donation  for  the purpose  of  estab- 
lishing the  superiority  or  supremacy of  the Pope  over  the 
secular authority. 
We have then under these fonr heads examined the question 
how far the canon law claimed supremacy for tho spiritual over 
the temporal power : first, the tradition of  cases in which the 
Popes had actually  appointed or deposed kings ; second, the 
development of  the theory of  rscommunication  to the point 
that it implied that the Church had t>he  authority of  deposing 
kings  and emperors ; third, Lhat  isolated phrase in  Gratian, 
which might mean that Peter received from our Lord Hiinself 
Power both spiritual and temporal ;  and fourth, the interpre- 
tation of  the Donation of  Constantine. dt is clear that while 
the canonists claim for the Pope authority to exercise discip- 
line over all temporal rulers,  to the extent even  of  deposing 
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them,  they  are not  clear  or  unanimous  with regard  to the 
theory that the Pope as the successor of  Peter holds a supreme 
authority over both powers. 
It is  now  possible  to examine those  phrases of  the popes 
which  were  considered  by  Gregory  IX.  and  his  advisers 
worthy  of  a  place  in  the  authoritative  collection  of  the 
Decretals.  It  is  indeed  of  real  importance  to  Consider 
these  statements,  which  were  formally  adjudged  to be  de. 
serving  of  a  place  in  the  systeni  of  the  canon  law,  apart 
from  the  phrases  which  various  Popes  may  have  used  at 
other times.  It is extremely important to distinguish between 
phrases  recognised  as  representing  the  carefully  considered 
judgment of  the authorities of  the Church, from phrases which 
may have been  used in the heat of  controversy, which  may 
have represented tho actual feeling of  the moment but were 
not finally considered adequately representative of  the judg- 
ment of  the Church. 
The statements  which  we  have  now  to examine are with 
one exception contained in Decretal letters of  Pope Innocent 
111. ; and we  will  do well  to remember that there were few 
of  the great Popes of  the Middle Ages who set the ecclesiasti- 
cal power higher,  and who actually exercised a greater influ- 
ence in Europe. 
We begin by examining a letter which he addressed to the 
Emperor Alesius  of  Constantinople,  on the relations and the 
relative  dignity  of  the  temporal  and  spiritual  authorities. 
Alexius had apparently complained that Innocent had written 
of  him in severo  terms,  and apparently had appealed to St 
Peter's phrase, "  Be subject to every ordinance of  man for the 
Lord's sake " (1  Pet. ii. 13), as indicating that the empire was 
superior in authority and dignity to the priesthood, and that 
the emperor had criminal jnrisdiction  over priests as well as 
over  the laity.  Innocent energetically repudiates  these con- 
tentions,  and  specially  urges  that  though  the  emperor  is 
supreme in temporal matters, th~s  only affects those who hold 
temporalitics  from  him : the  Pope  is  superior  in  spiritual 
things, which  are superior  to the temporal even as the soul 
is to the body  AS  to the claim to criminal jurisdiction  over 
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the clergy as well as the laity, this is not just,  for this juris- 
diction is limited to those who use the sword. 
Be cites  various  passages  of  Scripture to show  that the 
priest  is  superior  to  the  king,  and  finally  compares  the 
of  the  Church  to the  sun  and that of  the  king 
to the moon.  God has set in the firmament  of  the heaven, 
that is, in the universal church, two great lights, that is, two 
great dignities, the pontifical and the royal authorities.  But 
as  the sun which  presides  over  the day is greater than the 
moon which presides over the night, so is the Pontiff  greater 
than the ki11g.l 
1 De~retals,  I  33.  G (Inn. 111 ),  5  1 : 
"  Mlrata  est autem ~mper~alls  subllm- 
itas,  slcut  per  easdem  nobls  l~teras 
destlnastl,  quod  te n181 [aus~]  fuimus 
In  nostrls  l~ter~s  al~quantulum  lncre- 
pare,  llcet  non lnrrepand~  anlmo, sed 
affectus  potius commonend1 quod scrip- 
aimus  memlnerlmus  nos  sonpslsso. 
HUIC autem  tuz  admirat~on~  non 
oausam, sed occaslonem  praebmt, slcut 
ex  olsdem  con]eclmus  l~ter~s,  quod 
leglfiti  beatum  Petruin  Apo~tolorum 
pnnclpem  SIC  scnpslsse :  '  Subd~ti 
estote  omnl humancc creatura proptor 
Deuni,  sive regl,  tanquam przcellentl, 
slve  duc~bus,  tanquam  ab eo  mlssls, 
~ud  vindictam malefactorum  lauclem vero 
bonorum.'  Volens  enlm  do  quo  nos 
ratioilablllus  admtramur,  imperatorla 
cels~tudo  per hac et alla, quae  ~ndux~t, 
lmper~um  sacerdotio d~gn~tute  ac potes- 
tato praferre, ox auctoritate  pramlssa 
trlplex  trahere  volu~t argumontum, 
prlmum ex eo,  quod legltur  ' subdltl 
estotc,' secundum ex eo, quod sequttur 
'  regl tanquam prrccellent~  , tortmm ex 
eo,  quod  est  adjectum  subsequenter 
"ad \lndl~tam  malcfacto~um,  laudem 
vero bonorum '  , per prlmum subesso 
bacerdotmm,  pel  sooundum  lmperlum 
praeemluere per  tert~um  imperatorum 
tam  111  sacerdotes  quam  lalcos  ]UrIs- 
dlct~ouem,  lmmo etlam glad11  potestatem 
acceplsse  przsumens  Quum  emm et 
bonl quldam smt aacerdotes, et qu~dam 
corum malefactores exslstant, IS, qul se 
cundum apostolum gladlum  portat  ad 
vlnrllctam  mnlcfactorum,  landem vero 
bonorum,  IU  mnlefic~eates  presbyter08 
excc.;sus  p~zesumptos  potest  ultoro 
glad10 vlndlcare,  quum  Inter  presby- 
tcros et al~os  apostolus non dlstlnguat. 
Verum  SI  CL  pcrsonain  loquentls  et 
eorum,  ad  quos  loquebatur,  ac  vlm 
locut~on~s dll~gentlus  attondlsses, 
scr~bcnt~s  non  expresslsses  talltor 
~ntellectum. . . .  Nam  61  per 
hoc,  quod  d~x~t  .  '  subd~t~  estote ' 
sacerdot~bus volmt  lmponere  jugum 
subjcctl~nl~,  et  eis  przelat~onls auc- 
tor~tatom  affere,  qutbus eos  subjectos 
csse monobat, sequoretur ex hoc, quod 
etlam  servus  qu~l~bet  m  sacerdotes 
imporium  accepisset,  quum  dlcatur, 
'  omnl l~umanae  croaturae '  Quod autem 
seqmtur,  ' regl  tamquam  przecellentl,' 
non negamus quln przcellat Imperator 
In tempornlihus  1110s duntaxat, qu~  ab 
eo susclplunt temporalia  Sed Pont~fox 
In  sp~r~tual~hus  antecell~t,  quae  tanto 
sunt  temporallbus  dlgmota,  quanto 
anima  przfertur  corporl,  lloet  non 
fi~mpl~c~ter  dictum  fuer~t  '  subdltl 
ebtote ' sed  add~tum  fuerlt,  ' propter 
Deum,'  nec  pure  s~t  subscrlptum, 
'  regl  praecellont~,' sed  interpositurn 
fors~tail  fmt non slne causa '  t~nquam  ' 
Quod autem sequ~tur  . '  ad kindlctam 
malefactorum,  laudem vero bonorum,' 
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'Phis passage brings out clearly some important points with 
regard  to the conception  of  the relative  position  of  the two 
powers.  Innocent  sharply  repudiates  the  notion  that  the 
secular  authority is  superior  to the Pope:  he acknowledges 
that the Emperor is  supreme in temporal matters,  but the 
Pope  is  supreme in spiritual things,  which  are far greater, 
and-a  point  of  great  importance-Innocent  clearly  holds 
that the clergy  are only subject to the secular power  so far 
as  they  hold  temporalities  from  that  power,  and  only  in 
relation  to these temporalities, and they are,  therefore,  not 
subject  to him  in  criminal  matters.  But,  finally,  in spite 
of  the fact that Innocent  holds  that the spiritual power  is 
immensely superior in dignity to the secular, he restates the 
Gelasian theory, that both powers, the secular as well as the 
spiritual, have been established by God, and he expresses this 
in the terms  current  in the ninth  century,  that these  two 
powers are within the Church.  It is noticeable, therefore, that 
imperator  super  omnes  et  bonos  et 
malos  gladii acccperit potestatem, sed 
in eos solummodo, qui utentes gladio, 
ejus sunt jurisdictioni  commissi, juxta 
quod veritas ait : '  Omnes qui acceperint 
gladium  glaclio peribunt.'  . . . Verum 
quicquid  olim  fuerit in  veteri  testa- 
mento, nunc aliud est in novo, ex quo 
Christus factus est sacerdos in zternum 
secundum  ordinem  Melchizedech,  qui 
so  non  ut rex,  sed  ut sacerdos in ara 
crucis hostiam  obtulit  Deo  patri,  per 
qunm  gonus  redemit  humanurn,  circa 
illum prmcipue, qui successor est Apos- 
toli Petri ct vicarius Jesu Christi. 
Potuisses autem prerogativam sacer- 
dotii  ex  eo  potius  intclligere,  quod 
dictum  est:  non  a  quolibet  sed  a 
Deo : non  Jtcg~,  sed  Sacerdoti;  non 
de  regia  stirpc  sed  de  sacerdotali 
prosapia  descendenti,  de  sacerdotibus 
videlicet, qui erant in Anathot : '  Ecce 
constitui  te  supcr  gentes  et regna  ut 
evellas et dissipes, zedifices et plantes ' 
(Jer.  i.  10).  Dictum  est  etiam  in 
divina  lege :  "  Diis  non  det,rahes, et 
principem  populi  tui  non  maledices,' 
quit:  sacerdotes  regibus  anteponens, 
istos Deos, et alios principes appellavit. 
Prreterea nosse  debueras, quod feoit 
Deus  duo  magna  luminaria  in  firma- 
monto cceli ; luminare majus ut prae- 
esset diei, et luminare minus, ut prae- 
esset  nocti ; utrumque .magnum,  sed 
alterum  majus,  quia  nomine  cceli  de- 
signatur ecclesia, juxta quod veritas ait: 
'  Simile  est  regnum  ccelorum  homini 
patri  familias,  qui  summo  mane  con- 
duxit operarios in vineam suam.'  Per 
diem  vero  spiritualis,  per  noctem 
carnalis  sscundum  prophoticum  testi- 
monium :  '  dies  diei  eructat verbum, 
et nox  nocti  indicat  scientiam.'  Ad 
firmamentum  igitur cceli,  hoc  est uni- 
versalis ecclesirc, fecit Deus duo magna 
lufninaria, id  est,  duas  magnas  insti- 
tuit  dignitates,  qurc  sunt  poutificalis 
auctoritas, et regalis potestas.  Sod illa, 
quae przost diebus, id est, ~~~iritualibu~, 
major est ; qum  voro (noctibus id est) 
carnalibus,  minor,  ut quanta est inter 
solem et lunam, tanta inter pontifices 
et reges  differentia  oognoscatur." 
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innocent  avoids  here  a11  suggestion that the spiritual power 
is supreme over the secular within the sphere of  the latter. 
We find that this position  of  Innocent is maintained con- 
sistently in other important  Decretals  which  deal  with  the 
matter.  There is  a very remarkable illustration  of  this in a 
Decretal dealing with the dispute as to the election of  Philip 
of  Suabia and Otto to the empire.  Innocent 111.  had inter- 
fered  in  this  case  to annul  the  election  of  Philip  and  to 
confirm the election of  Otto.  At first sight it would  seem as 
though  this were  05viously  an assertion by the Pope of  his 
authority over the secular power,  and of  a claim to take the 
appointment into his own hands and to supersede the electors. 
But Innocent is at great pains to disclaim this construction of 
his  action.  Some  of  the princes  had  complained  that the 
Papal legate had taken upon himself the office of  an elector or 
" cognitor,"  and maintained t,hat this was wholly illegitimate. 
Innocent denies that he had done this, and says that his legate 
had only acted as a "  denunciator,"-that  is, he had declared 
Philip to be unworthy and Otto to be worthy to receive  the 
empire.  Innocent recognises that the electors have the right 
and authority to elect the king, who is afterwards to be pro- 
moted to the empire ; they have the right by law and ancient 
custom, and the Pope must specially recognise this, as it was 
the  Apostolic  See  which  transferred  the  empire  from  the 
Greeks  to the Germans.  But, on the other hand,  Innocent 
urges  that  the  princes  must  recognise  that  the  right  and 
authority  of  examining  the  person  elected  belongs  to the 
Pope, who is to anoint and consecrate and crown him, for it is 
a general principle that the examination of  a person belongs 
to him who  is to lay hands on him,  and the princes  cannot 
maintain that if  they elected,  even unanimously,  a  sacrileg- 
ious  or excommunicated  person,  the Pope would  be  obliged 
to  consecrate  and  crown  him.  Finally,  he  claims  that  if 
the electors are divided, he has the right to decide in favour 
of  one  of  the parties,  and urges  that this  was  done in the 
case of  the disputed election of  Lothair and C0nrad.l 
' '  Decretals,' i. 6. 34 : " Inter cetera  jectione sunt usi, dicentes, quod Apos- 
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It is interesting to observe how  carefully Innocent guards 
his  own action, and disclaims  the intention of  overriding the 
legitimate rights of  the electors.  His claim, in fact, no doubt 
amounts to an enormous invasion of  the rights of the electors 
of  the empire-that  is,  his  claim to determine  which  of  the 
aut cognitoris personam ; si electoris, 
in  messem  alienam  miserat  falcem 
suam, et electioni  se  ingerens,  princi- 
pum  derogaverat  dignitati ; si cogni- 
toris,  absente  altera  partium  videtur 
perperam processisse, qnum citata non 
fuerit,  et ideo  non  debuit  contumax 
judicari : . . . Vertun  illis  principibus 
jus  et potestatem  eligendi  regem,  in 
imperatorem  postmodurn  promoven- 
dum, recognoscimus,  ut debemus,  ad 
quos  cle  jure  ac antiqua  consuetudino 
noscitur  pertinere ;  przsertim  quum 
ad  eos  jus  et potestas  hujusmodi  ab 
apostolica  sede  pervenerit,  quac  Ro- 
manum imperium in personam magni- 
fici  Caroli  a,  Grrecis  transtulit  in 
Germanos.  Sed et principes recognos- 
cere  debent,  et utique  recognoscunt, 
sicut  iidem  in  nostra  recognovcre 
prccsentia,  quod  jus  et auctoritas  ex- 
aminandi personam  electam in regcm 
et promovendam ad imperium ad nos 
spsctat,  qui  eum  inungimus,  conse- 
cramus et coronamus.  Est enim regu- 
lariter  et generaliter  observatum,  ut 
ad eum examinatio persona pertineat, 
ad  quem  impositio  manus  spectat. 
Numquid enim, si principes non solum 
in  discordia,  sed  etiam  in  concordia 
sacrilogum  quemcumque,  vel  excom- 
municatum,  in  regem,  tyrrsnum,  vel 
fatuum,  haereticum  eligerent,  aut 
paganum,  nos inungere,  consecrare  ac 
coronare  hominem  hujusmodi  debere- 
mus ?  Absit  omnino. 
Objoctioni  ergo  Principum  respon- 
dentes esserimus,  quod legatus noster 
. . . approbando  regem  Ottonem  et 
reprobando Philippum  ducem Suavia, 
nec  electoris  gessit  personam,  . . . 
ut potc  qui nec fecit aliquem eligi, nec 
elegit : . . .  nec  cognitoris  person- 
am exhibuit quum neutrius electionem 
qnoad  factum  eligentium  confirm. 
andam  duxerit,  aut etiam  infirmand. 
am.  .  .  .  Exercuit  autom  denun. 
ciatoris  officium ;  quia  personam 
ducis ejusdem indignam, et personalll 
regis  denunciavit  idoneam  quoad im. 
perium obtinendum : non  tam propter 
studia eligentium, quam propter merita 
clectorum :  quamvis plures ex illis qui 
cligendi  regem  in  imperatorem  pro. 
movendum de jure  ae de consuetudine 
obtincnt  potestatom,  cousensisse  per. 
hibeantur  in  ipsum  Regem  Ottorum; 
et ex eo  quod  fautores  Philippi  ducis 
absentibus  aliis  et contemptis,  ipsum 
eligore  przsumpserunt,  pateat  eos 
perpernm processisse :  quum explorati 
sit  juris  quocl  electioni  plus  con- 
temptus  unius,  quam  contradictio 
multorum  obsistat : . . . Nos  utique 
non  ducern,  sed  reliqunm  reputamus 
et  nominamus  regem  justitin  exi- 
gent~.  . . .  Quod  autem  qnum  in 
electiono  vota  principum  dividuntur, 
post  admonitioncm  et expectationem 
alteri partium favere possimus, maxime 
postquam  a  nobis  unctio,  consecratio, 
et coronatio postulantur, siout utraque 
pars a nobis mnltotiespostulavit, ex jure 
patet  pariter  et exemplo.  Numquid 
onim  si  principes  admoniti  et oxpec- 
tati,  vel  non  potueruut  vel  noluer- 
unt  in  unum  propositum  conveniro, 
sedes  Apostolica  advocato  et  defen- 
sore  carehit,  eorumque  culpa  ipsi  re- 
dundabit  in  pcenam  ?  Sciunt  autem 
principes,  . . . quod cum Lotharius et 
Corradus  in  discordia  fuissent  ele~ti, 
Romanus  Pontifex  Lotharium  core- 
navit, et impcrium obtinuit coronatus, 
eodem  Corraclo tunc  demum  ad ejus 
gratiam  redeunte." 
should  be  acknowledged  in  case  of  a  disputed 
;  but, as we  have pointed  out, there were important 
precedents  for  his  claiming  a  great and  even a  paramount 
share in  determining  the  elect8ion.l His  refusal to acknow- 
ledge  an excommunicated person  was  only  a  natural exten- 
sion of  the principle  that excommunication involved deposi- 
tion.  It is very significant that he makes no claim to any 
abstract political supremacy over  the empire ; his  silence is 
indeed  very  significant,  for, as  we  have  seen,  there was  at 
least  one phrase in the canollical collection of  Gratian which 
seemed  to imply that the  successors  of  Peter  had received 
this authority from Christ Him~elf.~ 
This  conclusion  is  confirmed  by  the  terms  of  another 
important Decretal letter of  Innocent, written to the French 
bishops,  defending his  claim to arbitrate between the French 
and English kings.  He begins by repudiating the notion that 
he desires to disturb or diminish the jurisdict;ion or authority 
of  the French king, while he expects that the French king, on 
his  part,  will  not interfere  with  the PapaNI  jurisdiction  and 
authority.  The Lord in the Gospcls had bidden  an injured 
person appeal to the Church, and the king of  England asserted 
that the king of  the French had transgressed against him, and 
that he therefore had a,ppealed to the Church, and the Pope, 
therefore,  could  not  refuse  to hear  him.  He  disclaims  a11 
desire to judge as to the question of  the fief, and he recognises 
that any question of  this kind belongs  to the feudal lord- 
that is, in this case, to the king of  the French, unless, indeed, 
the jus  commulze  had  been  altered by  a  special privilegium 
or  by custom ; but he  claims  the right  to decide  as to the 
"  sin," for it cannot be doubted that jurisdiction  on this point 
belongs  to the Pope.  The French king  should not consider 
it  derogatory to his  dignity to submit in this matter to the 
Apostolic  judgment;  and  he  appeals  to  the  words  of  the 
Emperor Valentinian  and to a  decree of  the Emperor Theo- 
dosius, which,  as he says, had been renewed by the Emperor 
Charles, under which any party to a suit might, even without 
the consent of  the other party, appeal to the bishop.  No sane 
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person, he continues, can doubt that it is the duty of  the Pope 
to rebuke men for mortal sin, and if they refuse to submit, to 
subject them to ecclesiastical censure : it cannot be pretended 
that kings are exempt from this jurisdiction.  If ths is true 
of  all sins, how much more must it be true with regard to a 
transgression against peace, and he appeals to the warning of 
the Gospel  directed  against  those  who  refuse to receive  the 
messenger of  peace.  Further, he reminds hlm  that the hng 
of  the French had used the help of  the Pope against Richard 
of  England.  Finally, he urges that a treaty had been made 
between  the kings  and  confirmed by  their  oaths,  and that 
this  had  been  violated,  and that no  one  could  doubt  that 
the  question  of  the  violation  of  an  oath  belonged  to  the 
Church.  He  has  therefore,  he  says,  appointed  his  legates 
to enquire into the matter, and if they found the complaint 
of  the Ring of  England to be a just  one, to take such  steps 
as  he  had  authorised,  and  he  admonishes  the  bishops  to 
receive and carry out the judgment.l 
1 '  Decretals,'  rr  1  13  "  Non  elgo 
putet  al~quls  quod  jurlsdlct~onem  aut 
potestatem  lllustrls  regls  Francoum 
perturbare  aut  mlnuere  mtendamus, 
quum  lpse  jurlsdlot~onem et  potes 
tatem  nostram  nec  veht,  nec  deboat 
etlam,  ~mpedlre, quumque  ~urlsdlc 
t~onem  proprlam  non  sufficlamus ox- 
plere,  cur  allonam usurparc  vellomus 
Sed quum domlnus dlcat In evangcl~o 
'S1 peccavent In te frator tuus  sl 
autem  occlos~am  non  aud~er~t,  s~t  tlbl 
slcut  othnlcus  et  publ~~anus  '  (Matt 
xxnl  15 ff ),  et rex  Angllm,  slcut  as 
sent, s~t  paratus sufficlentor ostendere, 
quod rex Francoum peccat In Ipsum, ot 
lpse clrca sum In  corrcct~on-  processlt 
secundum  regulam  evangol~cam, et 
tandem,  qula  nullo  mod0  profec~t, 
dlrlt  ecdes~m  quomodo  nos  qul 
sumus  ad reglmen unlversal~s  ecclrsla? 
auprema d~spos~tlone  vocatl, mandatum 
dlvlnum possumus non exaud~re,  ut non 
procedamus  secundum  forrnam lpsms, 
nlsl  fora~tan ipse  coram  nobls  v01 
legato  nostro  sufficior~tem In  con 
trar~um ratlonem  ostendat ?  Non 
enlm  mtendlmus  ~udlcare de  feudo, 
cujus  ad lpsum  spectat judlclum,  nlsl 
forte jurl  communl per  spoczals prlv~ 
loglum  vel  oontrarlam  consuetudmem 
allquld  s~t  detractum,  sed  decernere 
de peccato,  oujus ad nos portmet  slne 
dub10  censura,  quam  In  queml~bet 
exorceie  possumus  et debemus  Non 
~g~tur  injunosum  slb~  debet lcgla  dlg 
n~tas  reputare,  SI  super  hoe  apostollco 
judlc~o  se  comm~tat,  quum Valentml- 
anus  lncl~tus  ~mpcrator suffraganols 
nfed~olanensls  ecclesla dlx~sse  legatur 
'  Talem  In  pontlfical~  sede  oonstltucre 
procuretls,  cul et nos, qu~  gubernamus 
~mperlum,  sliicere nostra cap~ta  subnl~t 
tamus, et e]us mon~ta,  quum tanquum 
homlnes dolmquonmus, susclplamus no 
csssarlo  velut  med~carnenta  curantls ' 
Nec  SIC  lllud  humlll~me omlttamus, 
quod Tl~eodoslus  statu~t  ~mporator,  et 
Carolus, Innovavlt, de culus gcnero rox 
lpso noscltur descendlsse  '  qulcunque 
vldellcet lltem habens, SIT e pet~tor  fuatlt 
slve reus, slve In ~mtlo  lltlb 501 decur81S 
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The clami which Innocent makes is no doubt one of  great 
magnitude,  but it is very necessary that we  should observe 
carefully  the  grounds  upon  which  Innocent  rests  it,  and 
temporum  curnculls, slve quum nego- 
tluin peroratur, slre quum jam cmpent 
prom1  sententla,  sl  ]ud~clum  eleger~t 
sacrosanctre sed~s  antlst~tls,  llllco  slnc 
allqua  clubltatlone,  etlams1 pars  alla 
refragetur,  ad  ep~scoporum jud~c~urn 
cum  sermone  lltlgantlum  dmgatur ' 
Qunm  emm  non  humanre  eonst~tu 
tlon~s  sec1  dlvlna legls  potlus  lnnlta 
mur  qula  potostas  nostra  non  est  ex 
hom~no,  sed  ex  Deo  nullus,  q111  s~t 
San& mcntls, ~gnorat,  quln ad offic~um 
nostrum spectet de quocumque mortal1 
peccato  corrlpere  quernllbet  Chr~str 
mum, et sl correct~onern  contempqent, 
lpsum per  dmtnct~onem  eccleslast~cam 
coercere  . . Sod forsan dlcetur, quod 
alltor  cum  reglbus  et alltor  cum  alns 
est agendum  Ceterum sollptum novl 
mus  In  lege  dlvlna  'Ita  magnum 
judlcabls  ut  parvum,  nec  er~t  apud 
te  accept10  personarum,'  quam  B 
Jacobus  ~nter~enlre  testatur,  '  SI  d~s 
cerls el qu~  lndutus est voste przclara,' 
&c  Licet autem hoe moclo  proccdere 
valeamus super quol~bet  cr~mlnall  pec 
cato, ut pecoatorem revooemus a vlt~o 
ad  vlrtutem,  ab errore  ad ver~tatem, 
praocxpue  tamen  quum  contra  pacem 
peccatur,  L  qure cst vinculum car~t?tl>,' 
[de  qua  Chrlstus  spec~alltor  prmclpue 
apostol~s 'In quamcumque donium m 
travcrltls,  pnmum  d~clte  Pax  hum 
do mu^,  et  sl  fuerlt  1b1  fillus  ~ECIJ, 
requlescet  super  lllum  pax  ostra 
Qulcunque autem  non  re~eperlr~t  vos, 
nec  aud~er~nt  sermones  vostras,  exe 
untes  foras  excutlte  pulverem  do 
pedlhus  vestns  In  testlmon~um  11119  ' 
Quld onlm est a tallbus evlre foras npos 
tolos, nlsl communlonem 01s apostolicam 
denegare 7  quid est excutore pulverom 
de  ped~bus su~s, ms~  cllstrlctlono~n 
eccles~ast~carn  exercere 7  Quitm 
Rrav~s  autern  dlstnctlonls sentontla  111 
ult~mo  smt examme  ferlendl qul  non 
reclplunt  pscls  nunclos,  nec  aud~unt 
sermones  eorum,  per  se  lpsa  verltas 
consequentes ostendet, non slmpllc~ter, 
sod  cum  quadam  affirmatlone propo 
nens  '  Amen  dlco vobls, tolerablllus 
errt tcrra: Sodomo~um  et Gomorl~eorum 
In dle JU~ICII  quam 1111  clv~tatl  ,'  In CIVI 
tate clves ~ntoll~gens,  a qulbus non ex 
ceplt Ipses reges  Porro quum secundum 
legltlmas sanckones quod qulsque jurlu 
In  alterurn statwt, allus eo ut~  valeat 
oontra  ~llum,  et saplens  protestetur 
'  Patere legem,  quam  ~pse  tulens,'  et 
rex  lpse  Francorum  contra  clam me 
morlre  R.  quondam  Anglorum  regm, 
qul,  ut salva lps~us  regls pace  loqua- 
mur,  qula  non  ad  oonfus~onem elus, 
sed ad evousat~onem  nostram hoc dlcl 
mus, non eo erat deterlorls conll~tlon~s, 
In  bello fult  officlo et beneficlo  nostro 
usus,  qnomodo quod  pro  se  adversus 
~llum  admms~t  contra  se  pro  a110  non 
admlttet 71  Numquld apud nos debet 
esso  pondus  et  ponclus,  meusura  et 
mensura, quorum utrumque est abom 
lnabllo apud  Deum ?  Postremo  quum 
Inter  rcgos  lpsos  reformata  fuerlnt 
pacls  fcedera,  et  utrmque  prrestlto 
proprlo luramento firmata, qu;o tamen 
usque  ad tempus prztaxatum servata 
non  fuennt, numqulcl  non  poternnu3 
de jurament~  rel~glone  cognoscoro, qnod 
ad  jud~clum  eccleslao  non  est  dublum 
pertlnere,  ot  rupta pacls fcedera refor 
mentur 7  Ne  ergo tantam cllvcordlam 
ldoamur  sub  dlss~mulat~one  favere, 
tl~ss~mulare  rel~g~osorum  locorum  ex- 
cldlum,  et  stragem  negl~gere popull 
Chrlst~an~,  dllocto  fill0  abbatl  Case 
mar11 pra d~cto  legato dedlmus In prie- 
cept~s,  ut  nlsl  rex  lpse  vel  solldam 
pacorn  cum  prtcdlcto  rege  reformet, 
vel  trougas  Ineat  compotentes,  vel 
saltom  humll~ter pat~atur, ut  ldem 
abbas  et  venerabll~s frater  noster 
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notice  again  the  omission  of  all  claim  to act  as  one  who 
possessed  a  political  authority  superior  to  that  of  the 
temporal  sovereign.  His  claim  is based  on two principles, 
first,  the  rehgious  one,  that  any question  of  transgression 
or sin by one man against another belonged  to the Church's 
jurisdiction,  and therefore especially any transgression against 
peace, and any question conccrnlng the obligation or violation 
of  oaths ; secondly, on the appeal to a legal ordmance, which 
permitted  any party in a  civil  suit at any time to take the 
case  from  the civil  court  to that of  the bishop.  Innocent 
says that this law had been made by Theodosius and renewed 
by Charles the Great : the latter statement is incorrect, being 
based upon the spurious collection of  Capitularies of  Benedictus 
Levita (ii. 366) ;  but it seems that the original source of  the 
constitution is a genuine law of  Constantine.  It is contained 
in the constitutions of  Sirmond, and Hanel and Maassen have 
argued  that this  one  is genuine,  though  they think  that it 
was  repealed  by Arcadius  and Honorius  (Cod., i.  4.  7), and 
by a Novel of  Valentinian (iij. 34. 1).l 
Whatever  may  be  said  as  to  the  grounds  upon  which 
Innocent bases his claims, it is quite clear that we  have here 
no pretension to a general political supremacy.  It is perhaps 
worth while to put beside  this a Decretal of  Alexander HI., 
and another  of  Innocent  III., which,  in  regard  to smaller 
matters, seem to illustrate the same principle.  In the first of 
these  Alexander  111.  deals  with  a  case  in  which  certain 
knights had been summoned before the Bishop of  Trier about 
some  matters  concerning  the  fiefs  which  they held  from  o 
secular  lord.  Their lord forbade them to answer  about the 
cognoscant,  utrum  just31  s~t  quer1 
monla,  quam  contra  eum  proponlt 
coram ecclesla rex  Anglorum, vel  ejus 
except10  s~t  leg~timn, quam  coritra 
eum  per  suas nobis  liteias  duxit  ex 
pr~mcndarn,  luxta formam sib~  datam a 
nob15 procedere non omlttat  Ideoquo 
univers~tat~bus  vestrls  per  apostolica 
scr~pta  mandamus, et in v~rtute  obedl- 
entia  dlstr~cte  prmlplmus,  quatenus 
postquam  idem  abbas super 11oc man- 
datum  fuerlt  apostol~curn  exseoutus, 
sentantiam ejus,  Imo  nostram  verlus, 
rpcip~at~s  hnm~llter  et vos ~ps~  scrvetls 
et fac~at~s  ab  alns  observarl,  secun, 
quod  si  secus  egerltis  ~nobedlent~am 
vestram  pumemus " 
' '  Const~t  Slrmond,' I ed Hanol, In- 
t~oduct~on  , and Rfaassen, '  Gesch~chte 
der  Quellen  des  Kanon~schcn  ~echts,' 
v01  I  p  704, note 11. 
secular fiefs in the bishop's court, and the bishop excornmuni- 
cated them.  Alexander 111.  annulled the excommunication, 
and ordered t,he case  to be  deternunad by the feudal lord : 
only in case he should act unjustly does he order the matter 
to go to the ecclesiastical c0urt.l  In the second, Innocent 111. 
orders  the Bishop  of  Vercelli  to declare  null  and void  any 
letter which may be produced from the Holy See dealing with 
matters which belong to the secular courts of  Vercelli.  Only 
if  the consuls  and commune of  Vercelli  refuse  to do justice 
to those  who  appeal to their  court, then suitors may have 
recourse  to the court of  the bishop  or the Pope, and this is 
permitted,  especially  because  at that  time  the  empire  was 
vacant,  and  there  was  no  secular  superior  to whom  they 
might  appeal for justice.=  It is  worth  while  to notice how 
in both these cases the Popes, while maintaining the principle 
that  the  Church  was  bound  to  protect  those  who  were 
oppressed or unjustly treated, yet emphatically set aside any 
attempt on  the part of  Church  authorities to supersede the 
ordinary process of  secular justice. 
l '  Decretals,'  11  2  0  (Alox  I11  ) 
"Ex transmlsa nob~s  ini~nuat~one  B C 
et W  mllltum eocles~z  tuz mtellex~ 
mus,  quod, quum R  do Cassavllle eos 
super  quadarn  posre\rlone  coram 
venernb~ll  fratre nostro  'J'recensi epls 
cop0  traxisset  In  causam,  nobills  vlr 
do  Campis  eorum  tlommus,  [a  quo 
possesslones  tenebant]  sub  deb~to 
fidel~tatir  eis  iri111bu1t ne  de szculan 
feudo In  jud~cio  occlcs~ast~co  rosponrl 
erent  Itaque  przfatus  eplscopus  in 
eos  velut  in  contumsces  excommunl 
cntlon~s  sententiam  promulgavlt  et0 
(et lnfra)  [Mandamus,  quatenus prse- 
fatos  m~l~tes  ab  evromrnun~catione 
contrad~ctione  et appellatlone  cessante 
absolves  etc ]  (et mfla  )  De~nde  per 
dommurn feud1 causarn jubeas  termm- 
an,  et sl  ]pro  aliquid  malit~am  d~s- 
tulerit,  tu  el  sublato  appellatlon1s 
obstaculo  debitum finem  lmponas " 
'  '  Decretals,'  11  2  10  (Inn  I11  ) 
"  Mandamus  quatcrius  si  quando  a 
la~cis Vercellenslbus  litteras  super 
robus,  praclpue  quae  forum  seculare 
contlngunt, a sede Apostolica contlgent 
~mpetrail,  eas sublato appollat~on~s  ob- 
fitaculo,  decernas auctor~tate  nostra irri- 
tas et manes, durnmodo dicti consules, 
et commune  de  se  conqucrcnt~bus  in 
jt~dicio szeculan,  exhlbeant  just~tlse 
complernentun~  Liceat  tnmen  ~psls, 
qui sub clsdem consulibus tallter dux- 
onnt  contendendum,  si  se  In  aliquo 
aensennt  przgravan,  ad  tuain,  s~cut 
hactenus servatum ost, vcl ad nostram, 
s~  maluennt, audientiam appellare, hoc 
pr~sertirn  tempore,  quo  X ncante  im- 
peno  ad  jud~cem  secularem recurrere 
ncquount,  qu~  a  superlorlbus  In  sua 
just~tia  oppr~muntur S1  vero consules 
juit~tia  tanquam mer~to  subpoctl fuer- 
int recwatl,  coram  arb~t~~s  communl- 
ter electls de causa susplc~onls  agatur, 
I~UZ  SI  probata  fuer~t  esse  lusts,  ad 
te vcl  ad nos  pro  just~tla  recurratur, 
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In  two  Summas described  by  Schulte, the Pope  is  called 
"  verus  imperator,"  and in  one  of  them it is  said  that the 
emperor  is  his  vicar.l  It  is  clear  that this  judgment  does 
not correspond with that of  the Decretals. 
1 Summa  Coloniensis  on  Gratian, 
Dec., C.ii. Q. 3.7, 'Dict. Grat.' : "  Quare 
imperator  potest  infamiam  abolere 
ideoque, cum papa super imperatorem, 
immo  ipse  verus  imperator  sit,  non 
est dubium eum idem  posse." 
Summa Coloniensis on Gratian, Dec., 
C. ii. Q. 6. 3 : "  Hic quzritur an  a swcnl- 
ari  tribunali  in  cansis  pecuniariis  ad 
papam  appella~mi  possit.  Videtur  hoc 
inde  quod papn verus  imperator est." 
Summa IJarisiensis on Gratian, C.  ii. 
Q.  6.3  : "  Quod ad dominum papam de 
secularibus dicit,  quid  sit faciendum, 
sed non  precipit,  vel  possumus  dicere 
quod  ipse  est  verus  imperator  et im. 
perator  vicarius  ejus." 
Quotod  by  J.  F.  von  Schulte  in 
'  Sitzungsberichte  der  Akademie  der 
Wissenschaften.'  Wien,  1870, pp.  11  1, 
131.  I  owe  the reference  to note  12 
in F.  Maitland's  translation  of  a  part 
of  Cierke's  ' Das  Deutsche  Genossen- 
schaftsrecht.' 
CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  RELATION  OF  CHURCH 
AND  STATE. 
IN  the passage  quoted at the beginning of  the last chapter, 
Stephen of  Tournai speaks of  the two peoples, the clergy and 
the laity, who dwell within the one state or commonwealth of 
the Church.l  To the careless reader this might seem to imply 
that the secular authority is subject to the ecclesiastical.  This 
would  be a complete misunderstanding of  his meaning ; the 
Church, in the sense in which he  uses  it here,  is not  to be 
confused  with  the  ecclesiastical  organisation  of  which  the 
Pope  is  the head.  For Stephen is  careful  to say that the 
head of  the Church, in the sense in which he is here using the 
word, is Christ, while the priesthood and the kingship are the 
heads  of  the two  authorities  which  are  within  the Church. 
Stcphen is putting into his  own  phrase  the priilciple  of  the 
Gelasian theory  of  Church and State. 
We have in the last chapter discussed the question how far 
this conception had been  abandoned by the canonists in the 
eleventh  and twelfth  centuries,  and its place  taken by  the 
theory that the Pope was  supreme in secular things over the 
secular as well  as over the ecclesiastical auth~rity  ; and our 
examination  has  led  to the conclusion that, whatever  view 
may  have  been  maintained  in the heat  of  controversy,  the 
Canon law  of  the period  we  are considering does not admit 
this principle, and the great Popes, so far as their judgment 
is embodied in the Canon law, repudiate this conception. 
1 Soe p.  198. 
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This does not mean t,hat the authority of the Church is not 
of greater dignity than that of  the State.  Gelasius had con- 
fined himself  to pointing  out that the responsibility  of  the 
priest was greater than that of  the king ;  while Hincmar of 
Rheims added that the dignity of  the bishop is greater, for he 
consecrates the king.2  The Canon law holds to the conception 
of  the  greater  dignity  of  the  spiritual power ;  its  general 
principle  is  well  expressed  in a  phrase  quoted  by IVO  and 
Gratian as from  Gregory Naeianzen,  which  lays stress upon 
the superior dignity of  that authority which  deals  with  the 
soul over that which  only deals with  the body.3  In the last 
chapter we have quoted that phrase of  Innocent 111.  in which 
he compares the spiritual power to the sun and the temporal 
to the moon.4  These  phrases illustrate the growing sense of 
the superior  dignity of  the ecclesiastical authority, but they 
do not mean that the Church claims authority over the State: 
The whole matter would indeed have been simple and easy 
if  the spiritual society could be separated from the secular,- 
indeed Stephen's rather easy phrases would have been adequate 
if we could imagine this to be possible ; in fact, of  course this 
was impossible, for in fact the two jurisdictions ran across each 
other, or, to put it more correctly,  the layman and the cleric 
were each subject not only to the one authority, but in some 
measure at least to both, and the two systems of  law some- 
times at least deal with the same subjects.  The difficulties of 
the relations of  Church and State in the Middle Ages arose in 
large measure from the very nature of  things, while in a large 
measure  also  they  were  the results  of  historical  conditions 
whose  character we  have considered in relation to the ninth 
century in the first volume, and which we shall have to con- 
sider in relation to the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries 
1 Vol. i. pp.  191, 192.  orem principatibus vestris.  Aut num- 
2  Vol. i. pp. 255, 256.  quid  justum  vobis  videtur  si  codat 
3  Ivo, '  Decret.,' v. 5 : "  Suscipitisno  spiritus carni ?  Si a  terrenis  calestia 
libertatem  verbi  ?  Libenter  accipiti3  supcruntur ?  si  divinis  praferantur 
quod lex Christi sacerdotali vos subjecit  humana ? "  Cf.  Gratian,  '  Dec.,'  D. 
potestati,  atque istis tribunalibus sub-  X. 6. 
didit 1  Dedit enim et  nobis potestatcm,  '  See pp. 215, 216. 
dedit  et principatum  multo  perfecti- 
in  a future volume.  We cannot now anticipate this discussion, 
but we  must  bear  in mind the fact that the eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries were full of  the clamour of  the great con- 
troversy  between  the Empire and the Papacy, between  the 
Kings  and the Bishops,  and that the real  difficulty  in  the 
adjustment of  this controversy lay, not so much in the fact 
that each  side  put forward unreasonable  claims,  as  indeed 
they sometimes did, but much rather in the fact that the two 
jurisdictions  did really  cross each other, and that in the con- 
ditions of  the society of  that time it was very difficult indeed 
to find  a  satisfactory  adjustment of  claims  which  in  them- 
selves, or at  any rate as related to the conditions and circum- 
stances of  those times, were reasonable.  For that matter, the 
difficulty has not disappeared even in our time. 
We have in the last chapter dealt with the supposed claim 
that the Pope was  supreme over the State both  in  spiritual 
and  temporal  matters.  We  must  now  consider  the  more 
general relations  of  the authorities of  Churc,h and State. 
We begin by considering the theory of  these canonists with 
regard to the relations  of  Canon  law  and secular  law.  We 
have  already  discussed  their  conception  of  the  Canon  law 
itself,  and  will  be  eyidcnt  from this that whatever  may 
have  been  the theory or practice  of  the ninth  century,  the 
Canon law recognises  no authority of  the secular power  over 
Church  law.  The  civil  ruler  has  no  authority  over  Canon 
law, but rather he cannot abrogate Canon law; l  he has no 
authority to make  laws in regard  to ecclesiastical matters12 
'  Ivo,  'Decret.,'  iv.  187 :  "  Im- 
periali judicio non possunt ecclesiastics 
jura  dissolvi.  Non quod imperatorum 
leges,  quibus  sapc  Ecclesia  contra 
(circa)  haereticos  utitur,  srepe  contra 
tyrannos, atque contra pravos quosque 
defenditur, dicamus penitus renuendas ; 
Bed  eas quidom evangelicis,  apostolicis 
atque canonicis  decretis,  quibus  post- 
Ponendre  sunt,  nullum  posse  inferre 
Prejudicium asseramus."  Cf.  Gratian, 
'  Dec.,' D. X.  1. 
Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  D.  xcvi., 
Gratianus :  "  Illud  autem  Honorii 
Augusti,  quod  de  electione  summi 
Pontificis  supra  constituisse  legitur, 
nullius  esse  rnomenti  prohatur :  cum 
non  solum  de  ordinibus,  sed  nec 
etiam  do  rebus  Ecclesiasticis  laicis 
legatur aliquando attributa disponendi 
facultas.  Undo  quecumque  a  Prin- 
cipibus  in  ordinibus,  vel  in  Ecclesi- 
asticis  rebus dccreta inveniuntur,  nu1 
lius  auctoritatis  esse  monstmntur." 
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-such  regulations, even though well-intentioned and designed 
for the good of  the Church, are void, and must be repudiated.1 
There is  no  doubt about the theory  of  the canonists:  the 
Church has its own legislative authority, and its own system 
of  legislation,  which  is  wholly  independent  of  the  secular 
authority and of  secular law.  This principle is, so far, noth- 
ing more than the application of  the Gelasian theory of  the 
two authorities  with their two spheres. 
But now we come to a more difficult question, and that is, 
.How far is  the  secular  law  subordinate  to the  law  of  the 
Churqh ?  The  consideration  of  this  question requires  much 
care if we are to keep clear of  mistakes into which even some 
very  competent  historians  have  fallen.  One  thing  is  per- 
fectly clear in the theory  of  the canonists,  and that is,  that 
the secular law is inferior and subordinate to the law of  Cod, 
and that no secular authority can lawfully make laws which 
are  contrary  to the  law  of  God.  This  is  very  positively 
expressed  in  a  phrase  of  the  Pseudo-Isidorian  decretals 
which  is  cited  by  Burchard  of  Mainz,  by  Ivo,  and  by 
Gratiaq2 and  more  tersely  in  another  phrase  quoted  by 
the same canoni~ts.~  This principle is one about which there 
was  no substantial difference  in medhval society.  But the 
principle must not be misunderstood,-the  law of  God is not 
the  same  as  the Canon  law  of  the  Church.  We  have  dis- 
'  Decretals,'  I. 2.  l0  : ''  A  quibus 
(laicis), si quid motu proprio statutum 
fuorit,  quod  ecclesiarum  etiam  re- 
spiciat  commodum  et  favorcm,  nul- 
lius firmitatis exsistit, nisi ab ecclesia 
fuerit  approbatum,  unde  statutum 
Basilii  de  non  alienandis  pradiis 
rusticis  vel  urbsnis,  ministeriis  ct 
ornamentis  ecclcsiarum,  illa  repro- 
batum  fuit  potissima  ratione,  quod 
auctoritate non  fuit Romani  Pontificis 
roboratum." 
Burchard, '  Decret.,' xv. 8 : "  Non 
licet  ergo  imperatori,  vel  cuiquam 
pietatem  custodienti,  aliquid  contra 
mandata  divi~iitatis  prresumere,  nec 
quidquam  quo  evangelicis  propheti- 
eisque seu apostolicis regulis obvicetur 
agere.  Injustum  enim  judicium,  et 
diffinitio injusta, regio metu, vel jussu 
a judicibus  ordinata  non  valeat:  nec 
quidquam quod contra evangelicam et 
propheticam  aut  apostolicam  doe- 
trinam,  constitutionemque  eorum  sive 
sanctorum  Patrum  actum  fuerit, 
stabit :  et quod  infidelibus aut ham- 
ticis facturn fucrit, omnino cassabitur." 
Cf.  Pseudo-Isidorc, ' Calix.,'  I. ep.  1. 
16.  Cf.  also  Ivo,  '  Decret.,'  xvi.  9 ; 
'  Pan.,' ii.  1.11 ; Gratian, '  Decretum,' 
D. X. 3. 
a  Burchard, '  Decret.,'xv.  l0 : "  Lex 
imperatorum non est supra Dei  legem 
sedsubtus."  Cf. Ivo, '  Decrct.,' xvi. 11 ; 
'  Pan.,'  ii.  139 ;  Gratian, '  ~ecretum.' 
D. x. i. 
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cussed  this  subject  in  a  previous  chapter,  and  now  only 
recall the necessity  of  careful distinction between  the Divine 
law in the strict sense  of  the term,  and the positive Canon 
law of  the 0hurch.l  In  considering the relation of  the Canon 
law to the secular law, we must not confuse the authority of 
the Canon law with that of  t,he law of  God. 
'Canon  law  is  binding  upon  all  members  of  the  Church, 
whether  laity  or clergy:  those  who  do not  obey it  are to 
be  held  as  though they  repudiated the faith:  This  is very 
forcibly put in a passage  from a  letter of  Leo  IV. which  is 
citcd by Ivo and by Grs~tian.~  There is no doubt about the 
principle that the layman as a member  of  the Church must 
obey the Canon law, with regard to a,ll those matters which 
belong to the sphere of  the Canon law.  And more than this, 
there are strong phrases in the canonists which lay down the 
principle that all constitutions  (i.e.,  secular ones) contrary to 
the Canons and to the dccrees of  Rome are void.3 
But,-and  here  we  must  be  very  careful,-this  does  not 
mean that the Canon law has any place or authority in secular 
matters :  there is, indeed, no suggestion in any of  these writers 
of  any such notion.  An  examination  of  the context of  the 
passage  just  quoted from Gratian will  show that he is  here 
only  considering  the question  of  the relation  of  the secular 
law  to  ecclesiastical  affairs.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
Gratian implies  in these passages  that if  there is a  conflict 
1 See  chap. ix.,  especially pp.  165, 
166. 
IVO,  '  Decret.,'  iv. 72 : "  Quam ob 
causam luculentius et magna voce pro- 
nuntiare non timeo,  quia  qui illa qum 
dixirnus  sanctorum  patrum  statuta, 
qua apud nos  canones  pratitulantur, 
sive  sit  episcopus,  sive  clericus,  sive 
laicus, non indifferenter recoperit, ipse 
convincitur nec catholicam et apostoli- 
cam  fidcrn,  nec  sancta  vera  Christi 
evangelia quatuor utiliter et efficaciter, 
et ad cffectum (profoctum) suurn rcti- 
nere  v01  eredore."  Cf.  Ivo,  ' Panor- 
mia,'  ii.  118, and Gratian, '  Decretum,' 
D. xx. l. 
3  Ivo, 'Dec.,'  xvi.  l0 : "  Ut consti- 
tutiones contra canones et decreta pratr- 
sulum  Romanorum,  vel  bonos  mores, 
nullius  sint  momenti."  Cf.  Gratian, 
'  Doe.,' D. X. 4. 
Gratian,  'Dec.,'  D.  X., Gratianus : 
"  Constitutiones  vero principum  eccle- 
siasticis  constitutionibus  non  premi- 
nent, sed obsecuntur. . . ."  Part II., 
Gratianus : "  Eece quod constitutiones 
principum  ecclesiasticis  legibus  post- 
ponenda  sunt.  Ubi  autem evangclicis 
atque  canonicis  decretis  non  ohvia- 
verint,  omni  reverentia  dignatr  habe. 
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bet,ween the two systems of  law, the secular must necessarily 
give way.1  There is no reason to think that the question in 
this general sense is present to Gratian's mind at all in these 
passages.  It will be  useful to compare with these phrases  of 
Gratian the comment which  Rufinus makes upon this "  Dis- 
tinction."  He observes that the statement, that secular laws 
which contradict ecclesiastical law are to be set aside, requires 
some  analysis.  There  are two  kinds  of  ecclesiastical law: 
the one is "  merum "--that  is, it is founded upon the divine 
ordinance,  or  that of  tlhe holy  fathers,-such  is  the law of 
tithes ; the other  is " adjunctum vel  mixtum "-that  is,  it 
really depends upon human law,-such  is the law of  prescrip  - 
tion and other similar matters.  Ecclesiastical laws, which are 
<L mera,"  cannot be annulled by the laws of  the emperor ; but 
of  those  ecclesiastical laws  which  depend upon the imperial 
legislation there are some which can be thus ann~lled.~ 
It is phin that Rufinus  recognises  the fact that the two 
systems of  law have each their own  province,  but that the 
two  provinces  are  not  wholly  separate,-that  there  are  at 
least  some cases in which the Church regulations are related 
to secular laws, and that at least in some of  these cases it lies 
with the secular authority to continue or to abrogate certain 
rules.  Rufinus does not discuss the question who is to decide 
l  I.e.,  by  Gierke,  '  Das  deutsche 
Genossenschaftsrecht,'  vol.  iii.  sect. 
11, note  19 
Rufinus,  Summa Decret.,'  D. X. : 
"  Illud autem, quod in subject0 capit- 
ulo  dicitur,  quod  'l  ex  imperatorum 
ecclesiastica jiira dissolvere non potest,' 
non  omnino  indistincte pretereundum 
est.  Sciendum  ergo  est  quod  jus 
ecclesiasticum aliud est merum solum- 
modo, scil. ex divina constitutione vel 
patrum  sanctorum  desccndons,  ut jus 
derimationum,  diocesium  et  llujus- 
modi ;  nliurl  adj~inctum  vel  mixtum, 
scil. quod ex constitutione humanorum 
legum  perpandit,  ub  jus  prescriptiol~is 
et si  qua  similia.  Mera  itaque  jura 
ecclesia~tica  leges  imperatorum  nulla 
ratione,  nec  in  totum nec  in  partem, 
valent dissolvere ; ea vero jura ecclesi- 
astica  que  de  imperatorum  constitu- 
tjonibus pendent,  aliqua quidem sunt, 
que lege  imperatorum  in totum et in 
partem  credimus  quod  possent  con- 
velli :  que  quidem  magis  in  odium 
quorundam,  quam  in  generalem  fa- 
vorem  ecclesie  instituta  sunt, ut pre- 
dictum  jus  prescribendi.  Hoc  enim 
jus  occlesie in pnrtcm  cotidie  dissolv- 
itur, quando aliqua ecclesia ab impora- 
tore privilegium impetrat, ne adversus 
ram ecclesia alia prescribat.  In totum 
etiam putamus quod jus hoc posset ex- 
tingui ; si eum imperator legcm daret, 
ut omnis et omniurn prescriptio  quan- 
tumvis  longi  temporis  do  cetero  ces- 
saret, ex tunc ct deinceps nec ecclesia 
ullo mod0 prescribere possct." 
in  cases  of  a  conflict  between  the two systems of  law.  On 
the whole,  it  does  not  appear that these  canonists present 
any definite theory upon this subject  : their general principle 
is  clear, that each system of  law is  supreme within its own 
sphere. 
Among  the  earlier  writers  the  one  who  seems  to come 
nearest  to  asserting  the authority  of  the  canons  over  the 
laws is the author of  ' Petri Exceptianes.'  We have  quoted 
an  important  passage  from  him  in  the  first  part  of  this 
volume,  and it is worth noticing  that he speaks not merely 
of  the  legal  authoriby  of  the  canons  of  the  first  councils, 
but  also  holds  that a  new  canon  may  abrogate  an earlier 
1aw.l 
There  is  also  one  passage  in  the  Decretals  which  seems 
to assert the claim that where there is any doubt to which 
jurisdiction  a particular question belongs,  the matter should 
be referred  to the Pope.  This  passage occurs in a  decretal 
of  Innocent 111. : he had been asked by the Count of  Mont- 
pellier  to legitimatise  his  illegitimate  children,  and,  while 
refusing to do this, sets out the grounds upon which he con- 
sidered that the Papal See vas competent  to deal with  the 
question.  The  treatment  is  complicated,  but,  as it  seems, 
Innocent claims that the Roman See has always,  and in all 
places,  power  to legitimatise as far as the qualifications for 
spiritual offices  are concerned,  but does  not norma,lly claim 
authority to legitimatise for secular purposes, such as inherit- 
ance,  except  in  those  territories  which  are  subject  to the 
temporal aut,hority of  the Pope.  Where, however, there is no 
secular authority to which recourse can be had, as in the case 
of the King of France, who recognises no superior in temporal 
things,  the  Pope  could  deal  with  the  matter  if  the  King 
chose to submit it to him, though the Kirlg in the judgment 
of  some had no need to do this, but could have dealt with the 
matter himself.  The King of  Prance had applied to him  in 
such a  case,  and he had complied  with his  request.  80 far 
Innocent  seems  to make  no  very  advanced claim.  But he 
then goes  on to say that not only  in the patrimony  of  the 
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Church-that  is, in the Papal States-but  also in other terri- 
tories, in certain cases, the Pope exercises temporal jurisdiction 
"  casualiter."  He explains  this  by  saying that he  does not 
wish  to interfere with  other men's  rights,  and he  recognises 
that Christ  bade  men give to Czsar what was  ~zsar'si  and 
refused to decide the case of  the man who asked him to judge 
between him  and his  brother  about their inheritance.  But, 
he continues, in Deuteronomy the principle is laid down that 
in difficult and obscure cases the matter should be referred to 
the decision of  the priest,  and that his  judgment  should be 
accepted.  He urges  that the Pope  occupies  the position  of 
the priest in the Deuteronomic legislation, and that this prin- 
ciple  applies  especially  to those  cases  where  there  is  any 
uncertainty whether the matter belongs  to the ecclesiastic~l 
or the secular auth0rity.l 
'  Decretals,'  iv.  17  13  (Innocent  tempore, quaeresque ab eis, qu~  indica 
I11 ,  "  Por  Vencrabilem ") . "  Ratiorii  bunt  tibi  judicii  veritatem,  et  facies 
bus  igitur  his  induct1  regl  gratiam  quacumquo dixorint  qui praesunt loco, 
forlmus requ~slti,  oausam tam ex  vet  quem  olegerit  Dominus,  sequerisqile 
er1 quam ex novo testamonho trahentos,  eorum  sententiam  noc  declinabis  ad 
quad non solum in occlesirrr patrimon10 
super  quo  plenam  in  temporallbus 
gerlmus  potestatom,  verunl  etiam  in 
a1119  reg~on~bus,  certls causls inspectis, 
tomporalom  jurisdlct~onem casualiter 
(carnaliter-c  a  g  h  k , carnal~tor 
-Rcg  )  exercomus,  non  quod  aliono 
juri  praejudrcaio  vahmus,  vel  potosta- 
tom  nobis  mdebitam  usuipare,  quum 
non  ignoremus,  Chr~stum  in cvangelio 
respond~sso  Reddite quae sunt  Gas 
arls  Czsan,  et  qua  sunt  Del  Deo ' 
PI  opt01 quod  postulatus,  ut hered~ta 
tom  divlderot  intor  duos,  '  quis,'  In 
quit,  ' constitu~t me  judlcem  super 
vos 1 ' sod, quia, sic~~t  in Deuteronom~o 
contiuetur,  ' 81  d~Ecilo  et ambiguum 
apud te jud~cium  essa perspexeris, in 
tor  sangmnom  et  sanguinom,  causam 
et causam,  lopram  et non  lepram,  et 
judlclum  Inter  poitas  tuas  verba  v1 
dorig  var1~11 surge  et  adscende  ad 
locum,  quem  elogcr~t  Domlnus  Deus 
tuns,  veiilefi  ad  sace~dotes L~vltlci 
generis, et ad  ludicem,  qui  fuerit  1110 
dexteram val ad sinistram  Qu  autem 
superblent,  nolens  obedire  sacerdotis 
Imperio,  qlu  eo  tempore  mlnistrat 
Domino Doo  tuo, decreto judlcis mor 
ietur,  et  auferes  malum  do  Iwacl ' 
Locus  enim  q11em  elegit  Dominus, 
apostolica  sodes  esse  cognosc~tur SIC, 
quod earn Dominus In se ipso [e] laplde 
angular1 fundav~t. .  Tria  qulppe 
distingmt judicia  pnmum inter  san 
guinem et sanguinem,  per  quod  crim 
inale  intelhgitur  et  clvlle ,  ultimum 
inter lepram et lopram, per quod eccle 
siasticum  et crlminale  notatur , mod 
mm inter caufiam et causam, quod ad 
utrumque  refertur ,  tam  ecclosiastl 
cum quam civile, in quibus  quum ali- 
quid  fuorit  dificilc vel  ambiguum,  ad 
judicium cst sedls apostollcae recurron 
dnm,  ~ujus  sontentlam  qui  superb~us 
contcmppscrlt observari morl prrcclpltur 
et auforri malum  de Jslaol, id est, per 
axcornmunicat~onis sontentlam,  velllt 
mortuus,  a  communiene  fidel~um  se- 
paran." 
This is s far-reaching claim, and in  the course of  the thir- 
teenth  century  furnishes  one  of  the  starting-points for  the 
most  extreme  claims made  by  some writers,  that the Pope 
possessed in the last resort all temporal as well as all spiritual 
auth0rity.l  But that Innocent 111. himself contemplated such 
an interpretation of  his claim seems very doubtful, especially 
in view of  the great caution with which, as we have seen, he 
expresses him~elf.~  Still it remains  true that Innocent 111. 
does in this passage, clearly though incidentally, set forward 
the claim that in cases of  conflict between  the spiritual and 
the temporal jurisdiction,  the spiritual power is to decide.  It 
must, however, be remembered that the incidental statement 
of  such a view in a passage in the Decretals does not justify 
the assertion that it was an established principle of  the Canon 
law that in cases of  conflict between it  and the secular law, 
the Canon law was necessarily to prevail.  The normal view 
of  the Canon law down to the thirteenth century is that the 
sphere of  the two systems of  law are distinct, and that each 
is supreme in its own sphere. 
If  there were grave difficulties in adjusting the relations of 
canon law and secular law, it was even more difficult under 
the terms  and traditions  of  medizeval  society  to adjust  the 
relations of  the clergy and the laity to the two authorities.  It 
cannot seriously be questioned that Gelasius and the ecclesias- 
tical writers  of  the ninth  century clearly recognised that in 
secular matters the clergy were subject to the jurisdiction  of 
the secular power.3  But there had gradually grown up in the 
later  centuries  of  the ancient  empire  a  great  system of  ex- 
emptions of  the  clergy from the jurisdiction  of  the  ordinary 
secular courts, and these exemptions continued and developed 
in the new states which grew up on the ruins of  the ancient 
empire in the West.  In an earlier chapter of  this volume we 
have discussed the treatment of these exemptions by the civil 
lawyers, and have pointed out the extent to which they were 
l  Cf  esp.  R  Scholz, '  Die  Publizis  Wf  pp. 213 223. 
tik zur Zelt  Ptill~pps  des Schonen und  Cf  vol.  1  pp  190,  191,  and  pp. 
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The clergy are thus, in the normal canonical theory, exempt 
from the jurisdiction  of  the secular courts.  We have, in con- 
sidering the matter, already touched upon the question of  the 
taxation of  the clergy by the secular authority, but we must; 
consider this  a little further.  The  treatment  of  the subject 
by Gratian is not very full, and is incidental to a discussion 
of the canons which prohibit the bearing of  arms by the clergy, 
but it will  serve  to illustrate the canonical  view.  Gratian 
holds that those ecclesiastics who live on tithes and first-fruits 
are free  from  all  secular  taxation.  As  to those  who  hold 
estates  and houses,  he  first suggests that they are liable  to 
pay  taxes,  but then raises  the question  whether  even these 
properties  are  liable  to  taxation,  and,  after  quoting  some 
authorities which  seem  to justify  the view,  he  finally  con- 
cludes that the clergy are only to pay taxes on those things 
which they have bought or have received as gifts from living 
pers0ns.l  Gratian's treatment is both inadequate and obscure, 
l Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  C  XXIII  Q 
8,  After  c  20,  Gratianus  "  Tall 
bus  nulla  occasio  relinquitur  occupa- 
tionis secularis rn~hc~a,  qula cum de 
decimis,  et pnmitiis  vivant,  tanquam 
filn summl regls m omnl rcgno a tcrron~s 
exactlonibus  libc11 sunt, ita ut dicerc 
valeant,  venit  Princops  l~ujus  mundi 
et in nobls non habet quicquam '  Porro 
alii sunt, qu~  non content1 dc~lmis,  et 
pumllns,  prmdia,  vlllas  et castclla,  et 
civltates  possident,  ex  qulbus  Ca,san 
debent tributa,  nisi  Irnperlal~  benigni- 
tate immunitatem  ab hujusmodi  pro 
meruerlnt  Quibus  a  Domino  dicltur, 
'  Reddtte  que  sunt  Ccsaris,  Cesarl , 
et que  sunt Dci,  Dco '  Qu~bus  idem 
Apostolus,  '  Reddite  omnibus  deblta, 
cui  tributum,  trlbutum , cul  vcct~gnl, 
vectigal ' " 
This  IS  followed  by  two  quotations 
to illustrate the propriety of  tho clergy 
paylng  taxes on certaln propolty,  but 
then Gratlan suggests that thls IY aftcr 
all doubtful 
Part  I1 ,  Gratianus  "  Quamvis 
etiam  hujusmodi  non  videnntur  Im- 
periallbus  excut~onlbus sub~lciendi. 
Nam,  cum  tempore  famis  cunctorum 
Cgyptiorum terram slbi emerit Pharao, 
atque sub eadem  fame sue servltuti 
cunctos  subjiceret,  sacerdotibus  ita 
necossarla submlnlstravlt,  ut nec  pos- 
sefis~onibus,  nec  llbertato  nudarentur, 
Domino  ex  tunc  pronuntlante,  sacer- 
dotes In  omni gente llberos esse  opor- 
tore " 
Gratian  then  cites  certaln  passages 
which  he  undorstands  to  mean  that 
the clergy aro not to pay taxes even on 
certain  Church  lands.  He concludes 
as follows - 
After  c  25,  Gratianus .  "  Hlnc 
datur  lntelllgi  quod  do  hls,  qua,  Im 
pcriah  benefic~o,  vel a  qn~bushbet  pro 
bencficlo  sopulture  Ecclcsla  possidet, 
nulllus  jurl,  msi  Eplscopl,  teneantur 
asstrlcta.  DC his vero,  qua, a qulbus- 
hbrt emerit, vel vivorum donationlbus 
accepel~t,  Princlplbus  consuetn  debet 
obsequla  ut et annua eis  persolvat 
tlibuta, ct convocato exercitu cum ela 
proh~iscatur  ad castla." 
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but it may suffice for our  present  purpose,  which  is, not to 
dlscuss the question of  the taxation of the clergy in the Middle 
Ages,  but to consider the theory  of  the canonists  as to the 
relation  of  the clergy to the secular power. 
When we  have recognised the whole effect of  the immuni- 
ties  of  the clergy from the jurisdiction  of  the secular courts, 
and from  taxation of  certain  sorts, we  can ask  whether  we 
are to conclude that the canonists held that the clergy were 
not properly  subject to the secular authority.  Such general 
phrases  as  those  of  Stephen  of  Tournai  which  we  have 
quoted  might  almost  seem  to suggest  this.  But such  a 
conclusion was  not  actually  drawn  by  the  canonists.  We 
have just  seen that Gratian admits that on certain kinds  of 
property  the  clergy  must pay  taxes,  and he  seems to give 
as the reason for this that certain kinds of  property are held 
by  the clergy under  the sanrllon  of  the secular power.  In 
virtue  of  this  fact then at least, the clergy,  so far as they 
held  such property, are subject to the secular power.  This 
seems to be what was meant by Innocent 111. in that decretal 
which wc have cited in a previous chapter, when he says that 
the emperor has superiority in temporal things, but only over 
those  who  hold  temporal things from  him.2  It  is not clear 
from  the passage  as  it  stands  whether  Innocent  meant  to 
admit that some of  the clergy held temporal things from the 
emperor, but he probably did so, while he in the same passage 
emphatically repudiates the criminal jurisdiction of  the secular 
power  over the clergy, on the ground that this only extends 
ov r those who use the sword. 
&he  principle  that in some sense the clergy are normally 
subject to the temporal power is very clearly maintained  by 
Rufinus  in  a  passage  in which  he  asserts that the Pope  is 
in no  sense  subject  to this  authority,  but  that the metro- 
politan is subject with respect to secular  matter^.^  Damasus, 
Cf  p  198  aha "  For  the wholc  pussaye,  cf. p. 
2  '  Decrotals,' I  33  6,  8  2  'L  Quod  215, note 1 
autem  sequtur,  'regl  tanquam  prz 
S  Rufinus,  'Summn  Dec ,' D  xvin. 
cellenti,'  non negamus,  q~un  pr ccellat  c  13,  "  S1  eplrcopus  '  "  Ex  h00 
Imperator  in  temporallbus  lllor  dun-  quidem  hnbere  volunt  qula,  si  lrn- 
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indeed, goes much further, and maintains that as Christ  and 
His  apostles were  subject on earth to the emperor, so must 
their successors also be sub~ect,  and he repudiates the doctrine 
that  the  Pope  has  the  two  sw0rds.l  Damasus,  however, 
would  seem  to have  belonged  to the anti-papal party,  and 
his  statements must be  taken as representing that positioru. 
On the whole, it seems to be fairly clear that the Canon law, 
% late as the Decretals of  Gregory IX., knew nothing  of  a 
theory  that the clergy  are outside  of  the sphere  of  secular 
'  authority.  As  ecclesiastics they may be so., but as men they 
are, in some degree at anyrate, subject to it. 
The two " peoples,"  then, of  the clergy and the laity, are 
not to be  conceived  of  as living wholly  separate from each 
other under  different  jurisdictions.  The clergy  are in some 
measure under the secular authority, and the laity under the 
ecclesiastical.  But it is also clear that the clergy  have some 
special rights and obligations of  intervention in secular affairs. 
We have in the last chapter discussed  the question whether 
these canonists believed that the Church exercised supremacy 
over the State, and we have seen reason to conclude that this 
was not normally the case.  We must now, however, be careful 
to notice that the Canon law does maintain that the Church 
has the right and the duty to intervene in certain  cases for 
the defence of  those who  have been  unjustly treated by the 
secular power. 
We can trace this principle throughout the canonists with 
whom  we  are  dealing.  Regino,  Burchard,  and Ivo  cite  a 
postea vocaverlt eum apostohcus, prlmo 
adlre  lmpcratorem  debct,  postmodum 
apostol~cum  Sed longe  alla rat10  est 
In  apobtollro,  alla  In  metropol~tano, 
metropolltanus  qulppe pro secularlbus 
prlrlclpls  sublacet,  summus vero  pon 
tlfcx In  nu110  el  subest  Nec  de a110 
eplscopo  hoc  est  ~ntell~gendum,  nlsl 
do eo,  quem ab lmperatore comltatum 
habere const~terlt  " 
l Damasus,  ' Burchardlca,'  R  128, 
"  Solut~o  "  "  In  temporallbus  vero 
superlontatlbus,  et  omnlbus  jur~bns 
mundanls  slcut  Deus  et  apo~tol~  In 
terns  Impcratorl  subcllL1  fuorunt,  ~ta 
quoque  successores  eorundem  subjlcl 
debent, no s~bl  judlcmm  acqulrant, ut 
In 1110, 'magnum ' (C XI  Q  1 27), et 
XI  Q  11  1  qul res~st~t  (C  XI  Q  3  97) 
Nam lmperlalls potestas  a  Deo est ut 
In  llla,  ' sl  Imperator ' (D  xcvl  11). 
Quomoclo  autem  Papa  utrnmque 
gladlum,  ot  ccclum  et terram  a  Deo 
In  solldum  accepent,  Deus nov~t." 
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canon which lays upon the bishops the duty of  remonstrating 
with those judges  and others who oppress the poor, and bids 
them, if  their intervention should be ineffectual, address them- 
selves  to  the  king,  that  he  may  restrain  the  oppressor.l 
Burchard  and Ivo add a  canon bidding the bishops  excom- 
municate  those  judges  and powerful  men  who  oppress  the 
poor, if  they will not listen to their  protest^.^  But this is not 
all : Ivo summarises the provisions of  the Novels that if  any 
suitor suspects the governor of  the province, he is entitled to 
demand that the bishop should sit with the governor to hear 
the case.3  We have already pointed out that this is the doctrine 
also of  some of the  civilian^.^  To this is probably related the 
claim that in civil cases one party to a suit could take the case 
from the secular court to that of  the bishop even against the 
will of  the other party.  This is quoted by Deusdedit, by Ivo, 
and by Gratian, and part of the passage is cited by Innocent 
111. in that letter which we  have already discus~ed.~  As  we 
1 Reglno  of  Prum,  'De  Synod 
causls,'  11  296  "Cplscopl In protogen. 
dls  popi~lls  ac  defendendls  ~mposltam 
slbl curam non amblgant, ldeoque dum 
consplclunt  judlces  ac  potentes  pau 
perum  oppressoles  ox~sterc,  pllus  eos 
sacerdotall  common~tlone  redarguant , 
et 81  contempserlnt  emendan,  eorum 
~nsolentlam  regus aur~bus  lntlmcnt , ub 
quos sacerdotalrs admon~t~o  non flect~t 
ad  justltlam,  regalls  potestas  ab rm- 
probltate  coerceat "  Cf  Burchard  of 
Worms,  ' Decret ,'  xv  1,  and  Ivo, 
'  Uecret ,' XVI  2.  (Burchard and Ivo 
subst~tute  for the last clauses the rule 
that they  shall  excommunicate  those 
who wlll  not llsten ) 
2  Burchard of  Worms, ' Decret ,' xv 
3  "  Ut  judlces  aut  potcstates  q~u 
pauperes  oppnmunt,  sl  commomtl  a 
pontlfico  suo  non  cmendaverlnt,  c\ 
commun~centur."  Cf  Ivo ,  L Dec ,' 
XVl.  3 
a  IVO  of  Chartres,  Decret ,' XVI  143 
"  S1  cm  prrcses  provlncla  suspectus 
esae videtur, et hkgare apud cum solum 
noluerrt, llceat el ad eplscopum mvocarc, 
ut cum lpso cons~dente  causam aud~at, 
et v01 aml~all  ~ompozlt~one  l~tlgatores 
t~anslgelo  faclant, vel cognltlal~tel,  ita 
tamen ut sententla leglbus consentanea 
~mponatur."  Cf. '  Novel ,'  86,  1-4 
Wf  pp  87 90 
6 Deusded~t,  'Coll. Can ,' IV  283, "In 
Cap  Karoll Imp " . "  Volumus atque 
pratclplmus,  ut omnes  nostra  dltlon~ 
.  subject1  .  hanc sententtam quam 
eu  xvlo  Theodosu  imperator~s llhro. 
cap~tulo  v~dellcet  XI'  ad  lnterrogata 
Ablavu ducls, quam 1111  et omnlbus pre- 
scrlptam mlslmus Inter nostra cap~tula 
pro  lege  tenenda,  consulto  omnlum 
fidel~um nostrorum  posulmus,  lege 
cunctls perpetua teneant -Idem,  284. 
Qmcumque  l~tem  habens  sxve  petltor 
fuerit,  vcl  In  lnltlo  ht~s,  v01  decursls 
temporum  currlcuhs,  slve  cunl  nego 
tlum  peroratur,  slvc  cum jam  ceperlt 
prom1  sentcnt~a,  SI  jucl101um  elcgerlt 
sacrosanctat  lagls  antlst~tls,  1lllc0 slne 
allqua  dubltat~one  etlam  sl  all& pars 
refrangatur,  ad Eplscoporum  ~uihc~um 
cum  sermone  Iit~gantlurn dlr~gatur. 
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have  pointed  out,  the  passage  is  conta'ined  in  the  Con-  - 
stitntions of  Sirmond, and is  a  genuine  law  of  Constantine, 
but was probably repealed by later legislation.  No re-enact- 
ment of  it can be traced in any genuine legislation of  Charle- 
magne, but it is among the spurious Capitularies of  Benedictus 
Lcvita.  There is no trace of  any recognition  of  this by the 
civilians ;  indeed  its  provisions  go  far  beyond  what  they 
recognised.  But  the  general  principle  of  the  recourse  to 
ecclesiastical authority in defect of  justice  was recognised by 
them,  and  was  clearly  based  upon  the  legislation  of  th'e 
ancient  empire. 
The Decretals are generally careful to limit the claim of  the 
spiritual court, with respect to secular matters, to the case of 
defect of  justice.  We have already quoted two passages which 
illustrate this ;  but as the matter is so important, it is worth 
while  to take note  of  some  other  passages.  In a  Decretal 
letter addressed to the Archbishop bf  ~heims  by Alexander 
III., in  answer  to  a  question  of  the  Archbishop  whether 
an appeal  could  be  legitimately made from  a  civil court to 
the Papal See, he says that such appeals could be made  by 
those who  were  subject to the Pope's  temporal jurisdiction ; 
but  though  the  custom  of  the  Church  might  permit  such 
appeals  even  in other  cases,  the  strict  law  did  not  allow 
them.2  Again, Innocent 111. refused to allow a certain widow 
to bring her case into the spiritual court unless  it related to 
matters which belonged to the ecclesiastical judges,  unless the 
secular court refused to administer justice to her.3 
pro~criptionis  vincula promi  non pati- 
untur,  investigat  et  promit  sacro- 
sancta:  religionis  auctoritas.  Omnes 
itaque  causa:  quze  praetorio  jure  vcl 
civili tradantur, Episcoporum sententiis 
terminat~,  perpetuo  stabilitatis  jure 
firmentur.  Nec liceat ulteriusretractare 
negotium quod Episcoporum sententiis 
deciderit."  Cf.  Ivo,  '  Dccret.,'  xvi. 
312 ; Gratian, '  Decretum,'  C. xi. Q. 1. 
35-37 ; and '  Dccretals,' 11.  1. 13 ; and 
for  a  discussion of  the  sources of  the 
regulation, cf. p. 222; 
1 See pp.  222,  223. 
B '  Decretals,'  ii.  28.  7 : "  Denique, 
quod  in  fine  questionum  tuarum 
quzris, si a civili judice ante judicium 
vel post  ad nostram audientiam fuerit 
appollatum,  an  hujusmodi  appellatio 
teneat : tenet quidem in his, qui sunt 
nostrz? temporali jurisdictioni subjecti ; 
in  aliis vero,  etsi  de  consuetudine  ec- 
clcsile  tencat, secunclum juris  rigorem 
credimus non  tenere." 
'Decretals,' ii.  2.  11 : " Nos  igitur 
attendentes,  quod  aliis  injustitiam 
facere non debemur : mandamus,  qua- 
tenus nisi sit taliv oauea qu~  ad eccle- 
The matter was doubtless one of  great difficulty : a recourse 
of  some sort to the bishop  had no  doubt been  permitted in 
the  later  centuries  of  the  ancient  empire,  and  had  been 
adapted to the elaborate  organisation of  the administrative 
and judicial  system of  those centuries, and during the period 
when  the  new  political  organisations  of  the  Middle  Ages 
were  only  slowly  taking  shape,  an  appeal  to  the  ecclesi- 
astical  protection  was  natural,  and probably  not  resented. 
But  as  mediaeval  civilisation  became  organised  and  the 
secular  power  developed  a  coherent  machinery,  the  inter- 
vention  of  the  ecclesiastical  authority  in  secular  matters 
became  more  and  more  difficult  to  harmonise  with  the 
regular  working  of  government.  By the twelfth  and thir- 
teenth  centuries,  customs  which  had  once  worked  without 
difficulty  were  becoming  matters  of  serious  controversy. 
But we  cannot  here  discuss  this  subject  fully:  it cannot 
be  properly  dealt  with  in  relation  merely  to the Canon  or 
the Civil law. 
The matter may very well  here  be  concluded  by noticing 
some  sentences  of  Stephen of  Tournai,  which  illustrate the 
hesitation and uncertainty which was coming over the minds 
of  many practical  men.  Steplien comments upon  a  passage 
quoted by Gratian from Pseudo-Isidore, which lays down, in 
broad  terms,  the right  of  any  oppressed  person  to invoke 
the protection  of  the Church,  and then adds that it was  a 
disputed question whether  a layman could  appeal in secular 
law-cases to the Pope.  Some said that no such appeal could 
be  made,  while  others maintained that this  could  be  done, 
for even  the  emperor  acknowledged  the Roman  Church  as 
his mother, and the Pope as his father, for it was from him 
that he received the imperial cr0wn.l 
siasticum  judicem  pertinere  noscatur,  judicium ; '  per  sententiam  vel  ante 
ei  supersedere curetis : dummodo  per  gmvatus injustc.  '  Sacerd.,' i.e. synodi, 
judicom  sccularem,  suam  possit  jus-  ubi  resident  sacerdotes  scil.  opiscopi, 
titiam obtinere,  alioquin non obstante  vel sacerdotes superiorum pralatorum. 
ipsius  contradictione,  causam  ipsam  'Ad  majorem  sedem,'  metropolitani 
. . .  ratione pravia terminetis."  vel  primatis.  Quaritur,  utrum  in 
1 Stephen  of  Tournai, '  Summa De-  forensibus causis laicus possit appellare 
cret.,' C. ii. Q. 6. 3 :  "'Omnis  oppressus  ad apostolicum 7  Quidam dicunt  non 
libere sacerdotum (si voluerit) appellet  posse, nisi ad imperatorem, ab impera- 
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The claim that the ecclesiastical  officers had not only the 
right but the duty of  intervening in secular affairs  seems to 
us  specially  important, as illustrating the fact  that it was 
impossible  to secure a  complete  separation between  the two 
spheres  of  the  spiritual  and  the  temporal  authorities.  In 
some cases,  at least, the ecclesiastical  authority could  inter- 
vene  with  regard  to matters which  primarily  concerned  the 
secular  authority;  or,  to put  the  matter in  another  way, 
matters  which  seerned  at  first  sight  of  purely  temporal 
significance  might  frequently  prove  to have  a  relation  with 
principles  with  which  the spiritual authority was  primarily 
concerned.  Stephen  of  Tournai's  facile  phrases  about  the 
separation  of  the two  spheres  were  misleading  rather  than 
illuminating. 
It is important to observe that in another direction still 
this  receives  important illustration.  There  are  traces  even 
in  the Canon  law  of  the eleventh  and twelfth  centuries  of 
the principle that the laity had some, if  an undefined, share 
in the government  of  the Church.  We  do not here  discuss 
the question of  patronage and investiture : these matters are 
so closely connected with the great controversy of  the times 
that the canonical  treatment  of  these subjects  can  only  be 
considered  along  with  the general  history  and literature  of 
that subject:  we  hope  to deal with  the matter in  another 
volume.  But it is worth while to notice here that even t,he 
canonical  collections  of  the  eleventh  and twelfth  centuries 
contain passages which imply that the laity, formerly at least, 
had sometimes possessed the right to be present at the Synods 
of  the Church.  Some of  the canonists reproduce older regula- 
tions which  imply the presence of  the laity at some  Church 
assemblies.  Burchard of  Worrns  quotes the thirteenth canon 
of  the  Council  of  Tarragona,  which  enjoins  upon  metro- 
politan~  to summon to their synods not only the cathedral 
tore  autem et przfecto provincia  non  tra :  nam ipse imperator non dedignatw 
ost  appellandum,  sed  supplicandnm.  vocare  ecclesiam  Romanam  matrem 
13t  dlcunt quidam, posse  appellare ad  sunm  et  apostolici~m patrem  suum; 
apostolicun~  a seculari jucllcr, alii con-  ah  eo enim accepit  coronam imper~i." 
and  diocesan  clergy,  but  also  some  of  the  laity.]  Ivo 
cites  a  canon  of  the  Fourth  Council  of  Carthage  in  a 
form which implies that laymen might be present at synods, 
and  bids  them  speak  only  on  the  permission  of  the 
~lergy.~  These  reminiscences  of  an older  system of  Church 
authority  have  some  importance  as  indicating  that  even 
in  the  canon  law  of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries 
there was  still some tradition that the laity had some place 
in  Church  authority.  This  is  further  illustrated  by  the 
citation, both by Deusdedit and Gratian, of  a sentence from 
a  well-known  letter  of  Pope  Nicholas  I.  to  the  Emperor 
Michael,  which  repudiates  indeed the claim  of  the Emperor 
to  take  part  in  the  discipline  of  the  Church,  but  admits 
that the Emperor and all the laity may perhaps  have some 
ola)im to be  present  at those  synods  which  deal  with  the 
faith, inasmuch as this is a matter which is related not only 
to the clergy but to all Christian pe~ple.~  Such phrases may 
be  difficult  to reconcile  with  the general  tendencies  of  the 
Canon  law  in  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries,  but  we 
must take account of  them in estimating the whole character 
of  the medi~val  position. 
'We have seen that the Canon law does not deny that the 
clergy  are in secular matters subject to the authority of  the 
secular  power,  though  it  insists  upon  the  importance  of 
certain  important  exemptions  of  t,he clergy  from  the juris- 
diction  of  the  secular  courts  and  from  certain  kinds  of 
taxation.  It is not necessary  to bring forward  evidence  to 
1 Burchard, 'Derret.,'  i. 48 : "Epis- 
tolz tales per  fratres  a  metropolitano 
aunt  dirigend~, ut  non  solum  de 
cathedralibus  Ecclesia  proshyteris, 
verum  etia~n  de  dicecesanis  ad  con- 
cilium  trahunt,  et  aliquos  de  filiis 
Ecclesize  seoularibus  secum  adducere 
studeant." 
2  IVO,  '  Decret.,'  xvi.  13 : "  Laici in 
synodo,  przsentibus clericis, nisi ]psis 
jubcntibus,  docere non andeant."  Cf. 
Fourth  Council  of  Carthage,  98  (the 
text in Bruns' '  Canones Conciliorum,' 
omits tlie words "  in synodo "). 
a  Gmtian,  ' Decretum,'  D.  xcri.  4 : 
"  Ubinam  legiutis,  imperatores  ante- 
cessores vestros sinodalibus conventibus 
interfuisse,  nisi  forsitan  in  quibus  de 
fide  tractatum  est,  quo  univcrsalis 
est, que non solnm ad clericos, verum 
etiam  ad laicos  et ad omnes  omnino 
pertinet  Ghristianos."  Cf.  Deusdedit, 
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show that the layman is in spiritual matters subject to the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Church.  We  have  in  the  last  chapter 
dealt with the question of  the excommunication  of  emperors 
or  kings: if  thc supreme  secular  ruler  was  thus subject  in 
spiritual matters to the spiritual authority, there could be no 
doubt  as to the position  of  the private  layman.  We  have 
found no trace in those canonists whose works wb  have been 
able to use  of  any recognition  of  the principle  asserted  by 
John Bassianus and Azo, that when the layman was brought 
before  the spiritual court the secular judge  was  to sit with 
the bish0p.l  We shall recur to this matter in a later volume, 
when  we  deal with such well-known  regulations as those  of 
William  the Conqueror  in England,  or  of  the Constitutions 
of  Clarendon, that the king's tenants in chief  and ministerials, 
and the men of  the king's boroughs and domains, might not be 
excommunicated without the king's  consent, or at leaat until 
the matter had been brought before the king or his Justiciar.* 
But it is necessary here to take account of  an aspect of  the 
canonical theory of  excommunication  which we  have not yet 
had occasion to consider, and which is sometimes overlooked. 
We have in the last chapter briefly illustrated the tremendous 
nature of  excommunication, and its far-reaching consequences. 
But we must now be very careful to recognise that the power 
of  excommunication was  not an arbitrary power,  but could 
only be exercised for lawful reasons and in a lawful manner. 
An unreasonable  or unjust sentence of  excommunication had 
not in the canonical theory any final  validity:  it might  be 
right that a man should submit to it until it could be revised 
by competent  authority, but such  a  sentence had no  effect 
before  God.  The  canonical writers  are quite aware  of  this 
principle,-indeed they discuss the matter vory carelully, and 
lay down some conclusions without hesitation. 
Cardinal  Deusdedit  has  a  very  important  summary  of 
passages from the patristic writings  dealing with the subject. 
An  unjust  excommunication  injures  him  who  inflicts  the 
sentence rather than him who is sentenced ; the Holy Spirit 
1 Cf. p. 86.  deal with  thls in  detail (1928). 
8  We  have  not  found  ~t po5s1ble to 
by whom men are bound or loosed will inflict on no man an 
undeserved punishment ; justice  annuls all unjust sentences ; 
the man who is unjustly sentenced will be rec0mpensed.l 
Gratian  discusses the subject in the third Question of  the 
eleventh  Cause,  and cites  an immense  number  of  passages 
bearing upon it.  He first quotes many canons which seem to 
show that a sentence of  excommunication, whether it is just 
or unjust, must be respected by the person condemned until 
he has brought his case before a synod of  bishops.*  But he 
then  points  out that there  are  also  canons  which  seem  to 
point to another conclusion-that  is, that an unjust sentence 
is not to be obeyed ;  and he cites a number of  canons which 
l  Deusdedit,  '  Col1  Can ,'  iv.  72 . 
"  Augustlnus  ad Auxil~um  Eplscopum 
Inter caetera  Illud plane  non  temeie 
dixer~m quod  si  qulsquam  fidehum 
fuerit  anathemat~zatus  inluste,  e~ po- 
tlus  obierit  qui  faclt,  quam  01  qui 
hanc  patitur  Inluriam.  Spiritus enlm 
sanctus habitans  in sanctls pcr  quem 
qmsque  legatur  aut solv~tur,  lmmerl- 
tam null1  ingerit  pcenam.  . .  Idem 
ad  Auxihum  Episcopnm  qui  excom- 
municaverat  Cass~anum cum  famllla 
sua . . . ceplstl  habeie  fratrem tuum 
tamquam  publlcanum,  l~gas  lllum  In 
terra, sec1  ut jute facias  vide.  Nam 
lniusta vlncula d~runlpit  jushtia.  Idem 
In  sermone  Domin~  in monte  Teme- 
rarium judicium plerumque nil111 nocet 
01  de  quo  temerarie  judlcatur.  El 
autem qu~  temere judicat,  ipsa temeri- 
tas necesse  est,  ut noceat.  . . .  Idem 
In  expos~t~one  psalml c11  S1  qms Jus- 
tus  est  q~u  lniuste  maledlo~tur,  et  si 
~uiuste  maledlcltur, przemmm  1111  red- 
dltur.  Hys~dorus  in l~bro  de  summo 
bono.  '  Qul i~ocet,'  nit Apostolus, '  rc 
clpiet  ~d quod  nocult '  Non  solum 
enlm  credendum  ost  ei  qui  ln~usto 
msled~citur, nihil  omnino  ei  Illam 
maled~ct~onem  obesbe,  verum  insuper 
credendus  est  maledlctus  lnjuste,  per 
id  pram11 increments susclpere " 
2 E g ,  Gratian, 'Decretum,'  C  XI  Q. 
3, c.  1,  "Sententla  pastorls, slve justa 
sive inlusta fuerit, t~menda  est." 
c.  2 : "  S1  quis  a  proprio  Eplscopo 
excommnu~catus  est : non  eum  prlus 
ab alns debere susc~p~  , nlsl aut a suo 
fuerlt  ~eceptus  Episcopo,  aut consilio 
farto Eplscopls occurrat et respondeat : 
et  si  Sinodo  satlsfecer~t,  et  statuerit 
sub  alia  eum  sententia  recipl  Quod 
etlam  clrca  lalcos  et Presbyteros,  et 
Diaconos, et omncs  qui  in  clero  smt, 
convenit  observar~  " 
c. 9 . "  Placuit  universo  concil~o,  ut 
qu~  excommun~catus fue~~t  pro  suo 
noglectu, sive Eplscopus, sive qullibet 
clericus, et tempore suae excommuntca- 
t~onls  ante  audlent~am communlcare 
praesumpserit, Ipse  in  se  damnat~onls 
judlcetur  sentent~am  protuhsse " 
c.  30  "Cler~cus  qm Eplscop~  distric- 
t~onem  circa so inlustam putat, recurrat 
ad Synodum " 
a  "  Gratian, '  Decretum,'  C.  XI.  Q.  3, 
after  c.  40,  Gratlanus .  "  Premissis 
auctor~tatibus,  quibus iniustae sentontlae 
usque ad excommunicat~onem  utriusque 
partls parere jubemur, ita respondetur 
Grego~ius  non dlcit sententlam in~uste 
latam esse servandam, sad timendam. 
SIC et  Urbanus  Timenda  est  ergo, 
id  est non  ex  superbla  contemnenda. 
Rel~qua:  vero  auctorltates  de  excom- 
municatis loquuntur, qui vel vocat~  ad 
Synodum  vemre  contempserunt,  vel 
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might  seem  to prove  this,l  and asks how  these  canons  are 
to be  reconciled  with  each  other.2  He points  out  that a 
sentence  may  be  unjust  for  various  reasons :  it may  be 
unjust  in consequence  of  the intention  of  the judge,  or in 
consequence  of  some  impropriety in form,  or  in  respect  of 
the ground which is alleged  for it ;  and he cites  a  number 
of  canons  bearing  more  or  less  upon  these  various  causes. 
Gratian's own conclusions are not very clearly expressed, but 
he seems to mean that an  unjust sentence of  excommunication, 
though it has no validity before God, must be respected, both 
by  the excommunicated  person  and by  others,  until it has 
been  brought before  the competent  authority, except in the 
case  where  a  person  has  been  excommunicated  because  he 
will not commit some wi~kedness.~ 
nescientcs, inlustam sententlam a ~udice 
reportaverunt,  vel  qui  ncglectu  sue 
vitre  simstram  de  so  oplnionem nascl 
permittentes  sententiam  In  se  excep- 
erunt.  Hos  siqutdem  solos  excom- 
mun~catioms  sententia  ferire hcet." 
Gratian, 'Decrctum,' C XI  Q  3, Part 
IV.,  Grat~anus  .  "  De  111s  lnquam  et 
hujusmodi, przmlssre auctoritates lcqu- 
untur, non de ~niuste  suspensis.  Qucd 
autem iniusta? sentontlae parendum non 
sit multis  auctorltatlbus  prcbatur " 
'  E g , Gratlan,  '  Decretum,'  C  xi. 
Q. 3,  c.  46 : " Cul  est ~llata  sententia, 
deponat  errorem,  et  vacua  est ,  sl 
iniusta est, tanto eam curale non debel, 
quando apud Deum, et elus ecclcslam 
nemlnem potost g~nvare  lnlqua senten- 
tia  Ita ergo se non absclvi deslderet, 
qua se nullatenus persplcit obllgatum " 
Grat~an,  '  Decretum,'  C  XI  Q  3, 
after c  64, Gratianus . "  Ex h~s  datur 
mtelltgl, quod inlusta scntent~a  nullum 
alligat apud Doum, nec apud Ecclesiam 
ejus ahquis  gravatur lnlqua sententia 
smut ex Gelas11 capitulo habetur (z.e ,  C. 
XI.  Q  3, c.  46, ' Cul  est illata ')  Non 
ergo ab eius communlone abstlnendum 
eat, nec el ab officto cessandum in quem 
cognoscitur  lnlqua  probata  sententia 
Cur  ergo  capltula  Carthaglnensls  (C 
xi.  Q.  3,  c.  30) et African1 (C  xi  Q. 
3,  c.  9)  atque  aliorum  concillorum, 
prohibent  lnjustc  damnatum  In  ccm- 
munlonem  reclpi  ante  ~udioii  exami- 
nationom  7 " 
a  Gratlan,  '  Decretum,'  C  X  Q.  3, 
Part V,  Gratlanus . "  Si ergo iniuste 
deiecti,  non  etiam  per  Episcopos  re- 
pararl possunt,  nisi de manibus eorum 
rcc~piant, quze  amlserant :  quomodo 
sua  auctoritate  culque  licet  lniuste 
ligatis communicare, et 0x8,  non pet~ta 
absolutlone, sua celebrare officla, slcut 
Gelasius  videtur  sent~re  P  (r.e , C  xi. 
Q. 3, c  46, ' Cul  est illata ').  Ad hec 
respondendum  est,  quod  sententia 
al~quando  est  ~niusta  ex  animo  pro- 
ferentl5,  lusta  vero  ex  ordine,  et 
causa . aliquando est iusta ex  animo 
et causa, sod non ex ordine : allquando 
lusta  ex  animo et ordlne,  sed  non  ex 
causa.  Cum  autem  ex  causa  ~niusta, 
fucnt, al~quando  nullum m eo omuino 
qu~  acousatur  delictum  ost,  quod  sit 
damnati~no  dignum .  ahquando  non 
est In eo illud, bupla  quod fcrtur sen- 
tentla sed ex alio nominandus est.  Ex 
animo est iniusta, cum ahquis servata 
~ntegritate  ludiciarll  ordmis  In  adul 
terum, vel queml~bet  cnminosum,  non 
amore  lustltn,  sed  livore  o&i,  vel 
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There is an important passage in Stephen of  Tournai which 
sums up the canonical view of  excommunication.  It must be 
observed, he says, that a sentence of  excommunication can be 
regarded  in three  ways.  A  man  may be  excommunicated 
before  God and the Church, when a man has justly been cut 
off  from the Church on account of  his crimes ; or he may be in 
pretio,  aut  favore  adversarlorum  in- 
ductus  aententiam  profert.  Unde 
Beda  super  eplstolain  Jacobl  alt  11, 
'Ire  enim  vlrl  lustltiam  Del  non 
operatur,'  qma  qu~  lratus In  aliquem 
sontentlam  prcfert,  et sl ille  quantum 
ad se lustam reportet sententiam : iste 
tamen  qu  non  amore  lustitia?,  sed 
hvore  od11  in  eum  sententiam  dedlt, 
iust~tiam  Del, in quem perturbatlo non 
cadit, non imitatur." 
Gratian,  '  Decretum,'  C  X.  Q.  3, 
after c  72,  Gratianus :  'L Huic itaque 
sententia? quze  non amore lustitiae, sed 
ex alia qualibet causa fertur in quem- 
quam humillter  obed~endum  est." 
Gratlan,  '  Decretum,'  C.  X.  Q.  3, 
Part  V1 , Gratlanus  "  Cum  ergo 
sentent~a  ex  ordlne  ~niusta  eat,  nec 
tunc  ab  ea  recedendum  est:  quia 
etlam  ante quam scntent~a  daretur In 
eum,  pro  qualltate  SUI  reatus  ligatus 
apud  Deum  tenebatur.  Contingit 
allquando,  ut adulter  sententiam  pro 
sacrllegio  reportet,  cuius  reatum  in 
conscientia non habet.  Ha?c sententia, 
etsi  iniusta  sit,  quia  non  est  in  eo 
cnmen, super  quod lata est sententla, 
tamen  iuste  ab eo reportata est,  qula 
ex  reatu adultem lamdiu apud  Deum 
excommun~catus  fuerat  Et  In  hcc 
casu  lntelligenda  est  llla  auctor~tas 
Gregorii  (' Sententla  pastorls,'  &C  , 
Gratlan,  C.  X.  Q  3,  c.  1).  Iustaln 
scntont~am  vocat, quando crimen sub- 
est,  bupor  quod  fertur.  iniuslain, 
quando  lllud  non  subost,  qure  tamen 
timenda  vel  servanda  ost,  quia  ox 
alio iamdudum damnandus mat.  Unde 
curn  przmisisset  Gregonus . '  Utrum 
luste an imuste obliget pastor, pastoris 
tamen  sententla  gregl  t~menda  eat ' 
(subsecutus adiecit), '  ne 1s  qu1 subest, 
et cum lniuste forsitan  llgatur, ipsam 
obligatlonis  sure  sententlam  ex  alla 
culpa  mereatur.  Pastor  ergo  vel 
absolvere indiscrete  timeat,  vel hgare. 
Is autem  qui  sub manu  pastorls  est. 
ligar~  timeat vel in~uste  nec pastor18 
sui  ludlcium  temere  reprehendat.  ne 
etsl ln~uste  l~gatus  est, ex ipsa tumidae 
reprehonsioms  superbla,  oulpa,  qum 
non  erat, fiat ' 
Ahquando  nullum  subest  crimen et 
tamen  vel  od~o  judicis,  vel  factione 
~ntmicorum  oppowtam slbi aentent~am 
damnatlonis in se exclpit " 
Gratian,  'Decretum,'  C.  X.  Q.  3, 
after  c.  86,  Gratianus :  "  Haec  sen- 
tentia potlus iudicem laedit, quam eum, 
in quem temere fertur " 
Gratlan, ' Decretum,' C.  X  Q  3, after 
c. 90, Grat~anus "  Hie etsi, ut dlctum 
est, non  teneatur hgatus  apud  Doum, 
sententise tamen parere  debet : ne  ex 
superb~a  ligetur, qui prlus ex purltate 
consclont~z  absolutus tenebatur " 
Part V11 , Gratianus .  "  Idem  est, 
quando  contra  aequltatem  seiltent~a 
fortur :  veluti  quando  subditi  non 
possunt cog1 ad malum, scicntes obedi- 
entiam  non  esse  servandam  przelatis 
m rebus  illic~tis  " 
Gratian, 'Decretum,' C  X.  Q  3, after 
c.  101,  Gratianus.  "  Cum  ergo  sub- 
d~ti  excommunlcantur,  quta ad malum 
cog1  non  possunt,  tunc scntentlo non 
ost  obediendum  qula  iuxta  lllud 
Gelasu,  '  Noc  apud  Deum  nec  apud 
Eccleslam  eius  queinquam  gravat 
imqua sentent~a  ' " (C.  46). the position of  one who is excommunicated before God, and is 
therefore  not a  member  of  His  body,  which  is  the Church, 
although  he  had  not been  cut  off  from  the  Church  by its 
sentence ; or again, a man may be excommunicated before the 
Church, but not before God, if  the sentence of  excommunica- 
tion is unjust and founded upon no true cause.l 
Finally, it is important to observe that the Decretals draw 
the same distinction between the validity of  excommunication 
before  God  and before  the  Church.  Innocent 111.  in  one 
passage  does  not  hesitate  to say  that there may  be  cases 
where  a  Christian  may know  that a  certain  action  will  be 
a mortal sin, though it may not be possible to prove this to 
the Church, and that in such a case he must rather submit to 
excommunication than commit the mortal sin ;  and  in another 
place  he lays it  down  explicitly that while  the judgment  of 
God  is  always  true,  the-judgment  of  the  Church  may  be 
erroneous,  and that thus a man may be coildemned by God 
who is held guiltless by the Church, and may be condemned 
by the Church who is guiltless before God.3 
It needs  no  elaborate argument to demonstrate the great 
importance of  this distinction between the formal and outward, 
l  Stephen  of  Tournai,  'Summa 
Decret ,' C.  111.  Q.  4,  Dlct.  ad c.  11 . 
"  Notandurn  Excommun~cat~o  multls 
modls d~cltur. . .  Excommun~catur  au- 
tem quis apud Deum et eccleslam, allus 
apud Deum et non apud ecclesiam, alms 
apud  ecclcqiam  et  non  apud  Deum. 
Apud  Deum  ct eccleslam  qui  proptcr 
sua  scelera  luste  per  sontentiam  ab 
ecclesla  separetus  est ,  qul  autem 
cr~minal~ter  delinqmt,  statlm  apud 
Deum  pro  excommunicate  habetur, 
quonlam,  quantum ad ipsum,  non  est 
membrum corpons sm, quod est ecclesla, 
quamvls per sententlam eccleslae non s~t 
separatus ab ea.  Apud eccleslam et non 
apud  Deum  escommun~catus  est,  qu~ 
non  luste,  nulla  causa  subs~stente, 
sententiam excommunicat~onis  acclpit " 
2  '  Decretals,'  v.  39.  44 . "  Inqulsl- 
tloni  tua? brev~ter  respondentes,  credi 
mus  dlstlnguendum,  utrum  alter  con- 
iugum  pro  certo  sciat  impedirnen- 
turn conmgn, propter quod sine mortal1 
peccato non valeat carnale commerclum 
exercere, quamvls illud apud ecclesiam 
probare non possit : an impedimenturn 
hujusmodi  non  sclat  pro  certo,  sod 
credat.  In primo  itaque  casu  debct 
potius  excommunicat~onis sententiam 
hum~litcr  sustlnere,  quam  per  carnale 
commcrcmm  peccatum  operarl  mor- 
talc " 
3  '  Decretals,' v.  39  28 . "Nos lgitur 
 consultation^ .  . .  tuae breviter respondo- 
mus,  quod iudl~~um  Del  veritatl,  quae 
non  falllt, nec  fallltur,  semper  lnnlti- 
tur.  ludlcium  autem  ecclcsiae  non- 
nunquam opinloncm sequltur, quam et 
fallere saepe contingit, et falli.  Propter 
quod conting~t  interdum, ut qui llgatus 
est  apud  Denm,  apud  Ecclesiam  s~t 
solutus .  et qui llher est apud  Deum, 
ecclesiastica sit sententia  innodatus." 
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and the real validity of  the censures of  the Church.  Mediaeval 
history is full of examples of  the defiance of  these censures by 
men who had no thought of  repudiating the spiritual authority 
of  the Church.  It would, however, be impossible to deal with 
this subject completely without passing from an examination 
of  the theories of  the Canon  law into the discussion  of  the 
general history of  these centuries, and that must be reserved 
for another volume. CHAP.  XII.]  SUMMARY.  251 
CHAPTER  XII. 
SUMMARY. 
WE  have  now  endeavoured  to  consider  some  of  the  most 
important  aspects  of  the  political  theory  of  the  Civil  and 
Canon lawyers down to the middle of  the thirteenth century. 
Enough  has  been  said  to show  the immense  importance of 
distinguishing the tendencies of  that period from those of  the 
period which followed it ; for the more closely we study the 
movement  of  ideas in the Middle Ages,  the more  clear does 
it become  to us  that we  must  distinguish  very sharply be- 
tween the views of  those great thinkers who in the thirteenth 
century  endeavoured  to  construct  a  coherent  and  logical 
system  out of  the infinitely  complex  elements  of  mediaeval 
life and thought,  and the judgments  of  those  earlier writers 
of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries  who  represent  an 
intellectual  and political  civilisation which  was  growing  and 
changing too rapidly  to allow them to stop and attempt to 
marshal  their  ideas  in  a  systematic  order.  The  great 
systematisers  do  no  doubt  represent  the  Middle  Ages,  but 
only in this sense, that they endeavour to fix and define, and 
therefore in some measure to stereotype, what had been a thing 
living  and  growing  and  continually  changing.  For  there 
are few periods in the hibtory of  the world when the move- 
ment of  circumstances  and ideas was  more rapid, and there 
is  nothing  which  still obscures any real  apprehension of  the 
Middle  Ages  more  effectively than  the  notion  that  these 
centuries  were  a  period  of  fixed  opinions  and  unvarying 
conditions. 
In this  volume  we  have  dealt  with  some  aspects  of  the 
political  ideas implicit  or formally  expressed in  a  literature 
whose  conceptions  are directly founded  upon  antjiquity, the 
civilians  building  primarily  upon  the  ancient  jurisprudence, 
the  canonists  primarily  upon  the  Christian  Fathers:  they 
represent,  therefore,  some  of  the  most  important  elements 
which  the Middle  Ages  inherited from  the ancient world. 
If  now  we  ask  ourselves  what  are  the  most  significant 
conceptions which they present, we may well begin with that 
majestic conception  of  law, presented to us both by civilians 
and canonists, as representing not the mere mill or power of  a 
community or ruler, but rather the attempt to translate into 
the terms and to adapt to the conditions of  actual life, those 
ultimate  principles  of  justice  and equity by which,  as they 
believed,  the whole universe was controllcd and ordered.  In 
the civilians this is related primarily to the discussion of  the 
nature and meaning of  a.quitas  and justitia,  and secondarily 
to their treatment  of  the jus  naturale ;  while the canonists 
deal  with  it  chiefly  in relation  to  the jus  rzatu~ale  and its 
character as the standard to which all laws must conform, the 
norm or test to be applied to all institutions. 
It is out of  these conceptions that there grows the necessity 
of  distinguishing between the world  as it actually exists, and 
the ideal or perfect conception of  the world  and human life. 
And, again, canonists and civilians  have alike inherited from 
the  later  philosophy  of  the  ancient  world  and  from  the 
Fathers the conception of  the distinction between the natural 
conditions  of  human life,  which  they think  of  as primitive, 
and the conventional institutions under which  men  actually 
live.  Many  of  these  conventions  are in  themselves  to  be 
reprobated, but are accepted as  being  the means  by which 
men's vicious and criminal tendencies may be oontrolled, and 
they may be trained for the ideal. 
We  have  dealt  with  the treatment  of  the institutions  of 
slavery and property  as illustrating this conception,  but the 
theory of  the State both in the canonists and civilians is also 
related to it.  To them both the State is a sacred institution 
that is necessary and sacred as the means of  establishing such 
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The canonists do not indeed look upon it  as natural in the 
stricter sense, but rather as a conventional institution, made 
necessary by men's vices, but still a sacred and divine remedy 
for those evils, and with this judgment the civilians probably 
agreed.  They represent not so much the Aristotelian theory 
of  the State, as that modification of  it presented by some at 
least of  the Stoic writers.l  It  has indeed been urged by some 
writers of  eminence that the ecclesiastical theory of  the State 
denied  its  sacred  character,  and,  following  some  supposed 
theory  of  St Augustine,  held  that the State did not really 
represent the authority of  God.  We shall have to return to 
this question in later volumes,  and shall then try to reduce 
the  complexities  of  mediaeval  thought  to  some  reasonable 
proportions.  In the meanwhile,  we  must  content  ourselves 
with saying that this is not the conception of  the canon law, 
not even of the Decretals, and that whatever may be the final 
conclusion  about the general  principles  of  the Middle  Ages, 
the  canonists  at least  as  well  as  the  civilians  held  to the 
principle  of  the sacred character  of  the State. 
The civilians,  as far as we  can understand them, shared in 
these conceptions, but we  also find in some of  their writings 
an interesting attempt to establish the conception of  the State 
as resting upon the natural relation between the whole society 
or  universitas  and its  rnembem2  It  would  seem  that  we 
have here a more organic conception of  the nature of  political 
society, as necessarily arising out of  the constitution of  human 
nature and the principles  of  social relations.  And alongside 
of  this  and in close  relation  to it we  have to recognise  the 
great importance of  the fact that the civilians  repeated for 
the Middle  Ages  the principles  of  the Roman j~~risprudence 
that  the  only  source  of  political  authority  was  the  whole 
community, the universitas  or populzcs.  In our first  volume 
we  have  pointed  out the great significance  of  the fact that 
this was the normal theory which  the ancient world  handed 
on to the Middle Ages and the modern world.  This was not 
the less important, because the conception coincided with the 
native traditions of  the barbarian societies ; the doctrine of 
l Cf. vol. i. pp. 23-29.  C-7. 
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the civilians  stated clearly  and explicitly what was  implicit 
in the new constitutions. 
There are indeed other aspects of  the tlieory of  the ancient 
jurists  which  do not correspond  with  the traditions  of  the 
new  societies,  and here the influence  of  the civilians is more 
complex,  and it requires  some care and some  discrimination 
to estimate  the whole  nature  of  this.  We  have  seen  that 
they  were  divided  upon  the  question  whether  the  Roman 
people,  in transferring their  authority  to the emperor,  had 
wholly  parted with their original  authority.  Some  of  them 
maintained that this was  the case,  and here we  have what 
was  undoubtedly  a  new  and alien  element in the medizeval 
tradition.  Some of  the civilians maintained that the people 
having t,ransferred their authority had done this once and for 
all, and that even their custom had lost its original force in 
making and abrogating law;  and that thus the emperor was 
left as the sole and absolute legislator.  This conception was 
new  to the Middle  Ages,  and indeed  it did not  attain any 
great importance in these times : its development belongs to 
the period  of  the Renaissance,  when,  in the breaking up of 
the  general  fabric  of  medizeval  civilisation,  the  personal 
monarchies  which  reached  their  full  development  in  the 
seventeenth  century  began  to  take  definite  shape.  Some 
share  in this  development is  probably  to be  traced  to the 
influence of  some of the civilians. 
It is,  however,  a  great mistake to suppose  that this was 
the only or the most general view  of  the civilians,  for many 
of  them, including  the great Azo,  held  quite another view, 
and maintained that the people had never really parted with 
their  authority,  that  the  ruler  held  a  delegated  authority 
which was  not unlimited, while the people  always continued 
to control  all  legislation  by  their  custom,  and might  even 
if they chose reclaim the authority which they had entrusted 
to the ruler.  And, as we have seen, Irnerius, Roger, and Azo 
are  very  clear  in  holding  that  the  emperor,  even  though 
entrusted  by  the  populus  with  legislative  as  well  as  ad- 
ministrative  authority,  could  only  exercise  this  with  the 
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had received its authority from the  ~oP~~ZUS. Their doctrine 
is generally related to the phrases  of  Theodosius and Valen- 
tinian in the Code, but we  are left with the impression that 
we  may here  suspect also the influence  of  the contemporary 
constitutions. 
The canonists have little to say directly upon this subject : 
some of  them, indeed, like Rufinus, agree with those civilians 
who hold that custom has no longer any legislative authority, 
except with the consent  of  the ruler;  but on the whole the 
great importance attached to custom in the canonical theory 
of  law,  and the final  decision  of  the Decretals that custonl, 
under the condition  of  a legal period  of  prescription,  always 
retained the force  of  law,  seem  to throw the weight  of  the 
canon law on to the same side as the civilians like Azo. 
It is  difficult  to summarise what  we  have  said  as to the 
theory of  the relations of  the two authorities of  Church and 
State;  but we  may once  again point  out that in  order  to 
understand their relation in the Midclle Ages  we  rnust  begin 
by  taking  account  of  the fact,  which  is  brought  out  with 
special  clearness  in the work  of  the civilians,  that a  great 
part  of  the  exemptions  of  the  clergy  from  secular  juris- 
dictions  and obligations,  and a  good  deal of  their  claim  to 
intervene  authoritatively  in  ~ecular  aflairs,  is  really  to  be 
traced  to the deliberate  organisation of  society  in the later 
empire,  and especially  by Justinian.  And finally, we  think 
that an examination of  the subject  W%  have made it  clear 
that  while  the  Chnrch  had  come  to  claim  a  tremendous 
authority in relation  to the empire,  it is not the case  that 
the  Church  as  represented  in  the  deliberate  judgments  of 
the Canon  law claimed to be  supreme over  the State.  The 
normal  doctrine  of  the Canon  law down to tlie  time of  the 
Decretals  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  fifth  and  the  ninth 
centuries,  that  the  two  authorities,  the  ecclesiastical  and 
the civil,  were  equally  and  separately  derived from  Christ, 
and that strictly each was supreme in its own sphere. 
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By 3us ctvtle slave has no peraowa, 
36 
By  jus  naturale  slave  1s  under 
'' obllgatlons,"  and  others  nIe 
under  '  obl~gat~ons  "  to hlm, 36 
Slave cannot sue or he sued In c1v11 
matters,  but he can In cr~m~nal 
cases, 36. 
Slave can proceed even agalnst 111s 
master In such cases, and for h18 
hberty, 36 
Jud~clal  author~ty  belongs to the 
uuzversetaa,  or  to  h~m  who 
represents  ~t,  67 
Unrversttas =  populua, 57 
Unxversal  custom  contrnues  to 
abrogate law,  67,  66 
Even  the custom  of  a  part~cular 
c~ty  does th~s  ~f  adopted dellb 
erately and with full knowledge, 
65. 66 
Denres  that  emperor  requrres  to 
follow the law of  Theodoslus and 
Valent~nian  In regard to leg~sla- 
t~on,  69 
Burchard  of  Worme,  canonrst  of 
eleventh century- 
All men, free or slave, are brethren, 
and must treat each other mercl 
fully, l18 
Apphcatlon  of  th~s  pmlc~plo  to 
marrlace  of  free  woman  and 
slarc liusband,  118 
Cites Is~dore's  phrase on slavery as 
consequenre and pun~shment  of 
sln  1 19 
B~sl~vp  may not emanclpate Church 
slaves unless he pays compensa 
t~on,  121 
C~tes  canon of  Gangrr anathema 
t~sing  those who encourage slaves 
to fly from thew masters,  122 
Cltes canon of  Althe~m  excommullr 
catmy Iugtt~ve  slaves, 122 
Slaves cannot  be  orda~ned  unless 
emancrpaterl, 123 
Ordalued slave may be  colnpelled 
to serve h18 master s church, 123 
Quest~on  as to slave orda~ned  with- 
out hrs master's  knowledge, 124, 
125 
Slave not to be rece~ved  Into mon 
astery  w~thout master's  per- 
mlsslon,  128 
B~shop  must ~nqulre  In  111s v~slta 
t~on  whether masters havo h~lled 
thew slaves, 130 
Ivlarnage  of  slaves  of  different 
masters only lawful w~th  maste~  S' 
consent,  but  ~f  they  have  con 
sented, cannot he d~ssolved,  131 
Church as sanctuary for slaves, 133 
Forb~ds  kidnapping, 134 
C~tes  canon  wlnch  Imposes  very 
m~ld  penance  on  man  who  has 
stolen through  want,  142 
Cltes canon  anathemat~s~ng  tho5e 
who  rebel  agalnst  the  lr~np, 
~nasmuch  as  he  IS  the  Lord S 
ano~nted,  146 
Exerc~se of  lust~ce  In  cr~mlnal 
cases der~ves  ~ts  authorltv flom 
God,  147 
C~tes  Is~dore  s phrases on functlon 
of  State  bema  to  ~romote 
lustlce  &c, 156 
C~tes  St Augustme's  phrase  that 
where there IS no rule of  Scnp 
ture, the customs of  the people of 
God are to be taken for law, 154, 
161 
Pope done has authonty to sum- 
mon  Synod  whlch  has  legal 
authonty,  164 
Ev~l  oaths must not be kept,  202 
Excommun~cat~on  and ~ts  results, 
203,  204 
Cltes passage  belonging  to l~tera 
ture of  Donat~on  of  Constantlne, 
but not Douat~on  Itself, 209 
Secular author~ty  and law subje~t 
to law of  God, 228 
B~shops  to protect the oppressed 
and  to  excommunicate  the 
oppressox,  239 
Laymen  summoned  to  Church 
5jnods, 243 
Canon lae and canomsts- 
Reple5ents  m  pazt  tllc  older  ele 
ments of  medla\al clvlhsat~on,  2 
Acc;ordmg to ' Petr~,  Exceptlone.. 
majons vlgorls  than secular 
laws,  14 (note 4) 
Mny  be  set  aslde  by  judge  for 
spec~al  reasons,  14 (note  4) 
Its concept~on  of  jus  natumle more 
~learly defined  than  that  of 
c~vll~ans,  31 
r~eatment  of  ~ts  relat~orl  to c1r11 
law by  c~v~l~ans,  78 80 
Its relat~on  to  c~vil  law  not  the 
same as that of  dlv~ne  law,  80 
Canons  of  the  first  four  general 
counc~ls  have  the torce  of  la~>, 
because  Justln~an  gave  them 
thlti,  79,  80 
bupreme In ~ts  own sphere, but not 
In that of  c~vll  law, 80 
INDEX 
'  Petn Exceptlones  sugyebts that 
~f canon law and clr 11  law d~ffer, 
the  former  must  ~reva~l.  80 
(not? 1) 
Value  of  canon  law  as represent 
lng the cons~dered  and deliber 
ate  judgment  of  eccles~ast~cal 
wr~ters,  93 
Sources of  canon law  94,  95 
Theory of  law denved from Roman 
law, but through Is~dore,  96 
Jus  canonum  ma  In  secondary 
sense  be  callecf  ,us  dzvznum 
according to Stephen of  Tourna~, 
139, 181 
Theory of  property, 136 142 
Dlffers from jus  dzvznum, I e ,  jus 
naturale, on  subject  of  prlvate 
property, 139 
Customs of  people of  God,  or  zn 
stztutu  of  former generations, to 
be taken as law In  those thlngs 
about wluch Scr~pture  has mado 
no rule  154  161, l62 
Rule of  Pope Telesphorus vo~d,  be 
cause not accepted by custom of 
those concerned, 165, 166 
Relatlon  to custom,  157 159,  186 
188, 194, 195 
Theory of  canon law In the canon 
~sts,  160 197 
Grat~an  s general principles of  law 
In relatlon to,  164, 165 
Jus dzvznum not the same as canon 
law, 165, 166 
Infenor to Scr~pture  andjus natur 
ale, 168, 169 
Decrees of  councils as canons, 169, 
170 
~ecrees  oP  Popes  as canons,  170 
175,  188 190 
Decree  of  Pope  Anastaslus  con 
trary  to  evangelical  preccpts 
and earller Fathers ~nval~d,  171, 
189 
Relatlve  authority  of  Popes  and 
Fathers  In  rolat~on  to canons 
175.  176 
~uthdrlt~  of  canons a question of 
junsd~ct~on,  175, 176 
Its  author~ty b~nd~ng  on  %l1 
Chr~st~an  men,  but  relat~ve  to 
~ts  purpose,  176 177 
Treatment  of  subject  by  Pau 
capalca,  178 180 
Orlgin  according  to Rufinus  and 
Stephen,  181 185 
Use  of  phrase jus  dzvznum  In  re 
lation  to  it  by  Stephen  of 
Tournai,  181,  182 
New  canons  cannot  alwavs  over 
r~de  old,  185,  186  193,  194 
D~spensat~ons,  190 192 
Tendency  of  IIugucc~o to  cle 
preciate  Decretals  192 
Im ortant introductory  letters  to 
&mpllatIons  111  and v,  and to 
VOL.  11. 
Gregory  IX  'S  Decretals,  as  de- 
velop~ng posltlon  of  Pope  as 
leglsl?tor  197 
T~eatment  of  ~clat~ous  of  Church 
and  State,  198 249 
Treatrncnt of  ~ts  relation to secular 
law by canonlsts  237 233. 
lurch and State- 
Treatment  of  their  relat~on by 
c~vll~ans.  76 91.  254 
The d~vine  law superior to that of 
State  77 79 
But that does not apply to canon 
law, unless thls 18  suggested by 
'  Petr~  Exceptlones,  79  80 
Immunltles of  clergy, 81 86 
Roger  and Accurslus hold that ~f 
layman brlng suit agalnst cler~c, 
and is d~ssatisficd  wlth judgment 
of  b~shop,  he may have recourse 
to secular court, 82,  83 
Lalty subject to Church law  and 
courts In  eccleslast~cal  matters, 
86  - - 
Jo Bssslanus, AZO,  and Accurslus 
hold that when a layman is tried 
for an ecclesiast~cal  offence,  the 
c1v11  mag~strate  must sit with the 
blshop  86,  87 
Civ~lians  recognise r~ght  of  eccles~ 
ast~cal  author~tv  to ~nterveno  in 
secular  cases  tb  secure just~ce, 
87.  88 
~hei; pnnclples  derived  from 
Novels,  88 90 
Prov~b~on  In civil~ans  about elect~on 
of b~shops,  90 
Treatment  of  the subject by  can 
onlsts, 198 249, 254 
Gelablan theory  as represented  by 
Stcphen, 198, 199 
Exam~nat~on  of  supposed clalm on 
part  of  Church  to  be  supreme 
over  State,  200 224 
Tradlt~on  of  cases whore Popes had 
appo~nted  or deposed rulers, 200 
202 
Excommun~cat~on  and depos~t~on, 
202 206  ' 
Theory that Peter and hls succes 
sors had rece~ved  authorltv over 
temporal  as  well  as  sp~r~tual 
lringdom  horn  Cllrlst  206 209 
The  Donation  of  Constantlne  In 
canon law, 209 213 
T~eatmont  of  rrlat~on  of  authority 
of  Pope to that of secular ruler 
in the Decreta~s,  213 224 
Lettcr of  Innocent 111. to Emperor 
Alexlus  213 217 
Lctter of  Innocent I11  on d~sputed 
clect~on  Otto to empire  of  l'h111p  217  of 219  Suabia and 
Letter of  Inno~cnt  I11  defend~ng 
h13  claim  to  arb~trate  between 
K~ngs  of  Erance  and  England, 
219 322 
R2 INDEX.  INDEX. 
Decretals  ~llustratlng  repudiation  Are  agreed that the people  is the 
of  claim to political supremacy,  I  souice of  polltlcal authority, 56 
222,223 
Clnlm In two Summas on Gratlnn's 
Decretum that Pope 1s veru%  zm 
perator,  224 
Phrases evpiess~ve  of  .;uperior dig 
nlty of  Church, '' soulandbody," 
"  sun and moon,"  226 
Thcorv of  canonlsts with regard to 
relaiions of  canon law and secu 
lar law, 227 233 
Theory of  canonists as to relation 
of  clergy to the secular authority, 
233 238 
Theory  of  the canon~sts  wlth  re- 
gard to r~ght  of  the Church to 
Intervene  for  dofence  of  the 
oppressed,  238 242 
Traces of  thcory of  r~gllts  of laity 
to a voice in government of the 
Clmrch, 242, 243 
Theory of  canonists with regard to 
ox~ommnnicat~on  and its valid 
~ty,  243 249. 
Clcera- 
Defimtion  of  cequltas  quoted  by 
clvillans,  8 
Definition  of  justice  quoted  by 
Placentinus, 10 
HIS  oonceptlon of  natural law, 29 
statement' about  custom^ and law 
quoted  by  Gloss  on  Brachy 
logus,'  52 
His doctrine that law of nature IS 
law of  God followed by Fatherq, 
Isidore, and canon law, 99 
CIVII  Law  See under Jus Czvzle 
Civil~ans- 
lhelr polrtical  theory founded on 
law books of  Justln~an,  6,  26. 
Normal  conceptiorl  of  cequztas, 
justice, andjus, 7, 8 
Nature  of  lustice  and ~ts  relat~on 
to cequttas, 8 12 
Then theory ot jus,  13 27 
Posh~ble  d~vergenco  between clvll 
lans antececient to, or indepen 
dent of, school" of  Bologna, and 
the later mombors of  the school, 
on obligation  of  magistrates  to 
dec~de  accord in^ to strict law, 14, 
15, 17 
Them theory of   UP naturale, 28 33 
Difficulty  with legard to existlng 
institut~ons  w111ch  are contrary 
to jus naturale,  33,  49 
Them theory of davery, 34 40 
Then theory of property, 41 49 
Use  the word  lex  In  widest  yense 
as well as In that of  Cams, 50, 
5  1 
All recognlse that custom once had 
force of  law, differ whether thls is 
stlll the case, 52 54 
Their theory of  political authority, 
66-78. 
75 
Are  divided  on  question  whether 
the  people  stlll  retaln  ~ts 
authoi~ty,  59 67 
Afa~ntaln  the sacred  character  of 
the secular  law,  77 
Recogni,e  the ex~stence  alongside 
of  thls of  another system of law 
and author~ty,  77 80 
Clergy- 
Lxemptlon  from  secu ar jurisdlc 
tion,  treatment  of  this  by 
civilians.  81 86 
Treatment  of  thls  by  canonlsts, 
233 238 
Exempt~on  from  taxat~on,  treat 
ment  by  canonl~ts,  236,  237 
Thev  are  normally  subject  to 
sgcular  authorit$  in  - secular 
matters, according to canonlsts, 
237, 238 
'  Cologne Gloss on Inst~tutes  '  Author 
ldent~fied  by Fitting with Cualoaubus 
of  Pav~a  (see under Gualcausus), 42 
Cornpllat~ons Flve collections of  Papal 
Decretals before Gregorv IX ,94, 185 
constantine I ,  ~m~erGr~ 
His plirase about custom In  Cot1 
v111  52  (83), 2  G9 
Donat~on  of  See under Donat~on 
Constltutlon of  Slrmond, a genuine 
law of  Constantlne, 222, 240 
Cjrpus Jurzs Czvrlzs  See under  Jns 
tlnian 
Councils, General- 
Canons  of  first  four  have  been 
given force of  law by Justlman, 
79, 80 
Place of  their decrees in canon lam, 
94,  163,  167,  177,  178,  182 
Can only  be summoned by  Pope, 
164,  169 
Councils, Provincial- 
Some  of  them  canons In  body  of 
canon law,  94 
Place  of  then decrees  In  Church 
authority,  163,  167,  170,  182 
Their  decrees  only  blnd~ng  upon 
those  who  are under  the jnrls 
dict~on  of  bishop  of  the  p10 
vince,  184 
Custom- 
Treatment by the civilians  50 58 
All civilians recognlse that it once 
had force of  law, 52 G5 
Subject to equ~ty  and ~ustlco,  59 
Treatment  of  it  by  o~vilians  in 
relat~on  to  polit~cal  author~ty, 
59 67 
Divergence among them as to the 
questlon  whether  it  stlll  has 
foroe  of  law,  59 67 
Law must be conformed to custom 
of  country, accordlng to Iaidore, 
Ivo, and Grat~an,  96, 97, 100 
Isidore and Grat~an  dlv~de  all law 
Into natural and customary.  98 
All human law is custom, wr~tten 
or unwritten,  99,  100,  154,  155 
The jus qentzum a part of  custom- 
ary law,  114, 115, 153 
Treatment  of  ~ts  relat~on  to c1v11 
law by the eanonists,  153 159 
No  law  is  vahd  whlch  1s  not 
accepted by the custom of  those 
concerned, l65 
Question how far custom stlll con 
tinues to have the force of  lam 
accordlng to canon~sts,  156 158 
Decretals of  Gregory IX hold that 
custom  w~th  legal  prescr~ption 
has force of  law,  158 
Darnasus- 
Civilian and oanonlst of  early thir- 
teenth century,  108 
Jus  naturale unchangeable even by 
Pope, 108 
Decretals of  Pope contrary to gen 
era1 canons approved by author- 
ity of  Scr~pture  are vo~d,  193 
Denies that emperor has temuornl 
authority from Pope,  he lias ~t 
from God, 212 
Pope  could  not  recelve  empire 
from  Constantlne, nor could Con 
atantme blnd his successor,  212 
Decretals- 
which  Pope  John  VTII , mlth 
blshops,  &c ,  elects  Charles  the 
Bald  as emperor, 201 
Gtes from Anastas~us'  '  Bibl~othe. 
carlus ' the trad~tion  that Pope 
Gregory  led  revolt  of  Italy 
against  iconoclast~c  emperor, 
201 
~lt%~onatlon  of  Constantme, 209. 
C~tes  Constitut~on  of  Slrmond au 
thor~szng  any party  m  a  case, 
without  consent  of  the  other 
party, to take the case  to the 
bishop,  239 
C~tes  Pope  N~cholas' phrase  that 
the la~ty  have nght to share in 
determiiung matters which  con 
cern the faith, 243. 
C~tes  varlous  passages  on  nu1 ~ty 
before God of  unjust exoommuni- 
cation, 244, 245 
Dlssensiones Domlnorum,' Codex Chis 
ianus- 
Relations of  custom and law, 61 63 
Some  persons  held  that  Senate 
could st~ll  mahe laws, 62  (note l), 
70  . . 
Donat~on  of  Constantine- 
Treatment  of  this  by  canon~sts, 
200,  209 213 
Its genuineness  denled  by  Otto 
111,  213 
The five comp~latlons,  94,  195  Emperor- 
The great collection of Gpegory  IX .  /  The  pnnce  the only  person  who  -  - 
159 
As formlng part of  canon law, 162, 
16.3,  164, 170 175, 179, 183, 184, 
185,  188 190,  192,  193,  194 197 
Theory of  canon law in them, 194 
107 
VD 
The Sext, the Clementines, 95 
No custom can overridejus naturale, 
any transgression of  it  endangers 
a man's salvat~on,  108 
The place of  custom in law,  158, 
A", 
Treatment of  question of  autholity 
of  Pope over emperor, 213 224 
Deusdedlt,  Cardinal,  cunonlst  of  olev- 
enth century- 
Cltes  provision  against  sale  of 
Chr~st~an  men Into slavery, 134 
Cites Romans  YI  11  and 1 Peter 11 
on  sacrod  character  of  secular 
authority,  147 
Cites canon, whlch lays down that 
authority  of  crimlnnl  justice  is 
derived from God, 147 
Cites  Gelasius'  theory  of  the two 
author~t~es,  the eccles~ast~cal  and 
the secular,  both lnst~tuted  by 
Chrlst, 148. 
Cites Is~dore  s 'Sentences  on func 
tion  of  State  to  set  forward 
ji stlco, &c , 150 
C~tes  words of  b~nod  of  Rome In 
can decide in  cases- of  conflict 
between  mquztas  and strict law, 
16,  17 
His author~ty  der~ved  from Roman 
people,  58, 89 
Justinian in one place calls hlm the 
how fir th~s  was general anclent 
view, 59, 60 
Hugolirius says that  the people con- 
st~tuted  him  procurator  ad hoc, 
65, 66 
The cmperor can only Ieg~\I~lte,  ac- 
cordlng to hnenns, Roger,  and 
Azo, w~th  counsel and consent of 
Senate,  according  to form  pre- 
scnbcd by Theodosius and Val 
entlman, 67, 68 
Bulgarus maintains that thls form 
1s not necessary, 69 
Discussion of  limitations of  h~s  au- 
thor~ty,  70 72 
Discussion of  his relation to prlvate 
property, 72 74 
Jo Bassianus calls lum God's pro- 
curator to make laws, 76, 77 
According to P~llius  he has plenz- 
tudo  potestatzs  In  thlngs  whlch 
belong  to him  as Pope  has  in 
h18,  78 
Called God's wear In letter of  Pope 
Anastas~us  c~ted  by Ivo, 14b. INDEX. 
Theory that he  1s  not  strlctly  a 
layman ment~oned  by  Rufinus, 
149. 
Careful dlstlnct~on  by Innocent 111. 
between  character  of  anolntlng 
of  emperor and that of  blshop, 
149. 
D~scusslon  of  clalm of  Pope to ap- 
point or depose hlm,  200-202 
Clalm  of  Pope  to excommunloate 
hlm  and  absolve  his  subjects 
from oath of  alleglance, 202-206. 
Nature of  Innocent III.'s cla~m  to 
Intervene In electlon of  emperor, 
217-219. 
Cla~m  of  Innocent 111.  that the 
Pope  transferred  emplre  from 
Greeks  to Germans,  217. 
Equ%,"&~us  and Placontlnus hold that 
bv lus naturale all men are free 
aAd equal, 35. 
Thls 1s also doctrlne of  the Canon 
Gelasius, Pope- 
Influence of  his theory of  the State 
and the relations of  Church and 
State on the canon law, 144, 147, 
148,  198,  199,  2  7,  222,  226. 
Paucapalea treats t%e Donatlon of 
211 
Innocent  111.  restates  Gelas~an 
principle that secular as well as 
eccles~astlcal  authorlty has been 
established by God, 21G. 
Glossa  Ord~nar~a  of  Accurwus.  See 
under  Accursms. 
'Glossa Ordlnar~a'  on Gratlan says that 
Pope has both swords, spiritual and 
temporal, 208, 209. 
God- 
HIS  rolatlon to cequztas,  7, 9. 
Justlce  a quality of  God's w~ll,  9. 
Commands  men  to glve  to each 
other what they need,  9. 
Dlstlnctlon between justice In God 
-  - 
Law, 117, 118. 
Excommun~cat~on- 
Treatment of  ~ts  nature and results 
by canon~sts,  200, 202-200. 
If  unjust  has  no  valldlty  before 
God,  244-249. 
Place  of  t'helr  writings  m  canon 
law, 94. 
Canonlsts  reproduce  them  theory 
of  slavery andproperty, 117 142. 
And In large measure thew theory 
of  the State,  143, 152. 
Relatlon of  their authorlty to that 
of  Pope, 175, 176, 180. 
Fittlng, Professor- 
HIS  reconstruction of  h~story  of  the 
systematic study of  Eomnn law 
before the school of  Bologna,  G 
HIS vlew  that clvlllans before  the 
school  of  Bologna  were  loss 
hampered by deference to lltcral 
text of  law than latcr clvlllans, 
and In man, 11. 
Gospels- 
Teach  the  perfect  justice  wh~ch 
blds men turn the other cheelr to 
the smlter, 19, 20. 
Thegus naturale contained ~n  them, 
30,  31,  98 (note l), 104-109. 
Fathers- 
Them conception of jus naturale, 29. 
Private property not a natural in- 
stltution. 41. 
14, 15, 18. 
Florentlnus : HIS phrase about slavery 
quoted by clvll~anq,  34, 35, 39. 
France, Southern.  Trace of  law school 
there In early Mlddle Ages, G. 
FrederlcB Barharossa :  HIS  consultation 
with Bologna clvll~ans  about lmperial 
riellts over prlvate property,  72. 
Gratian- 
The first to systematise the collec- 
tions of  canon law, 94, 97. 
Commentators on h~s  ' Decretum,' 
~regdom-  - 
The c~vlllans  held that by gus nat- 
wale all men were born free,  34, 
35. 
Dlscusslon  of  ~ts  nature  by 
Irnenus,  34,  35. 
Notion  that Influence  of  c~vlllans 
was  unfavourable  to  pol~tical 
freedom requlres  correct~on,  75 
94. 
Tralned In law school of  Bologna, 
97. 
His treatment of  law based on IS- 
dore, 98-101. 
HIS  clabslficat~on  of  law as dlvlne or 
natural  and human  or  custorn- 
ary,  98-101. 
Jus naturale contalned In  law and 
Gospel, 98. 
Jus so called because ~t  1s lust, 100. 
Purpose of ?us  to ~estrain  men from 
1n;urlng each otller, 100. 
Definition of  nature of  gus as repre- 
senting prmciples of  l~~ncstas,  Ju8- 
tlce, cutltom,  &C  ,  100. 
Repeats Iszdore's  tripart~te  defini- 
tion of  law  102. 
And  h13  definltlon of  jus  naturale, 
10.2. 
Jus noturale = counsel  of  Gospel, 
"Do  unto  others  whnt  thou 
wouldest  that others sllould do 
unto thee,"  106. 
Jus naturnre 1s  prlrnltive  and un- 
changeable,  105 
All  const~tut~ons,  occlesiast~cal  or 
secular, contrary to gus  naturale 
to be role~ted,  105. 
The fir4  to face the qucstlon how lt 
1s  that while  tho'ps naturale IS 
contalned in the  law,"  somo of 
th~,  1s set aslde,  109. 
Points  out  that institutions  llke 
property  are  allowed,  though 
contrary to jzts  naturn!~,  110 
The ?us qentau~n  part of  cuqtomar! 
law of  manklnd, 114, 115 
The customary law began after the 
fall, when  men  began  to come 
together,  115 
Cltes canon proh~bitlng  d~ssolutlon 
of  marrlage  of  slaves,  on  the 
ground that God is the Father of 
all men,  118, 119. 
Slave of  monastery can be emancl- 
pated  only to be  ordalned and 
mlnlster to the monastery,  121. 
Cites canon of  Gangrse, anathema- 
tlslng those who encourage slaves 
to fly flom them masters, 122. 
Dlscusslon  of  ordlnatlon of  slaves, 
122-127. 
Discusses  reception  of  slaves  xn 
monastenefi,  127,  128. 
Inconsistent canons about ordlna- 
tlon of  znscrsptzfzur, 128, 129. 
Freedman can only be  ordained ~f 
master surrender all nghts, 129. 
Marrlage  of  free  and slave ~nd~s- 
soluble,  132 
Church a sanctuary for slaves, 133. 
Manumlsslon a pidus act, 135 
His treatment of  prlvate property, 
136 142.  .  . 
Cltes St Augustine's condemnation 
of  those  who  say  that  they 
should  take  property  of  rlch 
man to glve lt to the poor,  142 
His theory of  nature  of  political 
soc~ety  and authonty,  143-152. 
Polit~cal  soclety not prlmitlvo, 143, 
144. 
Sacred and havlne divlne author-  - 
~ty,  146,  147. 
Founded  upon  Gelaslus'  the01  y, 
147,  148. 
Cltes Isldo~e-functlon  of  State to 
set forward lustlce. 160 
Cltcs  Isldoro'~  definltlon  of  jus 
rzvzle,  154. 
HIS doctrlne that clvll law 1s  cus- 
tom, wrltton or unwntten,  154, 
155 
No  law  1s  vahd  which  1s  not 
accepted by the custom of  those 
concerned, 155. 
Qucstlon  whether  Gratian  held 
that custom overrode law In hls 
own  day,  156. 
His theory of  canon law (v  under 
canon law), 165 178. 
Cltos Gregory V11 'sletter clalmlng 
that Popes had  deposed k~ngs, 
200. 
Cltes canon showlng that Pope ab- 
solves  from  oath of  alleglance 
to excommunicate perqons,  204, 
241.5. 
Pope  absolves ~ubjects  from oath 
of  fidellty  when  he  deposes 
rulers,  205. 
Cltcs phrase of  Peter Damlan, tliat 
Peter and 111s successors recelve 
authorlty over temporal as well 
as splrltual klngdom for Cbnst, 
206. 
Doesnot clto  Donatlon  of  Con- 
stantlne, 210,  213. 
This  1s  Inserted  In  Palea  in  De 
crotu~n,  210. 
Cltes  as from  Gregory  Nazlanzen 
clalm  tliat  splrltual  power  1s 
suporlor to temporal, for it deals 
w~th  thc qoul, 226. 
Chllrch law cannot be abrogated by 
emperor, 227. 
La~ty  have no nght to legislate on 
Church matters, 227. 
Secular authority and law subject 
to law of  Crod, 228 
Canons  blndlng  on  all  Chnstlan 
people,  229. 
All  lams  contrarv  to canons  are 
void,  229. 
No  evldence that Gratlan  1s  here 
treating of  a dls~ute  as to boun- 
dnrles Gf  eccles~krt~cal  and secu- 
lar s~heres.  229. 230. 
~lscusslon  of  exekptlon. of  clergy 
from o~vll  and  cr~mlnal  courts, 
234,  235 
Exemption  of  clergy  wlth  regard 
to taxat~on,  236,  237. 
Cltes  Constltutlon  of  Slrmond, 
wh~ch  perm~ts  elther  party  to 
take clvll  case to Pope wlthout 
consent  of  the other,  239,  240 
Cltes phrase  of  Nlcholas  I., whlch 
admlts that lalty are ent~tled  to 
take  then  part  in  dec~dlng 
matters whlch concern the fa~th, 
'242  --v. 
Treatment of excr~mmun~cat~on  : ~t 
may be valld bcfore Church, but 
~nvahd  before God, 245 247 
Gregory I,  Pope : Rule about fartlng 
attributed to hlm declared by Gratlan 
to be  vold, because  not accepted by 
the custom of  those concerned,  155, 
I fi6. 
Gregory VII. (Hlldebrnnd), Pope- 
HIS  phrase as to s~riful  character of 
olrcumstances undo1 w111~li  socu- 
lar anthor~ty  arosc,  145. 
Real meanlng of  the phrase,  146. 
Gregol y IX ,  Pope- 
His collection of  Decretals, 96. 
Custom wlth reasonable  and legal 
prescrlptlon  overrides  all  law, 
158. 
Gualcausus- 
Identified by Flttlng wlth author of 
the  tutes,  Cologne  42  Glors In the Instl- 
Property  acqulrsd  by  c~vll  or 
natilral luw,  42. INDEX.  264  INDEX. 
Hermogenlanus . Probably  held  that 
prlvate  property  belongs  to  jus 
gentzum,  not jus  naturale,  41 
Hlncmar of  Rhetms  D~gnlty  of  b~shop 
greater than that of  klng, for he con 
secrates h~m,  226 
Hugol~nus,  c~v~han- 
Dlscuss~on  among  clvlllans  as  to 
wrltten  and unwritten  ceqttztas, 
.W 
I I 
Dlscuss~on  of  vd~d~ty  of  lmperlal 
rescr~pts  contrary tojus czvzle or 
gentzum,  32 
Rescrlpts  contrary to jus  naturale 
are vo~d,  32 
Freedom the pr~mltlve  cond~t~on  of 
man, 35 
Prescrlptlon belongs to clvll not to 
natural cequztas, 48 
Roman  people  never  transferred 
them  author~ty  to  emperor  In 
such  a  sense that they  do  not 
retaln ~t  them custom still has 
force of  law, 65, 66 
The  cmperor  constituted  as  pro 
curator ad hoc by Roman people, 
65, 66 
Dlscuss~on  of  l~mltat~on  of  r~ghts  of 
emperors, 72 (note 1) 
The Pear of  God 1s the foundatlon of 
law, 77 
Law  the  foundatlon  of  human 
soclet?,  77 
The  State  a  multitude  of  men 
iomed toeether to llr e by law, 77 
Re"scr~pta  cbntrary  to  natural  or 
dlvlne law to be rejected by the 
courts.  78, 79  .  . 
Hugucc~o- 
Canonlst of  twelfth century,  192. 
Deprc~~at~on  of  Papal  Decretals, 
192,  193 
Tnnocent I,  Pope  HIS  statement that 
authority  of  cnmlnal  justlee  1s  de 
rlved  from  God,  147 
Illnocent IIT ,  Pope- 
God has lnst~tuted  both secular and 
eccles~ast~c  authorlt~es,  hke  to 
the  lum~narles  In  the  heavens, 
147,  214 217,  226 
Draws careful dlstlnctlon  between 
consecrnt~on  of  emperor and  of 
blshop,  149 
Emperor supreme only over those 
who hold temporal  thlngs  from 
him,  215,  216,  237 
Clalms  that  Popes  transferred 
emplre from Greeks to Germans, 
201, 217, 218 
Letter to Emperor Alexlus on rela 
tlon of  lmper~al  to papal author 
~ty,  214 217 
Letter  on  dlsputed  elect~on of 
phihp  of  Suabla  and  Otto  to 
emplre  217  219 
Letter  to  French  blshop  on  hlu  I 
clalm to arb~trate  between Eng 
land and France, 21'4 222 
Letter to Rlshop of  Vercelll. settlng 
as~de  cla~m  to supersede secular 
judge,  but  clalmlng  rlght  to 
protect  those  unjustly  treated 
by courts,  223 
Clalms  that  Pope  should  decide 
where  uncertain  whether  case 
comes  before  temporal  or 
spiritual court,  232 
Refuses to allow  w~dow  to brlng 
case from clvll to church court, 
unless  clvll  court  refuses  to 
admln~ster  just~ce,  240 
Treatment  of  excommun~cat~on 
which  may  be  vahd  before 
Church invahd before Cod, 248 
Inscrzptrtzus  See under Ascrcptctrus 
Inst~tutes  of  Justln~an- 
Treatment  of  hmltat~on  of  rlghts 
of  masters over slaves carr~ed  on 
by clvll~ans,  37, 38 
The phrase  about  custom  us  law, 
c~ted  by  Ivo, and mod~fied  IJJ 
Grat~an,  154 
Institutes,  Exordlum  of  Anonymous 
Summa  of,  defin~t~on  of  cequztas, 8. 
Ir~lerlus- 
Founder of  law school at Bologna, 
6 
Poss~blg  pup11  of  law  school  of 
Rome,  6  - 
Summa  Codlcls  or  Summa  Tre 
cenq~s,  8 
Authorslnp of  works attr~buted  to 
h~m,  8 
'Qusst~ones  de juns subtll~tatlbus,' 
8 
Definlt~on  of  cequztas, 8 
Defin~t~on  of  justlce and ~ts  relat~on 
to ~quztas,  9 
Treatment  of  nature of  justice  In 
Quzest~ones,'  11, 12. 
Laws not to be enforced by judge I£ 
contrary to aguztas (In- Summa 
Codlc~s  '), 15 
Only prlnce can Intervene In case of 
doubt, between jus  and cepuztas 
(~n  Gloss), 17 
Describes honourable men who see 
to ~t that anything In  law  con 
trary to mquuas 1s  cancelled (In 
' Qumst~one\  ),  18  19 
Author  of  treatwe '  De Bqu~tate,' 
19 
Author~ty  of  law  only  gladly  ac 
cepted when agreeab o to cequztaa, 
19 
D~scui.;es  nature  of  jus,  bpec~ally 
the difficulty ra~sed  by phrase of 
Paulus (q  v  ),  22 24 
Treatment of  slavery as llustratlng 
the meamng of  taklng away from 
the jus  commune, 34 
L~berty  belongs tojus naturale, 35 
Important passage on  nature and 
destructson  of  human freedom, 
35  l 
The  ascrzptztzus  not  In  the  same 
cond~t~on  as that of  the slave, 
but 1s servus qlebce, 39 
No pnvate property by nature (~n  a 
eloss\. 43 
pGperiy has arlsen by rnzqurtas (m 
a gloss), 43 
In  Summa Codicls ' s~eak~  of  the 
bejpnmgs of  naturdks jurzs  do 
mznzum, 43 
Speaks of  a naturalzs possesszo, 43, 
44  -- 
Threefold jus, estsbl~shed  by law, 
custom, and nature, 53 
Custom had once the force of  law, 
but thls had ceased slnce people 
transferred  thew  authoritv  to 
emperor,  53 
Custom, not only of  Roman people 
but of  any clty, has force of  law, 
~f  not contrary  to wr~tten  law, 
63.  54 
Pol~&cal  author~ty  arlses naturally 
from relat~on  of  the unzversztas, 
I  e ,  populus,  to ~ts  members, 56, 
57  -. 
Populus = respubltca, thls concep 
t~on  applied  to  the  Roman 
populus,  57 
The custom  of  Roman people has 
ceased to make or unmake law, 
for  they  have transferred them 
author~ty  to emperor,  60 
The emperor  can only make laws 
wlth  the consent of  the Senate, 
68 
The emperor cannot take away a 
man's  property  w~thout  cause, 
73  .  - 
The  oppos~te  vlew  malntalned  In 
another text of  thrs passage, 73 
Alongside of  c1v11 authority there is 
another author~ty-ecclesiast~cal 
-derived from Cod, 78 
Episcopal ~ur~sdictlon  In ~ts  pleni 
tude only extends over the per 
sons who  dewonam  mzlztoam  ger 
unl, 81 
Pumshment  of  eccles~astlcal of- 
fences  of  clergy  belongs  to 
blshop~,  82 
Cr~rnlnal  cases agamst clcr~c  go to 
c~vll  court, but ~t cannot pun~sh 
h~m  untll  deqraded  by  brshop, 
84,  85 
C17  11  caseu can be taken to blshop 
~f  both  partles agree,  87 
Isldore of  Sevllle- 
HIS  theory of natural law, 29 
HIS  phrase understood to mean that 
by jus  naturale  all property was 
common, 41 
HIS  legal chapter founded on some 
jurist~c  source, 41 
Theory of  canonlsts on law derived 
from  Roman  law,  but  largely 
through Is~dore,  96 
Uncertainty  as  to  source  of  his 
treatment  of  law,  rery close  to 
D~gest  and Inst~tutes,  but partly 
independent, 96 
Treatment  of  these  sources  by 
Volpt,  96 
HIS  defimtlon of  law quoted by Ivo 
and Gratlan, 96, 100 
HIS  class~ficat~on  of law as dlvlne or 
natural, and human or custom 
ary, the bas~s  of  Gratlan's treat 
nlent, 98, 101 
HIS trlpart~te  theory  of  law,  the 
theory  of  the  canonlsts,  102 
HIS  defin~t~on  of  jus  na+u;ralo  clted 
by  Grat~an  and  accepted  by 
ranon~sta,  102 
Jus constztutzonzs began w~th  law of 
Moses,  l l5 
HIS descr~pt~on  of  slavery  as  a 
punlshmcnt and remedy  for sln 
quoted  by  Burchard,  110 
HIS  phrase as to funct~on  of  secular 
rule] to set forward justlce, &c , 
clted by canonlsts,  150, 151 
Grat~au  cltea  h~s  definltlon of  jus 
czvzle, 154 
Ivo of  Chartres,  canonlst,  author  of 
'  De~retum  ' and  Panorm~a,  96, 97 
HIS defimt~on of  nature  of  law 
derlved from Isldore  96, 97 
Repeated by Grat~an,  100 
Men  are all  brethren,  chlldren  of 
God,  and  must  bcha~e  mercl 
fully  to each  other,  118 
Appl~cat~orr  of  thls  to  lntllssolu 
b111ty of  marnage of  free women 
w~th  slave  husbands,  and  of 
slaves w~th  each other, llS, 131, 
132 
Blshop must  pay  compensat~on  ~f 
he  emanclpates  C11vrch  slave, 
121 
slave of  monastery cannot be eman- 
c~pated,  121 
Cltes  Canon  of  GIangrre  excom 
mumcatlng those who encourage 
slaves to flee from thelr masters, 
TOO 
1LL 
Cltes Canon of  Althelm excluding 
fugltlve slave from Communion, 
122 
Slave  cannot  be  ordalned  unless 
emanc~pated,  and unless master 
surrender  all  r~ghtv  over  h~m, 
123 
Quest~on  of slave ordalned w~thout 
h~s  master's knowledge, 124, 125, 
127 
Or recelved Into monastery, 128 
Church protects  hbertles  of  freed 
men, 131 
Church a sanctuary for slaves, 133 
Manumlss~on acceptable  to  God, 
134. INDEX. 
C~tes  St Augustlne on property as 
the oreatloll of  the State, 178 
Cites  canons  denouncing  excom 
mun~cat~on  agrtlnst  those  who 
rebelled agalnst klng,  146 
C~tes  letter of  Pope Anastaslus I1 , 
~n  whlch empeIor 1s spohcn of  as 
God's vlcar, 146 
C~tes  passage  from  St Augustme 
laylng down that obedience even 
to  unbehevlng  ruler  1s  com 
manded  by  God,  146,  147 
C~tes  canon  that crlmlnal  lustlce 
derlves author~ty  from God, 147 
C~tes  Gelaslus' theory of  naturo of 
Chulch and State, 148 
Cltes  Iqldore s  phrase  as  to  the 
funct~on  of  State to  set forth 
justlee, &c ,  150 
Cltes  St Augustine's  phrase  that 
customs of  people of  God are to 
be talren for law, when Scripture 
has not lald down rule, 154, 161 
Cites  phrase  from  Inst~tutes  on 
custom as law,  154 
C~tes  phrase derlved from St Basll 
on  custom  m  Church  ~nstltu 
tlons,  161 
C~tes  Important  clas91ficat1on  of 
authorltles m  Church  law  from 
St Augustlne,  162 
Cltes Leo IV  s letter on source of 
canon law, 163 
The power  of  calhng  councll  wlth 
legal authorlty belongs to Pope, 
l64 
All Sanctlones of  Papal See to be 
accepted  as though  they  were 
confirmed by  St Peter,  164 
Cltes letter from Nlcholas I  that 
there  1s  no  dlffelence  between 
autlionty  of  Papal  decretal 
letters In the body of  canon law 
and others, l b4 
Cltes letter of  AI<  xander I1  that 
the decreta  of  Rome  are to be 
aoccpted and reverenced,  164 
C~tcs  Cregory V11  s lettcr clalmlng 
that Popes  had deposed klngs, 
200 
C~tes  Gregory  V11 'S  letter cla~m- 
lug author~ty  to excommunicate 
secular  rulers,  204 
C~tes  phrase of  Ul ban I1 that Pope 
absolves from oath of  allegiance 
to  excommumcate  rulers  and 
lordu  204,  205 
Cltes  Donat~on of  Constant~ne, 
209 
Cites  passage  as  from  Gregory 
Nazianzen  eccles~at~cal  author 
ity greater than secular,  for  ~t 
deals w~th  the soul, 226 
Canon law cannot be  annulled  by 
emperor, 227 
Secular authorlty and law subject 
to law of  God, 228. 
Cnnon law b~ndlng  on a11  Chrlstlan 
people, 229 
All  secular  const~tut~ons  agalnst 
canons  are vold,  229 
Blshop  to protect  the  oppressed 
and  to  excommun~cate  the 
oppressor,  239 
Summarises  provision  of  Novels, 
that su~tor  havlng susp~c~ons  of 
judge  may demand that blshop 
should  sit w~th  h~m,  2.39 
Quote.;  Const~tut~on  of  Slrmond 
that &her  party, wlth the con 
sent of  the other, could take civil 
case to blsllop,  230, 240 
Laymcn may not speak at  a Synod 
w~thout  consent of  clergy,  243 
Julianus, anclent lurlst- 
His savlne. that custom has force 
of  law,  60 
Juhanus-'  Epltome  Novellarum,'  80, 
82,  81,  84,  88,  89 
Jurlsprudentla  De{lnlt~ons  by Placen 
tlnus and Azo, 24, 25 
Jus- 
Derlr ed from justice,  7 
It  is lust~ce  ex~ressed  In  terms of 
law", 7, 8  L 
God's  will  to glve e~  c~y  man h~s 
PS.  9 
Dlscuss~on of  tlns  by  medlzval 
c~vll~ans,  13 27 
D~ffcrs  from ~ustlce  because thls 1s 
unchangeable,  whlle  gus  varles 
w~th  varylng  condlt~ons, 1.3, 
n.  no 
Yl, YL 
Quest~on  whether ~t  perfectly rep 
resents justlce,  19 
No  system  of  jus  can  perfectly 
reprcsent the Divlne justlce,  21 
Just~ce  has w~der  scope than jus 
can always provlde for new cases 
-e  g ,  Lazarus, 21 
D~fficnlty  ralsecl  by  a  phrase  of 
l'aulus,  22,  23 
Irncr~us'  vlew that the word 1s used 
In many senses, 22, 23 
D~stlnct~on  between  gus,  lex, and 
gurzsp~udentza by  Placentlnus, 
24,  25 
Jus  1s  that  wlllch  lex  declares, 
24,  25 
Azo dist~ngu!c;lios  between ?us  pub 
lzcum and przvatum,  25,  26 
Azo  and  all  c~v~lians  accept 
trlpart~te  dlvls~ons  of  jus lntogus 
naturale, gcntzum, and czuzle, 25, 
26, 28 
(bee also under Law ) 
Jus canonum  See under Canon law 
Jus  czvzZe- 
Its relatlon  to custom, treatment 
by  c~vll~ans,  50 55 
Relatlon  of  ~t to D~vlne  law  and 
canon  law,  treatment  by  clvll- 
lans,  78  80 
INDEX 
Relat~on  of ~t  to  custom, treatment 
by canonlsts, 153 159 
Jus const?tutzonzs according to Gratlan 
began wlth leglslat~on  of  Moses,  115 
Jus  Dzvznum- 
Clvillans recognlqe that thls 1s more 
exalted  than  human  law  and 
supreme over ~t,  77 79 
Secular rulers may be compelled to 
perm~t  fiomethlng  aga~nst  I& 
eg,  usury,  79 
Class~ficat~on  of  law as D~vlne  and 
human by Is~dore  andGratlan, 98 
Dlvlne law equivalent to gus nat 
urale, 98, 99 
Jus canonum  may,  according  to 
Stephen, be called In a secondary 
sen% jus dzvznum, 139, 181, 182 
But ~t 1s  not properly  the same 
thlng,  165 166 
Jus qentzum- 
One term of  the tr~partite  definltlon 
of  law  recogmsed  by  the 
civ~l~ans,  25,  26,  28 
Treatment of  ~t by canonlsts,  114- 
116 
A  part  of  the  customary  law  of 
mankind,  114,  115 
Embodled  In  lnstitut~ons n  Inch 
arose  when  men  began  to llve 
together after the Fall, 114 116 
Rufinus looks upon it as  represent- 
ing a  partial recovery  from the 
Fall, 115, 116 
Jus naturale- 
One term of  the tr~part~te  dlv~slon 
of  ?us  przvatum  accepted by all 
c~villans,  25 
Treatment of  thls by the clvll~ans, 
28 33 
Relat~on  of  their concept~on  of  ~t  to 
that of  Ulplan, 29 
Azo s treatment  of  the phrase  as 
capable of  belng  used  In  many 
senses, 30 
Relat~on  of  it to Mosaic law  and 
Gospels, 31 
Supreme and immutable, 31, 32 
No  law  contrary to ~t  vahd,  32, 
78,  79 
Existlne. lnst~tutions  contrary to ~t, 
accounted for by dlstlnct~on  be 
tween  the  pr~maeval innocence 
and  present  vlces  of  human 
nature, 48,  49 
Slavcry and jus naturale, 34 36 
Private property and jua  naturale, 
41 49 
~la&.lficatlon  of  law as natural or 
 IT me, and human or customary, 
by the canomsts, 98 101 
Equivalent  to command to do to 
others  as we  sho~lld  wlsh  them 
to do to u4,  93,  105 
Doctrine of  the canonlsts derlved 
from anc~ent  n  nters hke Clcero, 
Et Paul, and Fathers, 99. 
Treatment  of  the,  by  canon~sts, 
102 113 
Relat~on  of  them theory to that of 
lurlsts  102 105 
~ialys~s  of  ~t  by  Rufinus  and 
Stephen,  103 105 
Prlmltlve  and unchangeable,  105- 
InR 
All  constztut~ons,  eccles~ast~cel  or 
secular, contrary to ~t are vold, 
105 108 
Quest~on  raised by Gratlan how ~t 
is that while  ~t IS  contnlned  in 
"  law  and  gospel,"  there  are 
rules  of  "law  ' which  are  no 
longer  blndlng,  109,  168 
Moral precepts of  ' law  belong to 
~t,  but not  precepts  whlch  are 
mzstzca,  109 
Dlscuss~on  of  ~nst~tut~ons  contrary 
to lt, such as property,  110 113 
Demonstratzones  of  gus  naturale 
represent the Ideal, property and 
slnvcry  contrary to them llter- 
ally,  but actually  preparo  mcn 
for ideal.  111. 112 
I 
Its  relat~on'to  slavely, In canonlsts. 
117 120 
Its relation  to property, In canon- 
lsts, 136 142 
Jus  statutum  Contrasted wlth cequztas, 
15 
Justlce- 
I~R  relation  to cequztas, 7 12 
The wlll to act In accordance with 
cpquztas, 8 12 
Defin~t~cn  by Irnerlus, Placentlnus, 
&c,  8 12 
Its relation to jus, 7, 8, 13 27 
A quallty of  God's w~ll,  9, 11, 13 
Dlffers fromjus, for ~t  1s unchange 
able  13 
Dlstlnction between just~ce  In God 
and man, 19 21 
Relat~on  of  the perfect to the Im- 
perfect just~ce,  19, 20 
No  system  of  gus can adequately 
represent it,  21 
Dehn~t~on  of  law  as represent~ng 
justlce by Is~dore,  Ivo, and Gra 
t~an,  96,  100 
Just~man  In Novels  gave  canons  of 
first four general counclls the author- 
~ty  of  law, 80 
Justzlza, De- 
An anonymous treatise antecedent 
to, or independent of,  school of 
Bologna,  9 
Dlscuss~on  of  nature of  just~ce,  9 
Justlce complete In God, 9 
Dlstlngmshes  between  Imperfect 
human justice and perfect lustlce 
of  God, 19, 20 
The  former  allows  man  to meet 
v~olcnce  wlth v~olenco,  the latter 
teaclies  men  to turn the other 
cheek  to the smlter,  19, 20. INDEX. 
The former represented in the Old 
Testament,  and  prepares  the 
way for the latter, which  1s rep- 
resented  by  the  New  Testa- 
ment,  19, 20. 
Laity : Traces In canon law of  trad~tion 
that they  once  had  some  share  In 
government of  Church,  242,  243. 
Law- 
Author  of  '  Petri  Exoept~ones  ' 
states  h~s  mtention  of  sett~ng 
as~de  laws which  are useless  or 
contrary to oequotas,  14. 
Judge  may,  accord~ng  to  '  Petri 
Except~ones,' have  to  mod~fy 
th~s  for spec~al  reasons,  14. 
Must not bo enforced ~t  contrary to 
cequztas, 14, 15. 
Represents  not  merely  will  or 
power  of  ruler  or country, but 
the ~r~nciples  of  justlee,  26, 27, 
251.-  A 
General theory of  law In the canon- 
ists, 96-101. 
Must be agreeable to nature, just, 
for the common good, and con- 
formed  to  the  <ustom  of  the 
country,  96,  97,  100. 
Conception  of  canon~sts  der~ved 
from  Roman  law,  but largely 
through St Isidore,  96 
Classihcat~on  as d~vinc  or natural, 
and human or customary, 38. 
Leo IV., Pope- 
His list of  author~ties  recognised In 
Church courts, c~ted  by Ivo  and 
Gratian, 163. 
HIS  saying that those who will not 
obey the canons are to  be held as 
~nfidels  c~ted  by Ivo  and Grat~an, 
17fi. 
Lex u&d  by civ~lians  In broadest sense 
as %ell as In  the techn~cal  sense of 
Gaius' definition, 51. 
'Libellus de Verb~s  Legallbus'- 
An anonymous treatme thought by 
F~tting  to belong to the eleventh 
century, 28. 
Sets  out  tripartite  definition  of 
law,  28. 
Says that  possesszo 1s e~ther  c1v11 or 
natural, 42 
Defines  nature  of  a  Pragmat~c 
Sanct~on,  67 
'  L0 Cod1 '- 
Criminal cases aga~nst  clergy go to 
secular court  ,but  ~t  cannotpun~sh 
t~ll  bishop has degraded, 85 
Civil  but not  crim~nal  cases  can 
with consent  of  both parties go 
to bishop, 87. 
Martinus- 
One of  the four doctors, the imme- 
diate  successor  of  Irner~us  at 
Bologna,  17. 
His appeal to  unwritten equity, 17, 
18. 
Mosalc Law- 
The ]us  naturale as contained in it. 
30, 31. 
Jus naturale decalogz, 31. 
Jus naturab contained In "  law and 
gospel,"  98 (note 1). 
D~fficulty  in regard  to th~s  dis- 
cussed  by Gratian and Rufinus, 
109, 110.- 
Jus  constztuttonts  began  with 
Mosaic leg~slation  about slavery, 
115. 
'  Natura Actionum, De'- 
Domznzum by c~vil  or natural law, 
42 
Fitting suggests that  Placent~nus  is 
correctmg  th~s  treatise  in  his 
'  De Varietate  Act~onum,'  42. 
Natural law.  See under Jus naturale. 
N~cholas  I., Pope- 
HIS  statement of  author~ty  of  Papal 
Decretals,  whether contamed In 
regular  collections of  canons or 
not, c~ted  by Ivo and Gratian, 
164. 
His statement that  laity have nght 
to  take part in determin~ng  ques- 
t~ons  of  the falth, 243. 
Novels of  Justmnian- 
Canons of  first four general councils 
have force of  law, 80. 
Civil  cascs  between  clergy  and 
la~ty  go  to b~shop,  82. 
If  blshop  cannot  or  w~ll  not de- 
c~de,  they go  to secular  court, 
82. 
If  layman  is  dissatisfied  with 
bishop's judgment ln  such cases, 
he can go to secular  court, 82, 
83. 
Clergy  can  In  cr~m~nal  cases  be 
brought  before  b~shop or  to 
secular court,  84. 
If  the cler~c  is condemned  by the 
secular  court,  it cannot punlsh 
t~ll  b~sliop  has degraded,  84 
If bishop 1s  d~ssatisfied  w~th  the 
judgment, he 1s to refer the case 
to the prince, 84. 
John  Bassianus,  Azo,  and Accur- 
sius interpret the Novels as say- 
ing that  if  a layman was brought 
before the eccles~ast~cal  court the 
prceses  should  s~t  w~th  bishop, 
86, 87. 
Any sultor who suspects the judge 
may demand that blshop should 
s~t  w~th  h~m,  88, 89, 239. 
Or  he  may appeal to the b~shop, 
who, ~f the judge will not hsten, 
1s  to  give  him  letters  to  the 
emperor,  88,  89. 
Regulations for episcopal elect~ons, 
90. 
dihtur,"  &c,  22  vaie law; 28 
D~scussion  of  dificulty  caused  by  Commei~ts  on and accepts Ulp~a 
this, ~n  Irnerlus, 22.  defin~tion  of  3us naturale, 29. 
Oaths : Treatment bv canomsts of  the 
claim of  Church to'absolve  men from 
then oaths, 202-206 
Odofredus  HIS contemptuous  refer- 
ence  to Martinus'  appeal to an un- 
wntten cequztas,  17,  18. 
Old~nation- 
Of  slave, according to c~vilians,  38- 
40 
Of  ascrzptztws,  according to civil- 
ians, 39, 40 
Of  slaves, accordmg  to canonists, 
122-129. 
Of  znscrzptztzus, accordlng to Gra- 
tlan, 1.28, 129 
Otto 111  denics authent~c~ty  of  Dona- 
tion of  Constant~ne,  213 
Otto IV. : Disputed eIect~on  to empire, 
217. 
Palea- 
Cites canon excommun~catlng  those 
who revolt aga~nst  the lrlng, 146 
Canons ~nserted  by later hand in 
Gratlan's '  Decretum,' 210 
Two of them c~te  Donat~on  of  Con- 
stant~ne,  210. 
Papznian : His  defimtlon  of  law  re- 
fcrred to by Irnerius, 57, 68. 
Paucapalea- 
Canon~st  of  twelfth  century,  first 
commentator  on Grat~an,  106. 
Ju8 naturale contained m "  law and 
gospel"  forb~ds  us  to  do  to 
others what we should not w~sh 
them to do to us, 106. 
Jus naturale pr~m~t~ve  and ~mmut. 
able, 106. 
Follows Grat~an  about or~gzn  of  jus 
constztutzonzs, 115. 
Quotes  Inst~tutos  saying that all 
men were born free,  119. 
Pol~t~cally  organised  society  not 
prim~tive,  147,  144. 
Origlns of  canon law, 178. 
Canon law not to be ~dent~fied  w~th 
jus naturale, 179. 
Place  of  custom  in  canon  law, 
179 
Relation  of  authoi~ty  of  Fathers 
and b~shopz,  180 
F~rst  canonist  who  comments  on 
Donation  of  Constantine, 210. 
He ~nterprets  it as meanlng  that 
Pope ha3 all political author~ty  1x1 
the West, 211, 212 
He holds that Donat1011 overr~des 
the pr~rlciple  that Pontiff  should 
not assume royal  rights,  21 1 
Paulus, ancient ~urlst- 
"  In  omn~bus qu~dem,  maxlme 
tamen in  jure, requitas spectanda 
est,"  15 
HIS nhrase. " Jus ~lur~bus  modis 
n's 
Relation of individuals and magls- 
trates, 57. 
Pescatore,  Professor  G.,  his  work  on 
Irnenus, 8, 17. 
Peter, First Eplstle of  St- 
His phrase on sacred character of 
secular authority, cited by Deus- 
ded~t,  147. 
Theory that Peter and his successor 
recaved  from  Christ  authority 
over temporal as sell as sp~i~tual 
k~ngdom,  200, 206 209. 
'  Petn  Except~ones Legum  Roman 
orum '- 
A legal work antecedent to or in 
dependent of  school of  Bologna 
6. 
Asserts that he w~ll  set aslde laws 
useless or contrary to  cequztas, 14. 
Judge  may have to mod~fy  c~vil  or 
canon laws  for special reasons, 
14 
Canon  laws  of  greater  authority 
than civ~l  laws,  14 (note 4). 
C~vil  law cannot ~n ordmary cases 
abrogate jus  natumle, but does 
do so ~n certain cascs,  33. 
Custom has force of  law, 52. 
Canons  of  first  four  general 
counclls have force  of  law,  80 
Seems  to mean  that canons  can 
abrogate civ~l  laws, 80 (note l), 
231. 
CIVI~  cases  between  clergy  and 
laity  go  to  b~shop  unlesq  he 
cannot  or  will  not  dec~de,  82. 
Civil cases treated  by  bishop  not 
subject to appeal,  87. 
Suitors In secular cases suspecting 
the  judge  may  demand  that 
bishop  should  s~t  w~th  him, 88. 
Phillp of  Suabia . D~sputed  elect~on  to 
emplre, 217. 
P~ll~us,  c~vilian- 
HIS  d~scussion  of  lim~tation  of  the 
powers of  the emperor, 71. 
Emperor has plenajurzsdzctzo in h18 
matters, and Pope ~n  his, 78. 
Placentinus- 
Founder  of  law  school  at Mont- 
pellier,  8 
Definit~on  of  csquztas ,8. 
D~scussion  of  cequztas and justztza, 
10. 
Quotes  defin~tions  of  just~ce  by 
Plato, CIL~~O,  and Ulpian,  10. 
Justice  a qual~ty  of  w~ll.  10. 
Jus  flows  from  justice  "quaez 
rzvulus  ex fonte,"  13,  14, 24. 
D~scusses  nature  of  jus,  lea,  and 
jurzsprudentza,  24,  25 
Jus is that which  lex declares, lex 
1s the doclarat~on  of  jus, 24, 25 
Accents tr~part~te  defii~~t~on  of  pn- INDEX  INDEX  271 
Holds that all laws contrary to  jua 
natur zle  are mvahd, 32 
Quotes Florent~nus  on l~berty  and 
equal~ty  of  men  38 
Sums  up prov~s~ons  of  Inst~tutes  on 
l~m~tat~on  of  r~ghts  of  masters 
over slaves,  37 
The man who lr~lls  111s slave IS l~able 
to same pumshment as ~f  he had 
k~lled  a freeman, 37 
A slave 111  treated beyond  reason 
able measure to be compulsor~ly 
sold, 37 
Azo says that Placentlnus held that 
a  man pun~sh~ng  Ins slave  was 
llable to be  pun~shed,  38 
Holds that the ascqzptztzus 1s kber, 
though sewus glebce, 39. 
By JW  naturale all property 1s com 
mon, 44 
Custom has no longer force of  law, 
for Roman  people  have  tram 
ferred  tlie~r  author~ty  to  the 
empe~or,  60,  65,  66 
Prlnce must not orda~n  laws con 
trary to that of  God or nature, 
78 
Plato- 
Defin~t~on  of  just~ce quoted  by 
Placentmus,  10 
HIS  pr~nclple of  commur~~ty  of 
goods  referred  to  by  Grat~an, 
137 
Pollt~cal  Author~ty- 
Theory of  c~v~l~ans  as to ~ts  source, 
56 75 
Founded upon natural relat~ons  be 
tween the unzverrstas or populus 
and ~ts  members, 56 58, 252 
The emperor, according to Placon 
t~nus,  the vzcarzus of  the Roman 
people, 58. 
All  c~v~l~ans  lecognlse  that  the 
autllor~ty  of  the emperor IS  de 
nved from  the people,  58,  59, 
262 
Azo holds that th~s  1s true also of 
the Senate  59 
Quest~on  whether  Roman  people 
had surrendered all tho~r  power 
to emperor,  or st~ll  retamed ~ts 
author~ty  and could  resume  ~t, 
59 67, 252 
Irnenus,  Placent~nus,  and  Roger 
rna~ntarn  that the custom of  the 
people  has no longer leglslat~ve 
author~ty,  GO,  61 
D~scuss~on  of  th~s  ~n  D~ssent~onos 
Dommorum,  61 63 
Azo  holds  that  custom  st~ll  has 
force of  law,  63,  64 
And  that Roman people  has  not 
abdloated  ~ts  authority,  and 
could recla~m  ~t,  64 
Hugol~nus domes  that  Roman 
people transferred them author 
~ty  to emperor ~n such a  ~enie 
that  they ceased to  possess ~t,  66, 
66 
He holds that the people  created 
the emperor a procurator ad hoc, 
65, 66 
Bulgarus  and Jo Bass~anus  hold 
that universal custom st~ll  ahro 
gates law, 65, 66 
Div~s~on  of  oplnlon among civ~hans 
as to need  of  consultmg  Senate 
for leg~slat~on,  67 70 
Some  c~vll~ans  mainta~n that 
Senate reta~ns  power of  mak~ng 
laws, 70 
Limltat~ons  on  author~ty  of  em 
peror,  70 72 
Relat~on  of  emperor to pr~vate  pro 
perty, 72 74 
Its  relation to eccles~ast~cal  author 
~ty  as treated by clvll~ans,  76 91 
Is accordmg to c~vlhans  sacred  for 
fear of  God is the founda,tion of 
law, 76, 77  251 
The system of  d~v~ne  jus more ex- 
alted than the human, 77 
Theory of  canomsts v  ~th  regard to 
~ts  nature, 147 152 
They  are  rleai  that ~t is  sacred 
and der~ved  from God,  145 148, 
251 
Thew theory founded upon the Gel 
asian doctr~ne,  147, 148 
Fheory  that  emperor  was  not 
str~ctly  a  layman, 148,  149 
Its  funct~on  is  to  set  forward 
lust~ce,  150 
An  eril  author~ty  does  not  pro 
perly represent God's authority, 
159, 151 
Treatment  of  relatlon  of  Church 
and Stato by civ~l~ans  and canon 
~sts See  under  Church  and 
State 
Pompon~us,  59 
Pope- 
Accord~ng  to P~llms,  has plenztudo 
pqtestatzs in  d~v~ne  matters,  as 
Lmperor has ~n secular, 78 
Place of  Letters (of Popes) in canon 
law, 94 
HIS  leg~slat~ve  authority  See 
under  Decretals 
Not  hound  by  canons  though  110 
generally obeys them, accordmg 
to Grat~an,  172 
Phraso  regard~ng  emperors leg~s 
lat~vo  author~ty  transferred  to 
Pope by Gratian,  174, 175 
Legzbus  eccleszastzczs  solutus  ut 
grznceps  czztlzbus,  accordmg  to 
tophen, 189 
HIS secular authonty  See under 
Church and State 
Populus  the  source  of  all  pol~t~cal 
powc~,  56 67 
Pragense, Fragmentum- 
Anonymous treat~so  antecedent to 
or  independent  of  school  of 
Bologna,  7,  8 
Its defin~t~on  of  cequztas and ~ts  re 
Iat~on  to just~ce  and )us,  and 
tbe~r  relation  to God,  7,  R 
Definit~on  of  just~ce,  9, 10 
Jast~ce  perfect In God,  10, 21,  22 
Just~ce  1s  In  men  per  partzeopa 
tzonem,  10  21,  22 
Jus  d~fferent from  lust~ce, for 
just~ce  1s con-tant, juq  var~ahle, 
13, 22 
Custom recogn~sed  as law, 52 
Pragmat~c  Sanct~on  Defined  by  the 
L~hellus  de Verbis  Legalibns  and 
by Aro,  67 
Pmvslegza- 
Condit~ons under  wh~ch these 
could be granted by the emperor, 
70 
Cond~tions  under wlnch  they may 
be giantod by Pope, 172, 173 
Procurator ad hoc  lhls  the pos~tlon  of 
the emperor, accordmg to Hugollnns, 
6  5 
Property- 
Theory of  the c~v~llans,  41 49 
The theory of  ~t ~n anc~ent  jur~sts 
and Christian Fathers, 41 
Medmval  c~vll~ans  perhaps  ~n 
fluenced  by both,  41,  42 
Belongs  to jus  natura'e,  accord 
lng to Gualcausus, to ' L~bellus 
de  Verh~s  Legallbus,'  and  the 
'  Brachylogus,' 42, 43 
Irnenus  (in  Glosses)  holds  that 
there IS no pr~vate  property by 
jus naturale, 43 
Irnorlus  (~n  '  Summa  Trecensis  ) 
speak4  of  naturalzs  guru  do 
mtnzum  and  of  naturalzs  pos 
sesszo,  43,  44 
Ant~~u~ssimorqm  Glossatorum 
Dlstinct~ones  speaks  of  pos 
sesszo as czvzbs and naturalzs, 44 
Joannes Bass~anus  speaks of  th~ngs 
wh~ch  are common property  as 
underjur naturale przmcevum, 4 1 
Placent~nus  holds that by jus nut 
urale all thmgs are common, 44 
Roger  holds that a th~ng  may be 
possessed by one man underjus 
naturale,  and by  another under 
gus gentzum or czvzle, 46 
Azo s treatment of  subject d~fficult 
to interpret, 45 47 
Hugolmus says that prescnpt~on  IS 
contrary to natural ceqzrztas,  but 
In accordance m~th  civil oequztas, 
48 
Accurs~us  Qays  that some held that 
property belongs to jus naturale, 
and that communza means corn 
munzcanda  he  himself  holds 
that ~t  belongs tojuu rlentzunb, 48 
Treatment of  subject by canon~sts, 
110 113, 136 142 
They all hold that by ?us naturals 
all things are common,  130 142 
Private propertv the creat~on  of the 
State, 137, 138 
It 1s  not  qlnful, though  ~t arlms 
froin sln,  137,  138 
Accord~ng  to Stephcu  ~t IS  sanc- 
t~oned  by canon law, wh~cli  has 
been  made  by  men,  but  w~th 
God s ~nsp~rat~on  139 
L~mltat~ons  upon r~ghts  of pr~vate 
property  connected  wlth  thebe 
pilnclples,  140, 141 
St  Tl~omas  Aqumas goes further In 
drawlng thls out than theeanon 
~sts,  142 
Pseudo Isidore  Place ln formation of 
canon law, 94 
Ravenna, traces of  law scllool at, 6 
Regrno  of  Prum,  canoinst  of  tenth 
century- 
Bishop  must  not  emanclpate 
Church  slaves  w~thout  paylng 
compensat~on,  120 
Abbots must not emanclpate slaves 
of  monastery, 120 
Slave  cannot  be  orda~ned  unless 
emanc~pated,  123 
Blshop know~ngly  orda~nmg  slave 
without  h16  masters  consent 
must pay double compensat~on, 
124 
Cltes  phrase  of  Theodosran  Code 
that slave famil~es  must not be 
separated, 130, 131 
Marr~age  of  slaves of  d~fferent  mas 
ters,  mthout the masters'  con- 
sent, void,  131,  132 
Church  as  sanctuary  for  slaves, 
133 
Proh~bits  k~dnapplng  and sale  of 
Chr~stlans  to heathen. 134 
Manum~ss~on  a mer~tor~ous  act, 134 
C~tes  canon  lmposlng  very  m~ld 
penance on man in want who has 
stolen,  142 
C~tes  canon  anathemat~smg  those 
who rebel agamst the lung, 146 
Cvll oaths must not be kept, 202 
Results of  oxcommunicat~on,  203 
Does not clto Donatlon of  Constall 
t~no,  209 
Bishop  to  defend  the  oppressed, 
and to donounce oppressor to the 
lrmg  239 
Roger, c~v~l~an- 
The first part of  the concept~on  of 
just~ce  IY to fear God, and maln 
taln one s parents, 20 
The secontl allows a man to return 
blow for blow, 20 
Th~s  lr  mjustlce  In  ~tself, but 
~ustlce  as  compared  w~th  un 
provoked  aggression,  20 
A man may have property by jus 
naturale, 45. INDEX  INDEX. 
The Roman people have no longer 
the  leg~slat~ve  author~ty, for 
they  have  surrendered  thls  to 
emperol,  60.  61 
The  dlvine  jus  qnper~or to  the 
human,  77 
C~vll  proceed~ngs by  one  clonc 
against  another  go  before  the 
bishop,  82 
C~vll  proceed~ngs between  clerlc 
andlayman belong to the  blshop, 
but layman  not  satisfied  with 
iudgment  can have recourse  to 
secular  court,  82,  83 
Cr~mlnal  procoed~ngs  against clerlc 
go to secular court, but ~t can 
not punish h~m  till degraded by 
blshop,  85. 
Roman Law- 
Represents  one  of  the  older  ele 
ments In mediaeval clv~hsat~on,  2 
Quostlon as  to extent  of  the  system 
atlc studv of  ~t  In earlier M~ddlo 
Ages, 6  " 
'  Petrl Exceptlones ' and the worhs 
contalned  In  Flttlng's  '  Tu1i5 
tlsche Schriften des fruhelon Mit 
telalters ' as ~llustratlng  thls, b 
The people the only source of  p01 
lt~cal  author~ty,  56 
The  vlace  of  this  In  canon  law. 
94,- 96 
Romans,  Ep~stle  to,  clted  on  sacred 
character  of  secular government  by 
Cardlnal  Deusdedlt,  147 
Rome  Poss~ble  survlval of  law school 
there during early  Mlddle  Ages,  6 
Rufinus, canonist of  lfth century- 
Commentator on- 
D~scusses  jus naturale, 103 113 
Repudiates  leqtsttea  tradztzo -z  e , 
Ulpian's definlt~on  of  jus naturale 
as an~mal  instinct, 103, 104 
Analysls  of  jus  naturale  as com 
mands,  prohlb~tlons, and  dc 
monst~atlons,  103 
Power ofjus naturale d~mln~shed  by 
Fall,  restored In  part by DOCR 
logue, completoly by Gospel, 106, 
i  n7  --. 
Holy  Scr~pture  = znstztuta  natur 
alza. 107 
All  laws  contrary to natural  law 
vold, 107 
Dlspensat~ons from  natural  law 
void,  save  when  man  has  to 
choose  between  two ev~ls,  108 
How, tl~en,  is it that parts of  the 
"law "  are  abrogated ?  109, 
110 
How, then, is part of  natural law 
abrogated  ?  110 113, 169 
Property and slavery contrary to 
gus  nuturale,  111 
Certain cond~t~ons  contrarv to ?us 
naturale  In  letter,  buf;  really 
fulfil  it,  111,  112,  117,  120  1 
Jus qentzum and the beginnings of 
humzn socletles,  115, 116 
Church  retams rlghts  over  slaves 
even when emancipated,  123 
Prlvate person emanc~pating  slave 
for ordmation retains no rights, 
123 
On-&ve  ordalned wlthont master's 
knowledge, 124 127 
Pr~vate  property  contrary to de 
monstratzo  of  qus  naturale. 138 
Pr~vatc  proper~y Justlfiabi~, as 
tcnding  to reallse jus  naturale, 
138, 139 
D~scusses  St Augustine's  vlew  of 
luuurv of  rich.  141 
Pol~ticai  soelety 'bepan  with  ni~m 
rocl  and In  ~nlqnlty,  144 
Mentlons theory that emperor was 
not str~ctly  a  layman,  149 
An  evll  author~ty  permitted  by 
God but has not sanction of  God, 
150 
Repeats  Gratian's  vlew  that  all 
law 1s  really  custom,  156,  157 
Custom  only  abrogates  clvll  law 
with consent  of  emperor,  canon 
law w~th  consent  of  Pope,  157, 
187 
Samo  pos~t~on  as  one  school  of 
clvillanq,  157 
rreatmont of  theoiy of  canon law, 
180 193 
Class~ficatlon of  canons according 
to sources,  182 
Proh~bltlons  of  the four great coun 
rils and of  tl o Apostohc Canons 
cannot  be  abrogated, 182, 183 
What the counc~ls  perm~t  may be 
changed, 183 
Treatment of  proejudzcztzo  by cus 
tom, 186 
Treatment  of  dispensation,  190 
192 
Treatment of  obligation  of  oaths, 
205 
Oath of  allegiance  void  ~f  person 
excommunicate, 205 
Oath of  alleg~ance  void 11  person in 
office is canonically or legally de 
posed,  205 
Elaborate  comment on passage In 
Gratlan on Peter and hls succes 
sors  havlng  recelved  temporal 
and spiritual klngdom, 206, 207 
Quotes  phrase  about  transfer  of 
emplre  from  Byzantium  to 
Constantlnovle.  but  does  not 
speak  of   ona at ion,  212 
Secular laws regarding eccles~ast~cal 
aifalrs void, 227 
Dlstlnction  between  eccleslast~cal 
laws,  mera and mzxta, 230 
Secular  authority  cannot  annul 
mera, 230 
Agrees w~th  Grat~an's  treatment of 
exempt~on  of  clergy from secular 
~ur~sdiction  ~n clvil and orlminal  Severe condemnation of  those who 
cases, 235  fly from their master or encour 
The Pope 1s not sublect to temporal  age this, 122 
power, but all bishops and clergy  I  Ordlnatlon of  the slave, 122 127 
are subject, 237, 238  I  Uncertainty of  G~atian  S  pantion 
about o~dlnation  ot onscrzptatzus, 
Sanctuary- 
Churches as sanctnanes according 
to clv~llans,  38 
Churches as sanctuaries according 
to canonists,  132 114 
Scrlptnres, Holy- 
Relation of  these to law, 78 80 
Their place in canon law, 94 
Senato- 
Azo's statement that it consisted of 
one hundred members, who were 
originally elected by the people, 
59 
Laws  according  to somc  civ~llans 
can  only  be  made  w~th  its 
coun~el  and consent, 64,, 67  70 
D~bscnsiones Domlnorum  (Cod 
Cliisianus) says that some held 
that  Senate  could  stlll  mahe 
laws,  70 
S~rmond,  Constitution of- 
Permits elther party to a su~t,  even 
wlthout  consent  of  tl~c  other 
party,  to take  tho  case  to the 
blshop,  219 222,  239,  240 
A genninc law of  Constantme, but 
repealed,  as  some  think,  by 
Arcadlus and Hononus, 222, 240 
Its renewal  by  Charlemagne  as 
sorted by spurlons capitulary of 
Benedlctus Levlta, 222,  240 
Blavery- 
Treatment of  thls by clvillans, 34- 
40 
All  civilians agree  that lt is con 
trary to jus  naturale,  34,  35 
Opinions of  Bulgarus, 36 
Clvlllan5 restate and In somo meas 
ure  amplify  the  l~rnltat~ons  of 
aiiclent law on right of  thc master 
over the slave, 37 
Clvllians  iecogn~se  Church  as 
place of  qanctuary for slaves, 38 
Treatment of  ord~nat~on  of  slaves, 
38, 39 
Treatment by the clvil~ans  of  tho 
rclation  of  the  ascrrptztzus  to 
slavcrv,  39,  40 
Cont~ary to  the  jus  naturale, 
according to all canonists,  111 
113, 117 
Treatment of  the whole subiect by 
canonists,  117 135 
Them concept~on  rolatod to that of 
equal~ty  of  men  as Gocl s  ch~l 
dren,  118 
Slavery a consequence of  sln,  but 
lawful, 119, 120 
Illustration of  ~ts  lawfulness In fact 
that tl~o  Church was ltself often 
a slavel~olclcr,  120 122 
128  129 
llitig ltion of  cond~t~on  of  slavery, 
129 134 
Repetition  by  some  canonists  of 
rule  of  Theodo51an  codc  pro 
hib~ting separat~on of  slave 
fam~lies,  130 
Important canons about marriage 
of  slaves,  131, 132 
Churches as sanctuaries, 132 134 
Canons forbidding kidnapping, 134 
Church loobed upon emancipat~o~l 
as an act~on  acceptable to God 
134, 135 
State  See under P  litlcal author~ty 
Stcphen of  ~ournal{canonlst  of  twelfth 
century+ 
Commentator on Gratian, 104. 
The jus naturale has many senses, 
compare Azo, 104, 105 
Follows  Rufinus  In  div~dlng  jus 
naturale Into commands, proh~bi 
tions, and demonstratzones, 1 11 
Slavery introduced by jus gentzum, 
contra~  y to  thc  demonstratzones of 
jus naturale, 11  3,  117 
D~scusses  reception  of  slave  lnto 
monastery wlthout master s per- 
misslon,  128 
Property contrary to demonstratzo 
of  jus naturale, 179 
Property sanctioncd by jus canon 
um  wh~ch  1s mad0 by men, with 
God's lnsplratlon, 139 
Treatmcnt of  theory of  canon law, 
180 192 
Speaks of  gus dzuznum, vel canonz- 
cum, yuod  dzz~znum  est,  181 
Sprahs  of  jus  cunonum,  quod  ab 
homznzbuv quamvzs tamen deo zn 
spzmnte, 181 
Dchnes  D~creta  as  decrees  glven 
by  Pope  In  presence  and  w~th 
authonty of  card~nals,  18 t 
Decretalzs epzstolu, a letter wr~tten 
to bishop  or ecclesiast~cal  judgo 
m  ho has asked Pope s adv~ce,  184 
Says Pope alone has lcg~slat~ve  au 
thority, 188 
Thls state~nent  does not agree wlth 
other passages,  188 
Pope is legzbus eccleszastzczs solutus 
ut  prznceps czvzlzbus, 189 
His  ~mportant re statement  of 
Gelas~us  theo~y  of  the  two 
author~tles  of  Church and State, 
198. 225 
Mentlons theory that Pope does not 
absolve a man from his oath, but 
declares he 1s already absolved, 
202 INDEX. 
Cautlous  treatment  of  statement 
that Pope has recelved authonty 
over temporal as  well as spiritual 
klngdom, 208 
Agrees with Gratlan regarding ex 
emptlon of  clerics from civil and 
crimlnal courts, 235 
Refers  to  dlsputed  questlon 
whether  laymen  could  appeal 
In  secular  cases  to the  Pope, 
241 
A man may be excommunicate be 
fore  God  and  not  before  the 
Church, or before the Church and 
not before God, 248 
Stoics-e  g, Seneca  and  Pos~donlus 
Their theory of  orlgln of  pollt~cal  au 
thority  reproduced  by  Fathers  and 
canonlsts,  143,  146,  252 
Summa  Colonlensls  The  Pope  is 
"  verus  ~mperator,"  224 
Summa  Parlslensls  The  Pope  1s 
"  verus ~mperator,"  and the emperor 
hls vlcar, 224 
Summa  Trecensis-d~scuss~on  of  au 
thorsh~p See under  Irner~us,  8 
Telesphorus,  Pope  HIS rule  as  to 
fastlng  c~ted  by  Gratian  as  an 
example of  a law void,  because  not 
accepted  by  custom  of  those  con 
cerned, 156, 166 
Testament,  New  Teaches  porfect 
justice  1s  to turn the other cheek to 
the smlter, 19, 20 
Testament, Old  Teaches an Imperfect 
justice, that  men may oppose vlolence 
to vlolence, but prepares the way for 
the perfect,  19, 20 
Teutonl~  trad~tion- 
Its  poss~ble influence  on  the 
civ~llans 69.  70 
Its  political theory, 75 
Theodos~an  Code- 
Provision that slave famllles must 
not be separated, 130 
Punlshes w~th  death kidnappers of 
children. 134 
Theodoslus and Valentlnlan- 
lhelr constitution on the form of 
le&lslat~on  with consent  of  Sen 
ate,  68. 
Dlscusslon of  the authority of  thls 
constitution, 67 70 
Theodoslus, Emperor  Law attributed 
to hlm, 219 222, 239, 240 
Tithes- 
According to anclent canons, to be 
divlded  into  four  parts-for 
blshop,  clergy, rcpalrs of  church 
buildings, and poor,  17 1 
Questlon whether Pope could altcr 
thls, 171 
Ulpian- 
HIS defimtlon of  J ustlce,  8,  10 
"  Jus est ars boni et requl,"  22 
Difficulty  of  relat~ng  his defin~tlon 
to phrase of  Paulus (q  U  ),  22, 24 
Tripartite definition of  prlvatc law 
accepted by  all medmval cl\ 11 
lans  28 
Defin~tlon  of  natural law as anlma 
~nstinct,  29 
Doubtful  ~f thls  was  his  normal 
VICW,  29 
Clvlllans  sornetlnles  accept  this 
v~ew,  29,  30 
Phrases  on  slavery  accepted  by 
c~v~llans,  34,  36,  36 
We have no knowledge of  h~s  vlew 
of  relatlon of  prlvate property to 
3us naturale  41 
Untuersltas  Origin of  political author 
ity  In  the  natu~al  relat~on  of  the 
unzverstlas  to ~ts  members,  66 58 
Urban I,  Pope, 172 
Usury  Co~ltrary  to law  of  God,  but 
may  be  allowed  by  emperor  on 
account of  pract~cal  needs of  woild, 
79 
Valentinlan  I , Emperor  Clted  by 
Innocent I11  as saylng that he  was 
prepared to submat hlmself  to ludg 
ment of  bishop, 219, 220 
Vlrar  Emperor  called  God's  vlcar In 
letter of  I'opo  Anastaslus I1 ,  clted by 
Ivo, 146 
W111  Justlce regarded as  quality of  the 
will, 7  11 
Zos~mus  I,  Pope.  172, 173. 
THE END. 
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